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ABSTRACT 
Before oil discovery and exploitation, industry in Qatar 
took the form of artisanal activities and traditional crafts. Since 
the 1960's industry has become modernised, complex and diverse in 
type and scale. This thesis explores the trends in industrial 
development in Qatar between 1950 and 1980, analyses and evaluates 
current industrial structure and possible future developments. 
The thesis is organised into ten Chapters~ The first three 
describe the parameters, including physical and human resources, 
within which the process of industrialisation has occurred and 
may develop. The evaluation of industrial policy, the relevance 
of standard theories of industrialisation and an examination of the 
role of government are next considered. Chapters 5 and 6 contain 
field-work based analyses of the complete inventory of manufacturing 
industries, public and private, large and small-scale and industrial 
linkages. This leads to an examination of industrial locations 
in Qatar. Chapters 8 and 9 are devoted to two themes of fundamental 
importance, viz. decision-making, investment and management at 
various levels and secondly, dependency on foreign labour. The 
judgement arrived at in the Conclusion is that the future for viable 
and socio-culturally appropriate industries, whether in a national, 
regional or international context, lies not in the expansion of 
basic industries but rather in typologically innovative manufacturing 
processes. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND OF THE STATE OF QATAR 
Qatar, an independent Arab country, occupies a small peninsula 
and several very small islands located in the Arabian Gulf mid-way 
between the head of the Gulf and the Straits of 1-Iormuz. At the 
neck of the peninsula is Saudi Arabia. Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran are Qatar's seaward neighbours. Qatar's 
territory has an area of approximately 10,600 sq.km. (l) and contains 
a population of about a quarter of a million. 
Qatar attained full national sovereignty from Great Britain 
on 3rd September 1971. On 11th and 16th September 1971 it became 
a member of both the Arab League and the United Nations respectively. 
Qatar, before that, was a member of the Organisation of Petrolet@ 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) from 1961 and from 1970 a member of the 
Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). 
Oil was discovered in 1939 and the production started in 1949. 
The oil revenues, as will be seen in the proceeding Chapters, w"~""e 
responsible for transferring Qatar from an almost unknown underdevelopcd 
country to a semi-developed or modern one. Oil production and export, 
as will be seen in Chapter 5, will continue to be by far the most 
important sector of Qatar's economy. Figure 1.1 shows that although 
the oil sector provides only a small share in overall employment it 
is, and has been, the principal contributor to the national Gross 
Domestic Product. 
If actual government revenue and expenditure arc considered 
the oil sector's contrihut.ion hccomcs cvcn l'·'·e;tter. 'l';tldt: 1.1 IH.:Iow 
shows de:.trJy that the uil revenues during U9S- 11\01 /\.11. 
') 
-L-
(c.a. 1975 - 81 A.D.) were the source of not less than 89 per cent 
of the total government revenues. 
Table 1.1 Actual Government Revenue & Expenditure (1395 H- 1401 H.) 
(In Mill ion QR) 
1395 1396 1397 1398 1399 I 1400 1401 
Total Revenues 7,135 8,927 8,154 8,225 12,090 19,004 19,243 
of which oil 
revenues 6,623 8,020 7,458 7, 421 11 '220 17,454 17,189 
Total 
114 '743 Expenditure 4,433 5,809 7,318 6,472 8,273 10,937 
I of which capital 
expenditure on 
minor and major 
projects 1,209 2,034 3,022 2,536 2,430 3,260 
Surplus 2,702 3,118 836 1,753 3,817 8,067 I I I 
Source Central Statistical Organization, Annual Statistical Abstract 
1981, T.l49, p.215. 
3,620 
4,500 
In non-oil GOP as illustrated in Figure 1.2, all sectors have had 
a general growth trend but with varying rates. The average growth rate 
of the manufacturing industrial sector was 24.6 per cent per annum. This 
rate of growth would have been much greater if the NGL plant had not 
been destroyed in 1977. The government services sector also rose sharply 
with an average growth rate of 25.0 per cent per annum. 
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
This study, of Qatar's industrial development, has several aims 
and objectives to achieve: 
1. /\part from a relatively few government statisti r.:s, there has 
hccn no a!!alytical study of what industries there arc in <)atar and 
1vhat their characteristics arc. This being the case it was felt 
r 
' 
: 
: 
! 
I 
I 
i 
I 
Fig. 1.1 Fig. 1.2 
Employment and G. D.P. by Sectors (1980) Non-Oil G.D.P. at Current Prices (1975-80) 
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to be crucial that a first pioneering study should be undertaken. As 
will be seen, this most important element of Qatar's development 
programmes does provide a base for further studies on specialised 
aspects of industrialization in Qatar. 
2. To identify and throw light on the manufacturing and extractive 
industrial sectors and specifically their development trends over 
the last thirty years (1950-1980). 
3. The analysis of each field of industry separately so as to 
shmv the structure of manufacturing industries in Qatar. 
4. To analyse the process of industrialization and the role 
of government in its development. 
5. To show how the demand on non-indigenous technology has had 
consequential socio-economic problems, especially that of dcpcnJcncc 
on a foreign labour force in industrial development. 
6. To throw light on the national industrialization policy and 
strategy which Qatar has been following. 
7. To evaluate, in economic terms, the existing industries and 
their future prospects. 
DATA SOURCES 
The author paid several visits to Qatar, two for detailed field 
work while an additional three were spent on data elicitation. The 
data sources obtained from these visits can be classified as follows: 
1. Statistical data and literature 
Largely obtained from governmental bodies and agencies; the 
author also collected various books and reports published by indiv-
iduals and working groups. These are all generally accessible for 
-4-
anyone (even though not centrally stored) and are noted in the 
Bibliography. 
2. Primary sources 
These sources can be categorized into: 
a) Special reports produced for the author of the thesis by various 
governmental bodies and agencies, as well as joint stock companies. 
These reports are mostly confidential and given to the author on 
condition that no third party is allowed to have direct access to them 
and that they should be used only for the purpose of this thesis. 
b) Feasibility studies and other similar reports. 
Although these reports are classified as highly confidential, 
fortunately the author succeeded in obtaining some of those which are 
related directly to industrial development in general and specific 
manufacturing establishments in particular. 
c) Interviews. 
The author was given special interviews by leading responsible 
individuals, in both private and public sectors, in which opinions 
were expressed and information given. These interviews, wherever 
possible, will be referred to as Personal Communications with the 
source, but in some cases the author cannot make direct attribution. 
3. Field work 
Field investigation was of two types: 
First : The search in almost every governmental body and 
agency with special concentration on : 
a) Commercial Registry Department of the Ministry of t:conomy and 
Commerce. The search in this department enabled the obtaining of a 
great deal of information about industrial establishments existing 
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now, or in the past, in Qatar. This information mainly concerned 
medium and small-scale manufacturing establishments, the specific 
data being : the name, legal status, location, issued capital by 
nationality (Qatari, non-Qatari and partnerships of both), date of 
start-up and other notes concerning the establishments. 
b) Statistical Department of the Ministry of the Interior. The 
author, with the help of this department, was able to obtain the 
necessary data concerning the non-Qatari population in the country. The 
information was categorized into occupational groups i.e. labourers, 
technicians, etc. and, at the same time, classified as holding new 
or renewed residential visas, Without this information the labour 
force question would not have been possible to analyse. 
The search in the above-mentioned departments and others was 
conducted only to allow greater depth in the analysis of industries 1n 
Qatar and their development. 
Lastly, the Questionnaire: It was essential for the study of 
the private sector to design a questionnaire (see Appendix 1.1) both 
to obtain data on, and to achieve an understanding of, the various 
elements of the function of the establishments. The personal carrying 
out of the field investigation involved enabled the author to extend 
the information search beyond the topics listed. This survey was 
essentially a random one because of the small size of some particular 
groups and because the author had, on some occasions, to usc his own 
judgement in selecting responsible respondents to ensure the accuracy 
of replies. The situation was confused during fieldwork by other field 
surveys being carried out by the Industrial Development Technical 
Centre (IDTC) and the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO). In the 
judgement of the author it was considered inappropriate to use the 
.. 
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data obtained by questionnaire to complex statistical manipulation but 
rather to utilise them to clarify and improve the value of other data. 
MAJOR RESEARCH DIFFICULTIES 
The author faced several research difficulties which can be 
summarized as follows: 
a) Apart from government statistics, there are few studies carried 
out on Qatar as a whole and none on the industrial sector of the 
country. 
b) Even government statistics, in some cases, when published by 
different bodies do not agree with each other and proved insufficient 
to meet the requirement of this study. Therefore, most of the tables 
and figures are compiled after considerable revision by the author. 
c) The author had spent a great deal of time in translating official 
statements, laws and decrees which concern industry. Although great 
efforts were made to make the translation convey the specific meaning 
in English of the Arabic texts of these laws and statements, the 
original texts remain the ultimate authority. 
d) The language barrier appeared considerable especially with 
those individuals who did not understand either Arabic or English. 
These barriers usually exist within some of the small-scale industrial 
sectors which are owned and run by ethnically non-Arabs, mainly 
Iranians and Indians. These barriers were in most cases, overcome 
by inviting a third party to translate. 
THE LAY OUT OF THE STUDY 
The study is divided :into ten Chapters. ChajJtcr 1 contains 
this brief introduction to the State and the contribution of oil 
and other sectors to the GOP. Also in this Chapter have been stated 
the objectives, data sources and other characteristics of this thesis. 
Chapter 2 is devoted to an examination of relevant physical 
features and natural resources. That is to show the availability of 
industrial raw materials and to explain some influences on industrial 
trends and to explain why Qatar has felt it necessary to adopt an 
industrialization strategy. Apart from the availability of capital, 
the human resources in any country, including Qatar, play a vital 
role in the development process. This is why Chapter 3 deals with 
human resources and education levels, as well as the relationship beh'een 
demand and supply of the labour force in Qatar. In the conclusion of 
Chapter 3 an attempt is made to design an approach to training which the 
government could adopt to make maximum use of the available Qatari force 
which simply cannot supply all of the industrial sector's demand for 
labour. 
Chapter 4, on Industrial Development in Qatar - Policies and 
Institutions, is devoted to examining the evDlution of industrialization 
strategy, in comparison to some of the existing industrialization theories 
and models. This leads to the formulation by the author of a suitable 
model which could be applied to Qatar and/or any of the Arab Gulf 
States. Chapter 4 goes on to examine government's role and intervention 
in the industrialization process. 
Chapter 5 examines the extractive industries i.e. oil, natural 
gas and others. This examination is extended to the evaluation of 
production/reserves of the vital two resources, namely the oil and 
natural gas. 
In Chapter 6 processing and manufacturing industries are 
discussed separately to show the structure of Qatar's manufacturing 
industries. The industries examined in this Chapter are : 1) oil 
refineries; 2) cement factory; 3) fishing industry; 4) flour mi.ll; 
5) chcm:ical fertilizers ullll 6) iron and steel complex. Attenbon is 
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also paid to current large scale development a~ well as to small scale 
industries. The evaluation of these industries was focussed on the 
emergence of the industry, the labour force, production and sales 
or consumption and an economic evaluation of each separate industry. 
Umm Said and the Industrial Estate of Doha are the main 
locations for manufacturing industries in Qatar and Chapter 7 is 
designed to examine the location of manufacturing industries in these 
areas. The discussion illuminates government policy toward these 
two areas, site preparation and the infrastructure provided by the 
government. 
The successful implementation of industrialization policies 
and the development of each separate industry depend heavily on 
decision-makirig, capital investment and management. Chapter 8 focuses 
on these vital elements in relation to public, Ministry and private 
sectors. 
In Chapter 9 the dependency on the foreign labour force for 
industrial development will be analysed under four headings: 
a. Factors which cause the dependency 
b. Occupational structure of the imported labour force 
c. Occupational distribution of Qataris and non-Qataris 
d. The impact of the foreign labour force 
Chapter 10, the conclusion, contains a summary of the discussions 
and concluding statements. The Gulf Coopcrati ve Council (GCC) and the 
Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consulting (GOIC) are also examined 
in Chapter 10. 
-9-
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CHAPTER 2 
PHYSICAL FEATURES AND NATURAL RESOURCES 
INTRODUCTION 
Many trends of industrial development are strongly influenced 
by the availability of the natural resources. This chapter is 
devoted to an examination of the physical features and associated 
natural resources of Qatar. 
2.1 MINERAL RESOURCES AND GEOLOGY 
The mineral resources of Qatar, exploited and potential, are 
determined by the geology of the country. The full potential of 
some of these deposits,particularly in their value as industrial 
raw materials, has not yet been realised, either as to quantity or 
possible utility. 
Qatar Petroleum Company (QPC) (see Chapter 5, Oil Inuustry) 
was very active in the field of geological investigation but because 
its attention was focussed mainly on hydrocarbons in general and oil 
specifically, QPC paid little attention to general geological 
findings. The government in 1970 invited C. Cavalier of the Bureau 
de Recherches Geoligiques et Minist~res of France, to carry out a 
full geological survey of Qatar peninsula and its islands. (l) 
Another comprehensive investigation of Qatar's geology and mineral 
resources, other than oil, was made available in 1979 by Seltrust 
Engineering Ltd. of U.K. Scltrust supplied the government with nine 
volumes of reports. (2) 
For the purposes of this thesis attention will be limited to 
stratigraphy rather than extended to questions of structure. The 
peninsula surface is covered by rock which originated from the 
-11-
Cenozoic era (see Table 2.1). The Cenozoic era contains several 
formations such as Umm Er Rhaduma, Rus, Dammam, Dam and Hofuf. The 
relevance of these formations, beside their surface outcrops and 
their influence on the terrain is that they contain several mineral 
deposits which have not yet been fully exploited i.e. silt, clay, 
gypsum etc. (see Chapter 5, pp. 134-136). 
The Mesozoic era (200-70 million years old) is the most 
important element in the geological stratigraphy in Qatar, Within 
this structure lie the Shuaiba and Uwainat limestones and the Arab 
Zones Formation, which contain, beside other mineral deposits, the 
all-important oil and natural gas. The first commercial quantity 
of crude oil was discovered in 1940,in the Arab Formation of the 
upper Jurassic, at a depth of 1,733 metres, (3) The Khuff formation 
of Permian age was recognised as an oil and gas producing zone in 
1959 by QPC , but because of the large unassociated gas content, the 
Khuff formation was not utilized until the second half of the 
1970's (see Chapter 5 pp. 128-133). 
The limestone deposits of the Pleistocene and Middle Eocene 
era cover the whole of the peninsula but are of relatively small 
thickness, with the exception of the Umm Salal and Umm Bab areas. (4) 
The latter was selected as an industrial site of a cement making 
factory, 
Several geological investigations have proved that iron 
oxides (hematite and ochre) exist in Qatar's islands i.e. within 
Halul and Shra'auh. These deposits originated mainly from the 
Paleozoic era. Due to the high cost involved in the extraction and 
transportation of such deposits, most reports have recommended that 
they should be left unexploited for the time being. 
Table 2.1 
-
Age b.p. Formation Sub-fo:rm- Member and Desc:rip- Occur- Mineral Dep-
ation tion renee osits 
Rec- [Depression muds & Silts (3m) 9 Sabkha(16m) !gravels* sands* 
ent I Sand dunes etc. silt salts* 
Miliolite beds(20m) Limestones* 
--Sandy c!ay 9 sand- Gravel* 
~ofuf stones gravels Sand* 
"CC 
~ >. (lOrn) ro 
il) s Limestones 9 clays, UJ Gypsum* ,clay--il) ~ jUPper Dam ~ il)Lf") 
!Dam sand,gypsum(48m) u Celestite, il) UN u 0 I 
,-... 0 •rl N 11-'ower Dam Limestone,clay <t: Clay* . 
>. ·rl .-4 (30m) ~ ::2:'0... .-4 . 
·-u s 0:: Limestone* '-' 
·rl >. ~per Limestone and :::::> Dolomites If) 
0 H s Marls (14m) Cf.J Phosphatic ro il) il) Dammam pammam N il) 
.-4 ~0 Simsima dolomites >. 
"CC (!)If) 0 
"CC lbl I & Limestone ~ 
·rl 0 r--~ 0 ::2UJ""' (45m) •rl 
il).-4 
Dukhan Alveolina !Pyrite .-4 u ·rl Lower :z 1 imestones (lm) fttapulgite 
0 pammam Midra shales(lOm) hosphatic 
-r--
limestone (1. 2m) I L il) >. 
-i H ~ i il) il) s 
jcelesti te :;: u Rus Chalk (ab. 60m) Part OON 
o-JUJ\0 by sub I \Gypsum N 
If) sur-
face I 
!Pal a- Umm Er Rhaduma I 
~ocene ! 
Limestones,marl, 
~ret- Shuaiba shale sands Petroleum* 
~ceone Fm,etc. (ab. 13 OOm) UJ 
u >. 70 -
·rl u 
0 s 135m N <t: 00 ~ur- Uwainat limestone Dolostone, lime-fflO ~ Petroleum* il)N assic Arab Zones stone evapor-
::E I 0:: 
0 135- (3.4) etc. itas,shales r-- :::::> 180mm Cf.J 
Perm- co 
ian & :::::> 
carb- Khuff Fm, etc. Cf.J Petroleum* 
u >. onif-
·rl errous 0 s 
N 225-00 
11)0 350mm 
...... \0 
rj I Camb- Halul & Hematite,ochre, 0...0 0 
:fs\f_If,oo Hormuz Dolomites,sand- Shra Auh carbonates, As-N 
m.y. stones volcanics Islands bestos,Volcanics 
(3m) = Thickness in metres. * = X e plo1ted today or 1n the past 
b.p - m.y. = million years before present 
Compiled by Author from: 1. Soliman,S.M.Geology & Min.Activ.in Qatar,Qatar,No.l974 
p.T. 2. FAO, The Water Resources of Qatar and Their Development: Vol.l Doha 
1981 p.3/9.T.3.1 3. Holmes A., Principles of Physical Geology,Nelson G.B.l965 
I 
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The fresh water aquifers examined in 2.3 below exist within 
two main formations; the Rus and Umm Rhaduma. 
2.2 CLIMATE 
Many writers and experts in the fields of geography and enviU)nment 
have tried to create kinds of linkages between the underdeveloped 
(or developed) countries and the different elements of climate and 
environment. Although this is not the place to discuss the different 
theories, it is well known that climate and weather has played a 
strong role in directing inhabitants' activities away from physical 
labour and especially in encouraging the native population towards 
office work, particularly in the government sector where most, if 
not all, premises are equipped with cooling systems. Climatic con-
ditions also affect industrial capital goods,in that corrosion 
becomes serious due to high humidity, temperatures and atmospheric 
salinity. 
Table 2,2 shows the monthly temperature and humidity at Doha 
International Airport in 1981. The temperature in the winter months 
(November to March) averages betw€en l8°C - 26°C, while the relative 
humidity of the same months averages between 55-66 per cent. In 
the summer months (April to October) the average of temperature and 
humidity reverse : the temperature rises to an average of 32.8°C 
and the relative humidity decreases to an average of 52.3 per cent. 
This phenomenon is present in Qatar due to the configuration of the 
peninsula and to the prevailing north westerly wind. 
The winds are mainly light, with an average of 9,6 knots per 
hour during 1978, (S) During December the wind direction is domin-
antly from the NNE, in February SSE and in the remainder of the year 
I 
' ! 
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predominantly NNW. (6) The average speed and direction of the winds 
have saved the capital city, Doha, from industrial pollution from the 
Urnrn Said area which is to the south of Doha. The configuration of 
the peninsula has also saved the country from the effects of sand-
carrying winds which are dissipated by passing over stretches of 
sea between Qatar and the rest of the Arabian Peninsula. This 
contrasts with the situation in Kuwait which is entirely unprotected 
from such winds. 
Table 2.2: Monthly Average of Maximum and Minimum Temperature 
and Relative Humidity 
Month Temperature (C
0 ) Relative Humidity (%) 
Min.Temp. Max. Temp. Average Min.R.H. Max.R.H. 
January 11.5 26.7 19.1 32 100 
February 8.8 29.0 ] 8 .. 9 24 100 
March 13.4 35,4 24.4 14 97 
April 14.7 40,1 27.4 12 90 
May 21.3 44.2 32.8 10 93 
June 21.2 45.2 33.2 8 91 
July 27,2 46,0 36.6 8 91 
August 29.0 44.6 36.8 10 91 
September 23,5 42.4 33.0 20 98 
October 21.2 38,9 30.1 15 95 
November 15.9 35.4 25.7 16 99 
December 12.2 30,6 21.4 19 100 
Year's 18.3 ! 38,2 28.3 15.7 95.4 Average I I 
Source Central Statistical Organization, Annual Statistical 
Abstract 1981, Doha, 1982 p.9, T.4. 
Mean R.H. 
66.0 
62.0 
55.5 
51.0 
51.5 
49.5 
49.5 
50.5 
59.0 
55.0 
57.5 
59.5 
55.5 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
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Rainfall, on the other hand, is extremely light and confined 
to the winter months, with an annual total varying from 10 mm to 
over 200 mm. (7) This low rainfall makes it impossible for agriculture 
other than nomadic pastoralism not to be dependent completely on 
ground water resources. 
2.3 SOIL AND GROUND WATER RESOURCES 
Except for the depression areas (Rodha, Pl.Rodat or Riyadh), the 
soils in Qatar are very poor, In general, the most widespread cultivable 
soils are very shallow with a thickness of about 10-30 cm.CB) 
Soil classification as well as the study of ground water 
resources was the main mission of the FAO project team in Qatar from 
1975-1979. The soils of Qatar can be summarized as follows:( 9) 
1, Rodha or lowlying soil : covered an area of 27,620 ha. (276.2 sq.km) 
a, Silty clay loam to clay loam (23,100 ha) 
b, Sandy loam to sandy clay loam (4,520 ha) 
2. Saline sabkha soil over a total area of 70,124 ha, (701,2 sq. km) 
3. Lithosol soil 
4. Sandy soil 
a, Gypsiferous depression soil of clay loam 
texture (6,517 ha) 
b. Sandy clay loam to sandy loam texture 
(63,607 ha) 
of an area 1,020,977 ha, (10,210 sq.km) 
a. Calcareous sandy loam (958,052 ha) 
b. Rocky hill outcrops (62,925 ha) 
covering an area of 36,167 ha.(361.7 sq. km) 
a, Calcareous coarse sand to loamy coarse 
sand (4,775 ha) 
b, White colitic sand of marine origin 
(31,392 ha) 
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It is inevitable from the above mentioned soil classification 
that the only soils suitable for agriculture are those of the first 
group which represent only 2.4 per cent out of Qatar's total area 
of 10,600 km 2 • It is now prohibited to remove clay and soil from 
the better soil areas for use in urban gardens. 
The underground fresh water resources, due to the climate and 
geological structure, are the only natural source of water in Qatar. 
The main aquifers with potable water lie within the Rus and Umm Er 
Rhaduma formations. (lO) (see also Table 2.1). In 1978/79, the total 
annual abstraction of the northern province underground water* was 
26.7 million m3 from the Rus formation and 25.1 million m3 from Umrn 
Er Rhadurna. (ll) If the present rate of the fresh ground-water 
abstraction remains the same the aquifers will be depleted in 
20-30 years. (l 2) 
From the point of view of the paucity of agricultural land and 
of water quality and quantity, the development of the agricultural 
sector is not favourable. Agricultural development would be costly 
to finance and simultaneously the crop(s)/hectare production costs 
would be much higher than in other countries. This, together with 
the rest of the physical resource situation has left Qatar with very 
limited opportunities for the diversification of the national economy. 
Additionally, the domestic production of agricultural products 
such as plant or animal fibres, fruit, vegetables, and forestry 
materials can never be extensive in Qatar. This means that while 
at the craft level there are some related activities, for example, 
date palms, the sub-sector of agricultural industries in Qatar 
cannot be developed on the basis of domestic resources (see Chapter 4). 
* Qatar is divided by a "V" shaped structure into two parts; north and 
south. The salt content of the northern part underground water is 
between 400-2000 part/million, whilst the southern part is between 
3000-6000 part/million. This is mainly due to the geological structure 
fault, which is present to a great extent in the southern part 
of the peninsula. 
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2.4 ~~RINE RESOURCES 
The natural endowments of the peninsula were not favourable to 
attract the inhabitants to settle inland. Therefore, most of the 
principal settlement centres were posted on the coastline or nearby. 
Qatar, as a matter of fact, has an important position because it 
appears as a "wedge" in the middle of the Arabian Gulf,* which 
provides a coastline of about 680 km long. (l 3) 
Economically, Qatar and the surrounding Gulf States largely 
depended on pearl fishing in the past, while fish provided the bulk 
of food for the Gulf people. More than 85 pearl banks are located 
within Qatar's territorial waters and these banks appear to be bigger 
in size and larger in number than those of other Gulf Emirates. (l 4) 
Nowadays most of the Gulf peoples, and including the Qataris, have 
abandoned pearl diving activities, leaving an accumulated and large 
crop of priceless natural pearls unharvested for more than a third 
of a century. In addition to the availability of natural pearls, 
Qatar could easily adopt the Japanese methods of raising the cultured 
pearls** which once destroyed Qatar's economy. 
The Gulf, apart from the pearl resources, has been supplying the 
indigenous populations with fresh fish for several hundred centuries. 
Fishing was one of the principal activities in Qatar, the consumption of 
fish being estimated at 100 k~. per inhabitant per annum. (l 5) 
J.Moorhead wrote: (l6) 
* 
** 
"It (the fishing industry) is a very ancient routine 
and it will probably still be going on long after 
the last oil tanker has sailed from the Gulf" 
From Qatar to the head of the Gulf lies about 530 km. whilst 
to the Straits of Hormuz about 560 km. 
The ease of adopting such methods is increased by the fact of 
water clearness, temperature, salt content, and other factors 
related to the water of the Gulf. 
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The fishing field, unfortunately, given all the income provided 
by oil, has been left as a small residual artisanal industry carried 
out mainly in the private sector and also by the Qatar National 
Fishing Company (see Chapter 6 pp. 161-162 ). The potential fisheries 
resources are quite good, especially if new technologies of fish 
farming of the more expensive species, i.e. lobster, prawns etc. are 
adopted. The Regional Fishery Survey and Development Project (RFSDP) 
of the Gulf, which was hosted by Qatar from 1975 to the end of 1979, 
carried out an extensive investigation programme on the fisheries 
in the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. The general conclusion of 
their findings was that the Arabian Gulf alone can produce 550,000 
tons of fish without affecting their reserves. (l 7) 
As far as manufacturing or industrial processing is concerned, 
it should be noted that approximately 87.3 per cent of the domestic 
consumption of fresh fish is supplied by the Qatar National Fishing 
Co. (QNFC) and small-scale fishing. ( 18) The potential for fish 
processing e.g. the making of fish meat or frozen fish for export, 
appears to be very limited. Nevertheless, there is some possibility 
of a food processing industry on the basis of fish farming, given 
the environmental potential. 
The sea water and beds are well known for their dissolved and 
non-dissolved mineral deposits, i.e. salt, phosphate, magnesium, 
manganese, cobalt, nickel, copper etc. Although operations for 
extracting such minerals, apart from salt, are difficult and costly, 
it is essential that the government, while oil revenues are in hand, 
sets up an evaluation project for the exploitation of such resources. 
The extraction of inland mineral deposits is analogous to a 
person living on his capital, whilst the extraction of sea miner;tl 
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d . . l"k 1" . h' . (l9) epos1ts 1s 1 e a person 1v1ng on 1s 1ncome. However, unlike 
the Red Sea, the structural character of the Gulf suggests that the 
exploitation of mineral deposits upon the sea bed is again very 
limited. Thus, whilst Saudi Arabia,through the Saudi-Sudan Red Sea 
joint committee has already found it worthwhile spending $58 million 
on the exploration of sea bed metallic minerals in the Red Sea (ZO) 
this option is not at the moment available to Qatar. 
Conclusion 
More investigat~on of Qatar's mineTal resources is still 
feasible but the author doubts whether any significant deposits, 
with the exception of oil and gas,will be found within Qatari 
territory. This may seem pessimistic but the results of all previous 
investigations support this conclusion. 
Climate not only adversely affects the working behaviour of 
the inhabitants but also stands as a serious barrier toward any 
significant low cost development of the agricultural sector. High 
temperatures and humidity place strains on crops and livestock and 
encourage the proliferation of pests and diseases, Poor soils and low 
water availability are the final crucial threat to the agricultural 
development. There is, therefore, great doubt whether Qatar can 
ever be self-sufficient in food supply or sustain a significant 
agricultural output. Agricultural Taw materials for industry are 
similarly unpromising, 
Qatar, consequently,is left only with an industrialization 
option to develop and ensure the continued growth of the domestic 
economy. With a large quantity of unassociated natural gas 
(see Chapter 5 p. 133 ) as well as the marine resources which 
have not been fully exploiteJ, Qatar has a solid base for some 
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industrialization programmes. The following Chapters will examine 
the industrial development policies and establishments against this 
background of a limited range of physical resources. Manpower is 
perhaps the key resource for industrial and other development, and 
in Chapter 3 are examined the elements of population and manpower. 
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CHAPTER 3 
POPULATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES 
The size and quality of the active labour force in any country 
play a vital role in the development of the country's economy in 
general, and of industry specifically. There is no doubt that the 
absolute size of, and trends in, population are of key importance 
in relation not only to the labour force but also to other phenomena, 
s.uch as the nature and size of the domestic market, These two main 
factors -trends in the labour force and in the population - have to be 
viewed side by side with education and vocational training, in the 
context of this study. 
This chapter discusses the population of Qatar in relation to 
general trends, natural growth, migration, population structure and 
the labour force and education levels, In Chapter 9 the question of 
dependence on foreign labour is examined in the context of the 
preceding analysis of industry. 
3.1 General Population Trends 
Qatar has long been distinguished by having a very small popul-
ation even as compared with its neighbours, as shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Population in the Gulf Emirates 
Year Kuwait Bahrain 
1905 48,000 100,000 
1957 206,473 115' 000 
1970 733,196 216,815 
* U.A.E. = United Arab Emirates 
** 1908 
Qatar 
27,000** 
50,000 
111,113 
U.A.E.* 
86,200 
130,000 
300,000 
Source : al-Kuwari, A.K., Oil Revenues in the Gulf Emirates, 1978, p.5. 
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However, to understand the population trends in Qatar, since 
the State has held only one census in 1970, we are forced to rely on 
an irregular series of estimations. The first of these was made 
during the Ottoman occupation between 1872 and 1914, when the 
population was believed to be some lO,OOOpeople living in 4,000 
houses. (l) Lorimer, in 1908 estimated the population at 27,000 of 
which 6,000 were foreigners. (see Table 3.2 below). Apparently, 
until the first half of the 1930's the population figure remained 
approximately around 27,000. Then, following the decline of the 
pearl trade, population numbers fell,up to about 1951, despite 
the fact that oil was discovered in 1939. 
During the late 1950 9s,estimates suggest that the population 
commenced once more to increase and this has since continued. In 
1960 it was estimated at 40,000, whilst in 1969 the population reached 
about 100,000. This is mainly as a result of the growth of the oil 
industry and the consequent growth in economic activities, especially 
in construction,which greatly increased the demand for labourers, 
technicians ... etc, and which had a considerable effect on in-migration. 
The population census processed in 1970 showed that the proportion 
of foreigners then consisted of 59,5 per cent of a total of 
111,113. (2) MEED, in 1979 estimated the population at 250,000, of 
which 60 per cent were foreigners. (3) The consultant firm, William 
L. Pereira, on the other hand, estimated the population in 1980 at 
240,000, with 71.8 per cent foreigners. (4) However valid are the 
estimates, it is clear that foreigners have constituted a majority since 
the late 1960 9s,whilst the Qataris became the minority group. 
Many studies have suggested that the population of Qatar has 
recently had an average growth rate of 8 per cent per annum. (5 ) 
If growth remains at the same rate, ceteris paribus, it has been 
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Table 3.2 Estimation of Population Growth in Qatar 
Year 
1908 
1930 
1939 
1940 
1945 
1951 
1952 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1967 
1968 
1969 
Sources: 
j I Total For- % of i ! Year Total For-
eign F. j ;eign 
27,000(a) 6,000 22.2 I I I 
25,000 
I 
111 133 (e) ' 1970 I 166' 094 
' I 
111 000 (b) I 
' I 
30,000(b) I ! 120 oooCg) [ 
' 
171,600 
28,000(a) 11,000 39.3 
I 25,000(a) I 
111 000 (a) i 1971 i 
' 
130,000(b) 
. I 
l 1972 120 ooo(f) ' 
20,000(c) I I 
I 
170 oooCb) , 
I 
25,000(c) I 
I I 
40,000(c) I 
1973 170 oooCa) 
' 
180 oooCb) 
' 
40,000(b) ! 1975 160 oooCa) 
' 
60 000 (c) 
' 
180 oooCg) 
' 
70,000(c) 1976 180 000 (a) 
' 
70,000(c) 202 oooCa) I 
' I 
8o oooCb) 
' 
210 ooo(a) I 
' I 
80,000(c) 200 oooCa) I 1977 150,000 
' 
9o,oooCb) 1978 230 oooCa) 
' 
80,000 (a) 1979 250,000(d) 150,000 
11 00' 000 (b) 
I 1980 
240 oooCg) , 172,300 
(a) Lorimer,J.G., Gazetteer of the Gulf, Qatar 1978. 
(b) Buhairi, S, & al-Fara, M. Qatar Geography (n.d), pp.86-92. 
(c) al-Jabir, M,H., Qatar, Human Geography, Cairo, 1977. p.l43. 
(d) MEED, Special Report on Qatar, November 1979, p. 
(c) MEDD, The First Population Census of Qatar, 1970, Table 10. 
(f) FAO/UNDP, Report of the FAO/UNDP Progranmd.ng Mission to 
Qatar, 1972, p.4. 
(g) William L. Pereira Associates, National Growth Forecasts, 
May 1977, p.23. 
I 
1 9o of 
i F. 
59.5 
59.0 
59.7 
75.0 
60.0 
71.8 
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predicted that the total population will reach the figure of 330,000 
in 1985 and 600,000 in 1995 (see Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3 Population Forecasts of Qatar by Nationality 
Year Qatari I Non-Qatari Total Non-Qatari 
% of Total 
1975 57,200 122,800 180,000 68.2 
1980 67,700 175,300 243,000 71.1 
1985 30,000 250,000 330,000 75.8 
1990 94,600 350,400 445,000 78.7 
1995 111 '900 490,100 602,000 81.4 
Source William L. Pereira Associates, National Growth Forecasts, 
May, 1977, p.23. 
The above table also illustrates very clearly the expected 
accelerating growth of the proportion of non-Qataris to Qataris in 
the population. If we accept the linkage between population growth 
and a policy of development through diversifying economic activity, 
especially through industrialisation, then the order of magnitude 
of these changes is probably approximately right. However, more 
recent changes in oil prices and the fall of oil production due 
to oil market gluts, and consequent economic reactions by the Qatar 
government,have shown these assumptions to be rather dubious. 
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3.2 Natural Growth 
3.2.1 Births 
Unfortunately, no birth statistics at all were published before 
1967, and even after 1967 the statistical data are not sufficiently 
complete to allow a precise and correct analysis of birth trends. 
In order to make a reasonable estimation of total births, it is 
necessary to add, at least 5 per cent to the registered figures.* 
Table 3.4 below shows the registered and revised statistics. The 
table illustrates that what had happened to the proportions of 
Qataris in the total populations also happened in births, i.e. whilst 
the Qatari population contributed 71 per cent of total births in 
1967 this was reversed by 1977 to below 43 per cent out of 5,333. 
This radical shift would have been much greater if the Qatari Authority 
had not restricted foreigners from bringing their families with them. 
There is no doubt, partly due to such immigration restrictions, that 
the gross birth rate in Qatar had declined from 4 per cent in 1967 to 
less than 3 per cent in 1978, The data on which this estimate is 
based are derived from Tables 3.2 and 3.4. 
Males, on whom, in accordance to present conditions, econon1ic 
growth is reliant, formed the highest percentage of recorded births 
with the exception of 1971, with an average of 51.1 per cent for 
the whole period, 
3.2.2 Deaths 
Due to the absence of legislation** governing the registration 
of cases of death, most of the Ministry of Public Health statistics 
are believed to have covered only 85 per cent of the total death 
cases. (6 ) It is necessary, therefore, to add at least 15 per cent 
** 
The figures tcg.i.s tcrcd nrc believed to COVt'T on! y about 9~) per c<.:nt 
of total b.i.rths. 
The legislation of Deaths and Births rcgistrat:lon was only introJuc<.:d 
in 1982, by Law No (5) of Organizing the Births ~ Dcatl1s Registration. 
I 
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Table 3.4 Total Births Reported in Qatar by Nationality & Sex 
(1967-1980) 
1-< ('j 
(!.) 
>-< 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 I 
1978 
1979 
1980 
; 
I 
I 
Sources: 
I I i I ~ Q) 0 ! <ll I ·..-l 
I ~ I ('j H ~ 
I '-cl-< ' Q) Q) ('j 
I (!.) I 1-< '-cl 1-< 
·..-l ·..-l ·..-l Q) ~ <ll (.) ~ ~
1-< 1-< 1-< ...-! I 1-<.J:: ...-! ~ ::l <ll ('j ('j ~ ('j 
I 
Q) rn I ~ (!.) 0 ~ (!.) rn I·"' ·..-l ~ ~~ 0~ ...-! <= 0...-t 0.1-<<" ~ 1-< t>() ('j o rn ('j ('j Q) ('j Q) ·..-l 0 0 o'0 0 Q) 
Cl ZCI 0'0 Cl ::E ::.L. I 0,0 ::E o::co:r:: f-o Lf)~$-< 
I 
I ' l I 
(2038) ( 836) 70.9 1474* 1400* 51.3 - 2874 I 144 
I 
(2015) (1177) 63.1 1642* 1560* : 51.4 3192 I 160 - I 
I I 
11780* 
! ' I 
(2042) (1396) 59.4 1658* I 51.8 - 3438 I 172 i 
; 
(2068) (1543) 57.3 1836* 1775* : 50.8 3611 I 181 -
I 
i 
' 
: 
(2095) (1826) 53.4 1948* 1973*. 49.7 - 3921 i 196 ! 
' i 
2108 1912 52.4 2071 1949 
: 
51.5 18 4038 202 
I 
2228 2121 51.4 2268 2081 ! 52.1 18 4367 218 
2092 2268 48.0 2198 I 2162 50.4 200 4560 228 ! 
I 
2141 2518 46.0 2372 2287 50.9 81 I 4740 237 
I 
2180 2731 44.4 2522 2389 51.4 - 4911 246 
I 
2261 3052 42.6 2686 2627 50.6 20 5333 ! 267 
I 
I 
I 2813 3164 47.1 3106 2871 52.0 -
' 
5977 I 299 
I 
' 
2752 3305 45.4 3037 3020 50.1 - 6057 l 303 
I 
2853 3897 42.3 3430 3320 50.8 I - 6750 338 
i i I 
I I I 
' 
Compiled by the Author from 
Ministry of Public Health, Births & Deaths Statistics 
1967-1978, Qatar. 
I ...-! ('j i ~ 0 
f-o 
'-cl 
~ ('j 
1-< 
CJ 
I 
3018 
3352 
3610 I I 
3792 
4117 
4240 
4585 
4788 
4977 
I 
5157 i 
i 
I 5600 
i 
627CJ 
6360 
I 7088 
I 
( ) Shankland Cox Partnership, Projection of Qatari Population,Qatar 
* Al-Jabir, M.H., Qatar Human Geography, M.A. Thesis, 
Cairo University, Cairo, 1977. 
1980 
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to the total to arrive at a reasonable figure. As shown in Table 
3.5, the total number of registered deaths varied from one year to 
another. "~at appears to be clear is that the male deaths 
in the whole of the period was much higher than female cases. The 
mortality rate among Qataris is higher than for non-Qataris, a 
consequence of differences in age structure, the majority of non-
Qatari being young and in the active age group 15 - 59. 
Table 3.5 Total Deaths in Qatar by Nationality & Sex (1974-81) 
I I 
' 
I 
I 
I i i I ~~I 
I I 0 U'll I 
I 
I (,) 4-l <1>' 
•r-i I •r-i ·r-i <1> I ~ I I 
~ ~ ~ ~ .-4 .-4 i ·.-l <1> ~I "d.-4 1-i cd 0 cd 4-l cd <1> I cd tj-l<!) cd U') <1>1 ~ C'j 
cd ~ z~ 0-1-' ,.....j s 0.-4 ~ ! o\o ro "d I cd~ I 
<1> cd cd cd cd <1> cd 0 I I..() <1> ~~ ~ 0 >- 0' 0' o\O 0' ::E tJ... o\o :E t-o I M ~ ;ll c..? t-o I 
I 
I 
i 791 1974(a) 688 I 103 
I 
1975(a) 600 I 90 (J!JO 
I 
I 1976(a) 609 I 91 700 
I 
I 1977(a) 303 383 44.2 487 199 71.0 686 i 103 789 
1978(a) 334 303 52.4 426 211 66.9 637 I 96 733 
1979(b) 709 106 815 
1980(b) 337 325 50.9 448 214 67.7 662 99 761 
1981 (b) I 334 391 46.1 504 I 
221 69.5 725 109 834 
I i I 
Source: (a) Ministry of Public Health, Births and Deaths Statistics, 
1967-1978, p.l. 
(b) Central Statistical Organization, Annual Statistical 
Abstract 1981, July 1982, p.25. 
There is no doubt, partly due to the effect of immigration 
on age-structure as well as the continuing improvement of public 
health services, that the death rate did decline from 0.5 per cent 
' 
; 
; 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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in 1967 to a little over 0.3 per cent in 1978. The data on which 
these estimates are based are found in Tables 3.2 and 3.5. 
The natural growth rate, in the light of previous discussion, 
was about 3.48 per cent in 1967, whilst in 1978 it was 2.52 per cent. 
The declining natural growth rate can be mainly explained by the 
effect of the increasing proportion in the population of non-Qataris 
and the consequent distorting effects, not only on population age structure, 
but also on sex ratios and marital status; many non-Qataris are young, 
single males. 
Given this rate of natural growth and the low absolute numerical 
base-level there is no possibility in the foreseeable future that 
Qatar will be able to sustain the growth of economic demand by using 
only the citizen labour force. This has forced,and will continue to 
force,the government to support much, if not all, of its policy of 
diversification of the economy by the use of expatriate manpower. 
3.3 Migration 
The migration field can be divided into two broad divisions, 
internal and external migration. Internal migration, although it 
has had a severe negative impact on villages and small towns, is very 
small in size compared to the external flow. At the same time there 
is no direct linkage of internal migration with the industrialization 
programme as such. Internal migration, for these reasons is therefore 
excluded from our discussion which will concentrate on external 
migration. 
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3.3.1 External Migration 
External migration is one of the State's top-secret subjects 
and in order to have reliable data concerning external migration one 
has to obtain special permission from high authority. Even so, the 
Statistical Section of the Ministry of the Interior would not allow any 
person to examine all of the statistical records. This, according 
to official sources, is because it affects the security of the State, 
has to do with the planning of immigration policy, and,lastly,to avoid 
publicity-creating anxiety in the local population over the large 
size of the foreign population. (7) Reliance therefore has to be 
placed on various partial and/or earlier sources. 
In the 1970 census, the number of expatriates was recorded 
as 66,094, that is to say 59.5 per cent out of111,133. Between 
1971 and 1974, 77,230 non-Qataris entered the country, of which 
only 670 were Arabs. In 1975, the Ministry of Interior, disturbed 
by this imbalance of expatriates by ethnic origin, instructed the 
private sector to import its labour requirements from Egypt. ( 8 ) 
Thus, in 1975, the number of Arab arrivals had risen to 4,766, to 7,392 in 
in 1976 and 8,514 in 1977. (see Table 3.6). Because of the deteriorating 
political relations between Qatar and Egypt, the number of immigrant 
Arabs then declined by 1978, to only 6,684. At the same time the 
non-Arab element was increasing, partly due to the high turnover of 
Egyptian workers, ( 9 ) the total of such newcomers reaching 
30,454 in 1978. 
It is clear from Table 3.6 that during 1975-78 the non-Qatari 
population increased rapidly, and since many of the immigrants 
remained in the country, especially the Asian group, the grand total 
of this period was 67.6 per cent higher than the 1971-74 period. 
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Table 3.6 Total of New Resident Visas (Issued between 1395-98H.) 
Year Arabs Others o, of Arabs Total '0 
L 
' 
1395 4,766 15,478 23.5 20,244 
1396 7,392 26,174 22.0 33,566 
1397 8,514* 29,971 * 22.1 38,485* 
1398 6,684 30,454* 18.0 37,143* 
Source :Ministry of the Interior, General Total of issued new resident 
visas, 1395H - 1398H, Statistic Section, Doha 1979. 
* Includes permanent resident visas. 
Unfortunately, between 1970 to 1976, the government has not 
recorded how many of the resident visa holders had finished their 
contracts and left the country. In 1977, however, the recorded 
departures numbered 2,885, rising in 1978 to 3,866,of which 1,557 
were Arabs. (lO) 
The non-Qatari immigrants, as shown in Table 3.7, were a 
mixture of several cultures, a majority being of non-Arab origion. 
The highest percentage among them, 63.0 per cent of non-Qataris, 
were derived from Asian countries. The second group was Arab, 
followed by Europeans and Americans. For individual countries of 
origin, the Iranians composed the largest element with 31.5 per 
cent out of the non-Qatari total, this high percentage of Iranians 
being based on historical and regional trans-Gulf contacts. 
Pakistanis came second with 25.8 per cent, followed by Jordanians 
and Palestinians with 14.5 per cent. Gulf State citizens came 
fourth with 7,556, of which 3,271 were Omanis and 2,042 Saudis. 
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Table 3.7 Non-Qatari Population by Nationalities (1970 census) 
Country 
Total of Arab Countries 
Gulf States & Saudi Arabia 
Jordan & Palestine 
Other Arab Countries 
Total of Asian Countries 
Iran 
Pakistan 
Other Asian Countries 
Total of European and U.S.A. 
United Kingdom 
U.S.A. 
African Countries 
Other Countries 
Total 
Number 
23,208 
7,556 
9,583 
6,069 
41,663 
20,663 
17,076 
3,744 
974 
756 
218 
245 
4 
66,094 
% of their 
total 
35.1 
11.4 
14.5 
9.2 
63.0 
31.5 
25.8 
5.7 
1.5 
1.1 
0.3 
0.4 
0.0 
100.0 
Source Computed by the author from MEDD, Qatar Population Census 
1970, Table 4. 
The immigration authorities, because of the imbalanced structure 
of the non-Qatari population which the census had shown, evolved a 
policy which recognised the need for immigrant workers, accepted that 
there would have to be an increase in the number of Asian origin, but 
attempted to reduce dependence on immigration from only one or two 
countries. 
In 1979, following the new pol icy, the composition of the 
non-Qatari population (excluding GCC citizens), as seen in Table 
3.8, shows that the Asian countries contributed almost three quarters 
of the non-Qatar.i population. Iranians had moved from first 
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place in 1970 to third, ranking after Pakinstanis and Indians. The 
total from Arab countries had increased in number, but decreased 
in proportion from 35.1 per cent in 1970 (see Table 3.7) to only 
20.6 per cent of the non-Qatari total. The position of European 
and Americans had risen from 1.5 per cent in 1970 to 4.2 per cent 
in 1979. There are no statistics showing how many GCC citizens 
were in Qatar but 1979 estimates were around 15,000 people. 
Table 3.8 The Non-Qatari Population as in 1979 
Country Number % of their 
total 
r· ---~--o..r, __ 
Total of Arab Countries * 34,468 20.6 
Palestine & Jordan 13,681 8.2 
Egypt 12,478 7.5 
Other 8,309 5.0 
Total of Asian Countries 123,271 73.7 
Iran 32,583 19.5 
Pakistan 41,498 24.8 
India 38,819 23.2 
Others 10' 371 6.2 
Total of EuroEean and U.S.A. 7,043 4.2 
United Kingdom 4,740 2.8 
U.S.A. 326 0.2 
Others 1,977 1.2 
Other Countries 2,454 1.5 
Total 167,236 
* Excluding GCC citizens 
Source : Computed by the author from the Ministry of the Interior 
of New and Renewed Visas from 1395-99H. Statistical 
Section Qatar. 
Statistics 
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3.3.2 Migration policy 
Law No. (3) of 1963 was the first law organizing and controlling 
the admission of non-Qatari nationals to the country, (ll) a measure 
deliberately taken to protect the position of Qataris. Law No. (3) 
of 1963 and its amendments specified that any expatriate wishing to 
move to Qatar had to obtain a Qatari sponsor. The Qatari in turn should 
provide decent employment for the worker(s) under his sponsorship 
and, once the requirement for the worker(s) ended, the sponsor 
was responsible for deporting hiw/them to his/their original country. 
The government for several reasons, however, did not provide enough 
powers of implementation for this legislation, and at the same time 
the law did not provide any restriction on the entry of families 
accompanying the foreign workers. 
The 1970 census opened the government's eyes to the immigration 
question at a time when there was particular sensitivity over Iranian 
immigrants. At the same time it appeared that there were 39.1 per 
cent of economically inactive non-Qataris (or 23.3 per cent out of the 
total population). The result of the census forced the government 
to adopt a new policy based on three objectives. 
a) To import more labour to meet internal development demand; 
b) To diversify the labour force of the country of origin, 
by achieving a balance between main nationalities 
(Iranians, Pakistanis, Indians and Arabs in general); and 
c) To apply a more restricted policy on the entry of families, 
although this excluded state employed senior staff, e.g. 
engineers, experts, doctors, teachers and managerial 
. . (12) staff. 
-36-
This last restriction followed the realisation that a) the 
families of junior staff and labourers were uneducated, b) the average 
size of such families was 4-6 which created serious demand problems 
for public utilities and other facilities, and c) the public expend-
iture bill for providing the basic requirements for such families 
was becoming very high. In general, it appeared that expatriate 
families were consumers rather than producers. (l 3) 
In 1974, and due to the high proportion of non-Arab expatriates, 
the Qatari Minister of Labour & Social Affair·s signed an agreement 
with his Egyptian counterpart to supply Qatar's requirement for a 
labour force from Egypt, a step which can be termed the "Arabization 
of Migration". This policy has failed because of the subsequent 
Qatar diplomatic boycott of Egypt in 1978. An additional factor 
was the especially high voluntary turnover of the Egyptian workers 
which made the private sector reluctant to employ them. 
The Minister of the Interior in 1975 set up a committee called 
Lagnat al-Istigdam, (Committee of Newcomers), consisting of four 
members representing; 1) the Director of the office of the Minister 
of the Interior; 2) Director of Immigration & Passport Department, 
3) Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs; and 4) the Police Force. 
The main objective of the committee is to regulate the balance 
between all- non-Qatari groups in the country by studying the 
applications for labour by the government, public and private 
sectors and at the same time to import the right numbers of workers 
which the country actually requires. (l 4) The Government, in order 
to allow the committee to carry out its objectives,instructed 
all individual persons, government, public or private establishments 
to subrni t visa applications to the commi ttec. The coJTUnl ttcc have the 
power to 1) instruct the applicants to import their labour requirement 
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from certain parts of the world; and 2) reject any application. 
The granting of valid visas has to be approved by Lagnat al-Istigdam. 
Although the committee improved balance between different nationalities 
of origin, as seen in Table 3.8, unfortunately the committee could 
not control irresponsible individuals and establishments who 
submitted false applications. Once many applications were approved, 
the visas ended in the black market where they were easily sold for 
QR 10,000 for each visa (equivalent to £1,780). In most cases foreign 
workers who wished to bring in their relatives were the buyers. 
In June 1980, the Minister of the Interior suddenly announced 
that the 1963 edict and its amendments for controlling work and rcsid-
ence permits would be strictly enforced, meaning that the foreign 
workers in the country had to be employed by their specific sponsors 
or transfer their sponsorship to their specific new employers, 
otherwise they had to leave the country. (lS) The announcement ended 
the "visa sale" and forced the sponsors to provide permanent work. 
The announcement, however, excluded workers in some specific trades 
which were not likely to be done by Qataris, such as barbers, 
tailors, .•. etc., and the government, according to official sources, 
is studying the possibility of transferring sponsorship from specific 
Qatari backers to either the Ministry of Municipal Affairs,or to the 
Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs. Many expatriates, as a result 
of this policy, were depcrted from the country simply because their 
nominal sponsors could not afford to supply them with work. This 
policy does not accept the necessity for a pool of casual labour which 
in 1970 was about 2.1 per cent of the total 43,390. (16) 
During 1981-82 the Minister of Labour & Social Affairs signed 
several labour agreements with Somalia, Tun.isia, 1\lorocco and Sudan 
i( 
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as part of the Arabization approach. Lagnat al Istiqdam, at the 
moment, facilitates any application that requires workers from the 
above-mentioned countries and Egypt. 
The migration theme in relation to industrialisation is 
further developed in Chapter 9. 
3.4 Population Structure 
Given existing social and traditional customs, a further 
analysis of the population structure is necessary for the purposes 
of this study. Because the country has been open to worker 
immigration we have to deal first with the whole population, and 
then, in order to understand the actual structural processes relevant 
here, we have to examine separately the Qatari and non-Qatari element. 
Unfortunately, the only basic data for general analysis is that of 
the 1970 census, and that is considered first, followed by a brief 
consideration of estimates for 1981. 
3.4.1 Population Structure of Qatar 1970 
Figure 3.1 below shows Qatar's population structure by sex 
and age groups. Immediately we note that males were the predominant 
sex in the population, whilst the dominant age groups were 20-29 
and 30-39 years. The main reasons behind this unbalanced structure 
even by 1970 were 1) the pressure of development requirements of 
manpower; and 2) the preference for economically active male immigrants. 
If it was assumed that the age groups under 20 and over 59 were 
economically inactive (and this is a reasonable assumption for 1970 
and later) the pyramid shows that these comprised almost half of the 
total population. About 91 per cent out of the 15,001 females between 
20-59 years of age have to be regarded as effectively economically 
Fig. 3·~ Qa~orr PopuiOJ~icm foy S~~ I Ag® S~n.nchnrr® ~910 
rspoo rs,ooo 14,ooo 12,ooo ro,ooo a,ooo 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 ®,000 
MALE FIE MALE 
Source: Ministry of Overseas Development, The First Population Census of Qatar, MEDD 19 70. T 
l 
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inactive (knowing that 96,5 per cent of the female total of 39,419 
were recorded as inactive), 
The pyramid also shows that the sex ratio of groups under 19 
and over 59 was almost balanced, whilst the sex ratio of ages between 
20-59 was considerably out of proportion with an average ratio of 
285.2 : 100 Males/Females. 
Under normal circumstances, the youngest group would be expected 
to be the largest, but this is only true of the Qatari population 
in isolation. 
3.4.2 Qatari Population Structure 
The Qatari population in 1970 was a normal, balanced demographic 
society with a general sex ratio of 101.3, this in a citizen popul-
ation of 45,039people, 40.5 per cent of the total 111,133. The 
age group under 20 years old was the largest, representing 60.9 
per cent of the total Qatari population, so we find that of the 
total Qatari population 50.9 per cent were juvenile males. The age 
group between 20-59 years made up 34.1 per cent of the Qatari total 
(see Fig. 3,2), 
If we take the age groups of under 20 and over 59 and add 
the economically inactive 98.7 per cent of the Qatari female 
population, (11) we find that in 1970 the economically active prop-
ortion of Qatari populatjon was some 18.1 per cent, leaving 81.9 per 
cent as dependants. The government clearly needed to increase the 
participation of the female population in economic activities through 
education, information and advertisements, and encouraging changes in 
social attitudes, 
The population pyramid (Fig. 3,2) shows noticeable bulges in 
Fig. 3·2 QOJ~Olri PopUJia~io~ P~r01midl roy S®~ ~m~ A~® 09J10~ 
10-14 
5-9 
0-4 
6,000 4,000 2,000 0 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 
MALE FEMALE 
Source: Ministry of Overseas Development, The First Population Census of Qatar, MEDD, 1970 T 
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the 0-4, S-9 and 10-14 age groups,which were masked in Figure 3.1 
due to the migration effect. These age groups were the only source 
of a future Qatari workforce for several decades. 
3.4.3 Non-Qatari Population Structure 
In 1970, the non-Qatari population numbered 66,094 and 
according to the population census, the female proportion was 25.8 
per cent, giving a general sex ratio of 287.7. It is very clear 
from Figure 3.3 that the total male population out-numbered the 
female by almost three to one, whilst males in the age group 20-59 
numbered almost five times the females giving an average sex ratio 
of 481.7. 
The figure also shows that the non-Qatari population aged 
between 20-59 numbered 42,425, 64.2 per cent of the total, whilst 
the population under 20 and over 59 numbered 23,669, 35.8 per cent. 
The non-Qatari population was therefore dominantly composed of 
young adult males for the following reasons: 
(a) Employers naturally chose members of the economically active 
age group i.e. 20-59. 
(b) Most immigrant workers had to be tough and suitable for 
hard, manual work (in 1978 about 55.9 per cent of the 
total of new residential visa holders were labourers) 
(c) Most of the paid work in Qatar, according to the common 
traditional customs which existed at this time, was 
confined to males only. 
Fig. 3·3 Non- Qatari PO[ptijhil~ion by S®~ /A~® S~nJJ~~l\H'® 0~10) 
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3.4.4 ~?yulation Structure 1981 
It is recognised that continued reliance on 1970 census 
analysis is less than satisfactory but no other census-based dem-
ographic evidence is available. However, the Central Statistical 
Office has produced estimates for the age and sex structure of the 
total population of Qatar in 1981 and these are shown .graphically 
in Figure 3.4. If this is compared with Figure 3.1, and allowance 
made for the difference between the age-group categories employed 
in each, what appears as most striking is their similarity. This, 
together with what other evidence is available, indicates that the 
demographic situation in Qatar has not changed significantly in 
terms of structure since 1970. 
3.5 Labour Force and Educational Level 
Industrial and economic activity depend mainly, beside capital 
and raw materials, on a labour force. Education, in this sense, can 
be seen as a means of supplying skilled labour. In this section 
the argument will be directed to two main subjects : the labour force 
and economic activity levels, and the educational level of Qataris 
and non-Qataris. 
3.5.1 Labour Force and Economic Activity 
Most economic activities, as mentioned earlier, are created 
by the oil industry as the "propulsive force". Manpower, in this 
sense, is employed in one or other of the following categories: 
(1) Direct employment in the oil industry and related activities 
such as exploration, drilling, production, etc. 
(2) Indirect employment by the oil industry in the form of 
fig. 3·4 Q(l)far Population Structure- Male and Female 1981 
Age 
MALE 
23,m2 
15-19 
10-14 
5-9 
0-4 
. ![ ?/~/~?/~/41L I I I i I I I I I I ' I I I I I I I I 
25 20 15 10 5 0 0 
Thousandls 
5ourcG: Cen1ra1Stotisflcal Oronizotion, Annual 5tafistica1Abstract 1981, Qatar 198tl 
~IEMALE 
5 ~0 ~5 :20 :25 
I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
-42-
providing the oil industry with .its needs such as services, 
both construction and technical goods, food supplies etc. 
(3) Employment associated with the distribution of oil revenues 
such as Government programmes of development, including 
public and private sector industry. 
Table 3.9 below, categorising the labour force in Qatar by sectors 
and nationalities, shows clearly that the non-Qataris out-numbered the 
Qataris in all the sectors with the exception of direct employment in 
the oil industry. This exception appears because 
"··· the oil sector paid them higher salaries than the government 
sector, and second .•. the government had established a kind of 
arrangement with the oil companies which protected the Qatari 
labour force from non-Qatari competition." (l8 ) 
Table 3.9 Economically Active Population by Sector & Nationality (1970) 
Non- % of % of 
Sector Qatar is Qatar is Total each Qatar is 
sector 
Agriculture & Fishing 86 1,984 2,070 4.3 4.2 
Manufacturing/Mining/ 1,825 3,417 5,242 10.8 34.8 
Quarrying 
Construction 207 7,578 7,785 16.1 2.7 
Oil Industry 1,259 950 2,209 4.6 57.0 
Wholesale/Retail Trade 880 7,005 7,885 16.3 11.2 
Banking 10 292 302 0.6 3.4 
Transport & Communications 655 2,571 3,226 6.7 20.3 
Government Services 1,391 4,781 6,172 12.7 22.5 
Other Services 1,855 11,644 13,499 27.9 13.7 
Total 8,168 I 40,222 48,390* 100.0 I 
% of the Total 16.9 83,1 I 100 \ 
* of which 46,997 Illales and 1, 393 females .• 
Source t MEDD, 1970 Yopulution Census, Tahlc 16. 
' 
i 
i 
! 
; 
; 
i 
i 
' 
I 
I 
! 
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The Qataris in other sectors formed in aggregate a proportion 
of 14.1 per cent. The non-Qataris, who formed 83.1 per cent out of the 
total labour force, were very much concentrated in services, construction 
and the wholesale/retail trade. 
In the early 1970's, the general policy of diversifying the 
national income was formulated (see Chapter 4, pp.64-67). This 
policy required a much greater labour force than existed in 1970, 
but unfortunately most of the estimates of the labour force growth 
after that time were far too low. In 1982 H. Al-Khayat stated 
that Qatar's total population figure in 1979 was 240,000 (that is 
to say an increase of 116 per cent over the 1970 census figures) while 
the total labour force figure was 71,117 (lg) (that is to say an 
increase of only 47 per cent over the 1970 census). This would 
give a difference in the two rates of growth of 69 per cent which 
seems unlikely. The most reliable source is the Annual Statistical 
Abstract of 1981 of the Central Statistical Organization which 
estimated the population of Qatar to be 244, 534 (an increase of 120 
per cent over the 1970 figure) while the employed labour force was 
estimated to belll,264 (20) (an increase of 129.9 per cent over the 
1970 census). The differences between the estimates of the Statist-
ical Centre and all others are believed to be because the former 
included the daily workers and all the small-scale purely private 
sector enterprises whilst the latter estimates excluded these, 
The labour force, however, was also estimated by IDTC in 1977 
and in 1978 to be around 51,261 and 69,158 respectively. (Zl) This 
estimation, which is shown in Table 3.10, if corrected for the 
exclusions,producessomewhat different results. We know that in one 
year 1977/78 the labour force increased by 34.9 per cent. The 
largest increase was estimated to be in the services sector, whilst 
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the largest absolute numbers, both in 1977 and 1978, were concentrated 
in the government sector and in contracting, which together contained 
65.6 and 57.3 per cent of the total labour force in 1977 and 1978 
respectively. 
Table 3.10 Total Labour Force* by Sector (1977 and 1978) 
I 
' % of I % of % of 
Sector 1977 each I 1978 each increase I 
sector I sector over 1977 I figures 
i j I I 
I I I I I Industrial Companies 4,677 9.1 7,441 10.3 59.1 
I & Establishments I I Contracting Companies 15,638 30.5 19,498 28.2 24.7 I I i ~etroleum; I 4.2 
I 
3,126 4,5 44.7 ! 2,160 
I Trading C;mpanies i 5,818 11.4 8,797 12.7 51.2 I I I 
I Banks & Insurance 900 1.8 1,091 1.6 21.2 I 
I 
Companies 
118,006 Government Sector 35.1 20,141 29.1 11.9 
Services & others 4,062 7.9 9,064 13.1 I 123.1 
* 
Total 51,261 100 69,158 100 
! 
Excluding the employment in Agriculture and Fisheries, domestic 
service, artisans, small establishments, defence & police forces 
and daily paid labourers. 
Source IDTC, Qatar Achievements in Industrial Development. 
Qatar 1981. p.27. 
34.9 
As the demand for the labour force is clearly going to increase 
given Qatar's national development goals, it is necessary at this 
juncture to throw some light on the expected labour demand up to 
1990-1995. 
All the estimates and projections which are available have 
agreed that there will be an increase in the total labour force in 
Qatar, but all of them predicted different growth rates. Llewelyn-Davies, 
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the English consultants, for instance, assumed that the labour demand 
(22) 
would grow by an average of 2.9 per cent per annum. William L. 
Periera, on the other hand, assumed that an average growth of 4.35 
per cent per annum would be applicable if the government implemented 
its diversification policy. ( 23 ) Caution must be used with these 
predictions because all their assumptions were based on data obtained 
in the early and mid 1970's. The situation later changed, especially 
at the end of 1977 when Qatar's trading/construction boom had overloaded 
the economy, and at the end of 1982 when the real crisis of oil prices 
developed, which ever since has seriously affected the government's 
general expenditure policies, 
Table 3.11, the Llewelyn-Davies medium employment forecast*, 
shows that the country over the twenty years 1972-92 would generate 
at least 43,962 new additional jobs, of which about 76 per cent 
would be required in the first ten years, The services and 
government sector would require most of the new jobs, which would 
result by 1992 in them possessing 79.3 per cent out of a total of 
97,338 workers, The primary sector would face a critical period 
especially in 1992, when employment would be expected to decline by 
22.9 per cent from the 1987 figure. 
William L. Pereira's team, which did not agree with 
Llewelyn-Davies' forecast carried out an employment growth forecast 
by sector, for the twenty-five years 1970-1995 shown in Table 3.12. 
This forecast stands on a more solid base due to the team's direct 
link to the Amiri Palace from which all development programmes come; 
but it did not take into account any possible change in oil prices. 
Table 3,12 shows that the demand for labour was expected to continue 
* It is clear from the Llewelyn-Davies' report that they ignored 
small-scale industries, and this must be borne in mind in the 
following analysis. 
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Table 3.11 Llewelyn-Davies Weeks, Medium Employment Forecast 
by Sector (1972-92) 
I 
11977 I I l Sector 1972 I 0. % 1982 % 1987 % I 'o I : ! I I 
i ! I ~ 
I 
I 
5,7071 i Primary ' 9.7 l 4' 988 6.6 5,195 ! 6.5 I 5,708 6.0 i ! I 
i 2,3691 
! 
Second- i 478 0.9 I 1, 929 2.5 2.7 
i 3,010 3.2 
ary* I I 66,436176.5 Tertiary** 39,451 73.9 !57 ,589 75.0 74,022 77.9 
I I I I 
Constr- 8,252 15.5 !12,278 16.0 12,278114.2 12,29812.9 
: 
i I 
uction I 
153,376 I 100 176,784 Total 100 86,790 100 95,0181 100 
: I I ! I 
* 
** 
Including proposed Aluminium & Salt plants requirements 
Including government and armed forces. 
Source : Compiled by Author from: 
. 
1992 % 
' 
4,400 4.5 
' 3,450 3.6 
! 
:77,210 79.3 
i12,278 12.6 
I 
l 
i 97,338 100 
I 
Llewelyn-Davies Weeks Qatar Development Plan, Technical 
Paper 3 of Population & Employment Qatar 1972-73, Tables 3 and 4. 
Table 3.12 
I Sector 
I 
I 
I 
!Primary 
i 
I 
/Second-
i ary 
!Tertiary 
I 
Govern-
ment 
Constr-
uction 
William L. Pereira, Medium Employment Forecast 
by Sector (1970-95) 
I 
I T 
11990 1970 % 11975 % 1980 % 11985 % 
I ' I i 
9 13,800 
I 1 
I 
I 4,300! i 5 3,400 3 3,400 2 4,000 
! I 
i I 
1 5,650 11 18,000 9 13,000 11 17,000 12 19,100 I 
126,100! 51 138,400 45 48,400 42 58,150 42 67,650 
I ; 
I ! I 17 20,000 17 24,600 13 28,650 I 6 ,650! 13 14,500 
I 8, SOOi 16 20,500 24 31,300 27 36,250 26 39,775 
i 
I 
I 
i 
T I 
% ) 1995 i % 
: ' 
I 
3 i 4,400: 3 
12 22, 55o: 13 
i 
42 73,000/ 42 
; 
18 31 '5001 18 
I 
25 I 42,000i 24 
, I 
! 
i 
~Total Econ- I 
100/ omically 51,200,100 185 J 200 100 116' 100 100 139' 400 100 159,175 100173,450 I Active i ' 
Source: William L. Pereira Associates : National Growth Forecasts 
Qatar Planning Studies, Qatar 1977, p.26 Table 8. 
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to increase, reaching a number of 173,450 in 1995, about three and 
a half times over the 1970 figure. In otker words, national 
activities would create a demand for an additional labour force of 
about 122,250, of which 53.1 per cent would be required in the 
first ten years. As a matter of fact, according to the Central 
Statistical Organization the total employment figure of 1981 had 
already reached 111,264. William L. Pereira had agreed with 
Llewelyn-Davies that the dominant sectors (with with different 
absolute and proportional figures) would be the service sector 
(including government employment) followed by construction. 
At this stage we need to examine the availability of the 
Qatari labour force, in order to see to what extent the Qatar:i 
population could respond to these projections of labour demand. In 
1980 Shankland Cox Partnership had carried out projections of the 
Qatari population from 1970-2000. (24 ) We have intentionally applied 
highest growth assumption (B), which is slightly higher than the median 
(A), at the same time assuming that most of the Qataris under 20 
years old would remain dependent because of their involvement in educ-
ation and training ( See Fig. 3.6). Table 3.13 shows that in 1975 
the Qatari total population was expected to reach 58,969 persons of 
which only 19,003 were of working age (9,624 of them female). The 
Qataris are expected to increase at an average of 3.77 per cent per 
annum, giving a total number of 164,043 Qataris in 2000. All the Qata-
ris of working age would increase by 4.07 per cent per annum reaching 
the figure of 58,370 in the year 2000 (29,284 of them female). This 
assumes raising the age of entry to employment to 20 years rather 
than 15. 
To illustrate the width of the gap between labour demand and 
Qatari labour supply, all the forecasts are displayed on a single 
-4~-
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Table 3.13 
Age Group 
0-19 
20-59 
60 and 
Over 
Total 
Age Group 
0-19 
20-59 
60 and 
Over 
Total 
~ge Group 
0-19 
20-59 
60 and 
Over 
Total 
Shankland Cox - Qatari Population Projection by Age 
and Sex 
1975 1980 
Male Female Total % Male Female Total 
18,839 18,464 37~303 63.3 22,2321 22,106 44,338 
9,379 9,624 19,003 32.2 12,067 12,223 24,291 
1 '389 1,274 2,663 4.5 1,554 1,300 2,854 
29,607 29,362 58,969 100 35,853 35,629 71,482 
1985 1990 
Male Female Total % Male Female Total 
26,252 26,314 52,566 60.0 32,232 32,232 64,464 
15,542 15,754 31,296 35.8 19,491 19,989 39,480 
2,069 1,611 3,680 4.2 2,498 1,883 4,381 
43,863 43,679 87,542 100 54p221 54' 104 108,325 
1995 2000 
Male Female Total % Male Female Total 
40,463 40,46S 80,926 60.4 49' 772 49,772 99,544 
23,630 23' 977 47,607 35.6 29,086 29,284 58,370 
2,832 2,510 5' 342 4.0 3,093 3,036 6,129 
66,925 66,950 133,875 100 81,951 H2,092 I C14 , OIJ :) 
Source Compiled by the Author from Shankland Cox Partnership, 
Qatari Population Projection Qatar January 1980, Table 13. 
i 
I % ! 
62.0 
34.0 
4.0 
100 
% 
59.5 
36.5 
4.0 
100 
% 
60.7 
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3.7 
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diagram. Figure 3. 5 shows that although we have adopted the highest 
Qatari population growth rate assumption, the gap between demand and 
supply is still very wide. If present customs remained unchanged 
ceteris paribus which indicate that work is confined to males rather 
than females, the gap of labour shortage appears even wider. Figure 
3.5, in general, shows that whatever the expected percentage of the 
increase of the Qatari population, the dependence on foreign labour 
(Arab or non-Arab) will remain and although the more work is needed 
to be done on the present pattern of labour deployment, a great 
number of foreign workers will have to be allowed to enter the 
country (see Chapter 9). 
3.5.2 Education Level of Qataris and Non-Qataris 
In 1952 the first primary school for boys was officially opened 
with 250 boy students educated by six teachers. Prior to that the 
education was carried out by religious men and women in the form of 
al-Kuttab. Education, in al-Kuttab was limited to instruction in 
recitation of the Koran and rudiments of reading and writing. Girls' 
education did not commence until 1957 when the first primary school 
for girls was opened, in Doha City, with 451 pupils and 14 female 
teachers. ( 2S) The education of both sexes was carried out from 1957 
until 1983 in separate schools and institutions. 
In the scholastic year 1979/80 the total number of schools 
was 142, of which 73 were for boys. The student enrolment for the 
same year was 37,651 of which 19,367 were boys, while there were 
3,204 teachers, of which 1,439 were males. ( 26) Average figures 
indicate that there was then one teacher for 11-12 pupils and one 
school for 265 pupils. But these figures are misleading, knowing 
that the Ministry of Education's annual report had included schools 
Fig. 3.5 Projection of Labour Force Demand and Oaiaris over 20 ( 1970- 1995) 
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and teachers in villages, and that many village schools comprise a 
very small number of pupils and therefore have a high teacher : pupil 
ratio. (Z6) Furthermore there is a noticeable shortage of school 
buildings in Doha City and many of the existing ones are overcrowded, 
i.e. 800 pupils or more for a school designed to accommodate 
540 pupils. 
The ladder of government education is based mainly on three 
school stages followed by university, abroad or locally. Figure 3.6 
shows the education ladder with its main three stages. The first 
stage is the primary, which children enter at six years old. This 
stage consists of six different levels. The second stage is the 
preparatory,where the boys have the choice either to carry on in 
general education or attend a religious institute, while there is 
nothing for the girls to choose apart from general education. The 
second stage takes three years to complete. At the third stage, 
secondary education, boys can choose from several types of education, 
i.e. industrial school, commercial school or general level, whilst 
the girls, if they want to carry on, can only join the secondary 
general level. The secondary stage takes three years and the pupils 
at general level and religious institutes have to choose, after the 
end of the first year, between science or literary streams. After 
the completion of this last stage the pupils have the right to 
continue their education, conditional on attaining the required 
standards, either in Qatar University or overseas universities. 
Education in Qatar is still not compulsory and the pupils can 
leave school at any level they or their parents/ guardians want. 
There are, in Qatar, several factors adversely affecting 
educational progress. ·rhc most important of these arc: 
OVERSIEAS 
Ub\l!VIE~~DY!IE~ 
OVE~SIEAS 
IUJN nf!E~~DYD IE~ 
From 
1981 
S~age 
Three ~ 
Secondary 
~ T~&ach®rTraining General S~age Commercial lndys~rial School 
Institutes School (Boys only) 
(G®n®ral) (Boys only) 
Religious lnstihstes 
(Boys only) 
* CIOS!Sd in 1980 
* * Entry clos0d in 1977 
~--
S~age 
Two ~ 
Prepora~ory 
Industrial * * School 
(Boys only) 
Stage 
000 
Primary 
Source· Reversed by the Author from Ministry of Education. Annual Report 19 771 78 
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1. Lack of qualified teachers. In 1963/64 for instance, the 
qualified teachers were only 18 per cent out of 516. In 
1968/69 they declined to only 11 per cent out of 666 and 
in 1978/79 there was 39.5 per cent qualified teachers in 
the primary stage out of 1,714. At the preparatory and 
secondary stages the percentage of qualified teachers was 
43.8 out of 1,168. (28) 
2. Lack of Qatari teachers, especially in preparatory and 
secondary stages. The Ministry of Education has been 
filling the gap by importing Arab teachers from abroad. 
In addition, the participation of Qatari females in 
education is much higher than that of Qatari males who 
have many opportunities to work outside the teaching 
field. ( 29) 
3. Overcrowded classes which have resulted in reducing 
educational benefit and at the same time decreasing the 
proper use of school facilities. (30) 
After this brief sketch of the education background, we analyse 
the education level of 1) both of the Qatari potential labour force 
and the Qatari active labour force; and 2) both of the non-Qatari 
potential labour force and the non-Qatari active labour force. 
3.5.2.1 Education Level of Qataris 
According to the 1970 census, the Qatari potential labour 
force was 19,226 of which 9,649 were female. (3l) From Tables 3.14a 
and 3.14b, showing the potential Qatari labour force by sex and 
age groups, we can deduce the following: 
1. Illi tcracy among males over 29 years old was dominant w.ith 
an average rate of 70.3 per cent of 5,512 persons. 
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2. Illiteracy among Qatari females was even greater in the 
age group 20 and over, with an average of 90.1 per cent 
out of 7,708. 
3. Qatari males were better educated than the females, because: 
a) male education had started earlier; b) in 1970 the total 
number of male schools was 48 against 39 schools for 
females; (32 ) c) parents used to be very hesitant about 
sending their daughters to al-Kuttab in the first instance, 
and then on to school; d) there are many obstacles facing 
females wanting to proceed for further education abroad; 
e) female education was set up only to meet cultural 
requirements rather than preparing them to meet the labour 
shortage;(33) and f) most females, after marriage, would 
leave school, 
4. There is no technical education for females and what in 
Table 3,14b is referrred to as vocational training is 
confined to that for teachers and nurses. 
In spite of the energetic educational policies and considerable 
expenditure the output of specialized institutions and centres is very 
low. Figure 3. 7 shows the general enrolment of six types of educ-
ational bodies. The oldest among them is the Industrial School which 
was opened in 1957/58 consisting of two stages, preparatory and 
secondary, with a total enrolment of 15 students. The largest enrolment 
of the Industrial School was achieved in 1967/68, but from then on the 
total enrolment declined to somewhere around 50 in 1978/79. The 
Teacher Training Institutes, Commercial school and Training & Career 
Centre had faced similar conditions but on different size and time 
scales. The fastest growing enrolment has been in overseas 
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Table 3.14a Qatari Potential L~bour Force by Age, Sex and 
· Educational Level (1970 Census) 
MALE 
Age I Pri- I Secon- Vocat- Univ- I% of 
Group None JKuttab mary dary ional & ersity Total none 
I 
I I I Tech. : level ! I ! 
15-19 119 10 598 I 1,038 145 I 12 1,922 6.2 I 
I ! 
20-29 588 81 537 l 600 207 130 2,143 27.4 : 
' 
30-39 1,447 296 331 146 33 i 21 I 2,274 63.6 I I 
! ! 40-49 1,516 362 82 30 13 2 ! 2,005 : 75.6 I I 
j 
' i 
50-59 ' 912 285 25 I 10 1 ! 2 ! 1,233 i 74.0 I I 
I : I 
Total 4,582 1,032 1,537 l 1,824 399 I 167 ! 9,577 : 47.8 ' ' ' i i I I I i : 
I i ! ' % of 47,8 10.8 16.4 I 19,1 i 
4,2 1.7 l 100 ' 
I I I I ' level I I I 
Table 3.14b 
FEMALE 
i 
I 
% of Age I Pri- Secon- Vocat- Univ-
Group None Kuttab mary dary ional & ersity Total none 
Tech. level 
I 
136.5 15-19 708 20 723 440 47 3 1,941 
I 
! 
20-29 2,167 103 326 92 9 11 2,708 '80.0 
30-39 2,400 106 33 13 I - 2 2,554 94 .o 
40-49 I 1,464 41 I 6 
- I - 1 1,512 96.6 i I I 934 97.6 50-59 912 20 2 - - -I I 
Total 7,651 290 1,090 
I 
545 56 17 9,649 79.3 
I I I I % of 79.3 3.0 11.3 
I 
5.6 0.6 0.2 I 100 I I level I l 
Source: /\1-:Jaber, M.H., Qatar lluman Geography, Unpublished M./\., 
Cairo University, Cairo 1977 /\ppcndices. 
' 
' 
I 
i j 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
l 
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universities where enrolment in 1961/62 was five students and in 
1978/79 the number was 720 students. But following the official 
opening of Qatar University in 1976/77 the numerical growth rate of 
overseas students has fallen. 
Table 3.15, showing Qatari manpower by occupation and educ-
ational level in 1970, indicates that 62.1 per cent of the 8,168 
economically active males were illiterate. The table also shows that 
the illiterate and those only with primary al-Kuttab education 
comprised 61.3 per cent even of those in Grade I occupations. This 
high percentage, as well as the general shortage of Qatari labour 
force led to the creation of "welfare employment", which provided 
the Qatari males with salaries without the actual need to work, this 
causing yet more demand for non-Qatari labour. 
Table 3.15 Qatari Manpower by Occupation and Educational Level (1970) 
% of % of 1% of ' 
Level of Occupation Total each total looha 
Education r to the active I city I II III IV total PoJ::>_ln. I i 
None 212 654 1,830 2,373 5,069 62.1 10.5 I 52.6 
I 
Primary or 206 856 559 548 2,169 26.6 I 4.5 68.0 Kuttab 
I Secondary 120 415 415 48 657 8.0 1.3 75.2 
Technical 92 56 36 9 193 2.4 0.4 72.5 
University 52 24 
-
4 80 0.9 0.2 92.5 
i 
Total 682 2,005 2,499 2,982 8,168 100 16.9 ! 
I Professional and technical, administrative, executive and 
managerial workers. 
II Clerical, sales and related workers. 
III Craftsmen, production and related workers. 
IV Farmers, fishermen, transport and service workers and others 
(including armed forces) 
Source: MEDD, Economic Survey of Qatar 1971, p.76, Table 5.1 
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3.5.2.2. Educational level of non-.gataris 
The education of non-Qataris- in Qatar is free and there is no 
restriction over the right of admission against any minorities in the 
country. The total enrolment, in 1980/81 of non-Qatari pupils was 
13,701, that is to say 34.3 per cent out of the total enrolment of 
39,944 pupils. (34) 
The total non-Qatari potential labour force in 1970, as shown 
in Tables 3.16a and 3.16b, was 47,848 of which only 8,492 were 
females, General deductions drawn from these tables are: 
1) About 67 per cent of the 39,356 males and 53.1 per cent of 
females,were illiterate. This may be explained by a) most of the 
males were manual workers brought from Asian Countries, and b) due 
to the immigration restriction against certain immigrant groups' 
families (see Migration Policies, pp.35-38 ). 
2) Males with secondary education and over made up 15.7 per cent 
of their total. On the other hand, 30.6 per cent of females had 
received secondary or further education. 
3) The overall illiteracy rate in 1970 among non-Qataris was 
about 65 per cent whilst the Qatari average was 64 per cent. 
Employed non-Qataris in 1970 numbered 40,222. ( 35) Table 
3.17 below shows the distribution of these between four major 
occupation groups. Table 3.17 also shows that the general activity 
rate among non-Qataris was about 84 per cent out of the potential 
total. Illiteracy among active non-Qatari workers was higher than 
the general average of non-Qatari potential labour force. Among 
non-Qataris in occupational group I numbers tended to increase 
parallel to rising grades of educational qualification, whilst the 
general trend in the other groups was the reverse. 
Table 3.16a. 
MALE 
Age 
Group None 
15-19 2,707 
20-29 10.714 
30-39 8,165 
40-49 3,595 
50-59 1,312 
Total 26,493 
% of 67.3 
level 
Table 3.16b. 
FEMALE 
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Non~~tari Pote~!Jal Labour Force by Age, Sex, and 
Educational Level (1970 Census) 
I 
Pri- Sec on- Vocat- Univ- % of 
Kuttab mary dary ional & ersity Total none level 
Tech. to total 
group 
116 722 644 22 13 4,224 64.1 
447 2,227 1,569 144 365 15,466 69.3 
522 1,446 1,363 162 617 12,275 66.5 
295 615 638 106 282 5,531 65.0 
154 137 139 43 75 1,860 70.5 
1,534 5,14 7 4,353 477 1,352 i 39,356 67.3 
3.9 13.1 11.1 1.2 3.4 100 
l 
I 
Age Pri- Secon- Vocat- Univ- % of ! 
Group None Kuttab mary dary ional & ersity Total none level 
Tech. to total 
group 
15-19 495 27 256 405 7 9 1,199 41.3 i 
I 
20-29 1,567 95 526 1,094 93 160 3,535 44.3 ! 
I 30-39 1,403 58 278 439 67 114 2, 359 ' 59.5 
40-49 722 29 79 129 14 31 1,004 71.9 
50-59 326 11 21 19 8 10 394 82.5 
Total 4,513 220 1,160 2,086 189 324 8,492 53.1 
% of 53,1 2,6 13,7 24.6 2.2 3.8 100 
level 
Source al-Jaber, M,H., Qatar Human Geography, Unpublished M.A. 
Cairo University Cairo 1977. Appendices. 
Table 3.17. 
Educational 
Level 
None 
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Non-Qatari M~ower Ex Occupation and Education 
Level (1970) 
Occupation Total 
I II III IV I 
% of 
each 
93 2~662 13,496 11,028 27,279 67.8 
Primary or Kuttab 192 1,535 2,207 2,821 6,755 16.8 
Secondary 896 1,752 949 545 4,142 10.3 
Technical 
University 
Total 
Occupation: 
350 87 100 20 557 
1,107 319 33 30 1,489 
2,638 6,355 16,785 14,444 40,222 
I = Professional and Technical, Administrative, 
Executive and Managerial Workers 
II = Clerical, Sales and Related Workers 
III = Crafsmen, Production and Related Workers 
IV = Farmers, Fishermen, Transport and Service 
Workers and Others 
Source Compiled by the Author from MEDD, Economic Survey of 
Qatar, 1971, p.76. 
1.4 
3.7 
100 
% of 
Total 
Active 
I Pop1n. 
56.4 
13.9 
8.6 
1.1 
3.1 
83.1 
It is clear that by 1981 the labour force and educational level 
had changed from what it was in 1970, but unfortunately there is no 
adequate data available. The Central Statistical Organisation has 
shown that,in 198l,of the employees of the Government, although 
illiterates comprised 52.9 per cent out of the total of 41,721, 
the percentage of the Diploma and over qualification holders had 
reached 9,329. (36 ) That is to say 22.4 per cent out of the total. 
r 
! 
! 
I 
I 
' 
I 
I 
' i 
! 
i 
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Conclusion 
There is no doubt that Qatar will continue to depend on a non-
Qatari labour force for the foreseeable future and possibly beyond 
for its development programmes. As more projects, including 
industrial, are established the more dependence on non-Qataris will 
follow. 
The oil crises of 1982/83 forced the government to reduce 
oil production and oil prices, thus decreasing the country's income 
and expenditure. This decrease has forced the government to adopt 
a tough line in its own direct employment and this will certainly 
have a "knock-on" effect on the private sector, especially for 
non-Qataris. This effect could be at least as severe as the slowing 
down of growth in 1977/78. 
Given the very large number of non-Qatari workers, and 
the unavoidable need for a high proportion of them,the government 
will have to set up a consistent employment policy to ensure a 
sufficient supply of labour and to meet other socio-economic require-
ments. Such a policy, to be acceptable and effective, will have to 
contain two components, one that offers secured terms of employment, 
especially for those who have been working for many years in the 
country. This is to give continuity, particularly important in 
industry, and secondly a component of Arabization of the labour 
force i.e. that has been adopted by the Ministry of the Interior in 
most recent years. 
The ultimate policy, which the author recornrnends,is that of 
the Qatarization of the labour force in certain selected sectors, 
i.e. oil, natural gas and basic industries and such a policy, 
re-examined in the Conclusion could be implemented as follows. 
-59-
The 1980 manpower has been calculated for all of the major industrial 
establishments, i.e. QGPC, QAFCO, QAPCO, QFMC, and QNCC. (see also 
Chapters 5 and 6). The total labour force of the above-mentioned 
establishments was 6, 349 employees, of which 1, 393 were Qatar is, about 
22 per cent of the total. These 1980 figures of employment are taken 
as the base year from which an assumed 5 per cent increase in employment 
in these and new activities is then projected. Figure 3,8 illustrates 
this projection for 1980-1989 together with vocational training 
programmes for cadres of different types of manpower. The first year 
as recommended would have three programmes for one to three years, 
while the fourth would extend for a four year period. This step 
should be taken to ensure the maintenance of the present Qatari/non-
Qatari ratio. The programme should then be carried on four year 
bases. The enrolment to such a programme should be selected as 64 
per cent from preparatory stage leavers and 36 per cent from secondary 
stage leavers, the preparatory leavers to be trained as technicians 
and skilled labour force, whilst the secondary leavers to be trained 
as engineers and highly skilled labour force. The programme for 
preparatory certificate holders is assumed to run for four years 
(48 months) as follows -
Period 24 months 6 months 6 months 6 months 6 months 
Institution Indust- I.S the In the In the Vocational 
rial Plant Plant Plant Training 
school 
(I .s.) (as trainee) (as trainee) (as worker) 
Place Qatar Qatar Qatar Qatar Qatar or abroad 
~-~._,· 
Fig 3·8 QClltariia~ions OJVllol VocOJ~DOii"DOJI TII'OJili'liU"'IQJ PII'O~II'Cllliii'tlm®s 
QATARI 
NON-QATAR! 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
A 8 
1983 1984 1985 
e- - E J F c I D u D E E 
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8=278 G ! ! H 
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The programme for the secondary leavers is assumed to run for four 
years (48 months) as follows: 
Period 6 months 6 months 12 months 24 months 
Institution I.S. In the plant In the plant Special course 
(as trainee (as worker) 
Place Qatar Qatar Qatar Abroad 
By adopting such an extensive programme _it is suggested that 
within 5 years from the base year Qataris could comprise about 50 per 
cent of the total labour force and within an additional three years 
the Qataris could make up about 90 per cent; experts and highly 
qualified engineers of non-Qatari origin would make up the remainder.* 
The government, for its part, would have to: 
1. Promulgate a law concerning a compulsory form of education, at 
least until the end of the preparatory stage which will ensure 
a sufficient enrolment of pupils to feed the training 
programmes; 
2. Improve school standards,. especially at elementary and 
preparatory stages; 
3. Improve the standard of the industry School, as well as of the 
Vocational Training Centre and the Commercial Institute, by 
adopting up-to-date techniques and methods. 
4. Adopt a tough line toward Qatari employees who want to move 
* 
from the industrial sector to government, or from productive 
to unproductive work. 
The drop out rate is assumed to be 5 per cent of the total of each 
programme enrolment, but during the whole period this could be-made 
up from movement into employment from those already in the higher 
educational pipeline. 
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5. In spite of the rather disappointing results obtained from 
specialised schools during the 1970's (see Fig. 3.6), maintain 
them in their separate identity but radically improve them. 
One current idea to group them into one body would result in 
the destruction of all of them. 
6. Make proper use of the Ministry of Information facilities to 
encourage the dissemination of positive attitudes towards 
education, training and employment. 
As we shall see from our analyses of industry in Qatar, this 
whole question of manpower deployment is absolutely critical to 
the future as well as significant to the understanding of the present 
situation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN QATAR - POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS 
4.1 Development of Policy Strategy for industry 
A. The evaluation of a strategy for industrialization 
and statements 
policy 
During the 1950's the government, according to QPC reports 
and statements, was not confident of investing within the country 
and it preferred to invest oil revenues in securities accounts 
in the United Kingdom. (l) In addition, the government preferred 
to leave all industrial projects to oil companies and private exploit-
ation. To emphasis this point, we can note that in 1957 the heir 
apparent, Sheikh Ahmad, asked QPC to construct an additional oil 
refinery at the company's cost. This matter had led to serious 
dispute because of the resistance of QPC to this suggestion. (Z) 
(see Oil Refinery in Chapter 6, p. 143 ) . A rare example of the 
government's interest in local industry occurred in 1957 when, it is 
believed, that the government invited Le Grand Adsco to study the 
availabi_li ty of cement raw material in Qatar. (3) Unfortunately 
neither the report, nor the government response are available but 
it is known that no action was taken, 
At the beginning of Sheikh J~ad's rule (which started in 1960), 
two statements relevant to industry emerged. The first was by the 
Ruler, in which he pointed out: (4 ) 
"I will try my best in ;i.ndustrial;ization, this is because I 
am very interested in vocational training, and we should 
increase the number of industries by educating a large 
number of Qatar's people" 
-65-
The second statement was made by the Deputy Ruler (Sheikh 
Khalifah, the present ruler) in which he declared that: (S) 
"Welcome to e~ery Arab producer to Qatar, on condition 
that he be joined by Qatari capital in investment 
projects." 
In 27 May 1963, after only one month of the 1963 "popular 
movement", (6) the Ruler issued an "Explanatory statement on the 
Comprehensive Programme for the Advancement of the Country." This 
statement is the only one of its kind published in the Official 
Gazette. The Ruler, in the statement pointed out that (?) 
"As the study of natural resources of the country and the 
discovery of the best way to invest these resources are 
one of the matters which concern us most in order to lay-
down a complete eeonomic plan for development which will 
stand on a sound scientific base, our government has 
contracted with Arthur D. Little (An American consultant 
firm) to carry out the above-mentioned study. 
The government will pay full attention in examining these 
reports when completed, and to take all means to 
implement the recommendations which prove to be suitable 
for,and profitable to,the country." 
At the end of 1963, Arthur D. Little submitted their report 
to the government. The report consisted of five main recomm-
endations: (S) 
a) To establish the best basis for the investment of 
the State's reserve fund 
b) To develop fishery resources 
c) To reclaim lands and to develop the agricultural sector 
d) To exploit natural gas 
e) To utilize mineral deposits, other than oil, in 
cement manufacture 
The government's response to these points was to select the 
first three recommendations whilst the fourth was left for closer 
examination and further studies to be carried out by the government. 
The fifth point was left only for studying its economical viability, 
including marketing aspects. 
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The start was delayed for two years and not until 2nd July 
1966 did the first industrial establishment emerge. The delay in impl-
ementing the plan was caused mainly by the trend in oil revenues 
which did not rise as expected. (9 ) We also note that the government 
in February 1967 offered 75 per cent of itS 60 per cent share in the 
Qatar National Fishing Company to the Qatari public. But an examin-
ation of the government's expenditure during 1966-67 indicates that 
the real reason behind this action was probably not as the government 
stated i.e. that this was to encourage the Qataris to invest in 
public projects, (lO) but rather to counteract a decline in revenue 
at a time when other expenditure was being cut. 
The first movement of the government in investing in hydro-
carbon industries came in 1968 when it purchased the topping plant 
from QPC (see Chapter 6, Oil Refincryp p. 143-144). 
In 1969.the governmentp due to the improvement in the proven 
oil reserves, production and revenues, then adopted a programme 
based on three general aims : (ll) 
1) increase the national income 
2) diversify the country's income sources 
3) acquisition of technical skills 
It is believed that the government adopted these fundamental approaches 
to development in accordance with Arthur D. Little's specific 
reconnnendations. 
The transfer of power in 1972 (see Section 4.2) helped in the 
acceleration of establishing some elements of an industrialization 
policy. The acceleration came as a result of the completion of the 
general infrastructural programme, which was vigorously undertaken 
between the end of the 1950's and the end of the 1960's. The final 
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formulation of an industrialization policy in Qatar was achieved 
in the early 1970 1 Sp a policy based on several specific elements .Cl 2) 
1) Introduction of a petroleum refining industry; 
2) Application of advanced technology in the production 
and processing of natural gas; 
3) Use of sophisticated technical research in any joint 
venture industry; 
4) Manufacturing cement from Qatar's own raw materials; 
5) Utilizing all feasible means to achieve the growth 
of light industries; 
6) Encouraging Qatari investment in local joint ventures 
either with the government or foreign business 
organizations; 
7) Exploiting fisheries in Qatar's territorial waters. 
8) Developing the agricultural sector by adopting up-to-date 
methods and techniques. 
It is clear that the industrialization strategy in Qatar, before 
evolving to its final form, can be seen as developing in several 
stages. 
B. Industrial development stages in the context of contemporary 
development theo~ 
Before examining the stages of industrialisation in Qatar, we 
need at least to examine in outline the theories and models of 
industrialisation strategies and economic growth which were current 
at the time Qatar was developing its own national policies. First, 
we can say that the theory of Stages of Economic Growth as enunciated 
by W. Rostow was,and is,not applicable to the case of Qatar and the 
rest of the Gulf Emirates. (l 3) This is mainly due to 
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a) the absence of a large peasant agricultural component in the 
pre-industrial traditional society. Rostow assumed that a 
developing country possessed a large traditional rural sector 
with all that that implied. 
b) Rostow in his pre-take off stage assumed that new production 
functions in agriculture, industry and enterprise would be 
based on risk investment of savings from several sectors. 
In Qatar and the Gulf, the only risk investment was provided 
by foreign oil companies partly through the state's central 
treasury. 
c) At the take-off stage Rostow assumed that effective investment 
and choice was mainly carried out by many different types of 
entrepreneurs. In Qatar, the State early appears as the only 
major investor. 
The only components of Rostow's argument which are relevant in 
Qatar and the Gulf are those associated with the results of successful 
growth, i.e. high urbanisation, high income and consumption; these 
are supported by a broad and high production base in the Rostow's 
model but in the Emirates are supported only by revenues from exported 
oil - i.e. a rentier consumerism. 
The big push and balanced growth theories are also not 
applicable in that all of them (Rosenstein-Radon and Nurkse) (1 4) also 
assumed the existence of sizeable multi-sectoral private enterprises 
responsive to enterprise opportunities through investment. The 
doctrines of big push and balanced growth are only relevant to Qatar, 
however, in terms of the considerable resource wealth derived from 
the sale of hydrocarbon making it possible to invest in other 
sectors. Imbalanced growth theory, however, implies the possibility 
of a choice between sectors to develop 9 whilst in Qatar and the rest 
of the Gulf Emirates there is virtually no, or at best only limited, 
choice due to the disequilibrium in natural resource endowment. 
But if unbalanced growth is seen from the theoretical viewpoint only, 
it appears applicable in the Gulf, especially in terms of the growth 
pole approaches of backward and forward linkages. (l 5 ) Even the 
doctrine of the strategy· of import-substitution is far less important 
than in other developing countries because of the existence of large 
export oil revenues which provide a large surplus in the balance 
of payment, while still allowing the consumption of imported goods 
to increase, e.g. in Qatar from QR 1,610 millions in value in 1975,to 
QR 5,265 million in value in 1980. (l6 ) 
The "Russian" model, which is known as the heavy industrial-
ization strategy, (l7) and was adopted by Algeria, appears to fit 
most closely to the Gulf Emirate situation where analogous autocratic 
and bureaucratic systems seem to exist and where the bulk of real 
investment has been carried on by the government in the establishment 
of heavy industries. But the Gulf area rejects the Marxist communist 
philosophy as atheistical, with all that that implies, not only 
in religious matters but also in fundamental socio-economic 
doctrines and practices. Thus in Qatar we find that Islamic teaching 
(together with cultural attitudes inherited from a tribal past) 
produces a situation which can be summarized thus: 
a) The simultaneous alleviation of poverty i.e. social welfare 
with a preparedness to accept the growth of the wealth 
of individuals 
b) Absolute respect for private property 
c) Public ownership exists to supplement and complement 
private ownership and not to replace it. 
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It appears from a comparative analysis of established dev-
elopment theories and models, some of which are very briefly summar-
ized above, that no single strategy. applied in its entirety, matches 
exactly with the situation of industrialization strategy in Qatar 
or in the Gulf Emirates as a whole. All strategies, with the 
exception of Marxist communism, are compatible with the Islamic 
system in respect of private ownership and the role of the private 
sector in saving and investing. However, it is ironic that the skewed 
balance between investment by the public and private sectors and 
the methods and fields of investment make it impossible validly 
to utilise any of the classic models in Qatar. See also the end 
of Section 4.8, p. 90 • 
C. An identifiable growth stage model for the Emirates 
It is clear from historical evidence that Qatar and the 
. rest of the Gulf Emirates have adopted, unintentionally, an indust-
rialization strategy which can be identified as having four stages. 
These stages are: 
1. Random Stage 
Random stage is the stage prior to oil d-iscovery in a period 
which may extend over the first decade or so after oil discovery. The 
main economic activity of the inhabitants was pearl fishing which 
was export-oriented. The leading sheikhs at this stage were essen-
tially tax and customs collectors, for the Ottoman Imperial power 
up to 1916 and thereafter, to maintain the Ruler and the apparatus 
of government such as the police force and administration. The 
only effective risk investment was brought by foreign oil companies, 
while other investments in a very limited number of fields were 
carried out by private entrepreneurs. The royalties and duties 
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which were collected from the oU industry created a need for,and 
the possibility of developing infrastructural facilities. The revenue 
for this was concentrated in the hands of the Ruler. In the meantime 
the Rulers and their developing institutions of government asked several 
foreign consultants to guide them in possible fields of investment, 
especially those projects which could utilise the proponderant natural 
resource, i.e. oil and hydrocarbons. There was no central idea of 
planning or of policy priori ties. 
2. Selective and Infrastructural Stage 
The selective infrastructural stage, although not separated by 
a clear boundary line from the previous one, emerged usually after the 
first decade of oil exploitation. The process of selection by the 
emerging domestic governmental machinery was carried out in accordance 
with the foreign consultant's findings and reconnnendations. The 
government(s) was strongly influenced towards investment in a limited 
range of possible heavy industrial projects which private savings could 
not financepor where large-scale risk played a vital role. In the 
meantime the government(s) established for the first time official 
education systems, health services, roads, i.e. physical and human 
infrastructure combined with welfare services. Simple arithmetic forced 
governments to recognize the great length of time required to develop 
local human resources into highly skilled forms. So these countries 
(the Gulf Emirates) imported all and more of what was required by the 
industrial sectors and others. This stage, also lasting about another 
decade, was essentially a period of broad-front expenditure with no 
net returns to government investment, and in which the private sector 
was mainly involved in the rising commercial and importing business. 
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3. Heavy Industrial and Consumption-Stage 
The heavy industrial stage~ as shown by historical events emerged 
almost two decades after the oil exploitation. The government(s) in 
this stage played an effective role in financing and organizing oil, 
natural gas and other basic industries. The massive expenditure on 
these projects and other services created a large demand for manpower, 
building raw materials and other inputs. This led to high aggregate 
levels of consumption, which as measured by imports was estimated in 
Qatar in 1980 as QR 21,937,500 per person per annum, or QR 1,828,125 
per month. (lS) This stage also took approximately a decade. This was 
a period of upward spiralling expenditure in which growth in each 
sector encouraged growth elsewhere. Now the private sector began to 
be involved in industrial activities, investing in the production of 
construction materials in particular. 
4. Forward Linkage Stage 
The forward linkage stage emerges after about three decades 
from the beginning of oil exploitation. The main structural charac-
teristic of this stage is the movement of emphasis away from the 
governmental creation of heavy industries which are export-oriented 
to light and medium industries, based on private sector investment, 
which produce consumer goods as well as construction materials. The 
high consumption rate which appeared in the previous stage continues 
at the same level or just above. The private entrepreneurs increas-
ingly play a dominant role in industry, whilst the government more and 
more assumes an organizing role. 
Kuwait entered the fourth stage in the mid-1970's while Qatar 
entered the last stage at the beginning of the 1980's. The U.A.E., 
with the exception of Dubai, are in the middle of the third stage. 
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For Saudi Arabia, although it has resources other than oil, the model 
is to some extent still applicable and it is believed that it is well 
advanced in the fourth stage. Bahrain, on the other hand, due to its 
small oil and gas reserves, has changed the emphasis from growth in 
manufacturing to become a banking and services centre in the Gulf, a 
special form of the fourth stage. 
A key factor is that Qatar and other Gulf Emirates during all 
four stages have remained dependent on international markets and 
suppliers. In the first stage, for instance9 the level of earnings of 
ea~h single year depended mainly on the price of the Gulf pearls 
in the international markets and when the artificial pearls of Japan 
were produced, the Gulf pearls retreated in value and collapsed as 
an industry. In the second, third and fourth stages the government(s) 
was/were dependent on foreign consultants, trade, labour, technology 
and capital equipment, etc. in their development programmes, and remain 
so today. Not only that but the Gulf still relies on international 
markets for the sale of crude oil and 'other hydrocarbon exports. 
This is not the place to consider the issue of dependence as 
such but perhaps we ~an not_e_ the following as relevant to the four 
stages outlined above. The first Random Stage was one which the Gulf 
Emirates were all to varying degrees politically dependent on external 
powers, primarily the United Kingdom. Governments which were only slowly 
evolving from traditional sheikhly systems were also economically 
dependent on the large and powerf~l trans-national oil companies for 
revenues and dependent for advice on foreign consultan~s. The second 
Selective and Infrastructural Phase was one in which the economic 
dependence on oil revenue, still determined by the companies, became 
even more critical because of rising demands for income to meet 
soaring expenditure. This was also a period in which,although domestic 
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government institutions became stronger, the reliance on foreign 
experts and specialists, as well as general labour grew rapidly and 
almost uncontrollably. Dependence on foreign markets for crude oil 
exports and foreign suppliers of virtually all capital and consumer 
goods, including food, became almost total. 
The third Heavy Industry and Consumption Phase shows some changes 
in the pattern. The governments take control of their oil and, through 
OPEC and OAPEC, attempt to control the rate of growth of oil production 
and prices, although still remaining dependent on foreign production 
companies, who also dominate the marketing of oil. Revenue demands 
continue to rise as also does the dependen~e on imported materials 
and manpower. Further, the new heavy petro-chemical industries them-
selves are dependent on foreign markets. It is also a period in 
which importers of oil, gas and feedstock realise their dependence 
on the Gulf exporters. The fourth stage of Forward Linkages is 
essentially one of increasingly complex mutual interdependence between 
the Gulf countries and the industrialised world and also the increasing 
network of "dependence" linkages between components of the private 
and public sectors of the domestic economies of the Gulf - especially 
in industry. The appearance of the GCC extends this into regional 
areas. The ways in which the question of regional and international 
linkages have been recently discussed by Arab planners is further 
considered in the Conclusion. 
4.2 The Linkage of Government Bodies with Politial Authority 
In Qatar, as in many analogous situations, the role of the 
government in economic decision making, as we shall further consider 
in Chapter 8, is crucial. As explored later in this and succeeding 
chapters, government bodies of many types dominate the process of 
industrialisation. These bodies are ultimately an<l directly all 
responsible to political authority which in Qatar, as in neighbouring 
states, has evolved from a Sheikhly system to a bureaucratised 
administration in which the Ruler (or his nominated Deputy) takes 
final decisions. 
As we shall see, although there is considerable continuity 
throughout the period with which we are concerned, i.e. the oil era, 
it is useful to make a chronological division - before and after 1972. 
The Linkages before 1972 
During the late 1940's and the whole of the 1950's English 
advisers helped the Ruler to develop a bureaucratic administrative 
system based on three departments, namely Finance, Administrative 
and Petroleum Affairs Departments. All of these were run and directed 
by English experts and advisers, and these were the govern~ent 
ministries up to 1962. (l 9) 
In 1962 the government issued Law No. (1) of 1962 of Organizing 
the Supreme Administration of the government. In accordance with 
Article (l) the Deputy Ruler was invested with the following 
powers: (20) 
1) To prepare a general policy, on the basis of a comprehensive 
programme, which will guarantee to the State the greatest 
measure of economic, social, cultural and administrative 
improvement; 
2) To propose Laws and decrees organizing the chief principles and 
basic rules of general government policy; 
3) To issue regulations, administrative decisions, orders and 
circulars necessary to put into effect general government 
policy; 
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4) Higher supervision for running of the government's financial 
and administrative organisation; and 
5) The appointment and dismissal of government employees in 
accordance with the provisions of the law. 
In addition to these powers, the Provisional Constitution, which 
was promulgated on 2nd April 1970, gave the Deputy Ruler the Prime 
Minister's post. Article (30) of this constitution stated that the 
Ruler would appoint Ministers in accordance with the Prime Minister's 
suggestions. In addition, the second clause of Article (38) stated 
that each minister was individually responsible to the Prime Minister, 
to carry out his dudes and dealing with the subject-s with which 
he is concerned. (Zl) Chart 4.1 illustrates the position which had 
evolved in the period before 1972. 
Chart 4.1 Pre 1972 - Upper Echelons of Government 
Amir 
Deputy Ruler/Prime Minister 
Prime Minister/Chairman 
Council of Ministers 
The linkages after 1972 
On 22nd F.ebru~~y,l972 the Deputy Ruler assumed the Amirship 
from his cousin Sheikh Ahmed bin Ali in a peaceful transfer of power*. 
The continuity of direction of the new regime is well established, 
* This accession was called "The Correction Movement". 
-77-
this continuity coming as a result of the authority and responsibility 
as Deputy Ruler and Prime Minister vested in the present Amir before 
1972p which made himp in practice, the strongest figure. Sheikh 
Khalifa, in the transfer of power, conveyed all powers to himself 
either directly as the Amir, or indirectly as Prime Minister (see 
Chart 4.2). These powers are well explained in the Amended Prov-
isional Constitution which was promulgated on 19th April 1972. (22) 
Chart 4.2 Post 1972 - Upper Echelon; of Government 
Amir 
Prime Minister/Chairman 
Counci 1 of Ministers 
It is clear, therefore, before and after 1972, that Sheikh 
Khalifa had been,and is still,organizing the general structure 
of the state's plans and he has also involved himse 1f directly, 
as will be seen in Chapter 8, with major and minor projects in 
the state, either economic, soc:lal, industry, cultura1 or 
administrative. 
After outlining how the state runs and controls the matters 
relevant to this study we can focus our discussion on the key 
governmental bodies whose jurisdiction involves them in industry 
and industrial organisation as a whole. We must also bear in mind 
the characteristics of the linkages out lined in terms of their 
relevance to development theory as well as practice. 
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4.3 Ministry of Finance & Petroleum 
As mentioned earlier, the bureaucratic organisation of finance 
and petroleum affairs was started in the 1940's under British control. 
In accordance with Article (3) of Law No (1) of 1962, Organizing the 
Supreme Administration of the Government, it was stated, a chief 
General Department shall be composed of three departments, namely: (23 ) 
1. Department of Finance Affairs 
2. Department of Administrative Affairs 
3. Department of Petroleum Affairs 
The higher supervision of the Petroleum -Department was officia-lly 
handed to the Minister of Finance (the Deputy Ruler) in October 
1967. (24 ) The functions of the petroleum department have changed 
several times since 1967, and by 1970 the functions of the department, 
as' defined by Law No (5) of 1970, were as follows: (2S) 
1) To carry out all the development of the petroleum industry in 
Qatar, and its progress, organization and the best utilization 
of oil resources; 
2) To follow up the activities of exploration, drilling, production, 
exporting and other technical activities; 
3) To study the economic bases on which the oil companies in 
Qatar operate, and to study the technical and economical 
statements and reports which these companies make, and 
prepare the necessary reports in this respect; 
4) To carry out the necessary negotiations with the oil companies 
operating in Qatar for the best technical and most economical 
ways which would guarantee the best achievements for the State; 
5) To prepare studies and s~tatements requested by OPEC, and to 
express opinions concerning stuaies and proposals prepared 
by OPEC. 
6) To follow up developments and trends relating to the petroleum 
industry and prepare the requisite studies to show the effects 
of these developments and trends on the petroleum industry 
in Qatar. 
The Department of Petroleum, during the 1960 1 s existed but at 
the same time was inactive. This was mainly due to the policy of 
the oil companies which always made direct contact with the highest 
level in the State i.e. the Amir and the Deputy Ruler, and not, as 
specif1ed in the law, through the officials of the petroleUlii 
department. This is why in 1970 the Committee for Studying the 
Ministerial Reports* strongly recommended that any governmental 
approach to the oil companies, or vice versa should be done through 
the Department of Petroleum. (26 ) This recommendation has still 
not been followed, and the establishment of the Qatar National Oil Company, 
by Law No (13) of 1972, manacled the department even more, insofar 
a~ al~_ i~p_ory_ant functions and ~~jectives were transferred to 
QNOC. In addition, later, the government replaced QNOC with an 
even stronger corporation called the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation 
(QGPC) (see pp. 84-8~. The corporation took full jurisdiction 
over the oil industry and it usurped the functions of the Petroleum 
Department in some cases, in following developments and trends re-
latin_g to the oil industry. ( 27) The corporation has even become 
the dominant representative of Qatar in world-wide conferences, 
i.e. OPEC and OAPEC. 
This Committee was set up :in accordance with the Council of 
Ministers Resolution No (4) tif 1970. 
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The Departments of Finance and Administration have been sub-
divided into various specialist units, none of which dire<:;tly controls 
or affects industrial activities» whilst economic and commercial 
affairs were transferred to the Ministry of Economy and Commerce. 
4.4 Ministry of Economy artd Commerce 
The first edicts and regulations which directly affect our 
field of study were as follows: 
Article (1) 
"An office called the 11Commercial Registry" sha.Jl be 
established in the General Department ·of the Government 
for· the control of companies •... " 
This is an article included in Law No (ll) of 1962 of 
. ~8) ( Establishing a Commercial R~gistry. In Article 9) of this 
Law the legislation pointed out that: 
"No person, real -or juristic, shall be allowed, f'rom the 
date of promulgating the law, to engage in coirunerce 
or to open a commercial or indtistriai establishment 
in Qatar without obtaining a licence from the 
Commercial Registry." 
Since 1st October 1962,the companies and establishments should 
have, but not all of them did, obtained licences to practise business 
th~ 
in Qatar. This approach was mainly due toAessentially commercial 
characteristics of nominally industrial enterprises which operated 
in Qatar. 
In accordance with Law No (5) of 1970, tJw Economy Department 
was included in the Ministry of Finance & Petroleum, whilst the 
Commerce Department was grouped with Industry and Agriculture. After 
less than two months Law No (11) of 1970 was issued, as an amendment 
of the Law No (5), and establishing the new Ministry of Economy and 
Commerce. 
In accordance with Article (4) of Law No (11) of 1970, the 
functions of the Commerce Department were as follows: ( 29) 
1) To lay down the general policy of internal and external 
trade and to supervise its implementation; 
2) Conceive methods to facilitate and control the flow of 
imported and domestic products, industrial, agricultural 
crops, animal, fishery and others; 
3) To organise the commercial companies' registration, construction 
companies' registration and commercial agencies' registration; 
4) Combat odeception in trade; 
5) To organise and to .sUpervise food supplies and }landling. 
At the same time Article (4) also defined the Economy Department's 
funGtion to be as follows: 
1) To conceive policies and- programmes and to prepare projects 
which support the national economy in a manner which secure 
the safety and flourishing of the country; 
2) To direct economic development by scientific planning and 
cooperation with specialized international organisations to 
ensure the State's development and progress and to ensure 
the best living standards of the citizens; 
3) To prepare studies and monetary statements for Qatar & Dubai's 
Monetary Council* 
The jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy & Commerce gave the 
Ministry the power of directing the economy according to the State's 
* The QDMC agreement was abolished in 1973. 
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requirements, but close examination of the Ministry indicates that 
the most important operational function of the Ministry relevant 
to this study is the registration section, headed by the Director of the x 
Economic Affair's Department. On the other hand, the most important 
required function, in the view of the author, which should be 
established is the integrated direction of economic development· 
This is in order to create a balance between all industrial fields. 
4.5 Ministry of Industry and Agriculture 
The Ministry of Industry and Agriculture was created under 
Article (1) of Law No ('5} of 1970 - Delimitation of Ministers 
Authorities and the Specification of the Ministries and other 
governmental Institution's Jurisdiction, and its amendment by 
Law No. (11) of 1970. 
The main objectives of the Industrial Department can be 
stated as follows: (30) 
1) To lay down the State's general industrialization policy and 
to supervise the implementation of the policy; 
2) To utilize the State's natural resources in a manner which 
will lead to increasing of the production level and 
decreasing of the production costs. 
3) To develop the national industries by way of protection, 
organising and encouragement, with the exception of the 
petroleum industries; 
4) To study the application of new projects proposed in 
connection with the State's requirements for such projects 
and to carry out all necessary action concerning them; 
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5) To lay down the specifications of industrial.production which 
all the industrial establishments should follow 
6) To combat deception in industrial products. 
According to the above-mentioned objectives, the Ministry was 
apparently the body most dominant over industries other than oil in 
Qatar. But, unfortunately, what happened to the Petroleum Department 
was repeated in the case of the Industry Department and even more so. 
In 1970 the Committee for studying the Ministries' Reports had 
recommended that in the primary stage the government should content 
itself by appointing no more than a Director of Industrial Affairs. (31 ) 
This recommendation remained essentially eff~ctive up to "1980. The 
reasons for this lack of departmental strength lie in a) the estab-
lis}1ing of the Industrial Development Technical Centre (IDTC) .to 
carry out planning and supervision, as noted in Section 4.7, and, 
b) the registration of industrial establishments which was carrie·d out 
by the Ministry of Economy & Conimerce. The release of the Industrial 
Department from these limitl1tions on full j,urisdiction over its 
stated function came with the promulgation of Law No (11) of 1980 of 
Industrial Organisation. The effect of this, however, did not last 
long. This is mainly due to Article (3) of this law where a permanent 
committee was to be established called the "Committee of Industrial 
Development". This committee (as considered in Section 4.9) had 
transferred to its jurisdiction most of the Industrial Department's 
objectives, leaving the Department to act as little more than a 
. (32) 
secretariat for the Comm1ttee. 
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4. 6 Qatar Geh¢ral P~et:t:'oleum Corpo~a tion (QGPC) 
Qat<l.r National Oil Company was created by Law No (13) of 1972. 
The creation of this company came as a result of the participation 
of the government in QPC's and SCQ's oil concessions. The government, 
in accordance with the proposal to take over all the country's hydro-
carbon resources and related activities, created QGPC by Decree of Law 
No (10) of 1974. This decree transferred the QNOC's jurisdiction-
to QGPC. 
The main stated function of QGPC was to fully develop the oil 
industry both l'lithin the country and abroad. This included th,e following: 
a) Exploration and extra~tion of oil and n(ltural gas; 
b) Production, refining, storing and distribution of oil, oil 
products and by-products; 
c) Contracting with international firms for marketing abroad. 
QGPC, in order to achieve its main functions, has been vested 
with the following powers: 
1) Establishing auxiliary companies, independently or jointly; 
2) Acquis-::i tion of, or partic:lpa:tion in, existing companies; 
3) Contracting with other companies or bodies which are involved 
in similar works, or which may help it in achieving its 
objectives; the corporation may participate in any manner 
with such companies or bodies, or may purchase or affiliate 
with them; 
4) To carry out all legal matters necessary to perform its 
operation. ( 33) 
QGPC, although a company rather than strictly a governmental 
body, is,however,wholly owned by the Government, following the Council 
of Ministe:rs 0 directive, with an initial capitalisation of one thousand 
million QRs, which has since been increased several times, reaching four 
billion QRs on 2nd July, 1980. 
In accordance with Article (9)(1) of Law No (10) of 1974, the 
Amir passed Resolution No. (6) of 1974 appointing the QGPC Board 
of Directors. The Board then comprised seven members,* headed by 
the Minister of Finance and Petroleum. Three of the members belong 
to the same ministry, while the other three are the State Adviser 
(as Vice Chairman), the Director of the Amir's office and the 
- ( 34) Managing Director of IDTC. The Board has the right to undertake 
all responsibilities for managing the c()rporation with the 
exception of the following matters which should be approved by the 
Council of Ministers: 
a) Obtaining internal or external loans 
b) Establishing auxiliary companies independently or 
c) 
jointly or participation in existing companies. 
( 35) Practising exploration and drilling of oil and gas operations. 
On 8th February 1975 the Council of Ministers issued Resolution 
No (-1-) of 1975, transferring all the- remaining -rights and assets 
of foreign oil companies (QPC and SCQ) to QGPC. (36 ) After the final 
take-over agreement with QPC on 16th September 1976, (37) QGPC 
established Qatar Petroleum Producing Authority - onshore and offshore, 
to carry out all oil operations, including exploration, drilling, 
production, processing, developing, transporting and storing, whilst 
marketing is held by QGPC. (for QGPC and its agreement with the 
foreign oil companies see Chapter 5, p.l06). 
* The members of the Board were increased to nine members in 1980. 
The two additional members are the Deputy Managing Director of 
QGPC and the Assistant Director of the Office of the Minister of 
Finance & Petroleum. 
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It is C"lear from this brief discussion that QGPC, although 
under the Chairmanship of the Minister of Finance & Petroleum, took 
all the oil industrial operations away from the Petroleum Dep~rtment. 
I 
At the same time, and in accordance with Article (4) of Law No (10) 
of 1974, QGPC has the right to set up any kindsof industries in 
Qatar connected to the oil industry. but this right, as seen above, 
was limited by the need to obtain the approval of the Council of 
Ministers. In addition, the corporation should involve IDTC, as 
seen below, in their preparation for setting up new industries. 
4. 7 Industrial Develop~ent Technical Centre {TDTC) 
The Centre is an independent governmental establi-shment with 
responsibility directly to the Amir. IDTC was created by 
Law No (3) of 1973 (38) in order to be the "Think-Tank" of all 
industrial development plans and to supervl.sc their execution after 
being ratified. The function of IDTC is best explained by its 
statutes, which may be summarized as follows (for full details 
see Appendix 4. 1 ). 
a) Preparing industrialization plans and projects to utilize 
the State's natural resources in conformity with its 
revenues and requirements; 
b) To carry out the economic and technical studies of these 
projects; 
c) to follow up the execution of approved industrial plans 
and projects; 
d) PE.!-rticipate in planning the availability of Qatari manpower 
and training; 
e) Co-operate and co-or~linate with other governmental bodies 
concerned. 
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The centre was the first specialized body which the government 
created to deal with industrial development in Qatar and its ultimate 
fabrication. But the apparent freedom of action of IDTC is restricted 
by Article (4) of Law No (3) of 1973 in which:C 39) 
"The centre shall submit all its reports to the Amir, 
and the plans and projects submitted will not be 
considered operative unless they are approved by 
the Amir." 
Even the technical experts at the centre shall be appointed by an 
Amiri decision. 
The centre, however, during it's short life has made a number of 
contributions t,o industry, such as the formulation and detailed 
study of proposals for (a) the oil refinery, (b) iron and steel, 
(c) petrochemicals, (d) expansion of cement plant and lime production, 
(e) cOmpost fertilizer, (f) au-tomatic slaughterhouse and (g) geological 
surveys for minerals other than oil and gas, and that is not the 
full extent of its contributions. C40) 
In accordance with Articles(2) and (3) of Law No (3) 
of 1973 all government ministries and institutions have to involve 
IDTC in their projects from the first stage to completion, including 
instructions regarding the supply of capital, pricing the final 
products and marketing, instructions which must be taken by Il.Yl'C 
and approved by the Amir. Clearly, most of the IDTC functions 
overlap with,and can conflict with,those of the Industry Department, 
Petroleum Department, QGPC and the most recent Committee of Industrial 
Dev_elopment. But the strength of IDTC is derived from the Amir's 
power and this is why the centre has survived. 
4. 8 Taxation, Laws in Qatar 
Qatar has been familiar \\'ith taxation methods since the era 
of the pearl industry, but the first taxation Law of Qatar is 
Decree No (1) of 1954 of Qatar Income Tax. This decree was issued, 
under the instructions of the Political Resident in the Gulf, on 
23rd April 1954. (4l) This taxation decree was set to levy taxes 
from the net income of all kinds of activities, either industrial 
or commercial, which practise business operations on Qatar's territory. 
The Director of Income Tax, appointed by the Ruler, was 
empowered to collect the income tax due and pa:y it promptly to the 
Ruler. On 24th Septemb~r 1955 the Political Resi_dent in th_~ G\l_lf ha,d 
issued Decree No (6) of 1955 of Amenqment of Qatar Income Tax. (42 ) 
. (43) The tax rate as specified in this amendment was as follows: 
On income more than Bu:t not exce~ding The % shall be 
70,000 Nil 
70,000 250,000 5 
250;000 500,000 10 
500,000 750,000 15 
1, ooo, oop· . 20 
1,000,000 1,500,000 25 
1,500,000 2,000,000 30 
2,000,000 3,000,000 35 
3,000,000 4,000,000 40 
4,000,000 5,000,000 45 
5,000,000 so 
Although D~cree No (1) of 1954 and its amendements were issued 
long ago, the taxation law in practice has been consistently applied 
;:gg..:. 
only to foreig~ banks and oil co!Jlpan.iesD (44 ) whilst Qatari public 
industries were exempt. This exemption cqme as a result of 
implementing Decree - Law No (3) of 1966 of Some Taxation Measure-
ments to Support the National Economy and its Development. (4S) 
Article (1) of Decree Law No (3) of 1966 stated that Qatari joint 
stock companies were exempt both from the existing taxes and 
whatever might be imposed in the future. Whilst Article (2) with its 
amendment had made this exemption for five years, this may be 
extended. But this exemption~ as defined by Article (3), should 
be supported by individual decisions from the Deputy Ruler/Minister 
of Finance. At no time fias there been any specific identification 
--
fdr tax ptlrposes of the Qatari private sector as a whole, and, 
ef:fect:ively, the private sector has been virtually ignored by the 
Income Tax Director. 
The other tax applied in Qatar is the Customs Ta~iff which 
include: ( 46) 
1. Payable Tariff* % 
General goods except those prohibited 
by law 
Tobacco, Cigarettes, Cigars etc. 
Gramophones & gramophone records 
Alcoholic beverages~ beer~ cider und 
similar 
10_*-* 
15 
SO*** 
2. Goods exempt from duties 
** 
*** 
Portland cement, :fresh fruits and vegetables, dates, 
livestock, sugar, rice, animal feed, printed material, 
gold and silver bullion a~d coins, undrilled pearls 
pro?uced in the Arabian Gulf, .and personal effects. 
All tariffs are levied on CIF value 
In 1983 the duties were increased to 30% 
Imported under special permit only 
._-"=': 
3. §B2ort anQ Transit good5_;_ No duty is Levied 
Most, if not all, industrial and commercial establishments 
in Qatar have been exempted from the 2~ per cent customs duties on 
everything related to their activities (see 4.10 below). Apart from 
that there are no other forms of tax applied in Qatar. 
Since there is no taxation of activities and since the custom 
tariffs are generally not applied to Qatari establishments, industrial 
and commercial, whilst this can be regarded as an act of policy in 
itself, it does mean that the use by government of taxation and tariffs 
as instruments to influence the nature of devel()p]llent growth, partic-
ularly,in industr_y, is not available to the government. Qat~r-and 
its neighbours are strikingly different in this respect to almost 
all other present-day states. 
4. 9 Industrial OrgaJiizatio~s' 
The organizing and iQentification of industries as manufacturing 
establishJII~nts did not attract the attention of the government 1.mtil 
\Tery recent years. But the regulation oJ industries as commercial 
establishm_ents was,and still is,the main governmental issue. The first 
attempt in commercially organizing industries was carried out by 
the promulgation of Law No (11) of 1962 of establishing the Commercial 
Registry (see Ministry of Economy & Co~erce, Section 4.4). However, 
the government, two decades after establishing the registry, still has 
no control over the growth and direction of the private sector, either 
in the field of industry, services or commercial, and still, up to 
this date, some of the private sector establishments arce carrying out 
industrial and commerCial activities without obtaining a licence 
(see Small Scale Industry and Industrial Estates of Doha, Chapters 
6 and 7). 
-:,-. 
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How(;;lver. the growt"h in the government's seriousness in organ-
izing th& industrial sector as a whole, and private industries 
sp~cifically, appeared in 1980 with the promulgation of Law No ( 11) 
f I d . 1 0 . . ( 4 7.) o n ustr1a rgan1sat1on. The law consists of 31 articles, of 
which Article (1) defined the conditions on which the industrial 
establishment can be recognized. These conditions are that industries 
should: 
1) have the main objective of manufacturing, processing or 
extraction of materials, mixing, collecting, fabrication, 
p~cking or cle;ming of materials and 
2) have capital investment nQt ,bei_ow -QR 4!?0,000 and with 
permanent employees of not less than 10 persons. 
Article (2) c1e:6ned local products a,s those which utilize as inputs 
not less than 40 per cent from local sources. 
In accordance with Article (3) of Law 'No (11) of 1980, a 
permanent committee called the "Committee of Industrial Development" 
was established. The committee, as specifi(;)_d by the article, consisted 
of 12 members headed by the Deputy Minister of Industry and Agriculture. 
(see Table 4.1). The nomination of individual members of the 
committee was left to be considered by the Council of Ministers. 
In Article (5) the legislation stated the foliowing objectives 
of the committee: 
1) To study the proposals and systems which aim tQ organise, 
protect, encourage and develop the national industries; 
2) To p:ropose the general policy of benefits, exemptions, 
facilities and incentives which are granted to 
industrial projects; 
3) Arty other jurisdiction which the law provides. 
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Table 4.1 The Members of the Committee of Industrial 
Development 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Deputy Minister of Industry & 
Agriculture 
Director General of IDTC 
Representative of the Arnir' s Office 
II 
II 
II 
II 
" 
" 
II 
II 
II 
of Ministry of Industry & 
Agriculture 
II 
II 
II 
II 
" 
" 
" 
Finance & Petroieum 
Economy.& Connnerce 
Justice 
Electricity & Water 
·Municipality Affairs 
Interior 
IDTC 
Qatar Chamber of 
Conunerce 
Chflirrilan 
Vice'-Chairman 
Member 
II 
II 
II 
II 
" 
II 
II 
" 
" 
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All the Co~ittee's proposals are subject to the approval by the 
Council of Ministers. 
In accordance with Article (20) an industrial establishment 
which is eligible for loan credit is one in which capital does not 
exceed QR 20 million. Article (23) limited the loan to 40 per cent 
of the total capital investment of the industrial establishment, with 
fixed interest charged of 3 per cent per annum. Article (3) added 
that the due date of payment of the loan and its interest should be 
- made within seven years, considering the first two years as a tolerance 
period. Whilst the CID will approve licences, the jl,lrisdiction for 
gran,tA11:g loans to industrial estabHshments is held by _another committee 
which l-ia-s set up according to Article· (25). This committee, called the 
"Co1Il111ittee of Light Industries Loans", consists of five me_mpers headed 
by the representative of the Alpir's office (see Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 The Merilb:e:rs . .off the _CoJ!Ullittce at Light 
Indu~rtr:ies Loans 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Represeqtati ve of the Am_ir9 s office 
II 
II 
" 
" 
~i!_l._lst;ry of_ Indust_rxJL 
Agriculture · 
Ministry of Finance & 
Petroleum 
IDTC 
Qatar Chamber of Commerce 
Chairman 
Member 
II 
" 
II 
The legislation specified in Article (11) that the Minister 
of Industry and Agriculture, on the recommendation of CID, has the 
right to cancel the licence of any industrial establishment if one 
or more of the following conditions are fulfilled: 
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1) If the company's declaration of intent for construction, 
operation and production, appears frivolous; 
2) If any of the conditions in the licence have rtot been met; 
3) If the industrial establishment intentionally supplied 
wrong information; 
4) If it is confirmed that an industrial establishment, which 
existed at the time of promulgation of this law, did not 
conform with the law. 
Anyone whose licence was cancelled may appeal to the Council of 
Ministers. 
It is clear, from the formulati_on and :r;-e:preseiltatfon -of 
Law No (11) of 1980, that the CollJ1cil of M!nisters, which is· hea,ded 
by the Amir, has the upper hand over th.e pe,rformance of these t\vO 
committees rather than the Minister of Inclustry and Agriculture. 
In addition, there is confusion over the jurisdiction of :the Industry 
D~partlfl<mt of the Ministry of Industry _and Agriculture, IDTC ano 
CI'D. Furthermore, all the laws and decrees iss.ues are accompanied 
by. an artic-le stating- that -all -previous--rules -and--regulat-ions 
which are inconsistent shall be abolished, again a source of some 
confusion. 
4.10 Government InceJ1tives fo:t IrtdU$try 
It is known that every country in the world offers incentives, 
in one form or another, to local industries, both to public and 
pri vatc sectors. There arc several inducements ava ilabl c to attract 
the entrepreneurs to establish new industries in Qatar, wh i.ch take 
direct and indirect forms. The main direct inducements are the 
following: 
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1. J,.ease of land at nominal rent 
The land which is leased to industry is the government's own 
land. The government only supplies the levelled land to the 
individual project and then the entrepreneurs build their own premises. 
There are two forms of leasehold, the first not requiring the payment 
of any sum against the land lease, and normally applied to the public 
sector industries. Under the second, the occupier is required to 
pay a nomi1\al amount against the lease, and this is used for the 
private sector (see Chapter 7 IED). In both cases it is understood 
that the land will remain in the government's possession. C·l 8 ) 
2. &em_ission of Taxes and [)Uties 
As mentioned earlier, the only taxes and duties which exist 
in Qatar are income tax and customs tariffs. The government, by 
pronn,1lgating Law No (3) of 1966 ·of Some Taxation Measurements to 
Support the National Economy and its Development, maintained the 
right to make some taxation exemptions to certain projects of the 
public sector. QASCO, for instance, under an agreement with the 
government, would not pay any taxes until the cumulative net profit 
(-49} woura equar -tfie-Triifial capit-al investment in the plant. The 
private sector, on the other hand, has not been committed to pay 
any amount from its net income. 
Although the customs duties on equipment, raw materials, 
and imported services are 2~ per cent of ClF values, the public 
sector industries have a special arrangement with the Ministry of 
Finance and Petroleum to receive exemption on the above-mentioned 
duties. The private sector,in some cases,can obtain the same 
exemption on equipment, raw materials and imported services. All 
the exemptions arc governed by re:;olution either from the Amir, the 
Counci I of Ministers or the Minister of Finance 11 Pet rolcum. 
3. Transfe~ Qf Fore-ign Funds 
In Qatar there is unrestricted transfer of funds in and out 
of Qatar, This inducement was set up to attract foreign capital 
and investment in the country, The attraction of foreign capital, 
although Qatar has hypothetically enough capital for investment in 
industry, was seen as a means to transfer modern technology, skill, 
experience, marketing, administrative and management know-how of the 
industrial field from industrialized nations to Qatar. The partie-
ipation of foreigners, in industry and commerce, is,however,governed 
by Law No (20) of 1963 and its amendments. (SO) The legislation 
in Article (3), sta_t_ed that 
" •.• Foreigners w}:lo are engaged_-in iridus1::ry shall''be 
acc~pfed~ (f Jhey have a Qafar'i'paJ-tfi~r or :Partners 
provided tha~. the capital of· the ~afaiis shall not 
be less than ·SI per cent of :~the firm-, s capitaL ii (Sl) 
In Article (2) of Degree-Law No (26) of 1966, the l~gislation limited 
the capital of foreigners practising business without a Qatari 
... · (52) partner, to be not more than QR 5, 000. But, "in the public 
interest", all or part of Law (20) of 1963 and its amendment can be 
diSpensed with, 
4. Foryign Labour 
The government, through the Ministry of the Interior, periodically 
has-produced measures to ease the importation of foreign labo~r needed 
for industrial establishments. The shortage of the local labour 
force, as noted in Chapters 3 and 9, made it necessary for the Qatari 
industrial establishments to import virtually all their requirements 
of manpower. The government, lately, has given permission to private 
sector establishments to import their expert and skilled manpower 
from any part of the world, though of course not from Communist 
.-97-
countrie,$, while, semi-skilled and unskilled labour should be from 
certain Arab countries (mainly from Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia 
and Sudan). The public sector is allowed to import its semi-skilled 
and unskilled labour from any destination. 
Besides these general incentives there are several inducements 
applied to the public sector as direct incentives whilst the same 
ones are applied to the private sector as indirect incentives. These 
are essentially infrastructural facilities, which include the following: 
1. Erection of roads from the plant site to the main road 
l!~:tw_ork of the COJJ,ntry; 
2. · Provision of ,gas, cicctr.icity and water for industrial 
estaoHshinents at prices close to production cost; 
3. Proyision of: port facili~i~;; to serVice in~ustrial 
establishmc;lnts; 
4. D€wetoprnent of Qatari human resources throli.~h education, 
technical arid administrative training in all fields 
aild at all levels. 
There are; in ad.dition to the above-rnen~~~~ne~_ ipcenpves, 
several inducements which are confined to the public sector only. 
They are: 
1. Provision of State's guarantees for foreign loahs; 
2. In practice, the supply of credit by local banks; 
3. Assistance with housing for workers and staff; 
4. State participation by not less than 70 per cent 
in the equity of industrial firms. 
The role of the state in providing physical and human infrastruc-
ture to support and encourage industrialization was notctl. This .is 
a very complex area because,as in all countries,the separation between 
the provision of facilities for the social good, such as communication, 
education, public utilities ... etc., grades almost imperceptibly 
into the provision of those same facilities to give infrastructural 
support for industry as such. Here all that can be said is that, 
as noted in Chapter 6 on specific industries in the public sector in 
particular and in the private sector in the lED there has been a 
very large outlay by the state specifically to encourage industrial 
development although it is impossible to quantify this very accurately. 
In this chapter we have surveyed the development of the 
government's policy and institutions relevant to industria1ization. 
We now analyse the m1:1,in industrial sectors and the structure of 
operation and it will be shown how these have been governed by the 
state's policy. In Chapter 8 we ret:urn to the key question of 
decision making covering other elements and utilizing the evidence 
obtained from the available data. 
.,gg_ 
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C~PTE~ 5 
EXTRACTlVE .HJDUS'!'RI ES 
This Chapter discusses the development of extractive industries, 
especially oil and natural gas. Section 5.1 examines the evolution 
of the oil extractive industry since the signing of the 1935 Oil 
Concession Agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company Ltd. The 
discussion includes the location of oil fields, pipelines, oil 
storages and terminals. Crude oil production, the evaluation of oil 
reserves/production rate and export will also be discussed. In 
Sect'ioh ·s. 2, beca.u·se c:>f several ·eleijleffts conterilin:) th;e natural gas 
wifi have been airead)/ :outlined in SectiQn 5 .1, the dlscuss{on 
is :focli?ed on proc1ucJion, consumption. a:nd the reserves/pro<ft.~,~tion 
rate of natur~l gas. 'A:Ltn.o·ugh other extt~c,tive inCJustries ape minor 
activities c.ompare'd to, t:~e above4mcrttioned industries,; Sec:tion 5.3 
hi-ghlights these minor extractive industries. The aim here is to 
ic;lentify how the natural endowment has influenced Qatar in devis-ing 
its strategy of investnie.rtt in oil and:natural gas fields rather than 
other natural resource~. 
5.1 Oil lnqu$try 
In this section the first concern is with one particular cxtrac-
tive industry which is one way of looking at the oil industry. The 
oil industry,which originally started as an extractive activity has, in 
fact, very quickly become m1.1ch mo.re than merely an extractive 
industry, and during the period in which the oil industry developed in 
Qatar there has been an enormous explosion of hydrocarbon processing 
which .we now call 11petrochemical". The larger integration is 
considered later in Chapter 6. 
The nrst indication of o}l ;:tvailabili ty in the Gulf region was 
maqe in 1908 in Iran, but Arab countries in the Gulf had no oil 
discovered in their territories before the 1930's, with the exception 
of Iraq in 1927. (l) 
From the 1920's onwards Frank Holmes, of the Eastern and General 
Syndicate, tried several times to obtain an oil concession in Qatar 
from Sheikh Abdulla bin Qasim who tried to follow the example of Ibn 
Saua of Saudi Arabia, and to disregard the 1916 Treaty with Britain. 
The British Political Resident blocked this by invoking the 1916 
Treaty, especially Articles IV and V. ( 2) 
Article IV 
Article V 
I, Sheikh Abdulla, fui-ther undertake that 
r will' ii6t'h~ye re;(atio'ris nor \iorrespond 
with, npr ~eceive :ihe agent ··of any othe:t 
P9~~f w:tihou1: the consent of the Hig~, 
Br.i~Hsn Gc)v~rniri~JJ.t, n€tth~r \\T:fl.l 1, \'/ithou;t 
s'4,~h co~sent, cecle 'tq_:atjy ~·t)1er Power ,o.r 
its s\lbjects, land e_itli~:I:' on l~ase., sale, 
tra_nsfer, gift, or aJ!y O:th&r way wha}soever. 
I also d_e.clare tha't, . witho4t the consent of 
t}\e High.:Biili.sh Gbver~meni;· I will not 
grant pear~ ffshery concessions, or any 
other monopolies conces!:iions, or cable landing 
r~ghts to anyone whOmsoever. 
As' a result, on 17 May 1935 Sheikh Abdulla signed an agreement with 
---~- ~- -· --~- ~---~~ 
Charles C. Mylles, who, acting on behalf of the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Cq!fi:pany Ltd. (APOC), obtained a concession covering the entire 
territory of Qatar in return for 400,000 rupees in cash on signat~re 
and 150,000 rupees for each of the following five years, also followed 
by 300,000 rupees each year to the end of the oil concession 
agreement. The agreement was for 75 years from the signature date, 
ending in the year of 2010, with a fixed oil price of 3 rupees per 
Imperial ton (2240 English pounds av.) which, :in turn, equalled 
4s.6d. at that time (see Appendix 5.1). 
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Traces of oil were discove~ed in 1939 at Dukhan in the extreme 
west of the country at a depth o£5,685 feet. (3) Before any extraction 
could take place, the company shut down the Dukhan oilfield in 1942 
because of World War II. In 1947 the company resumed operations and 
embarked on an extensive programme preparing for oil production, and 
the first export shipment took place at Umm Said oil terminal in 
December 1949. In September 1952, APOC transferred its rights in this 
concession to Petroleum Development (Qatar) Ltd. In 1955 the company 
changed its name to Qatar Petroleum Company Ltd. (QPC)*. 
Becituse of irregularities in the. 19~5 ag~~eJI}~rrt, t_he government 
contested the company's c-laim to -include the-- te:rri'to.rial water 
in its concession and in 1950 the arbitrators' findings confirllled 
Qatar's point of view. So, in 1952, a new oil con_cession agre,ement 
was signed between Sheikh Ali bin Abdulla and George 0. Higgins 
giving the rights of offshore oil concession to Shell Overseas 
Exploration Company Ltd. After two years, the company changed it.s 
n~me to Sh.eP Company- Qa.ta.r (SQQ). The offshore concession included 
all seabed areas beyond the three m;ile territorial li~it which fell 
un~~r qa~_~r's )_l:lX:~-s~~ction (see A~pe.J1~ix _?·1). SCQ c11rried out 
extensive operations, but the <iestruction of the f;irst drilling 
platform caused a delay of six years. The first offshore oil strike 
was made in 1960 at the Idd Al-Sha,rgi field. (4) 
* This toropany is an affiliate of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) 
group and is wholly owned by the following companies: · 
Royal Dutch/Shell g:roup 
Companie. Fra,nc(lise des Petroles 
Nellr E\~st Deve}opiTient Corp: ) 
50% Jersey $tandard ) 
50%.Mobil Oil ) 
Gulbenkian 
23.75% 
23.75% 
2~.75% 
5.00% 
100.00% 
According to the 19>35 and 1952 agreements, Qatar was divided 
into two parts, one of them covering the whole of inland Qatar under 
QPC supervision, the other one composed of the entire offshore 
territories under SCQ supervision (see Fig.S.l). After 1960 the oil 
companies gradually relinquished areas of their concessions, and by 
1970 the QPC concession mainly covered the Dukhan oilfield where the 
operation centred on an area of 2,000 sq. km. on the western Qatar 
peninsula. SCQ has released almost half of its concession, retaining 
only 5,000 sq. km. on the eastern part of Qatar's territorial 
water (see Fig. 5.2).. During the early 1970's, in preparation for 
t:akirig ftiU control of the oil industry, the Qatar National Oil 
Company was established to run the Government's share of both companies 
(~~E! -below}. Two years later, this company was replaced by Qatar 
General Petroleum toriJoration (QGPC), which was designed to incorporate 
e;x:ploration, production, marketing and processing oi:l and natural gas 
and we shall examine the broad activities of QGJ?C later (also see 
Chapter 4 pp. 84-86 ) . Here we can note that the Qatar Petroleum 
Pl!pducing Authority (QPPA), as a subsidiary of QGPG, was _created after 
the takeover of the former oil companies to manage the oil and g~s 
-operat-ions- -in Qata-r-. {S)_ This -led -to-changes in--the--~a ture ·of the 
concession and to new delimitation of production zones, which by 1979 
appeared as shown in Figure 5.3. 
Two major changes have been made, apart from those affecting 
concession areas, since the original oil concession agreements were 
signed. The first involved the government's share of the net profits 
of the concessionaires. An increase to SO% came into effect in 
late l952. (6) In December 1970 a·further increase occurred, raising 
the profit percentage to 55% as the government's 'take'. (7) The 
second major change was that creating government participation in the 
Development,of Oil Industry and Concession Areas ( 1960, 70, and 80) 
Fig. 5.1 
Fig. 5.3 
1960 
Source: At~ Kuwarri A.K., Oil Revenue in the G_ulf 
Emirates, Bawker/Durham University 1978 p.27 
1980 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Petr_oleul'fl. 
Oil .fnf!ustry in QatiJ"r 1982. Qatar P.4 1 
Fig. 5.2 1970 
Source: Ministry of.finance and Petroleum. 
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oil industry. The government first acquired, in 1973, a 25 per cent 
share of 4sset-owning partit~pation in each concession. In 1974 this 
was raised to 60 per cent, followed by a final takeover agreement 
between the government and QPG, signe!l in late 1976, giving the 
government 100 pe:r cent ownership. A similar agreement was sig;hed early 
(8) in 1977 with SCQ. Subsequently QGPC signed service agreem~nts with 
both QPC and SCQ. 
In accordance with Article (4) of both agreements, the companies 
(QPC and SCQ) would establish service companies - on:e called Dukhan 
Services Company wholly owned by QPC, while the other called Shell Services 
C6~pany wholly owned by SCQ, (9) QGPC would supply the services compal_l~~:S 
witry a service fee, which at the time of the agreement was 15 cents per 
barrel of oil produced either from onshore or offshore f:lelds, and giye 
the companies the right of buying 275 thousand barrels per day at the 
-
official price until the end of the agreements, which lasted for five 
years from 1977. The service agreements. we're changed at the beginning of 
1980 to become 20 cents per barrel produced, which would incrf;)ase to 
22 cents from the beginning of 1981, but without the right of buying any 
of Q~tar's crude oil. (lO) 
QGPC, however, has several subsidiaries, either wholly owned, 
such as QPPA Onshore and Offshore,* and the National op Distribution 
Company (NOOCO); or partly owned, such as Qe.,tar Petrochemical 
CqmpaJty CQAPCO) , with a Corporation share of 84 per c:ent 1 and Qatar 
FertiHzer Company (QAFCO) in which QGPC has 70· per cent of the ordinary 
shares and 100 pe·r cent of preference shares. The Corporation also 
has interests in Arab and foreign joint vent\Jres, whereby QGPC has 
18. 3 per cent holdings of Arab Ship Building & Repair Yard Co. (ASRY) 
* In late 1980, an announcement came from the Amiri Palace declaring 
the amalgamation of QPPA (Onshore and Offshore) with QGPC. 
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in Bahrain; 13.6 per cent of Arab Maritime Petroleum Transport Co. 
(AMP'FC) in Kuwait; 10 per cent of Arab Petroleum Investments Corp. 
(APICORP) in Saudi Arabia; 10 per cent of Arab Petroleum Services Co. 
(APSC) in Libya; S per cent of Arab Petroleum Pipelines Co. (SUMED) 
in Egypt; and 40 per cent of Campagne Petrochemique d'u. Norr!(COPENOR) 
in France. 
All this applies to the domestic scene, and this summary survey 
of oil in Qatar will be incomplete without an examination of the 
relationship between Qatar and multilateral oil organizations such 
as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)_, anCi the 
0:i'&anization of Arab Pef:r()l,~wn _Ej_cpq~tin.g Countr.ies (OAREC). Qatar 
was the first country to join OPEC after the five founder members (ll) 
(Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia artd Venezuela). The main object of 
the organization was to guard against the arbitrary reduction of the 
oil revenues of its member countries through cuts in oil prices bY the 
international oil companies. For several reasons, Qatar did not gain 
any increase in posted oil prices until 1971, when OPEC's power became 
really effective. But the significant increase of posted oil price 
followed the September 1973 oil conference and the Arab/Israeli War 
in October 1973 (see Table 5.1}. 
The most effective part which OPEC played was the introduction 
of ownership participation agreements between the member countries 
and the oil companies. This helped Qatar to gain a 100 per cent 
control and ownership over all phases of oil industry in Qatar. (l 2) 
Qatar has also been a member of OAPEC since mid-1970, (13) 
and played an active role in the organization and participated in 
all joint projects which were carried out under the organization's 
sponsorship, such as AMPTC, ASRY, APICORP and APSC. 
Table 5~1 
15.7.1953 
16.7.1953 
28.5.1957 
13.2.1959 
16.8.1960 
13.2.1964 
15.2.1971 
1.6.1971 
20.1.1972 
1.1 .. 19?3 
1.4.19'73 
~-.6.19).3 
1.7~~197.3 
.1.~~sA'9~73 
l: .·H) .197'3 
16 .10 ~1.9 i3 
1,:. :n . i 9~3 
1.-i2. 1973 
1.i.t974 
1.11.19i4 
1 :TO;f975-
-1.ii~l9ft 
t.l-A979. 
1:5.iA979 
1.4.19'79 
17 .5.1'979 
1:1 .r~.7:9 
___ 1,~1·1:9,79 
December 19.79 
Janli~t>' rQso 
- May-- {~80 
July I98_o 
Janmq:y l:~~n 
1st Nov. 1981 
1st Jan. 1982 
20 March 1982 
'"-11.08-
Qatar Crude .. Oil Pcrices~ (1953..,19~2) 
(US$ per barrel) 
Onshore 
1.830 
2.080 
2.210 
2.030 
1.930 
2. 2,80 
2.387 
2.5-90 
2.705 
2 .8.62 
3 •. 025 
s:'a8·4 
3~:;~wo 
3~1:43 
.5;335 
s'~s99· 
r;~:if37 
12~414 
i2.ol4 
i"z:~~74YJ 
J}339Q 
J:ibo36 
l.s:~o5o·. 
17:040'· 
i~7-.s4:o 
21.:4~0' 
27 .• 420 
27'.:42 
29~.42 
--,31~;42 
33.42 
37.42 
35.65 
3.5.45 
34.49 
Offshore 
1.-830 
2.2QO 
2.305 
z·~sot 
2 •. 614 
2.-766 
2.923 
2~.-98() 
3;092: 
-~-~;o~.? 
-'5';.so3 
s:564 
5;'~412 
.17 ::··o~·3: 
11;613 
I~2;/54o 
1'3:~000 
r3irho 
i4d7io 
r6Jfso 
11~65_0 
21 •. 2_30 
2t~z3o 
27.23 
29.23 
-- si.is-
33-;2-3 
37"~23 
35;·;50 
35 .3.0 
34 ,3'0 
* Prices until 1.10.1975 are the posted prices and thereafter the 
official selling prices. 
Source : Minist1·y of Finance & Petroleum, Oil Industry in Qatar 1982, 
Petroleum Dept., Qatar, 1983, p .48. 
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The apparently simple fact of the taking over by Qatar of 
100% ownership, as stated above, has considerable significance for the 
development of industrialization in Qatar, as noted in Chapter 4.l.(C). 
The heavy industrial and consumption stage is approximately coincident 
with the taking over of total ownership of all oil assets in the 
early 1970's. It is no accident, therefore, that the last decade 
or so has seen the evolution of a Qatari industrialization policy 
during the period in which Qatar not only owns and controls the whole 
of the oil sector but has now also become responsible for financing 
it. (see Conclusion). 
5.1.1 Manpower in the Oil and Gas Fields 
In 1960 the labour force employed by QPC was over 2,500 
persons. (14) In 1972 the labour force of QPC had declined to 875, 
of which 67.2 per cent were Qatar is, while SCQ was employing 598, 
of which 59.2 per cent were Qataris. (15) 
At the end of 1975 the two companies were employing 1,811 
persons, of which 969 were Qataris (or about 54 per cent) . About 
77 per cent of the Qatari total, as seen in Table 5.2 , were classified 
as labourers, whilst only 3.8 per cent of the Qatari total were in the 
senior staff division (or 12.9 per cent out of the total senior staff). 
Table 5.2 Employment of QPC and SCQ by Nationality and Status (1975) 
I 
f 
Senior Staff Intermediate Labourers Total 
I 
SCQ 1 Tot.,QPC !SCQ ITot.IQPC I SCQ r Tot ·I QPC I SCQ I QPC Tot. I I i j I I ! I 
1 Europe I 11~2 I I i i I 123 i & USA I 95 123 218 - - - - - I 95 218 I I ! ! I I Qatar is 19 18 37 64 186 \370 i 376 746 I 511 I 458 969 
Other Arabs - 23 23 17 98 115 I 29 I 17 46 46 138 : 184 
I I ' 
Indian & Pak. - 9 9 126 63 I 189 88 i 14 102 214 86 300 
I 
Others - - - 1 - 1 16 123 139 17 1 123 140 
1 Total 114 173 287 266 225 491 503 530 1,033 883 192811,811 
' 
Source: Compiled by the Author from Ministry of finance and Petroleum tl 
Oil industry in Qatar 1976 
! 
I 
I 
t 
; 
I 
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By 1980 the situation of employment in the oil industry had 
reversed whereas the Qataris declined in percentage from 53.5 in 
1975 to only 36.7 per cent out of 2,719 (see Table 5.3). This, 
as will be noted in Chapter 6,is a common feature of trends in Qatari 
employment in the industrial field. 
Table 5.3 Employment Structure of QPPA* 1980 
1 Qatar is Non Qatar is: Total I i 
I 
Senior Staff 104 426 I 530 I 
Intermediate Staff I 256 608 I 864 
Labourers 639 686 1,325 
Total 999 1, 720 2,719 
* Qatar Petroleum Producing Authority 
Source : Al-Kuwari, A.K. The Role of Public Enterprise in Economic Development 
Alam al-Ma'rifa, Kuwait, June 1981. 
5.1.2 Location of oil fields 
In Qatar, at present, there are four oil-producing fields, 
only one of them onshore and the rest offshore. 
(1) Dukhan oil field 
The Dukhan oilfield (onshore) lies on the extreme west of the 
peninsula. The field reaches about 54 km in length and 8 km in width, 
covering an area of 432 sq. km. It was the first oilfield to be 
explored in Qatar, being discovered in 1939 by APOC. In 1972 there 
were 80 wells, of which 58 were oil producing, three abandoned, six 
d f b t . d 13 t . . . 11 (1 6) B use or o serva 1on an were wa er 1nJect1on we s. y 
1979 there were 150 wells, of which 70 were producing, 8 abandoned, 
12 for monitoring and controlling the water pressure, 3 water wells 
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and 57 were injector wells. The 70 oil producing wells were dis-
tributed over several zones as follows: (l 7) (also see Chapter 
2, Table 2 .1). 
(a) Seventeen of them were located in Arab III limestone, with an 
average rate of 45,000 barrels per day on an average depth of 6,400 ft. 
sub sea. The Arab III zone was discovered in 1939 and production 
started in 1949. 
(b) Fifty two were located in Arab IV limestone, the zone which 
started production in 1950. The total wells have an average production 
of 185,000 barrels per day at an average depth of 6,500 ft. sub sea. 
(c) The third and last zone is Uwainat Limestone which started 
production in 1960 from an average depth of 7,100 ft. sub sea. This 
zone has only one oil well, producing oil at a rate of 4,000 barrels 
per day. 
(2) The offshore oilfields 
The offshore oilfields are concentrated in the extreme east of 
Qatar's maritime territory and not far from the marine boundaries 
between Qatar, Iran and U.A.E. (see Fig. 5.3). There are three 
oilfields in Qatar's territorial water. These are Idd El-Shargi, 
Maydan Mahzam and Bul-Hanin. 
A. The Idd El-Shargi oilfield was the first discovered, in 1960, 
where the oil deposits are located within four limestone formations -
Arab III, Arab IV, Shuaiba and Uwainat - at depths varying from 
4,650 ft. to 8,000 ft. The field covers an area of 68.4 sq. km. In 
1972 there were 18 wells, of which 14 were oil producing, at a rate 
ranging between 250 b/d and 3,000 b/d for each well, and 4 wells 
abandoned. (lS) There was no development in this oil field until 1979. (l 9) 
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B. The Maydan Mahzam oilfield was discovered in 1963 and started 
production in 1965. The field covers an area of 29.8 sq. km. The 
crude oil of this field is produced mainly from three limestone 
formations -Arab III at a depth of 7,300 ft, Arab IV at a depth of 
7,350 ft. and Uwainat at a depth of 3,000 ft. ( 20) The field has 
11 oil-producing wells and 11 dump-flood wells; the production per 
well varies from 2,500 b/d to 20,000 b/d. ~l) 
C. The Bul Hanin oilfield has an area of 41.1 sq. km. The field 
was discovered by ADMA* in 1965 when the area was claimed to be under 
Abu Dhabi jurisdiction. ( 22) After the settlement of the Qatar/ Abu 
Dhabi offshore boundary in 1969, the field was included in the SCQ 
concession area. The field had, in 1979, 10 oil-producing wells 
supported by nine dump-flooders. The production draws from three 
limestone formations, Arab III, Arab IV and Uwainat, at a rate of 
29,000 b/d. (23) 
There is another offshore oilfield, Al-Bunduq, on the marine 
boundary line between Qatar and Abu Dhabi, and covers an area 
of about 20 sq. km. The field was discovered in 1964 by AOMA and 
was wholly ownej by that company. In 1969, after the settlement 
of the marine boundary, the two states agreed on the joint exploit-
ation of the field and ADMA was designated as its operator. All 
royalties, profits and other benefits were to be divided equally 
between Qatar and Abu Dhabi. In 1970, and after ADMA had released 
some of its share to a Japanese group, the Bunduq Company Ltd. 
was formed. In 1979 there were seven producing wells, out of nine, 
with a production rate in 1976 reaching 30,000 b/d, but then it 
declined in recessive pressure and production was 1 :imited to 10,000 
b/d. (ZL!) ln 1980 production was halted. 
* Abu Dhabi Marine Area Company Ltd. 
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5.1.3 Location of Pipeline Systems 
Before any processing of crude oil can be undertaken, it has 
to be transported from its field, either to refineries where the 
oil is treated as raw material or to the oil terminal(s) in order to 
export crude oil to the international market; such transportation, for 
many decades, has normally been by pipelines. Pipelines are also 
needed to gather the crude oil from producing points within the 
field. In this part we will examine the layout of the pipeline systems 
which was utilized by both crude oil and natural gas. 
Fortunately, the oil fields in Qatar require neither too 
large an amount of investment in settling pipelines nor very long 
pipes. This is because, firstly, the majority of the oilfields 
are in offshore areas where the sea is not deep (about 103 ft. depth) 
and, secondly, the distance between the west coast, Dukhan field and 
the east coast, on which lie the oil terminal and industrial 
activities at Umm Said, is only 82 km, while the distance traversed 
by pipeline is approximately 78.5 km. 
1. Onshore pipelines 
Onshore pipelines, as shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 are of 
three catego~ies. First there is the oil pipeline through which 
crude oil is pumped from Umm Bab to Umm Said through three pipelines, 
two of them being 14.5 in. diameter, while the third is 16 in. 
diameter. These three pipelines join together into one pipeline, at 
a distance of 42.5 km away from the pumping station at Umm Bab, and 
this 20 in diameter pipeline runs for over 36 km to Umm Said crude 
oil storage area. Secondly, there is a gas pipeline system distrib-
uting associated gas in three main directions to Doha City, Umm Bab 
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and Umm Said. The oldest of these is the pipeline through Khatiyah 
(gas separation station) to Doha, where it is used by the government's 
Water and Electricity Departments. The 10 in pipeline was set up at 
the beginning of the 1960's, extending about 80 km to Ras Abu Aboud. 
This pipeline was converted in the early seventies for the carriage 
of oil to Ras Abu Aboud and Ras Abu Funtas. The second one, which 
goes to Umm Bah, was set up according to a 1963 agreement between the 
government and QPC for supplying the Qatar National Cement Company 
with the associated gas for the Limestone furnace. (2S) Due to the 
growing need for associated gas in the Umm Said area as feed stock and 
for generating power, the third and most important pipeline was 
introduced into the pipeline network in the early 1970's. Half way 
between Dukhan and Umm Said, the pipeline forks, one section going 
to Umm Said and the other towards Doha which also divides into two 
lines north of Wakra, one for the use of Ras Abu Fontas and the other 
for Ras Abu Aboud. Thirdly, there is the natural gas liquids 
pipeline which was set up to maximise the profit from natural and 
associated gas instead of 'flaring-off'. The government set up two 
NGL plants at Umm Said. After the separation of associated gas from 
the oil, the gas is gathered at three stations - Khatiyah, Fahahil 
and Jaleha - passes through a stripping plant at Fahahil, and is 
then pumped, via a 12 in pipeline, 88 km. to Umm Said NGL 1. (26 ) 
(see Chapter 6, pp.212-216 ). 
2, Offshore Pipelines 
Offshore pipelines as shown in Figure 5.5, are of two categories. 
First there are the oil pipelines, introduced in 1965, connecting the oil-
fields of Idd Al-Shagi and Maydan Nuhzim to the oil stage :install-
ations and terminal at Halul Island. At first, when Idd Al-Shagi was 
~~-~Oil pipeline 
==. ~ GC!S plpGiin0 
----=Liquid gas pipGiinta 
To 
Doha 
@ Pipta cliam<ai<ar (inch<as) 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Petroleum Oil Industry in Qatar 19 76, 
Petroleum Dept. Qatar p.6 
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discovered, the company (SCQ) used an oil tanker called "Zenatia" as 
a floating reservoir, but when the second oilfield was discovered, there 
was a strong need for permanent exporting facilities and the choice 
was Halul Island. The oil is carried out from Idd Al-Sha~i to Halul 
through a submerged pipeline of 12 in. diameter over about 17.7 km, 
whilst Maydan Muhzam's oil runs through a 14 in. pipeline covering a 
distance of about 16.4 km. The oil between Bul Hanin and Halul 
Island runs over a distance of about 42 km. through a 20 in. pipeline. 
Secondly, there are the natural gas liquid pipelines. Until very 
recently all of the natural and associated gas was flared, but in 
1978 the QGPC carried out a project which was planned to connect the 
offshore field with the NGL 2 plant at Umm Said, a project completed 
in 1980. Two submerged pipelines of 24 in. and 12 in. diameter are 
used for transferred NGL (gas and liquid) over a distance of 88 km 
to shore at Wakrah, from which a buried pipeline runs for 28 km to 
U S "d (27) mm a1 . 
The onshore and offshore pipelines, as has been noted, involve 
several pipelines of small diameter which increase the transport 
costs, although the distances covered are relatively smaller than in 
other Gulf States. The implications for design of oil pipelines 
(as with gas gathering systems) of a step by step approach to extraction, 
industrial supply etc. will be examined later. 
5. 1. 4 Location of oil storages and terminals 
Because of the low domestic consumption of oil, export terminals 
were urgently needed to export the crude oil to the international 
markets. The location of the onshore oil terminal in Umm Said was 
greatly influenced by political consideration (see Chapter 7, p.225 ) . 
HALUL ISLAND 
oooooooooo Oil Pipeline 
·=====Gas Pipeline 
====Liquid Gas Pipeline. 
o Terminals 
!::::, Oil PlaHorm 
QATAR 
D 
BULHANINE 
@ Pipe Diome~er 
( i ncl'les) 
SourcG : Ministry of Finonco ond Potroloum, Oil Industry 
in ()ofor 191'9p Pofro/Qum Affoirs Dopf. P (Jofor 
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There are sixteen oil storage tanks at Umm Said with a total 
capacity of 270,430 tons (2.113 million barrels). The oil is pumped 
from the storage area to four oil measurements at Sealine Area, then 
to two tanker loading berths through undersea pipelines. ·The oldest 
is the Southern Berth which is about one km. from the shore, where 
the oil is transferred to oil tankers through a 24 in diameter 
pipeline with a capacity of 3,900 long tons per hour. The second 
berth, the Northern, was put in use in 1972 with a submerged pipeline 
of 36 in. diameter and lying 2.7 km. from shore. The total capacity 
of the Northern Berth is 4,600 long tons per hour. Two oil tankers 
can be loaded at the same time at a maximum combined rate of 4,900 
long tons per hour. In 1980, a total of 81,294,190 barrels were 
exported from Umm Said oil terminal and loaded onto 167 oil tankers 
with an average of 486,792 barrels loaded onto each tanker. (2S) 
While the political aspect played an important role in deter-
mining the location of onshore oil terminals, the economic aspect 
was dominant in locating the offshore oil terminal. The cost-minimising 
location at Halul Island was partly a function of distance to the 
earliest oil fields, Idd Al-Shargi and Maydan Mahzam which lay about 
17 km. away, partly because deep water surrounded Halul Island and, 
lastly, because the rock structure of the island reduced expenditure 
on construction and site preparation compared to neighbouring sebkhah 
or sand coasts. 
Before 1965, the oil terminal used by SCQ was an oil tanker 
located near the Idd A 1-Shargi platform. Halul Island, until mid 
1962, was considered as part of QPC's concession. The island was 
included within SCQ's concession in mid 1962. (29) So, in 1963, 
and after the discovery of Maydan Mahzam, the company chose Halul for 
the above-mentioned reasons. Work on oil storage and terminal 
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facilities commenced during 1965. There are nine storage tanks on the 
island with a total capacity of 4.5 million barrels (589,545 long 
tons). The crude oil is pumped from the storage area to the oil 
tankers through two pipelines, one of 30 in. diameter leading to a 
single point mooring buoy, SBM.I, lying about 2.4 km. to the south 
east of the island with a capacity of 6,500 long tons per hour, 
the second a 48 in. diameter pipeline to SBM.~I 4.8 km. distant 
(see Fig. 5.5). In 1980, a total of 89,148,638 barrels were exported 
through the offshore terminal, loaded onto 121 tankers with an average 
of 736,766 barrels per shipment. 
5.1.5 Crude oil production 
As noted earlier, Qatar started oil production in 1949, with 
the production of over 80,000 long tons. This figure only represented 
the December production, which explains the sharp rise of the 1950 
production, which reached 1,616,598 long tons, i.e. a 1,920 per cent 
increase. Since then, till the end of 1963, there was a steady 
yearly increase of onshore oil production with the exception of 
1959. Although onshore production during the 1964-80 period fluc-
tuated slightly annually, the period overall shows an average 1.30 
per cent increase in oil production per annum. In 1980, onshore 
production was 10,836,000 long tons (84,664,211 U.S barrels) with a 
daily average of 29.7 thousand tonnes (sec Table 5.4). 
Offshore oil production started in 1964 with 1,178,000 long 
tons from the Idd Al-Shargi field. In 1966, and with the help of the 
second oilfield (Maydan Mahzain), the production had reached 
4,724,000 long tons with a 301 per cent increase from that of 1964. 
In June 1972 the third field (Bul Hanin) started production and 
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Table 5.4 Qatar Crude Oil Production 1949-1980 (in 1,000 Long tons) 
* 
** 
** 
Onshore ~ % In- Offshore Year crease 
(Decrease 
1949 I 80 - I 
-
I 1950 1,616 ? 1920 -
1951 2,332 + 44.3 -
1952 3,245 ? 39.2 -
1953 3,998 + 23.2 -
1954 4,704 + 17.7 
-
1955 5' 362 + 14.0 -
I 1956 5,784 + 7.9 - I 
1957 6,505 + 12.5 - I 
1958 8,092 24.4 
I 
+ 
-
1959 7,867 - 2.8 -
1960 8,083 + 2.7 -
1961 8,249 + 2.1 
- I 
1962 8,671 + 5.1 
- I 
1963 8,953 + 3.3 
- I 1964 
I 
8,802 - 1.7 1,178 
I 1965 9,014 + 2.4 1,784 ! 
1966 8,915 - 1.1 4, 724 I 
1967 9,070 + 1.7 6,169 I I 
1968 9,018 
-
0.6 7,009 I 
1969 9,366 + 3.9 7,390 
1970 8,882 - 5.2 8,217 
1971 10.386 + 16.9 9,891 
1972 11,368 + 9.5 11,493 
1973 11,730 + 3.2 15,265 
1974 10,430 - 11.1 14,112 
1975 8,257 - 20.8 12,482 
1976 11' 360 + 37.6 11,797 
1977 9,336 - 17.8 11,282 
1978 11' 107 + 19.0 11 '828 
1979 10.790 - 2.9 12,847 
1980 10,836 + 0.4 11,539 
Total 252,208 159,007 
Onshore Long ton= 7.813 US barrels 
Offshore Long ton = 7.633 US barrels 
I % In- Total Daily crease average (Decrease) l 
I 
-
80 I 
! 
- 1,616 ! 4.4 
- 2,332 6.4 
- 3,245 8.9 
- 3,998 I 11.0 
4,704 I 12.9 -
I - 5,362 14.7 
I 
- 5' 784 15.9 
- 6,505 17.8 
8,092 I 22.2 
-
- 7,867 21.6 
-
8,083 22.2 
- 8,249 22.6 
- 8,671 23.8 
- 8,953 24.5 
- 9,980 27.3 
+ 51.4 10,798 29.6 
+ 164.8 13,639 37.4 
+ 30.6 15,239 41.8 
+ 13.6 16,027 43.9 
+ 5.4 16' 756 45.9 
+ 11.2 17,099 46.9 
+ 20.3 20,277 55.6 
+ 16.2 22,861 62.6 
+ 32.8 26,995 74.0 
- 7.6 24,542 67.2 
- 11.·6 20,739 56.8 
-
5.5 23,157 I 63.4 
-
4.4 20,618 I 56.5 
+ 4.8 22,935 I 
62.8 
+ 8.6 23,637 64.8 
- 10 . 2 22,375 61.3 
I 
I 411' 215 
I 
Suun:cs: Mi11ist r·y of l:ill;.UH."L' ;t!HI l'ctroletnu, Oi I l11du~>l ry in Q:•t:1r I~J7'J 
Q:1l~1 r, I ~JHO, n nd 
QCPC,Production anJ bnurt uf 1979-RO.Oatur I'JHI_ 
-
I 
I 
I 
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resulted in production reaching 11.49 million long tons, the first year 
in which the offshore fields exceeded the onshore production level. 
From 1973 to 1979 the annual oil production of the offshore field 
fluctuated slightly, with a general growth rate of -3.97 per cent 
per annum. In 1980 the production fell 10.2 per cent lower than the 
1979 level. The production was then drawn from the three fields 
as follows: 
a) 761,758 long tons from Idd Al-Shargi 
b) 3,474,480 long tons from Maydan Mahzam 
c) 7,302,734 long tons from Bul-Hanin 
At first, the oil production rate of onshore and offshore 
fields, mainly depended on the decision of the oil companies, but 
after 1972, the production rate was changed increasingly, according 
to the State of Qatar's evaluation of international oil prices, 
the country's revenue needs, as well as the discovery of new fields. 
For several policy reasons, the Minister of Finance and Petroleum 
announce.d in 1976 that the daily rate of oil production would be held 
around 475,000 barrels per day. (30) From this and Table 5.4 we 
may realize that the oil production had reached its peak in 1973 
and that no new field has been discovered from that date. Henceforth, 
production would be controlled in order to optimise returns, to limit 
oil extraction and preserve Qatar's oil reserves (see below). 
Table 5.5 shows the daily crude oil production in Qatar 
compared to other members of the OAPEC countries. During the 
1977/79 period, Qatar did not change its relative position which was 
the seventh amongst the eleven countries. This position has been taken 
over by Egypt since 1980. The total production of Qatar in 1977 was 
only 2.2 per cent of the OAPEC total production. In 1981 Qatar's 
percentage was up to 2.4 per cent of 16,682,000 barrels/day. 
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Table 5.5 Crude Oil Production in OAPEC Member Countries(l977-81) 
(In thousand barrels/day) 
1977 I 1978 1979 1980 1981 
I 
' 
I I 
I 
U.A.E. 1,999 1,829 1,838 1' 710 
l 1,502 i 
I 
' i 
Bahrain 58 55 51 48 I 46 I 
I 
I 
I 
Tunisia 89 103 117 116 I 112 I 
! 
Algeria 1,086 1,287 1,217 1,020 I 798 I I 
I 
i 
Saudi Arabia 9,200 I 8,301 9,532 9,900 i 9,808 I 
I 
I 
Syria 174 171 167 158 I 163 i 
I i 
I I Iraq 2,493 2,629 3,477 2,646 897 I 
Qatar 445 487 508 472 i 405 
i 
I 
Kuwait 1,967 I 2,129 2,445 1,658 1,130 I 
Libya 2,063 1,983 2,092 1,827 I 1,218 
I 
Egypt 412 484 497 557 l 603 I 
i 
Total 19,986 I 19,458 21,941 20' 112 16,682 
' 
Source OAPEC, Ninth Annual Statistical Report 1980-81, Economic 
Department, Kuwait 1983, p.l3 T.8. 
1 1% of each 
!country 
I in 1981 
! 
I 
I 9,0 i 
I 
i 
I 0.3 I 
l 0,7 
I 
I 4,7 
I 
I 
58.8 
I 
1.0 
i 
I 5.4 
I 
I 
I 
I 2.4 I 
i 
! 
I 6,8 
7,3 
! 3.6 
100,0 
i 
I 
! 
' 
i 
I 
I 
I 
! 
I 
' 
/ 
! 
I 
! 
I 
I 
! 
' 
I 
l 
I 
I 
I 
I 
' I 
I 
I 
' 
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5.6.1 Evaluation of Reserves/Production Rate 
The statistical data on this subject is limited, mainly due 
to the confidentiality surrounding information on oil reserves; the 
authorized departments are not eager to divulge this information 
publicly. 
The oil reserves of Qatar were estimated in 1948 to be about 
150 million tons, wholly in the Dukhan oilfield. (3l) At the beginning 
of the seventies, the estimated amount of crude oil reserve was 
raised to about 651 million tons (4,562 million barrels). (32 ) After 
many oil zones had been discovered in Qatar's onshore and offshore 
areas, the size of the oil reserve rose sharply and in February 1973 
reached some 7,000 million barrels, that is to say, about 1,000 
million tonnes. ( 33) There are two kinds of oil reserve estimations; 
one of them is the estimation of all the crude oil in the field itself, 
while the other shows the quantities which can be lifted from the field 
to the surface by using only the methods available at present. In 
January 1980, there was an estimated 5.4 billion barrels of crude oil 
which could be brought to the surface, while the total amount of 
Qatar's oil reserves in the ground is estimated to be about 21 billion 
barrels. (34 ) This shows that about a quarter of the total reserves 
could be economically lifted,using normal technology at early 1980 
prices. Table 5.6 below shows the production/reserves ratio. If the 
production rate remains around 475,000 barrels per day ceteris 
paribus the oil will last for approximately 31 years, or in other 
words, until the year 2011. During 1979 the exhaustion rate of onshore 
fields was 3.1 per cent, whilst that of offshore was 3.7 per cent, 
an average aggregate rate of 3.4 per cent. However, there is a high 
possibility that Qatar's oil will last longer than 31 ycors, givcr1 
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Table 5.6 Production and Reserves of Qatar's Crude Oil (US barrels) 
The reserves in 1.1.1980 
Production in 1980 
Cumulative Production 
Production Period until 1980 
Average Annual Production (1949-1980) 
Average Daily Production 
* Fixed Daily Production at a rate of 
Life Expectancy of the Reserves 
5,400,000,000 
172' 7 41 J 000 
3,192,444,000 
32 years 
99,763,875 
273,326 
475,000 
31 years 
(2011) 
Source : Compiled by the author from several confidentiru reports 
*See P. 119 
certain conditions; a) modern methods of extraction can reduce the cost 
of lifting the crude, and b) the careful exploitation of the North 
Dome. The ND, according to official sources, is one of the largest 
gas fields in the world (see Natural Gas, p. 133) and there are 
several indications that it also has large crude oil reserves within 
its structure. ( 3~ 
5.1.7 Crude Oil Exporting 
Due to the small quantities of oil and oil-products used within 
Qatar, the country has a large surplus to export, in the form of 
crude oil, to the international market, which, in turn, provides 
revenue and capital for its development programmes. Of course, the 
marketing of crude oil mainly depends on the size of the demand, 
and the price, as well as its quality. The Dukhan crude is of gravity 
41.5° API*, having an average sulphur content of 1.1 per cent by 
* API = American Petroleum Institution. 
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weight, while the offshore holdings yield a crude of lower density 
than that produced from Dukhan, with 36° API*and an average sulphur 
content of 1.52 per cent by weight. ( 3Q Qatar's crude oil price 
trends are shown in Table 5.1 above. 
Qatar started the exportation of crude oil at the end of 
1949, when about 15.433 long tons of crude were loaded onto an oil 
tanker called "President Meny" carrying the crude oil to Western 
Europe. (3?) In 1950 the figure of oil exported reached 1,536,420 
long tons, with an increase of 9,855 per cent over the previous year. 
Exporting of crude oil from the Umm Said oil terminal followed an 
increasing trend until 1963, excluding 1959. In 1964 and in the 
following years, the export rate became unstable, fluctuating due to 
the changing demand and the price of Qatar's crude and, of course, 
the development of offshore fields. The largest quantity ever 
exported through Umm Said was in 1973. The offshore fields started 
exporting in 1964 with 1,176 thousand long tons. In 1966 the amount 
exported increased by 304 per cent over the export rate of 1964. 
The offshore export level kept increasing from 1966 until 1973 
when the largest quantities exported from Halul Island were recorded. 
Export rates then dropped drastically. Whilst onshore fields took 
more than 20 years to reach quantities of over 9,500 thousand long 
tons, the offshore fields took only seven years to reach this level. 
(see Table 5. 'Z). 
However, the export aggregate from both onshore and offshore 
fields showed an increasing trend over the years, excluding 1959, 
until the end of 1973. After 1973, the effect of the Arab-Israeli War, 
changing demand price of crude oil, and governmental policy decisions 
over production rates, all culminated in a fluctuating but almost 
static level. 
* API = American Petroleum Institution 
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Table 5.7 Qatar Crude Oil Exports (1949-1980)(in thousand long tons) 
* ** Year Onshore % In- Offshore % In- Total Daily 
crease crease average 
Decrease) (De ac rESse) 
1949 15 - - - 15 -
1950 1,536 ~10,140 - - 1,536 4.2 
1951 2,246 ~ 46.2 - - 2,246 6.2 
1952 3,222 ~ 43.5 - - 3,222 8.8 
1953 3,920 + 21.7 - - 3,920 10.7 ' 
1954 4,546 ~ 16.0 - - 4,546 12.5 
1955 5,264 ~ 15.8 - - 5,264 14.4 
1956 5,665 + 7.6 - - 5,665 15.5 
1957 6y488 + 14.5 - - 6,488 17.8 
1958 8,055 + 24.2 - - 8,055 22.1 I 
1959 7,857 
-
2.5 - - 7,857 21.5 
1960 7,977 ~ 1.5 - - 7,977 21.9 
1961 8,144 + 2.1 - - 8,144 22.3 
1962 8,615 + 5.8 - - 8,615 23.6 
1963 8,971 + 4.1 - - 8,971 24.6 
1964 8,754 
-
2.4 1,176 - 9,930 27.2 
1965 8,904 + 1.7 1' 716 . + 45.9 10,620 29.1 
1966 8, 936 ~ 0.4 4, 755 +177 .1 13,691 37.5 
1967 8,910 - 0.3 6,148 + 29.3 15,058 41.3 
1968 9,059 + 1.7 6,971 + 13.4 16,030 43.9 
1969 9, 211 + 1.7 7,437 + 6.7 16,648 45.6 
1970 8,988 - 2.4 8,133 + 9.4 17,121 46.9 
1971 10,303 + 14.6 9,917 + 21.9 20y220 55.4 
1972 11,358 + 10.2 11 J 4 73 + 15.7 22,831 62.6 
1973 11,675 + 2.8 15,376 + 34.0 27,051 74.1 
1974 10,325 - 11.6 13,921 - 9.5 24,246 66.4 
1975 7,979 
-
22.7 12,390 - 11.0 20,369 55.8 
1976 11 J 000 + 37.9 12,141 - 2.0 23,141 63.4 
1977 9,005 
-
18.1 10,907 - 10.2 19,912 54.6 
1978 10,717 + 19.0 12,077 + 10.7 22,794 62.5 
1979 10,317 - 3.7 13,195 + 9.3 23,506 64.4 
I 1980 10,405 + 0.9 11,084 - 11.5 22,084 60.5 
Total 248,361 159,412 407,773 I l ! i 
* Onshore Long ton = 7.813 US barrels 
** Offshore Long ton = 7.633 US barrels 
Sources: Ministry of Finance and Petroleum, Oil Industry in Qatar 1979,Qatar 
QGPC,Production and Export of 1979-80 Qatar. 1980 and 
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Table 5.8 shows the exporting rate in Qatar compared to other 
members of OAPEC. Qatar, during the whole period held the seventh 
position amongst OAPEC in the daily exporting rate, with 2.8 per 
cent of total OAPEC exports in 1981. 
The geographical distribution of Qatari exports of crude oil 
shown in Table 5.9 indicates that the dominant importing region was 
Western Europe, about 70.3 per cent of the 1968 total, but this 
percentage dropped in 1972 to 63.3 per cent. The Western European 
market proportionally decreased every subsequent year, and in 1979 
fell to 41.6 per cent, 0.1 per cent less than taken by Asian and Far 
Eastern countries. In 1980 Western Europe recovered, taking 43.7 
per cent of the total, leaving Asian and Far Eastern countries second 
with 41.2 per cent. Asian and Far Eastern countries had a rapid 
demand increase from 1968 to 1979, excluding 1975 and 76, but a marked 
6.9 per cent decline in 1980. Until the end of 1971 the United Kingdom 
was the largest single country importing Qatar's crude oil, but in 
1972, the Benelux countries came first with 25.4 per cent of the total, 
with Holland importing almost the whole of this. In 1973, due to 
the boycott of Holland by the Arab Countries, the Netherlands only 
imported 3.2 per cent, leaving the first position to the U.K. From 
1975 to 1977 the United States of America was the single largest 
importer but was replaced by Japan between 1978 and 1980. From close 
examination of Table 5.9 it can be seen that the general pattern of 
export of crude oil between 1979 and 1980 shows a decline. The main 
reasons for the decline in the 1980 export rates were: 
1) competition between Arabian Gulf states; 
2) fluctuations of supply and demand in the oil international 
market; 
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Table 5. 8 Crude Oil Export in OAPEC Member Countries,* 1977-81 
(In thousand barrels/day) 
. 
I 
1977 1978 
i 
I 
I UoAoE. 1~983o6 1,819.2 
Tunisia I 24o71 45.6 
I I 
j Algeria 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 008 21 
' 
. 1 002 71 
' 
. 
i 
I 
I ! Saudi 
Arabia 8,608o2 7,706.9 
I 
I 
i I IS . i yn.a 150o7 153o4 
I 
I 
j Iraq I 2, 301.4 2~383.6 
Qatar I 430.1 487.7 
Kuwait I 1,611.0 1,761.6 
Libya 1,942.5 1,854.8 
Egypt 84.9 101.4 
Total 18,145.3 17,316.9 
* 
a 
Bahrain does not export crude oil 
Excluding Shargah 
I 
I 1979 1980 I 
I 
I I 
i 
(*) (a) i ! 
1,795o4 1,690.4 
I 
49o3 1 54.81 
0 717 8 1 . 
I 
i ' 
I 
8,816.4 9,249.3i 
I 
I 
148.01 120.61 
I I ! 
I 
3,274.0 2,465.8: 
I 
' 
495.9 465.8 
2,082.2 1,306.9 
1,967.1 1,698.6, 
117.8 142.5 
19,706.8 17,912.5 
I 
Source: Converted to daily rate by the author from OAPEC, 
Ninth Annual Statistical Report 1980-81 Economic 
Department, Kuwait, 1983, p.l4.T.9. 
1981 
i% of each 
I 
,country 
i ~ J.981 I )"n i 
I 
I 
! (a) 
1,427.4! 10.0 
I 
I 
i 
71. 2' 0.5 
520 6' 3 6 0 i 
i 
' 
I 
9,019.2' 63.3 
104o1 0.7 
698.6: 4.9 
i 
391.8: 2.X 
' 
I 
813.7' 5.7 
I 
I 
I 
1' 063.0: 7.5 
' I 
137.01 1.0 
14,246.6,100.0 
' I 
I 
I 
' 
: 
' 
I 
I 
i 
' 
I 
i 
i 
' 
I 
I 
' 
i 
I 
: 
' 
' 
' 
' 
Table 5.9 
Destination 
~ NORTH AMERICA 
of which 
U.S.A. 
! LATIN AMERICA 
I 
of which 
Brazil 
WESTERN EUROPE 
of which 
France 
Germany (F. R) 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
MIDDLE EAST 
of which 
Southern Yemen 
AFRICA 
ASIA & FAR EAST 
of which 
Japan 
Thailand 
OCEANIA 
of which 
Australia 
UNSPECIFIED (b) 
! Total 
Crude Oil Exports from Qatar (a) (Thousand barrels/day) 
r r ,. 1 • 
I 1968 i 1969 1970 I 1971 11972 II 1973 I 
L I J I 
- - ~- ~ --l !_:I ! ~ li 
i I i 
- l -. I 1.7 I 3.5 I 
12.3 I 9.6 I 10.2 I 4.8 I 
i i I 
10.9 
10.9 
0.7 
J.974 
77.9 f 
77.9 
i 
1975 
88.1 
88.1 
14.8 
1976 
90.8 
90.8 
I I. 1977 I 1978 1979 
90.4 
90.4 
8.5 
42.6 
42.6 
25.6 
19.4 
19.4 
42.7 
14.7 
1980 
12.2 
12.2 
35.1 
18.9 
% of 
1980 
2.6 
2.6 
7.5 
4.1 
5.2 
238.4 
63.6 
- 1 1.4 1
1
1o.2 4.8 
213.8 1240.4 294.1 j335.7 360.8 291.2 1235.0 
:--
268.2 1171.1 
2.7 
1216.8 
1 89.2 
! 4.4 
205.9 1203.6 143.7 
8.8 
52.8 
20.6 
13.4 
64.0 
36.5 
38.0 
5.0 
31.2 
20.9 
20.9 
I 
46.7 
0.7 
55.0 
28.7 
8.0 
69.2 
5.2 
5.2 
34.5 
38.9 
3.5 
35.4 
48.3 
48.3 
339.0 :353.0 
46.0 
46.4 
31.3 
22.2 
93.5 
1.9 
1.9 
49.9 
36.2 
3.5 
32.7 
24.8 
I 24.8 
362.8 
59.1 
5.2 
72.3 
50.3 
25.3 
76.4 
4.3 
45.0 
5.3 
57.7 
,122. 5 
15.0 
72.9 
7.8 
4.3 1 7.8 
56.5 li 41.1 
36.8 55.8 __ , __
i 
1.5 j 1.1 
35.3 I 44.4 
14.9 117.2 
13.5 I 11.7 
10.1 j 15.8 
--~--
I 428.6 i481.7 
I 
69.9 
I 
2.2 
65.8 
144.4 
8.0 
64.8 
9.0 
9.0 
89.9 
79.5 
14.2 
57.0 
16.3 
14.2 
97.0 
4.9 
4.9 
27.3 
32.4 
20.4 
42.9 
75.0 
I 
1.4 
54.8 
I !_:I I 
71.7 
14.9 
30.7 
84.7 
8.3 
57.9 
5.9 
5.9 
20.6 
48.4 
17.0 
28.5 
49.9 
5.3 
22.0 
1.1 
1 31.0 
56.3 
2.3 
13.8 
I 1.1 ! 
12.6 
55.6 
9.5 
29.8 
69.4 
4.7 
8.5 
8.5 
59.0 
1.4 
30.9 
71.8 
1.3 
10.8 
12.7 
0.3 
6.6 
15.4 
0.3 
2.3 
0.0 
0.0 
73.5 99.0 
I 1.7 
19.8 I 
41.9 i 64.9 1108.8 
18.51 6.7 114.5 ,3.1 
176.5 206.3 192.1 41.2 
3.7 
57.6 
4.7 
49.3 
1.4 
27.9 I 
! 
4.0 
46.3 
11.5 10.7 4.9 ~ 5.2 
-- -~-
11.5 10.7 4.9 i 5.2 
14 . .2_ ~ 22.1 131.0 
I I 
570.3 !511.2 \428.3 1486.6 
55.4 
48.1 
9.2 
9.2 
8.6 
1
115.8 
46.4 
I -
141.7 140.3 130.1 
46.0 40.7 8.7 
~I 
2.7 
2.7 
6.2 
0.6 
0.6 
1.3 
410.3 j480.0 !494.9 j466.4 100 
(a) Excluding Al-Bunduq exports. (b) To Gibraltar for wireless order. 
Sources : El Malakh,R., Qatar Development of an Oil Economy,Croom-Helm London 1979 p.42. 
Ministry of Finance and Petroleum, Yearly Bulletin of Expor.t q.nd Import. (1969-80) Qatar. 
QGPC, The Monthly Report No.40 of 1980, Qatar. 
I 
...... 
N 
~ 
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3) large accumulations of oil within the largest consumer 
countries; 
4) the decrease of local consumption within importing countries; and 
5) increased production in non-OPEC countries e.g. the U.K. 
and Mexico. 
All these have had a hand in the decline of the 1980 exporting figures, 
but the strongest reason of all was government policy on production 
rates. The relationship between this latter factor and industrial-
ization will be considered later. 
5.2 Natural Gas 
The term "natural gas" is applied to gas produced at the surface 
from underground accumulations of widely varying compositions which 
may or may not be directly associated with accumulations of crude oil. 
The emphasis, in this section, will be laid on examining production 
and consumption, degassing stations, the North Dome (ND), and the 
evaluation of reserve/production rate. 
5.2.1 Production and Consumption 
Until recently, Qatar produced large quantities of natural gas, 
mainly associated with oil, most of which was wastedinto the air by 
"flaring". This was due to: 
1) the difficulties of storage of natural gas for long periods; 
2) the absence of any domestic projects dependent upon that resource; 
3) anxieties arising from natural gas, poisons and explosives. 
All these reasons and others led to the wasting of this vital resource. 
Of course, there are some small quantities used on a small scale in 
the compan:ics themselves, for instance, for operating gus separation 
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stations for electricity generation and distillation plants etc. but 
all these operations only consumed about 10 per cent or less of the 
total production. Because of the lack of statistical data before 
1969, we can only discuss 1969 and the following years. 
Table 5iO below shows production and consumption of natural 
gas in Qatar in 1969-1980. The gas production of the oilfields in 
1969, was 136 billion cu. ft. with a daily average of 373 million 
cu. ft. The consumption in the same year was only 37 billion cu.ft, 
that is to say, about 27.2 per cent of the total production, and the 
remaining quantities were 'flared'. In 1970 production and con-
sumption were down to 131 and 35 billion cu. ft. In 1972 and 1973 
production was 181 and 227 billion cu. ft. respectively, while 
consumption of the same years was 40 and 42.5 billion cu. ft. Prod-
uction of natural gas fell from 272 billion cu. ft. in 1973 to 158 
billion cu. ft. in 1974 and to 146 billion cu. ft. in 1975. The decline 
in natural gas production was due to a decrease in oil extraction in 
1974 and 75 (see Table 5.4). In addition to a decrease in gas production, 
there was also a decrease in the consumption rate; for instance, 
consumption for 1974 had fallen to 28.5 b. cu.ft. and to 26.6 b. cu.ft. 
in 1975. The consumption of previous years was mainly used by the 
governmental electricity and distillation plants, the cement factory 
and for use by the oil companies, as well as QAFCO I. Because of the 
increase in oil production, gas production also increased, and at the 
same time the opening of the Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) plant helped 
to increase the consumption proportion, e.g. consumption in 1976 was 
about 45.7 per cent of the onshore total production, while in 1975 it 
was 35.7 per cent. In 1978, the production of natural gas increased 
by 8.1 per cent over the 1977 level, but consumption declined as a 
result of the discontinuation of the NGL rlant i.n late 1977. In 
-130-
Table 5.10 Production & Consumption of Natural Gas 1969-1980 
(In billion 
1969 1970 1971 I I 
I Location I % of % of I 1% of 
i Prod. Cons. Con- Prod. Cons. Con- Prod. 1 Cons. Con- ! 
slim. sum. sum. I 
I 
Onshore 79 25 31.7 75 25 33.3 90 31 134.4 
Offshore 57 12 21.1 56 10 17.9 69 4 l 5.8 i 
I ' Total 136 37 27.2 131 35 26.7 159 35 122.0 ' I 
Location 1972 1973 1974 
% of % of 1\J.: 
' 0 of 
P. c. c. P. c. c. P. c. I c. 
I i 
Onshore 90 35 38.9 111 33 29.7 91 28 13o. 7 I 
Offshore 91 5 5.5 116 9.5 8.2 67 I 2.2 I 1.5 i 
Total 181 40 22.1 227 42.5 18.7 158 29.5 j18.o I I 
1975 1976 I 1977 Location I 
' % of % of l 1% of 'I ! P. c. c. P. c. c. P. c. i c. I ! 
Onshore 70 25 35.7 99.3 45.4 45.7 ! 89.5 54.3 i60.7 
Offshore I 76 1.6 2.1 67.8 1.6 2.3 62.4 1.0 11.6 
I 
Total 146 26.6 18.2 167.1 47.0 28.1 151.9 I 55.3 136.4 
I 
I I I 1978 1979 1980 I Location ! 
_l ; I 
I % of % of 
J 
1 % of ' ' I i ! P. c. c. p. c. c. P. c. i c. I 
I I : 
Onshore I 100.7 51.3 50.9 159.1 151.8 95.4 1 124 110 :88.7 
I i Offshore 63.5 0.9 1.4 73.4 2.2 2.0 70.0* 2.0* 2.9 I 
Total 164.2 52.2 31.8 232.5 154.0 66.2 194.0 112.0 157.7 ! 
I I 
* Reserve Figure 
Sources: Computed by the author from 
Ministry of Economy and Commerce, Economic Survey of Qatar (1969-78), 
Qatar 
r-1inistry of Finance .. and Petroleum, Oil Industry in Qatar (Several 
Issues) 
QGPC, The Monthly RepoTtNo.40 of 1980 Qatar. 
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1979 production and consumption of the gas increased by 41.6 and 195 
per cent respectively. This may be explained by the setting up of 
new plants which mainly depended on natural gas such as QAFCO II, 
expansion of the Cement Factory, the Iron and Steel complex, as well 
as the increased demand of electricity generating and water desal-
ination plants. In 1980 gas production decreased by 19.6 per cent from the 
previous years, as a result of the decline of oil production. 
Offshore gas consumption, as can be seen in Table 5.10, remained 
almost the same during the whole period, and the 'flared' gas of the 
offshore fields remained a very high proportion of the total. In 1979, 
for instance, the flared gas of the onshore field was 4.6 per cent 
out of 159.1 billion cu. ft. produced whilst offshore flared gas was 
97 per cent out of 73.7 billion cu. ft. This raised the aggregate 
proportion of flared gas to 33.8 per cent out of 232.5 b. cu.ft. 
As may be noticed from the previous assessment, the quantity 
of natural associated gas produced mainly depends on the production of 
crude oil, and whenever there was a decline in oil production there 
was a corresponding decline in natural gas. 
Unassociated natural gas was discovered for the first time by 
QPC in 1959, and because attention was then concentrated upon crude 
oil, the gas well was closed down. In 1971 SCQ discovered an 
unassociated gas field at a depth of 2,460 metres. (38 ) This was 
the North West Dome* (NWD) gas field, one of the largest natural gas 
fields in the world. (39) The primary estimation of the field 
production capacity would be around 2,000 million cu. ft. per day. (40) 
Although the field was discovered in 1971 it has not yet been 
exploited although a decision in principle to develop it was taken 
in 1983. 
* The name came as a result of the field's location to SCQ's 
concession. Nowadays this field is called the North Dome. 
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5.2.2 Gas separation & gathering stations 
Natural gas is drawn from six separate gas stations (see 
Figs. 5.4 and 5.5). There are three stations in the Dukhan oilfield; 
one is Khatiyah on the northern side of the field; Fahahil located 
in the middle and,lastly,Jaleha in the western part of the Dukhan 
field. The crude oil produced from the Dukhan field passes through 
these stations for the separation of gas and water which accumulate 
in the crude. The next process is to separate associated natural 
gas from unassociated gas. Then the transportation of associated to 
Doha, Umm Bab and Umm Said follows. The gas remaining after these 
processes is flared. 
The other three stations are located offshore on the drilling 
platforms, and each field has its own station; for instance, the Idd 
El-Shargi field has a gas separation station with a capacity of 
56,000 barrels per day, Maydan Mahzam has a capacity of 180,000 
barrels per day, and Bul Hanin 220,000 barrels per day. All these 
three stations were separating natural gas from the crude oil and 
using small quantities of gas to operate the oil pumping stations, 
while the surplus of gas would be flared. 
Because of the need to increase the national income from non-oil 
resources, the government, in 1974, through QGPC, set up onshore field 
gas collection centres to collect the natural gas from separation 
stations and pump it to Umm Said. The main gases were propane and 
butane. To support this the government and QPC set up -
1) Pipeline systems connecting the gas separation stations 
to gas gathering and compression centres; 
2) Stripping plant at Fahahil; 
3) New Pipeline systems to transport NGL from Dukhan 
to Umm Said; and 
4) NGL plant at Umm Said. 
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The above operations were successful and the NGL plant started operation 
early in 1975, but unfortunately there was a mysterious fire which 
destroyed this plant in 1977. At the end of 1980 the offshore gas 
gathering centres, located on three different platforms, were put 
into the operation stream. The natural gas and liquid are, after 
dehydration, sent via Idd Al-Shargi to Umm Said (See NGL Chapter 6, 
pp. 212-216). 
5.2.3 Evaluation of reserves/production rate 
In 1979 production of natural gas amounted to 232.5 billion 
cu ft. (see Table 5.10) while the reserve of natural gas, associated 
and non-associated, amounted, in 1979, to approximately 19.3 trillion 
cu. ft. ( 4l) which relate only to the onshore field. Because of the 
absence of offshore oilfield figures for associated natural gas, 
we can only assume that the same proportional figure as onshore will 
apply to offshore fields, which gives a total of natural gas reserves of 
about 38.6 trillion cu. ft. If this is added to the reserves of North 
Dome, which has a recoverable figure estimated at 150 trillion cu.ft., (42 ) 
this will give a total reserve figure of natural gas of 209.6 trillion 
cu.ft. If the production figure of 232.5 b. cu.ft. and reserves remain 
the same ceteris paribus, the life expectancy of the reserves will 
last up to 900 years from 1979 i.e. until the year 2879. There is, 
however, a belief that the reserves will not last that long, due to 
expansion in natural gas use in NGL 1 & 2, and others as well as the 
LNG project which will be set up, according to the latest development, 
in Umm Said. The ND will be capable, according to present plans, of 
producing 730 billion cu. ft. per annum, ( 43) and if we assume that this 
project will commence production in 1986, the reserves of natural gas 
will last up to 210 years or to the year 2196. 
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5.3 Other Extractive Industries 
Apart from the exploitation of oil and natural gas, there are 
very few mineral substances actually extracted in Qatar, and even 
then on a small scale. Unfortunately, very little attention has 
been given to these extractive industries and therefore quantitative 
and qualitative studies are few. 
As one might expect from the survey on pp.l0-13 and from 
Table1.~ all the mineral deposits of Qatar relatively belong to 
recent sedimentary formations. Several mineral resources which have 
been extracted for a long time, either for the cement factory or for 
road/building construction, can be listed thus: 
1. Recrystallised limestone and superficial dolomite of the Simsima 
Member (Upper Dammam formation), with a thickness of 45 metres, are 
obtained by quarrying and hand-picking. Hand-picking of hard surface 
boulders is usually carried out near the main road, while quarrying 
is principally done by the government near Umm El-Afai about 20 km. 
to the west of Doha City. There are also smaller operations run by 
private firms. In 1980 private firms owned 18 stone crushing 
factories, 12 of these totally owned by Qataris. The government and 
private firms supply most of the building aggregate requirements of 
nearby Doha. 
2. White crystalline limestone of the Upper Dammam is quarried near 
Umm Bab for use at the cement factory. 
3. Green calcareous clay of the Lower Dam formation, with a 
thickness of 30 metres, is mined at Wadi Huwaila, about 17 km to the 
south of Umm Bab. All of this goes to the cement factory. 
4. Crystalline gypsum of the Upper Dam subformation. Until recently 
the cement factory imported the gypsum needed for making Portland 
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cement from Saudi Arabia. According to Claude Cavelier, at the top 
of An-Nafkah hill (about 85 metres above sea level), are reserves of 
gypsum estimated at a minimum of 200,000 cu. metres. ( 44) Gypsum 
is also extracted from the Al-Nikhsh area near the Gulf of Salwa 
which is about 37 km from the cement factory. 
5. Quaternary marine calcareous sand of the Hofuf formation is 
quarried mostly from al-Mahriga (Balad Ibrahim) east and south east 
of Doha city, also to the north and south of Wakra and near al-Khor. 
These sands are required for the building industry and road construction, 
as well as for infill and trench linings. 
., 
There are also other resources that in the past were utilised 
on a small scale, such as: 
1. Salt used to be collected for local consumption. The salt forms 
at present in Sabkha and in restricted inlets where saline water is 
evaporated naturally, leaving behind inpure salts. The collection of 
such salt ceased in the early 1970's. 
2. White limestone obtained from al-Khor for the use of traditional 
building. This quarrying of white limestone completely ceased when 
all construction utilised concrete or concrete blocks. 
3. Quaternary pseudo-oolithic limestone of Rus formation, found 
on the eastern coast and used as rubble in the building industry. The 
centres of this exploitation were at Jebel Fawairat and Wakra. 
4. Recent silts and muds are found in depressions and 
were usually used in the past for brick making. 
Several investigation studies have been carried out in respect of 
mineral occurrences in Qatar and their development potential. The 
result of these studies showed that there are several mineral deposits. 
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that could be developed on a commercial basis and could feasibly 
be produced economically due to the existence of favourable geographical 
and energy factors. These are: 
1. Salts from which sodium chloride, magnesia, magnesium 
metal and bromide could be produced. 
2. Attapulgite clays 
3. Gypsum 
4. Sand 
5. Ornamental and building stone 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Manufacturing Industries - By Type and Sector 
Introduction 
The pcarling industry, prior to the oil discovery, was the principal 
source of income for the inhabitants of Qatar. The decline of this 
industry from the 1930's onward has encouraged the authorities to be 
very cautious of wealth which will not last for ever, and this has 
always affected attitudes to oil, the most recent source of wealth. 
One result has been a more or less consistent wish to diversify the 
basis for national income. Diversification in Qatar takes many forms, 
but the main sector is that of manufacturing industries. 
In spite of this desire, movement towards industrial development 
was cautious rather than rapid, and, although many consultant firms 
were commissioned during the early 1960's to evaluate the fcasil>ility 
of establishing industries based on gas utilization projects, a~ well 
as local minerals, none of these projects saw the light of day during 
that decade, with the exception of QAFCO (see Section 6. 5 and 
·also Chapter 4 and a model of stages of development). 
This Chapter examines the evolution of manufacturing industry by 
sector, in Qatar. In general, the first group of industries which is 
examined comprises those which are in the public sector and might be 
loosely described as basic industries. The second group, mainly in the 
private sector, might be described as covering light industry. The 
discussion wi 11 concentrate, chronologically, through sections 6.1 to G. G on 
the following : Qatar National Oil Distribution Company (NODCO), Qatar 
National Cement Company (QNCC), Qatar National Fishing Company (QNFC), 
Qatar Flour Mill Company (QFMC), Qatar Fertilizer Company (QAFCO), 
and Qatar Steel Company (QASCO), Section 6.7 will examine 
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other manufacturing industries, including small-scale industries such 
as building materials, carpentry, metal fabrication and others. Attention 
is drawn at the end of this Chapter to projects in progress and 
under study. 
6.1 Oil Refinery 
According to Articles (1) and (2) of the 1935 Oil Concession 
Agreement (see Chapter 5.1 and Appendix 5.1) QPC was given the right to 
establish a refinery plant in Qatar. The relevant negotiations started 
in 1952 when the ruler insisted on this plant being established thougl1 
the company tried to convince the government to continue importing oil 
products from neighbouring countries. (l) In 1953, and following the 
involvement of the British Political Resident, the company agreed to 
build a small refinery to supply its own and local needs for petrol, 
gas oil and kerosene. (2) The refinery, which was the smallest of its 
kind in the world, had a designed input capacity of 24,000 imperial 
gallons (or 686 barrels) of crude oil per day. The refinery, or as it 
was then called, the Topping Plant, was situated in the Umm Said area 
attached to the storage tank farm. The construction of the refinery 
was started in 1954 and completed in 1955 at a total cost to QPC of 
.£206,000. (3) 
6.1.1 Production and Consumption 
Unfortunately, the unavailability of statistical data between 
the opening of the plant and 1961 forces us to limit analysis to the 
1962-1967 period, when the refinery was owned and controlled by QPC. 
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Table 6.1 To;e;eing Plant Production & Oil ;eroducts Consum:etion 
(1962-1967) 
(Figure in Barrels*) 
Petrol I Kerosene Gas Oil I 
I 
I Year 
Produc- Con sum- I Prod. Cons. Prod. tion ption 
36,973 161,247 I 32,696 53,438 54,227 
I 
1962 
1963 23,824 179,486 I 26,185 59,751 47,120 
1964 14,415 186,390 31,847 64,265 49,530 
1954 6,475 216,268 35,055 63,615 55,609 
1966 3,829 232,152 36,459 59,521 50,420 
1967 2,868 253,917 31,830 59,031 52,020 
* original figures in Imperial gallons 
Source QPC, Topping Plant Products & Purchases from Shell markets. 
Finance Dept. 3rd March 1968, 
Cons. 
231,612 
136,096 
110,989 
133' 745 
123,682 
130,101 
Table 6,1 above shows clearly that in 1962 the total production 
of the refinery from petrol, kerosene and gas oil met only a little 
over a quarter of the total domestic consumption in that year. Because 
of the rapid increase of population in Qatar and of per capita con-
sumption, the demand for oil products rose rapidly. But the refinery 
could not cope with such an increase due to its limited size. Indeed, 
the refinery output even included a sharp decline in the most popular 
product, 70 octane petrol, a decline over 1962-1967 of more than 34 
per cent per annum. Kerosene and gas oil production were more stable 
over the period than petrol production. 
The total gross income of QPC's refinery during the 1962-67 perioJ 
was £886,161 while the imported purchases of oil products for the same 
period totalled £3,719,554.(4) 1'his indicates how inadequate was the 
refinery. 
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In 1%7 the heir apparent, Sheikh Ahmad bin 1\li, asked QPC to 
supply the country's domestic requirement of oil products rather than 
have Qatar dependent on the Bahrain refinery. The company replied that 
a new refinery was the only answer, and in response to the request that 
QPC should construct and finance a new plant, maintained that a new 
refinery would not be profit making and, therefore, the company would 
not risk its own capital. QPC also asked why the government, instead 
of investing in securities in the United Kingdom, should not invest in 
Qatar. (5) During several years of negotiation the government and QPC 
could not reach any solution over this matter. This was because: 
a) The government did not have confidence in investing in Qatar, 
mainly due to QPC's report of oil reserve evaluation in which 
they predicted that reserves would last only ten years from 
the date of the start of production. (6) 
b) QPC had already recorded a net loss of £189,000 in 1957 from the 
established refinery, although this loss was caused mainly by 
the operational methods of the old fashioned plant, as well 
as by the deliberately maintained low selling prices of oil 
products which equalled in Ls.d. lsh., ~d. and 8d. per gallon 
for petrol, kerosene and gas oil respectively. (7) 
6.1.2 National Oil Distribution Company (NODCO) 
In October 1968 the government established NODCO, with govern-
ment capital and under the control of the Ministry of Finance & Pet-
roleum, with the objective of carrying out oil refining operations and 
the local distribution of oil products.C 8) The main two reasons for the 
establishment of NOIJCO, were a) the increase in the proven o:il reserves 
of the onshore oil l"iciJs ;111d in particular the ofhhon; di:-;cuvcric:;, 
ami b) the :refusal of QPC to construct a new rc finery. 
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QPC's topping plant was purchas~by the government at a price 
of £25,000 in cash, in addition to all equipment and stock belonging 
to the refinery. (9) The old refinery, when purchased, was capable 
of handling an input of 24,000 Imperial gallons (686 barrels) per day 
with a11 output of: (lO) 
Standarc\Petrol (70 octane) 6,000 Im.gal./day 
Kerosene 2,400 Im.gal./day 
Gas oil 5,000 Im.gal./day 
All production was consumed locally with the exception of standard 
low octane petrol. The balance of oil productions' consumption was 
met by importing through Shell Markets of the Middle East. (ll) 
In January 1972, NODCO signed a construction contract to build a 
new refinery with a capacity of 6,200 barrels of crude oil per day 
(12) 
with the McDermott Qatar Company of 1\merica. J llowevcr, the 
construction anJ installation of the cqui prncnt took a !most :s:~ months, 
and in September 1974 (l 3) the new refinery, of a total cost around 
QR 35 million, started its operations, with a designed capacity of 
6,200 b/d of crude as input, while the daily output consisted of : 
1,097 barrels of regular grade petrol (90 octane); 550 barrels of 
high octane petrol (97 octane); 580 barrels of jet aircraft fuel; 
140 barrels of kerosene; 1,300 barrels of diesel and 121 barrels of 
LPG. (l 4) The refinery's input and output have been increased several 
times and by 1977 the total jnput of the olJ and new refineries 
(1 c) 
reached about 11,500 barrels of crude/Jay. J 
In accordance with Article (6) of Law No.3 of 1Y72, the gov-
ernment transferred all its rights in NODCO to the Qatar National 
Petroleum Company (QNPC). By Article (6) of Law No. 10 of 1974 
all QNPC's right passed to the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation 
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(QCPC) (sec Chapter 4 pp. 84-H<i ) and accordingly NOUCO is flOW a wholly 
owned subsidiary of QGPC, with paid-up capital of QR 40 million. (l 6) 
The location of the whole refinery complex at Umm Said resulted 
from several factors: 
1. The old refinery owned by QPC was located in the QPC operational 
area (see above) and it made sense to locate the second 
refinery alongside. 
2. Umm Said remains the onshore crude oil terminal and storage 
base, and refinery input could e~Js:i ly he supplied by pipe! ine 
from the oil tank Farm. 
3. Although the Umm Said area is about 40 km away from the largest 
urbanized area, Doha, which has the main demand for products, 
in world terms this cost distance is low and the plant's 
atmospheric and pollution effects are relatively distant from Doha. 
4. The availability of land for future expansion. 
5. The various support services required for the refinery were 
available at Umm Said because of the continuing build up 
of the industr:inl area with a concentration of public sector 
heavy industries. 
6.1.3 Refinery Production & Consumption (1975-1980) 
Table 6.2 shows the production and consumption of oil products 
in Qatar since the first full operational year of the new refinery. 
In 1975 Qatar's total consumption of oil products was 1,530 thousand 
barrels, of which 1,389 thousand barrels were derived from local 
production; that is to say, 90.8 per cent of the consumption was met 
locally. In 1976, '77 and '78, the proportion of the refinery's 
supply of the domestic market was 87.2, 86,6 and 80.5 per cent res-
Table 6.2 Production and Consumption of O;il Products During 1975 80 
(Thousand barrels) 
Year 1Y75 1976 1::.;'/7 1S1.i6 1979 1980 
Oil 
Products 
LPG* 
Regular Grade Petrol 
. Premium 90R 
: High Octane Petrol 
Super 97R 
Kerosene 
Jet Fuel 
LGO * 
Total output 
~ of Prod. Increase 
':, of Consumption 
Increase 
Pr0d. 
22 
414 
137 
36 
230 
550 
1,389 
LPG = Liquified Petroleum Gas 
LGO = Light Gas Oil (Diesel) 
Cons. Prod. Cons . [ Prod. ;Cons. !Prod. Cons. Prod. 
I 
' 
I I 
..J-6 45 64 I 64 1 65 l 72 83 ' 77 
i 
I I 
I ! l I 
I 
I 
..J.Sl 526 532 ! 610 i 602 1 6-., , -- I 885 I- b,' ! 
i ! 
I 
I 
' 
138 ! 146 222 I 155 1 308 I 124 396 i 36 
i i 
I 
39 1 ..J.O 38 34 -..J. i :J I 38 35 ' 32 
i i 
369 383 560 448 I 548 -EiS bOO 481 
841 856 I 908 :::> :J :J I 921 ! 1,020 1,0.27 959 
I 
I 
1 ~ -o i 1 Q81 ·' ?7? I 2 ?-2 · 2 57 "' ': "6~l I 
' ;,) ..) ! ' ... - ' .... - ' - .J I ' I I - ' - ~· .::,SlS '.2,470 
' ! ' 
I 
-\.2.6 I 12.7 1.7 8.9 j I 
I 
48. s I 13.-l ~:l . -\ 
Source: National Oil Distribution Coq'nn)·, Annual Production StatisticJ.l Re~'C>rt, Qntar. 
I I :cons . I Prod. 
I 
Cons. 
! 
j 98 : 88 117 
I I I 
87811,005 '1,032 1 I I ! I 
' ' I 
362 I 106 i 393 I 
34 : 35 :J :J ' I I 
549 493 538 
1,035 i 1,110 1,1781 
I I 
2,956: 2,837 3, .::~n 
14.9 
4.9 i 
ll. 3 . 
J 
3.1 
35.4 
I 
>--' 
~ 
0' 
I 
3.8 
1..:: 
17.-l 
39.1 
--
100 
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pectively. This decline was mainly due to the increase of demand by 
private and public means of transport, as well as other utilities, and 
was not due to a fall in the refineries' production rate. In order to 
fill the gap between production and consumption, NODCO became the 
main importing agency; in 1979 and 1980 NODCO imported 418 and 409 
thousand barrels respectively. In addition, SCQ* had imported, in 1979 
and 80, 68 and 45 thousand barrels respectively of jet fuel. The total 
production of the refineries between 1975 to 1980 was 13,178 thousand 
barrels, of which there were 5,289,000 barrels of LGO (diesel), 4,112,000 
barrels of regular grade petrol and 3,777,000 barrels of other products. 
The total consumption of the oil products for the same period was 
15,440,000 barrels, of which there were 5,649,000 barrels of LGO, 
4,172,000 barrels of regular grade petrol and 5,623,000 of other products. 
The refineries in this sense had met 85.3 per cent of the total demand. 
As seen in Table 6.2 the dominant product of the refineries was diesel, 
whilst regular grade petrol came second and jet fuel took the third 
position. 
6.1.4 Oil Refinery Project 
The first concept of a further refinery project, with an input 
capacity of 150,000 barrels of crude oil per day, appeared in 
early 1975. (l7) In February 1976, QCPC signee! n contract with IDI' 
Management Services Inc. to carry out a feasibility stuJy for an 
oil refinery of a capacity of 50,000 barrels of crude, not of 
150,000 barrels. (l8) On 11th November 1976, the consultant produced 
the feasibility study for the project organizer in QGPC. On 12th 
November 1980, QGPC signed another contract with a French group to 
carry out the construction and installation of the new refinery. The 
* SCQ has a contract with Doha International Airport to supply its 
requirements of jet fuel. SCQ buys the quantities available from 
NODCO and then imports the balance. 
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work on the site, as agreed, will take an approximate period of 
33 months. (lg) The new refinery project, according to its design, 
will consist of eight processing units capable of producing an 
aggregate of 45,872 barrels per day or 16,743,280 barrels per annum. 
The product will consist of premium gasoline, super gasoline, LPG, 
naphtha, jet fuel, kerosene auto diesel, diesel, bunker and 
asphalt. (20) 
The location of the QR 134,700 thousand refinery( 2l) will also 
be in Umm Said, adjacent to the existing refineries. 
6 .1. 5 Economic Evaluation 
The old refinery of QPC, as mentioned earlier, was set up on 
political grounds, and not based on economic viability. It was agreed 
between the government and QPC that the price charged for the refinery 
products would be similar to those charged in Kuwait and Bahrain, 
(22) 
regardless of the refinery cost of production. In 1Y57 losses 
incurred in meeting domestic consumption were already substantial because of: 
a. The high operational costs of the refinery 
b. The relatively high prices of imported oil products which 
QPC was obliged to pay, i.e. 31.4 pence for petrol, 24.9 pence 
for kerosene and 14.0 pence for gas oil per gallon, compared 
with the low permitted sales price to the state and public 
(as related earlier, p .143 ) . 
QPC estimated a total loss of up to.£189 thousand annually. A mixture 
of economic and political factors can also be seen clearly in the 
establishing of the second oil refinery, which was set up according to 
requests from the public and the ruler of Qatar. 
The larger capacity of the second refinery, compared to QPC's 
plant, reduced the operational cost of refining domestic crude. Although 
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the total cost to NODCO operations included the difference between the 
cost of imported products and its own production and the sales prices 
which NODCO was allowed to charge (see Table 6.4), as well as the 
free-of-charge distribution of oil products through the whole of the 
peninsula, the company apparently gained a net profit on each oper-
ational year. In 1978, for instance, NODCO had total sales of about 
QR 105 million. Deducting from this the tot~l cost of running the 
refinery and importing products etc., about QR 75 million, gives a net 
trading profit of QR 30 million (see Table 6.3). In 1979, although the 
total sales showed an increase of 26.3 per cent over the previous year, 
the total costs of the company are recorded as increasing proportion-
ately more than the increase of the total sales. This increase of 
total costs was mainly due to the sharp rise of imported oil products 
(see Table 6. 3), and subsequently the net profit of 1979 declined 
from QR 30 million to only about QR 28 million. 
Two questjons which arise, here and jn the context of later· 
sections are, first, how far the reported accounts of NOUCO include 
elements of repayment of, and return to, investment, and, secondly, 
what are the transfer prices paid for crude by NODCO to the oil 
producing state owned industries, and also received by NODCO for sales 
to other agencies. These questions are considered in a wider context 
in the Conclusion, Chapter 10. 
6.2 Cement Factory 
The discovery of suitable limestone and other raw materials for 
cement manufacturing in Qatar came as a result of the Qatar Oil 
Concession agreement of 1935. The first article of that agreement 
specifically pointed out that in the case of discovery of any mineral 
the company must inform the Sheikh, who reserved the right of granting 
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Table 6.3 Profit & Loss Account of NODCO (in QR thousand) 
Sales & Costs 
I 
' 1. Total Sales 
2. Total Costs 
Crude Oil 
Refineries' Operational 
Cost 
lmportcd Products·" 
AJministrative Cost 
Distribution Cost 
Others 
Net Profit (1 - 2) 
1978 1979 
104,999 132,620 
74,828 104,716 
6,649 8,965 
18,166 20,407 
:B,244 
(>' 351 K' 00~> 
7,392 S,793 
3,226 
30,171 27,904 
* See details on Table 6.4 below. 
Source : NODCO, General Budget of 31.12.1979, Qatar. 
Table G.4 
Product 
LPG (a) 
Premium (90 R) 
Super (97 R) 
Jet Fuel 
LGO 
(n) per metric 
Price of lmportcJ Oil Products Dcr Call on· (:in r)HJ 
---·-------- -·------ -·----~ ---·--L---· -------------------
-·~ 
Imported 
Price 
1' 724.5696 
5.1983 
5.4555 
5.5161 
5,2155 
ton 
-, 
I 
I 
I 
·--·------, ------------------- ··- --
Selling 
Price 
150.00 
0.875 
1.3949 
5.5588 
0.6045(b) 
I 
I 
I 
5.000 (c) i 
NOIJCO 
Subsidies 
1,574.5696 
4.3233 
4.0606 
(0. 04 27) 
4. 6110 
0.2155 
-+--------· ___ ! _____________ _ 
(h) to the Public 
(c) to QGPC for Halul Island 
Source : NODCO, Price of Imported Oil Products per Gal1on,Financial 
Affa~rs Department, Qatar. 
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concessions for the extracting of such minerals discovered by any 
company or companies (see Appendix 5.1 Article 1). 
First thought was given to a cement proj cct in 1957, 1vhen 
P.C. Stevenson of Le Grand Adsco studied raw materials for cement 
manufacture in Qatar. This study was followed by a survey report 
carried out by KRUPP in 1963, (23) 
In October 1965, the Qatar National Cement Company (QNCC) was 
formed as a jointly owned share-holding between Qatari private investors 
and the Government. (24) QNCC's main object was to establish a cement-
making factory, as well as rnarketing the cement in Qatar and abroad. The 
initial capital was 35 million India Rupees in 1965, distributed over 
350,000 shares of 100 rupees per share. The funders of QNCC were the 
government of Qatar with 105,000 shares, the government of IJuhai with 
35,000 shares and 18 QataTi businessmen and companies with 1,000 
shares each. (25 ) The remaining 192,000 shares were to be sold in the 
market, of which only 162,504 shares were purchased. (26 ) 
In 1965, QNCC appointed Henry Pooley(Consulting Engineer - UK) 
as the overall consultants for the project. Sincelarge quantities of 
limestone and clay were accessible at several sites, a location 
choice \vas possible either at Umm Salal, about 17 km. to the north of 
Doha, or at Umm Bah, about 75 krn. to the west of the capital. The then 
Deputy Ruler (the present ruler) decided that in order to encourage 
the development of the western region, the factory should be built at 
Umm Bab. ( 27 ) Work on the site began in 1967, (2S) the main cement 
plant contractor being Franco Tosi of Italy, while Siemens of Italy 
were awarded the contract to supply and instal electrical equipment. 
/\1-attiyah Trading li ConstrucUng Company of Qatar was appointed as the 
. t f . . 1 . . k (29) ma1n con ractor o c1v1 eng1ncer1ng wor s. 
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In 1968 the government and QNCC signed a special agreement with 
QPC to supply the factory with natural gas. The three parties agreed 
that the supply of natural gas would not exceed five million cubic feet 
per day, the delivery point being at Jaleha gas separation station, to 
the south of the Dukhan oil field. (30) A local company's engineering 
department, Kassem Abdullah Sons of Darwish Fakhroo started the erection 
of equipment and pipe lines. The government agreed to supply the plant 
with fairly fresh water from the governmental water well field at 
Rmvdat Rashid, about 40 km. to the east of Umm Bab. The main contract 
for installing water equipment and pipelines was awarded to Tawfeeq 
Trading & Contracting Company of Qatar. (3l) 
The construction and installation of equipment took two years 
and by April 1969 the factory started the first processing of cement, 
(32) 
and the official inauguration of the plant took place in May. 
The designed capacity of the factory in 1969 was 100,000 tonnes of 
Portland cement per annum. 
The establishment of the cement factory was made possible by 
a) The large quantities of limestone at the surface, of quality 
approved by QPC's geologists, as well as others, and the 
possibility of quarrying near to the factory; 
b) The availability of clay near the north edge of Wadi Huwaila 
at a distance of 20 km. to the south of the factory; 
c) The availability of energy in the form of natural gas from 
near~ Dukhan to operate the factory; 
d) The availability of free water supply from Radhat Rashid. 
e) Other raw materials such as gypsum and iron oxide were 
originally planned to be imported no great distance from 
Saudi Arabia under tender agreements. However, in 1970, 
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QNCC started quarrying gypsum at a formation less than 40 km. 
distant and south of Umm Bab in an area called An-Nafkah. 
The iron oxide is now purchased from QASCO. 
In accordance with the Basic Statute of QNCC, the first Board 
of Directors of the Company chosen in 1965 consisted of nine members, 
two of them representing the government of Qatar (one of them is the 
Chairman), one representing the government of Dubai, \vhile the other 
six were drawn from other founding participants. By 1979 most of the 
names and statutes of the first Board remained unchanged including the 
Chairman, with the exception of the Dubai representative who ceased 
being on the Board of QNCC in 1972. (33 ) In March 1980, the Amir 
passed an Amiri Resolution No. (6) of 1980 indicating the re-formation 
of the Board of Directors of QNCC. This reduced the members to eight, 
increasing governmental representation to four and reducing private 
representatives to only four. (34 ) 
6.2.1 Labour Force 
Table 6.5 below shows the labour force of QNCC from 1%9 to 
the end of 1981, by nationality and QNCC's divisions. In 1969 the 
total labour force was 275 employees, of which 148 were Qatarjs, 53.8 
per cent out of the total. Within one year, 1970, the total 
Qatari figure showed the first indication of decrease, and from that 
time on became a declining minority. Between 1970 to the encl of 
1981 the trends in the labour force were as follows 
a. Qatari unskilled labour declined from 49 in 1970 to 2 in 
1974, an average clccline of 46.1 per cent per annum, whilst 
the unskilled non-Qataris incre<.•seJ hy 9.3 per cent per aJIIllllll 
during 1970-81. 
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b, Qatari semi-skUled labour declined from 43 to only 8 employees, 
whilst non-Qatar~s more than doubled from 60 to 123. 
c. Although the skilled Qataris decreased from 41 to 19 employees 
this was a slower average trend than that of the semi-skilled. 
The non-Qatari skilled division, on the other hand, similar 
to the ;;em;i.-skilled category increased greatly and at a much 
higher average rate. 
Table 6.5 QNCC!s Labour .Force by Nationality & Division (1969-81) 
I I 
I 
I !Year !
Engineering 
& Adminis- Skilled 
1 semi- Grand !% of ! Skilled Unskilled Total ~otal !Qata- ' 
I I rative 1 
1 
1969 I I : I 
I 
,N.Q. Q. ;N.Q. Q. :N.Q. I Q 
127 148 
1 ris 
I 
I 
I 275 53.K 
I 
i 1970 I 7 I 2 I 48 i 41 I ! 60 48 3~ 4 <) I 1 4 8 140 I 28H I tlH ( ! • J I I I I I i I I ' I I I 1971 7 2 I 45 42 62 44 i 96 I 14 210 102 ! :H2 :~2. 7 I I I I I I I I I I I I 1101 ! ' I 1972 10 I 2 I 50 
I 
42 70 35 I 10 231 89 320 27.8 I ' ' I I I I I i I 37 I ! I I I 1973 I 10 I 2 i 50 42 52 35 I 15 199 94 293 I 32.1 I I I I I I I I I I 
I 
i 
I I I i 12.4 1974 13 2 92 I 36 130 8 lOS 2 340 48 388 I 
I 
i 
I I I 1975 2 90 34 129 8 102 334 46 380 12.1 I I 13 2 I I 
1100 
I I I I 1976 I 16 2 99 I 30 131 6 2 346 40 386 jlO .4 I 
i I I I 1977 I 18 2 157 23 113 10 106 2 394 37 431 i 8.6 
1978 18 2 133 22 121 8 100 2 371 34 405 I 8.4 I 
I 
1979 19 1 201 16 120 8 106 2 446 
I 
27 473 S.7 
1220 
I 
1980 17 1 18 128 8 99 2 464 29 1493 5.9 
I 
1981 17 1 !221 19 123 8 102 I 2 463 30 i493 6 .J I ! 
I I I 
Source Data obtained by the author from Company Records. 
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A common feature throughout QNCC's labour force during the 
1970-1981 period was, then, a decline in the number of Qatari and the 
increase in non-Qatari employees. The reasons for th:i.s trend wr.;re 
a. The relatively long distance between the plant and Uoha City 
where most of the Qataris preferred to live and work. 
b. The majority of the QNCC's employees came originally from 
either India or Pakistan (at the end of 1981 there were 269 
Indians, 146 Pakistanis, 30 Qatar is and 17 others). (35 ) 
Non-Qatari workers' employment depends on their preparedness 
to accept the conditions offered and the requirement for them 
to stay with their sponsors otherwise they hove to leave 
the country. 
6.2.2 Production & Consumption 
Production at the QNCC plant started officially in May 1969, and in 
the same month some supplies reached the domestic market. Unfortunately, 
the cement import figures for 1970 and earlier were not officially 
recorded, but it is believed that Qatari market consumption was around 
70,000 tons a year when the plant began operation. (36) 
In 1969 production was 41,140 tonnes of Portland cement only. 
During seven months of operation the company achieved 41 .l per cent 
of the total annual capacity and supplied about SO per ce11t of thr.; 
(37) f' . f' local consumption. In 1970, the first full year o · opcrat1on o 
QNCC's factory, production jumped to 80,256 tonnes or about 90.3 per 
cent of the total capacity. It is worth mentioning here that the 
factory was designed only to produce Portland cement, but the need for 
salt resistant cement for construction work on industrial complexes in 
Umm Said led to plant modifications so as also to produce salt resistant 
cement. The yearly bulletin of imports for 1970 indicated that there 
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were no imports of Portland or salt res~stant cement during l97o.C 38 ) 
In 1972 production reached 105,8 per cent of design capacity, an increase 
of 54.8 per cent and a decrease of 59.2 per cent in Portland and salt 
rcsist;mt respectively over 1971, Because of the continued rapid growth 
in demand, QNCC took over the import operations from 1971 to make up 
the balance, thus becoming the central supplier and not only a 
manufacturer. (.39) In 1974 the government, through the "Supply Department" 
of the l'-1inistry of Economy and Connnerce, took over the cement importation 
operat;ion. But in 1977, and due to the large demand and short domestic 
supply of Portland cement, the government lifted the ban on private 
importation and allowed the private sector to carry out part of the 
importation of cement but without any government subsidy. In 1980 all 
of the imported quantities were supplied through the private sector. 
In 1974, although the production increased, i.t represented only 55 per 
cent of the total capacity of 115,000 tonnes per annum. ln 1975, 
however, the company faced ser;ious problems which caused planned prod-
uct;ion to run behind schedule: (a) the failure of the second furnace, 
(b) shortage of water supply, and (c) disruption caused by maintenance 
work on the first furnace and the rebuilding of the heat-resistant 
br;icks, In addition, dislocation was caused by the changing of prod-
uct;ion from Portland to salt resistant cement. 
In 1976, after the starting of the third furnace in September, 
production o;f the two products increased to 177,794 tonnes. That is to 
say, 70.1 per cent of the total design capacity. (see Table (,,(J). 
In 1975/76, the Amir had established two committees, one for 
importing cement, the other to supervise the sales and distribution of 
cement locally. Both of the committees failed in their operations and 
were abrogated. (40) During 1977-78 the production of cement was limited 
by a des~gn failure in the third furnace at a time when the production of 
Table 6. 6 Production & Consumption of Portland & Salt Resistant Cement (1969-1980) 
(Figures in Tonnes) 
% of 
----------~----------~-----------l1ncrease. (Jecrease) 
Production Consumption 
Year Portland 1 Salt 
'Resistant 
Total J in Prod-
;uction 
% of 
Prod.to 
the cap-: 
acity Portland Salt 
1969(a) 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Grand 
Total 
r 
41,140 
80,256 18,684 
64,336 ! 15,260 
99,585 6,228 
85,059 1 14.083 
100,786 17,424 
111,858 
147,572 
36,550 
30,222 
41,140 
98,940 
79,596 
105,813 
99,142 
118,210 
148,408 
177,794 
I 
140.5 
(19.6) 
32.9 
(6. 3) 
19.2 
25.6 
19.8 
41.1 
98.9 
79.6 
105.8 
99.1 
66(b) 
69 
70 _fc) 
80,256 
98,336 
136,585 
142,479 
! 153,961 
188,978 
325,366 
118,448 58,865 177,313 I (0,3) 53,7 323,667 
130,399 77,799 ! 208,198 17.4 63.1 354,337 
181,454 68,608 . 250,062 20.1 75.8 283,447 
151,524 58,418 I 209,942 I (16.0) 62.9 29i,242 
; I 
/1,312,417 402,141 1,714,558 I 2,425,794 
(a) Production started in ~lay 1969 of 100,000 tonnes per annum capacity 
(b) Second furnace started in April of capacity 115,000 tonnes per annum 
(c) Third furnace started in September of capacity 115,000 tonnes per annum 
) Not available 
Source: QNCC, Annual Reports (1%9-SO) Qe~tor. 
Resistant 
18,684 
15,260 
6,228 
14.083 
' 17,424 
36,550 
61,813 
120,743 
104,799 
84,758 
87' 116 
1567,458 
Total 
98,940 
113,596 
142,813 
156,562 
171' 385 
225,528 
387,179 
444,410 
% of .% of 
increase Prod.to 
(decrease) Consum-
in Consum- ption 
ption 
14.8 
25.7 
9.6 
9.5 
3:!..6 
71.4 
14.9 
70.1 
74.1 
63.3 
69.0 
65.8 
46.0 
39.9 
459,136 3.3 l 45.3 
I 
368,2os (19.8) , 67.9 I 
i 384, 358 f 4. 4 I 54.6 
12,993,252 57.3 
1 
>-' 
U1 
--.,J 
I 
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the first and second furnaces was given over mainly to salt-resistant 
cement for supplying construction work of industrial projects, and by 
a shortage of raw material crushers for providing inputs to the three 
furnaces. (4 l) In 1979 the production reached its peak at 250 thousand 
tonnes, of which about 69 thousand tonnes was of salt resistant cement. 
Total local consumption of cement that year was 368,205 tonncs, only 
67.9 per cent of which was met locally. In 1980 the total production 
was 207,712 tonnes, a decline of about 17 per cent over 1979. Total 
consumption did not increase significantly because of the completion of 
construction works of several industrial Jlrojects in Umm Said, and the 
slow down in the house building sector. 
During the whole period of operations up to the end of 1980, QNCC 
succeeded in supplying the domestic market with 54.1 per cent of its demand 
for Portland cement and by 70.9 per cent of salt resistant cement. The 
achievement could have been much greater if the plant had ever worked at 
its full capacity, ultimately 330,000 tonnes per annum. 
6.2.3 Quick Lime 
The other product of QNCC, not included in Table 6.(), is quick 
lime. In mid 1976 the Am:ir instructed QNCC to proJuce quick lime for 
Qatar Steel Company (QASCO). A joint committee was organizeJ between 
QASCO and IDTC and by the end of 1976 the committee hat! appointed llcnry 
Booly as the main consultant, Neweil Danvourd of the U.K. to import, 
construct, instal and operate the quick lime furnace, and Al-Rabban 
Contracting & Trading Company of Qatar was awarded the civil engineering 
contract. (42 ) The total cost of this furnace was estimated to be at a 
cost of about QR 26 million,C 43) with a design capacity of 30,000 tons 
of quick l'imc. Work was scheJuJcJ for completion in November I~J77, !Jut 
for vario11s reasons was not fin:isllcd unt:i I /\pri I 1~17~J. 
-159-
The 1979 production was 13,627 tons rising in 1980 to 18,583 
tons, a 36.4 per cent increase over the 1979's figure. In 1981 prod-
uction was about 21 thousand tons. The main conswner of quick lime 
is QASCO which utilizes the lime to process steel bars. 
In the first instance, when QNCC in the middle seventies was 
meeting a considerable proportion of Qatar's total demand, the sale 
price was fixed by the Qatar government. The gap between total demand 
and domestic supply, as noted earlier, \'l'hich appeared in 1977 led first 
to the raising of the sale price for QNCC cement, from QR8 to QRlL 
(subsequent rises have lifted this to QRill per SO kg. b:ti~). Where, 
however, the private sector has imported cement, ·in order to make su11te 
profit margin, then prices have been generally more than three times 
as large as prices for locally produced cement. The government, for 
several purposes, subsidised the difference between the retail price 
of imported cement and the QNCC supported level. This and other 
questions of government intervention are considered in more general 
contexts in the Conclusion. 
6.2.4 Economic Evaluation 
Table 6.7 below shows the profit and loss account of QNC:C during 
1977-80. The account shows clearly that although the factoryJiJ not 
reach its full capacity during these years, the company succeeded in 
achieving a net profit in each individual year. In 1977, for instance, 
the total sales was QR 40,650.3 thousand; that is to say, about QR 229.3 
per one ton. Deduction from that amount of QR 29,004.5 thousand for 
production, sales, administrative and other costs (QR 163.6 cost 
per single ton), will give a total trade profit of QR 11,645.8 thousand. 
Adding QR 664,300 of other income, will give a total net J>rofit of 
QR 1.),310.6 thousand in 1977. In 1978 the total net profit incre;J:>ed 
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by 94.5 per cent, while 1979's net profit grew a further 51.1 per cent 
over 1978. In 1980 the total net profit fell by 16.2 per cent out of 
the 1979 total net profit. This is explained by the decline of total 
sales figures by QR 7,928.47 thousand from the 1979 total sales; and 
the increase in various costs by QR 1,194.62 thousand. 
Table 6. 7 Profit & Loss Account of QNCC (1977-1980) (In thousand QR) 
Sales & Costs 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Total Sales i 40,650.3 55,747.07 70.670.74 62,742.27* 
Production & Sales 27,896.7 31,833.34 34,935.59 35,940.85 
Costs 
Total Profit 12,753.6 23,91.3. 73 35,735.15 26,801.42 
Administrative f, 1,107.8 1,666.74 2,246.55 2,435.37 
Other Costs 
Total Trade Profit 11 '645. 8 22,246.99 33,4kX.GO 21\ '3(J5. ss 
Other Income ** 664.8 1,696.96 2,6%.45 5,961LSI\ 
Net Profit (Loss) 12,310.6 23,943.96 36,185.05 
I 
30,334.09 
* Revised 
** Other income = interest, differentiation in stocks and others. 
Source : QNCC,Annual Reports (31.12.1977-31.12.1980) Qatar. 
6.3 Fishing Industry 
The fishing industry is potentially an important sector because 
it is almost the only part of Qatar's industry which is complet<..:ly 
unrelated to the oil and natural gas and therefore has prospects for 
the future. There is a possibility of establishing various industries 
depending on fish as the primary :input, such as fish C:llllling, ;~nimal 
fodder or o:U hydrogennti.on, as well as supplying an i.mportant food 
~n the Gulf area. 
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There are, in Qatar, two types of fishery, one of them the 
traditional which is not the concern of this study. Mainly because 
wooden traditional vessels make little demarid on modern equipment and 
manufactures, traditional operations is a catching more than a processing 
activity, and all caught fish is marketed fresh. The other type of 
fishing industry, which is the concern of this study, is the processing 
and quick-freezing of fish. This activity is carried out only by the 
Qatar National Fishing Company (QNFC). 
6.3.1 Qatar National Fishing Company (QNFC) 
Arthur D. Little Inc. of U.S. studied Qatar's prospects for 
fisheries development in 1961/62. The main conclusion of that study 
was as follows: (44) 
"To facilitate the training of local personnel, 
to ensure outlets to foreign markets and to 
obtain modern technical and managerial "know-how", 
the government of Qatar should licence one or 
more soundly established foreign fishing 
companies to participate in ..... a fish 
processing plant in Qatar." 
In 1966 the Qatar National Fishing Company was established in 
terms of Decree No. (9) of 1966, as a joint stock company with a capital 
of 4 million rupees, distributed in 4 thousand ordinary shares. The 
government contributed 60 per cent of the total capital while Ross Group 
International made up the balance. On the signature date, 16th May 
1966, the government and Ross paid only 25 per cent of their share, 
the remainder payable within five years, (45 ) In January 1967 the 
appointed Board of Directors of QNFC* signed a fishing concession with 
the government. The concession, ending in 1982, covers the entire 
territorial sea water of Qatar. (46 ) In February 1967, the government 
by using its right as specified in Article (8) of the QNFC's 
* QNFC's Board of Directors consist of seven members, four of them 
were appointed by the government, while the other three were 
appointed by Ross Group. 
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Fundamental Status,C47 ) offered the remaining 75 per cent of its 
shares (18,000 shares) to the Qatari public. 
During 1967 and the first months of 1968, the company was engaged 
in building the plants and related works. At the end of February 
the company started operation with three Jordanian made steel boats 
of 35 ft in length, and a quick-freezing plant capable of handling 
six to seven tons per day. (48 ) 
After nearly thirteen years of operations, the government took 
over QNFC in 1980. This action came as a result of the drop in the 
rate of shrimp catching, especially in 1978 and early 1979. In June 
1980, the Council of Ministers agreed, in principle, to establish a 
new fishing company with a governmental capital of QR 10 million. (49 ) 
In September 1980, an Amiri Resolution No. (17) of 1980 was promul-
gated, appointing the Board of Directors of QNFC. (50) The new QNFC 
has three steel boats, one of them, Gazelle, a governmental fishing 
boat of 110 feet long, bought in 1975 from Holland, the other two 
inherited from the earlier company. The new QNPC now operates both 
in shrimp and fish catchj ng. Unfortunately there j s no data ava:i.lab I c 
concerning the QNFC's employment, except the Economic Survey of Qatar 
Jan/Feb 1971, carried out by MEDD of M.O.D. when the report classified 
the work force of QNFC as (5l) 
1. Fishermen on QNFC boats 40 
2. Shore based employees 
of QNFC 59 
Total 99 
6.~.2 Production 
ln 1970, as shown in Table 6.8 below, the production of shrimps 
was 374 tons, about 1.03 tons per day. Production increased rapidly 
till the end of 1973, when it reached a 560 ton peak. During 1974 
Table 6.8 
Year 
Total 
Production 
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* Headless Shr:!p Production of QNFC (1970-1978) (in tons) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 19713 
374 391 465 560 422 323 520 572 30() 
% of increase 
(Decrease) 4.5 18.9 20.9 (24.6) (23.5) 61 10 (47.6)1 
* The first statistical data available was in 1970 and the last 
production year was 1978. 
Source : Ministry of Economy & Commerce, An Economic Survey of 
Qatar (1969-1978), Qatar. 
and 75 production declined by 24.6 and 42.3 per cent respectively 
from the 1973 production, a drop in production rate mainly due to tl1e 
cxhaust:ion of shrimp reserves in the Gulf area i.n general. nnd i.r1 (~at;1r's 
territorial waters speci.fically. Production, however, i11cr·eascd 
in 1976 to a second peak of total production of 572 tons. In 197M, 
once again, production declined to a figure.even less than that of 
1970 and again mainly as the result of declining stocks. This decline 
was caused by the increase in industrial projects in Qatar and other 
Gulf States, which caused pollution and the effect on marine conditions 
of proliferating water distillation plants. The unscientific catching 
operations, which did not distinguish between small and large species, 
had a destructive biological effect, whilst the company, dependent 
on only one kind of product, was not geared to carefully balanced 
marine exploitation. The government purchased all the company assets 
from Ross and the Qatari and company production records only extend to 
the end of 1978. 
The local consumption of QNFC products during 1968 and 1978 was 
insignificant and virtually all the quantities were exported to U.S.A., 
Japan and Europe. (52) 
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6.3.3 Economic Evaluation of QNFC 
Table 6.9 shows the profit & loss accounts of QNFC between mid 
1970 to the beginning of 1976. The company's operation bet\o,reen mid 70 
to mid 71 achieved a total sales value of about QR 2,740 thousand, 
but the company nevertheless registered a net loss of QR 63,635. In 
the next financial year the situation improved a little by achieving a 
total net profit of QR 426,870. The achievement continued in the 
next f-inancial yc;:n which ended in mid l~l73. In the financial perjoJs 
up to 29.2.1976 a net profit was recordeJ but the annual level declined 
and the return on capital was low and falling. The company, according 
to government publications succeeded by the end of February 1978 
in gaining a net book profit of QR 1,768,538. (S 3) 
Table 6.9 Profit & Loss Accounts of QNFC 
i Sales & Costs 
:I. Total sales 
I Other income 
'2. Total Costs 
iTrade Profit 
j (Losses) 
130.6.70 to 
I 130.6. 71 
t; 
2, 73~l,H~l0 
* 2,749,369 
( 9,479) 
!,.Amortisation of 
formation and pre- 54,156 
To 
30.6. 72 
3' (J 7 s, 34 3 
3' 194,31 7 
481,026 
54,156 
1971 - 1976 (In gRs) 
To To 
30.6.73 28.2.75 
S, OOK, 0(> 2 K, () 2 I , .)I\ 2 
3,7H(>,2H> 7 '67K '(,()0 
1,221,845 942,682 
36,105 36,105 
To 
29.2.76 
S,OIO,(,IK 
4 '9(JI\ ':) n. 
46,046 
trading expenses I 
:------~--~------,_----------~~------------------------~----------r-----------
)Net Profit (63 , 635 ) 
1
. 
\ (Losses) 426,870 1,185,740 906' 577 46,046 
i------------------~----------~----------------------~----------~-----------
* Proposed Directors' attendance fees are not included. 
Source QNFC, Annual Report and Accounts (l~l71-I~J7(>) Qat:1r. 
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6.4 Flour Mills 
First thought was given to establish a fully mechanized flour 
mill in Qatar in 1967, following a flour scare which made many Qataris 
fearful of taking any kind of freshly cooked bread. This situation 
arose as the result of shipping at least one consignment of flour 
sacks alongside a highly poisonous pesticide. (S4) 
At a very early stage some local businessmen contacted their 
colleagues in Kuwait to find out to what extent Kuwaiti experience 
in the flour milling field had succeeded.* (55 ) After two years of 
close examination the Qatari businessmen were satisfied and on 26th 
June 1969, nineteen of them signed the foundation document of the 
Qatar Flour Mill Company (QFMC). On 29th June 1969 the Amir promul-
gated a Decree of Law No (45) of 1969 permitting the nineteen 
businessmen to establish a joint stock company with an initial capital 
of QR 5 million. The main objective of QFMC, as specified in 
Decree No. (12) of 1969 and the fundamental statutes, is to import 
flour and wheat grain and pulverise the grain. In addition to that, 
Article (5) of Decree Law No (12) of 1969 requires the company to 
hold certain reserves of flour and grain, the reserves to be defined 
by a resolution from the Minister of Finance. (56) 
In 1969 the Deputy Ruler appointed Mr. Ahmad Al-Subaisi to 
allocate a suitable site for QFMC's plant, the company also appointing 
its Chairman to help in this mission. i\fter analysing all aspects 
the government recormnended that the location should be in Unnn Said, 
attached to QAFCO. The Chairman was not happy, so a special committee 
was set up to investigate. It found that because the dominant wind 
was northerly, and the site selected lay to the north of QAFCO, there 
* Kuwait Flour Mill started production in 1967. 
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was no way that the wheat flour and grain could be polluted by chemical 
fertilizer. The then Deputy Ruler agreed on the site. (S?) 
In 1970, the Boord of Directors* appointed Gibb-Ewbank of U.K. 
to design the plant, Darwish Engineering Company of Qatar was awarded 
the civil engineering contract, the mechanical and electrical instal-
lation contract awarded to Power-Gas and George Taylor of the U.K., 
d h . . f h R . 1 · · (SS) un er t e superv1s1on o Tomas opens1on, t1e equ1pment 1mporter. 
In September 1972 all the construction and installation of the 
equipment was complete (Sg) and in November of the same year the plant 
started operation with a daily capacity of SO tons. (60) There are, 
attached to the plant, slx silos of a total capacity of 8,000 tons, 
while the electricity and \vater supply was met from QAH:O. (C>l) The 
imported grain would be transferred to the silos through QAFCO's 
jetty , all for a cost of just over QR 11.4 million. (62 ) The govern-
ment supplied the company with QR 6,962,692 as a loan. (63 ) In return, 
a government representative was appointed to the Board of Directors 
partly to monitor the proper use of the government loan. (64 ) 
After only one full years operation,the Board of Directors dis-
cussed and agreed on a major expansion of the existing plant. This 
matter was still under study both by the government and the company 
in mid 1982 because of the d i. ff:i.cult i.es of expanding the plant on 
the present location surrounded by QAFCO on the south and QAPCO on the 
north. But during 1977/78 an interim expansion was carried out by the 
government by which an additional six silos of a total capacity of 
8, 700 tons were built, the company at the same time installing another 
production stream, which gave the factory a total operating capacity 
of 100 tons. (6S) 
* The Board of Directors consists of nine members and the first 
Board of Directors was appointed by the founders in 1969. 
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6.4.1 Manpower 
In 1973, as shown in Table 6.10, the company recruitment 
totalled 52, of which there were two English and six non Qatari Arab 
senior staff. The Qatari employees formed the single largest 
nationality group, 48,1 per cent out of the 1973 total. In 1974 
the Qatari percentage declined to 39 per cent while the non-Arab 
nationalities' percentage increased from 28.9 in 1973 to 42.4 per 
cent in 1974. Since then the number anJ. proportion of Qataris 
employed by QFMC has been decreasing while other nationalities, 
especially Egyptian, Indians and Pakistanis increased rapiJ.ly.C 66 ) 
In 1980 the total labour force of QFMC consisted of 35 Egyptians, 
three of them senior staff, 30 Indians, one of them senior staff, 
12 Pakistanis, one of them senior staff, 8 Palestinians, three of 
then1 senior staff, 9 of other nationality and only two intermediate 
Qatari staff. The reasons behind the decline of Qataris employed 
in QFMC are believed to be : a) the location of the plant in the 
Umm Said area and b) the working conditions in industry in general 
which were regarded by Qataris as relatively unfavourable, given 
the great rise in governmental demand for Qataris in non-industrial 
employment. The latter process is also reflected in the falling 
numbers of Qataris attending technical schools (see Chapters 
3 and 9). 
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Table 6.10 Manpower of QFMC by Nationality and Division (1973-80) 
I 
Year Senior Staff Intermediate Staff 'Grand Total 
Qat- /Non- I 
aris Arabs I Arabs Total Q A N-A T 
1973 2 2 25 10 15 50 52 
1974 2 2 23 9 25 ' 57 59 
1975 3 3 15 10 30 61 64 
1976 2 2 4 7 21 37 65 69 
1977 2 1 3 4 33 32 69 72 
1978 ") 1 3 5 36 33 74 77 ,;. 
1979 2 1 3 5 37 40 82 85 
1980 6 2 8 2 40 46 88 I 96 
Source QFMC, Statistics of Manpower 1973-80, Qatar 1982. 
6.4.2 Production and Consumption 
In Table 6.11 we see that following the start of operations in 
1972, in 1973 production reached a total output of flour of 10,477 
tons. This was a rate of 63.5 of capacity and represented 95.2 per cent 
out of 11,001 tons consumed domestically in 1973. A distinction in 
this respect should be made between flour production, which is the 
principal product of QFMC, and wheat bran which is a by-product of 
milling. In 1974 production consumption increased by 12.2 and 8.3 
per cent respectively, raising QFMC's share of the domestic market 
supply by 3.5 per cent. In 1976 the company achieved the highest 
proportion of production to capacity, 94.6 per cent. 
During 1977 and 78, due to the installation of additional silos 
and work on the new production stream installation, the production of 
flour dL~cl incd lHJt in l~J7~l production incrcn:;cd hy t12.k per cc11t ov<.;r 
Table 6.11 QFMC's Production & Total Consumption of Flour and Bran in Qatar (1972-80) (in Tons) 
Year 
1972* 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979( 2) 
1980 
Grand 
Total 
I 
I 
Imported 
Grain 
7,063 
16,169 
16,070 
17,163 
16,190 
23,416 
36, 786 
25,200 
1169,232 
I 
I I -.! 
1 Wheat Flour i% of in- ; % of 
I i crease ' produc-l Ni. 1 No.2 Total i in prod- i tion to 
I : uction ~1 capac-' ! ity(l) 
I i l ? ? : 692 II - I 25. 1 
., . I 
5,714 4,763 10,477 +1414.0 63.5 
6,946 4,808 11' 754 + 12.2 71.2 
I 
I 8,881 4,821 I 13,702 + 16.6 83.0 
' 
' 11,140 : 4,462 I 15,602 + 13.9 94.6 I I i I 
12,592 2,985 15' 5 77 - 0.2 94.4 
11,614 2,246 I 13,860 - 11.0 84.0 I 
I 
16,210 3,583 19, 793 + 42.8 60.0 
16,755 4,619 I 21,374 + 8.0 64.8 
I I I ! 89,852 I I I 32,287 122,139 I I ; 
* Production started in November 1972 
(l) Capacity is based on 330 days per annum 
(2) .Q_oubling the capacity to 100 ton/day or 33,000 tons/annum 
** 28% of flour 1 and 18% of flour 2 
I 
I 
I 
r 
I 
' I 
Wheat 
Bran 
** 
150 
2,228 
2,422 
3,327 
3,485 
4,242 
3, 972 
4,981 
5,548 
30,205 
I 
i 
Total 
Flour 
Consum-
~ ption 
I 
9,894 
11,001 
11,913 
13,750 
15,745 
15.689 
16,184 
19,801 
21,508 
125,591 
Source: QFMC, Production and Total Consumption of Flour and Bran (1972-SO) Qatar 1982. 
~ of Prod- Total J% of 
ito con- Brar. Prod. to 
1sumption Consum- ·consum-
/ ption ption 
i 
7.0 1,465 10.2 
95.2 4' 761 46.8 
98.7 6,599 36.7 
i 
99.7 I 4,095 81.5 I 
I 
I 
99.1 ! 5,897 59.1 
I 99.3 I 4,788 88.6 
85.6 I 8,700 46.7 
I 
99.96 I 10,585 47.1 
! 
99.4 ; 31,057 17.7 
97.3 I 76,482 39.5 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
..... 
0\ 
\.0 
I 
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that in 1978, and met all the domestic demand for flour. In 1980 prod-
uction was 21,374 tons; that is to say 64.8 per cent of the total 
capacity of the plant. 
The cumulative production of flour from 1973-80 (excluding 1972) 
was 122,139 tons, whilst the consumption was 125,591 tons; that is to 
say about 97.3 per cent of demand was met locally. The consumption of 
bran, on the other hand, was 76,482 tons, of which only 30,205 tons 
was produced locally. 
6.4.3 Economic Evaluations 
Table 6.12 below shows the sales value of flour and bran either 
produced locally or imported; Table 6.13 shows the sales and production 
cost per ton. In 1973 the company succeeded in achieving a trade 
profit of QR 112.01 per ton produced. 
Table 6,12 Sales Values of Flour & Bran and CIF Values of Imported 
Products 
(in QR ,000) 
! IImporte~b) IImporte~b): I Wheat Flour (a) Wheat(a) Year / Flour : Bran I Bran 
i No.1 ! No.2 Total 
! I 1973 4,806 I 3,584 8,390 676 
I 
! 1974 6,390 I 3,943 10,333 969 I 
I I 
I 1975 8,194 I 3,953 12,147 1,331 
I I 
1976 10,249 3,659 13,908 1,394 
I 
I 
1977 10,673 
I 
2,288 12,961 1,700 
1978 8,362 1,393 9,755 1,589 I 
I 
1979 11,671 I 2,212 13,883 1,992 I 
1980 12,063 2,864 14,927 2,746 
Grand 
Total 72,408 23,896 96,304 12,397 I 
Sources: (a) QFMC, Report on Sales Operation 1973-80 
(b) Ministry of Finance & Petroleum, Yearly 
Imports, Exports and Transit (1973-80) 
I 
524 
226 
141 
331 
438 
2,554 
72 
414 
4,700 
Qatar 1981. 
Bulletin for 
Qatar. 
I 
' 
i 
! 
: 
I 
I 
I 
i 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
7 31 
1,642 
735 
1,973 
309 
2,970 
' 
I 
5,492 i 
j 
18,154 I 
I 
32 J 006 1 
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Table 6.13 Production Costs and Sales/ton (in QR) 
I I I : Costs & 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 I 1978 I 1979 : 1980 Sales I i i i I i 
' ! I I 
l.Sales 713.53 797.24 791.45 801.67 739.71 636.14 641. zo I 656 .4s 
Values 
i I 
2.Prod. 601.52 622.90 679.00 734.50 598.25 11,012.06 927.39 ,097.69 
Costs 
I (1-2) 
Profit 112 .ol 174.34 112.45 67.12 141.46 (375.92) (286.19j (441.24~ 
l I (Losses) 
per ton I I 
Source : QFMC Special Reports, Qatar, 1981. 
In 1974 the total sales value was QR 11,301,696, whilst the 
production cost was QR 8,330 1 257, During 1975/76 the company's 
trade profit decreased by 22,5 and 48.1 per cent respectively from 
1974. In 1977 the trade profit was QR 2,804 thousand while the 
net profit was QR 3,888 thousand. (67 ) From 1978 onward the company 
faced a real loss in its trade profit figure. In 1978, for instance, 
QFMC had a trade loss of QR 5,703 thousand, QR 7,090 thousand in 
1978, rising in 1980 to QR 11,879 thousand. The losses in trade came 
as a result of the government's determination to control QFMC's final 
product pricing, Flour grades 1, 2 and bran sales prices during 
1974-76 were QR 0.92, 0.82 and 0.4 per kg. respectively. From 1978 
onward the government reduced the flour prices further to QR 0.72 
and 0.62 per kg. The government, in this respect, subsidised the 
company by the difference between the sale prices and production 
costs. (68 ) In 1978 the government records show that the company made 
a net profit of QR 2,168 thousand. (69) In 1980, and due to 
governmental backing of QR 16,478, 638, the company made a total net 
profit of QR 3,921 thousand. C70) 
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This last point, which is examined later in the general context 
of government policy, illustrates one of the features which characterises · 
parts of the industrial economy of Qatar, namely the question of 
how the viability of industrial enterprises is affected by government 
financial intervention, in this case in a privately capitalised 
business. 
6.5 Chemical Fertilizer 
The discovery of crude oil in 1939 and its exploitation from 
1949 not only supplied the country with oil and export revenue, but also 
with natural gas. The government's first movement towards heavy 
industries therefore was to establish industries depending mainly on 
natural gas as a primary input 
In the early 1960's, the government was busily engaged in 
studying several projects, such as chemical fertilizer, petrochemical 
and others, mainly in order to stop the flaring-off wastage of 
natural gas. (7l) Unfortunately, these projects were "frozen" for 
several years, due, not to caution in entering the "industrial era", 
but mainly because oil revenue did not increase as quickly as the 
government expected. This, of itself, affected the whole economic 
situation, especially between 1961-1965. C7Z) In early 1967, and thanks 
to offshore oil field development, the government decided to carry 
out some of its plans for economic diversification. In December 1967 
the Minister of Finance, Sheikh Khalifa al-Thani (the present ruler), 
instructed Gibb-Ewbank Industrial Consultants of London to carry out a 
feasibility study concerning an establishment of a Nitrogenous Fertilizer 
Plant in Qatar, as the first big industrial project. By April 1968 
the feasibility study had been prepared and submitted to the government 
of Qatar. (73) The general conclusion of the feasibility study was that 
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the establishment of a chemical fertilizer plant in Qatar was feasible. 
This was based mainly on the availability of sufficient quantities of 
associated natural gas produced at the Dukhan Oil Field, the low material 
handling costs, and the large and growing world demand for fertilizers, 
. 11 . h' h d 1 . . C74) espec1a y w1t 1n t e eve op1ng countr1es. The Gibb-Ewbank team 
studied two types of plant:C7S) 
Ammonia Capacity Urea Capacity Surplus Ammonia Overall Cap-
ital cost 
Case A 650 1,000 70 42 million 
Case B 900 1,000 320 46 " 
In addition, the team also recommended that an international sales organ·-
isation with world-wide experience should be set up in order to deal 
with marketing. 
The involvement of foreign companies or bodies in the fertilizer 
plant project was welcomed by the government, mainly due to: 
1) The shortage of management know-how in Qatar and the 
rest of the Gulf; 
2) The shortage of Qatari skilled labour and supervisors; 
3) Knowledge ofDand the technology in this type of industry 
was not familiar to the state and its people; 
4) The absence of international marketing experience in Qatar. 
Thus, the first step of establishing the Qatar Fertilizer Company 
(QAFCO) was made on 29th June 1969 by passing Resolution No. (3) of 
1969, permitting the involvement of Norsk Hydro of Norway, Davy Powergas 
Corp. Ltd. and Hambros Bank, both of U,K., as equity shareholders in 
QAFCO. On the same day the resolution was supported by an Amiri 
Decree No. (44) of 1969, 
In the first instance, Qatar, from its own revenue, paid for the 
physical infrastructure, this cost to be discounted over 40 years 
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and met by a rental charge paid by QAFCO. Secondly, the cost of the 
plant was met by raising money on the international market, backed 
by equity share allocation. The equity share capital of QAFCO was 
QR 56.7 million and divided as follows: 
State of Qatar 63% 
Norsk Hydro 20% 
Davy Powergas Corp. 7% 
Hambros Bank 10% 
100% 
In June 1969, QAFCO signed an agreement with Norsk Hydro, whereby 
Norsk Hydro undertook to provide staff and supervisors for managing 
the company, operating the plant and marketing QAFCO's output 
(ammonia and urea) through their world-wide sales organisation, Gibb-
Ewbank was appointed as engineering consultant for the project, while 
Davy Powergas was awarded the main contract for the plant, Furthermore, 
Hambros Bank, acting on behalf of six English banks, was appointed to 
arrange the loan for financing the project. (76 ) The government, 
besides providing and holding 63 per cent of the equity, was to provide 
infrastructural facilities necessary for the project, such as site 
preparation, access road, a jetty, conveyors and loading equipment, 
gas gathering facilities at the Dukhan area, pipeline systems from Dukhan 
to Umm Said (about 80 km), housing etc. 
The plant's location at Umm Said was selected and recommended 
by the consultant team of Gibb-Ewbank. Their recommendation was based 
on the following: 
1) The QPC marine terminal is served by deep water close to the 
shore, whereas other possible locations lay in shallow water; 
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2) The location at Unnn Said is less than SO km. from Doha City 
where labour is concentrated. 
3) Unlimited room for future expansion of the plant. 
The then deputy ruler and Minister of Finance supported this 
recommendation by his agreement. 
The work on site started at the end of 1970 and by the end of 
1973, all construction and installation of equipment was complete. 
The factory was designed to work at a daily capacity rate of 900 
tonnes of ammonia, two-thirds of which was to be used to give a daily 
capacity of 1,000 tonnes of urea. In addition, the plant was designed 
to be self-supporting in many ways, for instance, with two desalin-
ation plants with a total capacity of 2,545.5 cubic metres per day, 
three gas turbine generators with a total capacity of 30 MW, two 
sea water pumping stations with a total capacity of 625.3 cu. m. per 
minute, and a nitrogen manufacturing plant with a capacity of 1,000 
(77) 
cu. m. per hour. The electricity and desalination plants were 
also phased in with other general and industry-specific production 
units to ensure continuity and balance of supply overall. 
The direct total investment by the company was around 
QR 200 million, while government investment on all infrastructure was 
in the range of QR 60-80 million, C78 ) a total investment of 
QR 272 million. C79) 
In accordance with Article (4) of Amiri Decree No. (10) of 1974, 
the government's share in QAFCO reverted to QGPC. The control of 
the company is vested in a ten member Board of Directors. As the 
company has developed and expanded, as noted below, the effective 
representation has become dominated by the State of Qatar through 
the Chairman and five other directors (four actually appointed) from 
QGPC and other ministries, Two seats are held by Norsk Hydro and 
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the others by Davy and Hambros. This reflects changes in equity 
holding which now gives Qatar 70%, Norsk 25%, Davy 3% and 
Hambros 2%. 
In December 1974, the Board of Directors decided to expand 
capacity by building a second fertilizer plant of the same capacity as 
the first. (80) The decision was supported fairly quickly and by 
June 1975 the construction work of QAFCO II started with the co-operation 
of Norsk Hydro as coordinating engineer, Davy Powergas and Costain 
Process Engineering & Construction of U.K. as the main mechanical 
contractors and Chiyoda Chemical Engineering & Construction of Japan 
as the main engineer. We should note that two Qatari Companies, 
Howard al-Attiyah and Salmer al-Tadamon now appeared as main civil 
contractors, Hambros Bank remaining as the financial organiser for 
the project. (8l) Although the Ammonia II plant is essentially a 
repeat of the Ammonia I plant, over 200 modifications were implemented 
in order to improve the performance of the new plant. Urea II on the 
*(83) 
other hand, is based on a totally different process from Urea I, 
a reminder of the world-wide continuous technological change in 
industries of this kind and adopted here primarily to extend plant life 
expectancy. The expansion of plant capacity made it necessary to 
double the established support and accessory systems, such as nitrogen 
plant, ammonia storage tank, desalination plant, sea water pumping 
facilities, gas turbine generators and others. It is worth mentioning 
here that while the total investment in QAFCO I was QR 272 million, 
the total investment in QAFCO II was about QR 1,000 million, (84 ) 
more than three and a half times the investment in the old plant. 
* 
Two relevant points may be made in this context. First, the 
Whereas the old urea plant is based on Mitsui Toatsu's Chrystall-
ization process, the new plant ls based on Stamicarbon's Strippiitg 
process. 
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very large scale of.units of investment which are now required in 
hydrocarbon processing industries of this kind, and which are very 
considerable, even for the capital rich Emirates. Secondly, the 
dependence on imported capital goods exposes an investing country such 
as Qatar to at least one type of imported inflation, whilst changing the 
nature of, but not destroying, economic interdependence with other parts 
of the world. 
6. 5 . 1 Manpower 
A similar situation of dependence appears when we discuss the 
question of manpower and the number, but not the position, of Qataris 
in QAFCO. In this sense we will use QAFCO's manpower divisions 
(Senior, intermediate staff and daily paid workers) and general total 
figures. 
Figure 6.1, showing manpower by nationalities according to their 
total number, and Table 6.14, showing QAFCO's three manpower divisions, 
represent the labour force of QAFCO since the start of operations in 
1973. As may be noticed both from Figure 6.1 and Table 6.14, although 
the Qataris at the end of 1973, constituted one third of total numbers, 
the majority of them were working as daily paid workers. The highest 
proportion in the senior staff - the decision makers - comprised the 
Norwegians. This was as a result of a June 1969 agreement between 
QAFCO and Norsk Hydro. 
Training of nationals for responsible positions in QAFCO, in 
order to take over the management and operation, is the main aim for 
the national Qatarisation Committee in general, and for QAFCO in 
particular, By comparing the total labour force at the end of 1974 
with that at the end of 1980, a six year period, we can, however, 
deduce the following: 
Table 6.14 Composition of QAFCO Labour Force By Nationalty and Function 
i I I 
i End Nor- I Regional Senior Staff f Intermediate Staff i Daily Paid Grand 
I weg- I 
1 of ' ' Other :rot. \ Q ! I I I ' Total'. . IQ iPaki- i Ind.:. 
I 
1an • at- Arab A i p In 0 :Tot. Q A i p ! In 0 Tot. Sen.~ jari ' . !stan !ian I I I I Staff 1 I 
11973 I 2 
i I I 
I 
i 
45 I 3 1 i 2 2 ! 10 ill 61 84 : 90 ' - 246 75 23 8 i 19 19 144 445 
' 
1974 47 2 I 4 i 1 i 3 I - 10 I 30 63 108 110 2 313 123 27 9 : 20 21 200 i 570 I 
' 
! I I o73 ! I 1975 47 ! 2 I 5 : 1 I 3 I - ill I 67 73 122 156 4 422 : 101 44 4 25 19 193 
! I I I 
i I I 
: 30 1976 44 I 3 I 9 I 1 I 9 22 113 : 71 128 177 6 495 ' 30 23 1 2Jl 105 666 .__ I - I ; -...! i I I I I :lC I I I ' I I 1 I 
1977 47 5 Ill I 1 I 9 26 140 I 74 148 193 10 565 10 : 12 2 34 22 80 718 i -I I 
I I I 
1978 63 ! 6 114 I 5 /17 - 42 146 i 102 150 309 ! 35 
742 I 5 7 2 32 19 65 I 912 
i 
1979 ; 57 I 8 119 I 5 I 21 I - I 53 1155 108 155 345 i 40 803 I 5 I 4 i - I 21 16 46 : 959 
I 
1980 56 ! 10 :21 ! 5 1 24 I 
i 60 1153 118 151 379 50 I 851 I - - - I - - - 967 -i I I : 
' 
: ! 
* The full-time Norwegian teachers are not included 
Source : QAFCO, Manpower Statistics of 1970-1980, Personnel Dept. Umm Said. 
0~----~------r------r----~------.------r~===,----~ 
~~1'2 lgj'1 
Source: Tobie 6·14 
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1) There was a'n increase in Qatari numbers by only 5. 2 per 
cent during the 1974-80 period. 
2) The percentage of Qataris in the total had declined from 
27.2 per cent in 1974 to only 16.9 per cent in 1980. 
3) The Qatari senior staff had increased from two persons in 
1974 to only 10 persons in 1980. 
4) The number of Indians increased by 203 per cent during 
1974-80 with an average growth rate of 16.8 per cent 
per annum. 
5) The Norwegian team (all of them senior staff) increased by 
19.2 per cent during the 1974-80 period. 
6) The Qatari intermediate staff increased from 30 persons in 
1974 to 153 employees in 1980, but this came mainly as the 
result of the company's personal policy to transfer all 
daily paid workers to the status of intermediate staff or 
monthly paid workers. 
In addition QAFCO in 1979 renewed the June 1969 agreement with 
Norsk Hydro to an additional ten year period. This raises the 
question to what extent the Qatari labour force has gained from the 
ten years' cooperation with Norsk Hydro in the chemical fertilizer 
field. 
6.5.2 Production and Marketing 
It is noteworthy that Norsk Hydro's Nitrogen Division in Oslo 
acts as QAFCO's sales department and carried out independent decisions 
k . d . . (85) on mar ets, pr1ces an quant1t1es. 
Table 6.15 shows the production, proportion of capacity used and 
sales operations during 1974-80. In 1974 the production of ammonia was 
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118,320 tonnes, which represented almost 40 per cent of the anunonia 
annual capacity. The sales of ammonia, on the other hand, made up almost 
60 per cent of the 118,320 tonnes production. This adversely affected 
the urea production, since that plant was designed to receive t~o 
thirds of ammonia output. Therefore, the production of urea was only 
71,760 tonnes, or about 22 per cent of the annual capacity. The total 
sales of urea \vas 32,003 tonnes. 
QAFCO had achieved good f.o.b. prices for its output; for instance, 
the average ammonia and urea f.o.b. prices were QR 954 and QR 1,362 
per tonne respectively. (86 ) The f.o.b. prices of ammonia and urea were 
much higher than Gibb-Ewbank predicted, and this was the main reason for 
the expansion of the first plant. In 1975 the improvement in production 
was noticeable for both ammonia and urea. The ammonia output reached 
138,310 tonnes, or 46 per cent of the annual capacity, whilst ammonia 
sales were only 23 per cent of the total output. This in itself helped 
the urea production to increase by 133.6 per cent from the previous 
year, thereby reaching 167,620 tonnes. Another increase successfully 
achieved was in the urea sales operation where sales had increased four 
and a half times over the previous year. Unfortunately these increases 
coincided with a decline in QAFCO f.o.b prices, in which ammonia average 
prices reduced to QR 443, a decline of 53.6 per cent, while urea prices 
were down to QR 861, or 36.8 per cent less than 1974. (87 ) In 1977 
the company faced a large reduction in its production of both ammonia 
and urea. The sales accordingly declined. The reduction of 1977 came 
as a result of: 
a) Local difficulties, such as technical problems in operating the 
plant, also a complete shutdown of the plant because of natural 
gas supply shortage; 
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b) External reasons such as the continuous decline of export prices 
due to the surplus in the international market for fertilizers. 
(QAFCO average f.o.b prices were QR 389 for ammonia and QR 441 
for urea), as well as financial burdens. (88) 
In 1978 the production increased to more than the 1976 production 
level, 201,070 tonnes of ammonia and 255,600 tonnes of urea. The sales 
of ammonia had dropped by 6.8 per cent from 1977, leaving urea sales 
to score another remarkable increase of 157.4 per cent of the 1977 sales. 
The increase in the 1978 production and sales was mainly due to the 
continuous flow of natural gas solving the majority of the technical 
problems, the increase of the labour force by 27 per cent since 1977, 
and lastly, the improvement in the international urea f. o. b prices, 
so that QAFCO's urea average f.o.b price was QR 531 per tonne. (89 ) In 
1980, thanks to the successful operation of QAFCO II the company 
reached its highest production of ammonia and urea. The production, 
for instance, of ammonia was 507,709 tonnes. This represents an 
annual productivity of 525 tonnes per employee. The urea production 
was 640,678 tonnes, giving an annual productivity of 662 tonnes per 
person. (The labour force of QAFCO in 1980 was 967 employees including 
administrative staff). In addition, marketing operations also reached 
their highest level with 131,501 tonnes of ammonia and 699,156 tonnes 
of urea. Beside all that, the average QAFCO's f.o.b prices had 
increased from the previous year by 28.8 per cent for ammonia reaching 
QR 563 per tonne, and by 24.3 per cent for urea reaching QR 737 
per tonne. (90) 
The total sales of ammonia during 1974-80 were 478,967 tonnes. 
About 57 per cent was sold to Asian countries, and another 23.4 
per cent out of the total was sold to Western Europe. The total 
sales of urea during 1974-80 were 1,953,391 tonnes, 96 per cent of total 
sales sold to Asian countries. (9l) 
Table 6.15 QAFCO Production and Sales 
(metric tonnes) 
Year Production(!) Sal~s(2) 
Ammonia Urea Ammonia ! % of l % of (a) Urea 1 % of % to th~) ; I increase capacity 
1 
increase capacity : : 
. I I I I 
I i I i I ----1 
• 1974 118,320 ,. - i 39.8 71,760 i - 21.7 ! 70,731 32,003 
' I , 
' ' 1975 138,310 16.9 I 46.6 167.620 133.6 { 
I 1976 163,320 18.1 55.0 206,930 23.5 I 
1977 127.710 21.8 I 43.0 165,510 20.0 i 
i 
1978 201,070 57.4 I 67.7 255,600 54.4 
I 
1979(b) I i I 369,080 83.6 62.1 496,740 94.3 ' I i i 1980 507,709 37.6 85.5 ! 640,678 29.0 I I 
I 
-~otal ·--~625,519 l 2,004,838 I i 
' I 
---~ 
-----
(a) .~ual capacity based on 330 working days per annum 
(b) Start of Urea II from April 1979, start of Ammonia II from May 1979 
(c) Stock from previous year 
i 50.8 
I 
62.7 
50.2 
77.5 
75.3 
97.1 
I 
Sources: (1) 
(2) 
QAFCO, The Monthly Production, 1974-80, Production Department Umm Said 
QAFCO, Sales Statistics, 1974-80, Shipping Department Umm Said. 
I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
I 
I 
31. 731 145.198 
58.291 2 7 4 ' 540 ( c} : 
i 
53,634 115,154 
50,003 I 296,435 (c) I 
I 
I 
I 
77,076 395,905 
137,501 ("'' 699,156 '-) 
478,967 1,958,391 
-00 
N 
I 
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6.5.3 Economic Evaluation 
Table 6.16 shows the profit-loss accounts of QAFCO during 
1975-79. In 1975 the total sales of QAFCO, after deduction of 
sales commission, freight and other selling expenses, \vas 
QR 123.18 million. By taking away the amount of QR 54.35 million, 
for operational, administration and related costs, the remaining 
balance represented a trading profit of QR 68.83 million for 1975. 
The net profit, after the depreciation of property, plant, equipment 
and amortisation of pre-production expenses, was QR 32,5Y millions. 
In 1976, although there were increases in ammonia and urea product i.on 
and marketing, total sales were valued at QR 118.89 million, a 
3.5 per cent decline from the 1975 sales figure. This is mainly due 
Table 6.16 Profit & Loss Accounts of QAFCO 1975-79 (in million QR) 
Net Profits (Losses)* 32.59 (16.97) (31.15) 
* Before appropriations 
Source QAFCO: Profit t; Loss Account Heports (1976-79) 
Umm Said. 
3.62 18.15 
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to the sharp decline of ammonia and urea f.o.b prices. In addition, 
operational costs increased by 81.9 per cent from 1975, reaching 
QR 98.88 million. The main cause of the cost increase was the 
higher production level which was reflected in higher consumption 
of feedstock and other materials. This, in itself, reduced the 
trade profit to only QR 20.01 million. The company, furthermore, 
had a total net loss in 1976 of QR 16.97 million. 
In 1977, the financial situation of the company became worse, 
net losses totalling QR 31.15 million. In 1978 the total sales 
value was QR 158.51 million, of which QR 111.34 million had to be 
set aside to meet operational and administration costs. The net 
profit of 1978 was only QR 3.62 million. In 1979 the total sales 
value was QR 225.45 million, whilst the total costs were 
QR 141.71 million, of which QR 63.19 million was wages and salaries, 
QR 12.55 million was management fee, whilst QR 16.33 million was 
for feedstock. (92 ) The net profit of 1979 was QR 18.15 million. 
In 1980, QAFCO had the best year of operation in the company's 
history, where the total sales reached QR 541 million. After 
deducting all variable costs, a net profit of QR 134.92 million 
was achieved. (93) 
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Table 6.17 QAFCO Ammonia & Urea Prices (QR/Tonnes) 
j : ' 
' 1974 I 1975 1976 
Price ' I 
' 
Amm- Urea J\mm. I Urea Amm. Urea J\mm. 
onia I 
-----
1 584 
' 
I Highest 1,347 1 '771 720 1,550 5 75 467 
Average 954 1,362 443 861 426 ! 386 389 
I 
' 
Lowest 390 I 978 330 360 I 33o 336 327 ! I 
I 
I I 
I Price 1978 1979 I 1980 ' I 
I Amm. 
I 
I I I Urea Amm. Urea Amm. Urea 
L i ; 
i I I 
' ! 
I Highest 420 611 561 683 728 861 l I ' i 
I 
Average 338 531 437 597 I 563 737 
I 
I Lowest 272 484 388 498 I 423 596 ! I I 
Source : QAFCO, Sales Statistics, Shipping Dept. Umm Said 
Table 6,18 Gas ConsumEtion CgAFCO) (Million SCf) 
* 
I Year Gas Consumption* I I 
! 1974 9,559 
I 
I 1975 11,620 
I 1976 11,926 
I 1977 8,787 
1978 12,614 
1979 23,584 
1980 30,293 
Total 108,383 
Gas consumption depends on the plant load and lies in the range 
49,000- 57,000 SCF/tNH3 
1977 
Urea 
' 560 
I 441 
. 335 
I 
Source QAFCO, Gas Consumption during 1974-80, Production Department,l980. 
I 
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6.6 Iron and Steel Complex 
The first consideration given to establish a steel complex in 
Qatar was in the middle of 1972, (94 ) followed by a pre-feasibility 
study carried out by a team from the Ministry of Finance & Petroleum. 
The study findings convinced the Amir to go ahead with the steel 
project, and in April 1973 the Amir ordered IDTC (established at the 
end of March 1973), to prepare a feasibility study for the steel 
complex involving the use of natural gas in the direct reduction 
processing. In June 1973 the feasibility study was completed, IDTC 
recommending the participation of Tokyo Boeki Ltd. of Japan. 
The feasibility study was based on establishing a steel plant 
with an annual capacity of 147,100 tonnes of steel bars. In addition, 
IDTC estimated annual sales, in the early years of the operation, 
domestic and external markets by quantities and sales prices per 
metric ton as follows: (95 ) 
Qatari Market 
Saudi Arabia 
Other Countries 
Total 
Metric Tons/Annum 
45,000 
20,000 
82,100 
147,100 
Price/M.T. 
780 
730 
690 
Furthermore, IDTC team assumed that the total manpower required would 
be 650 with total annual wages and salaries of QR 15.01 million. (96 ) 
IDTC had added, in the feasibility study that a total investment 
of QR 210 million was needed. (97 ) 
In July 1974 the Joint Venture Agreement was concluded and 
officially signed by Qatar, Kobe Steel and Tokyo Boeki of Japan. On 
12 October 1974 a Resolution No. (5) of 1974 was passed permitting 
the involvement of Kobe Steel and Tokyo Boeki as share holders in 
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Qatar Steel Company (QASCO) with 30 per cent of QASCO's equity share 
capital. The Amir supported the Minister of Finance & Petroleum's Res-
olution by the promulgation of Decree No. (130) of 1974 of Establishing 
QASCO, with an initial capital of QR 200 million. (Increased to QR ~00 
million in 1980). The capital is distributed among the three partners 
as follO\vs: (9S) 
Number of ordinary Nominal Value 
Shareholder shares of QRlO,OOO Million QR Percentage 
each 
State of Qatar 14,000 140 70 
Kobe Steel Ltd, 4,000 40 20 
Tokyo Boeki Ltd. 2,000 20 10 
Total 20,000 200 100 
In addition, the government has undertaken responsibility for infra-
structual requirements such as a public jetty adjacent to the plant 
site, unloading and loading equipment, additional pipelines supplying 
natural gas from Dukhan, and the connecting of public water and 
electricity lines with the plant, plus housing units, access roads etc. 
The Board of Directors of QASCO consists of ten members, seven 
(including the Chairman) to be appointed by the government of Qatar, 
two by Kobe Steel and one by Tokyo Boeki. 
On 3rd November 1974 QASCO had signed four agreements and arrangements. 
They were as follows: (99 ) 
a. Management Agreement this agreement was signed with Kobe Steel 
Ltd. for an initial period of 8 years which may be extended 
by mutual agreement. Under this agreement, Kobe Steel had 
agreed to provide management services to QASCO. 
b. Training Arrangements : whereby Kobe Steel was to provide training 
for engineers and skilled operatives who will act as a 
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"core-force" on the production line of QASCO. This arrangement 
is covered by a "Construction Agreement". 
c. Gas, Power and Water Supply agreement : with the government, 
where the government undertook to supply and deliver gas, 
electric power and water to QASCO's plant to meet all its 
needs. This agreement fixed maximum prices for each item 
for the first five years of production. 
d. Marketing agreement with Tokyo Boeki : by which Tokyo Boeki 
undertook to arrange the marketing of the steel products 
outside Qatar for a period of ten years from the beginning 
of operations. This agreement may be extended by mutual 
arrangement. 
In addition to the above mentioned agreements, QASCO awarded 
Kobe Steel a turnkey contract covering the design, engineering, equipment 
supply and commissioning of the plant, whilst Taisei Co~1oration of 
J d d h f b .ld" d . . 1 . . k (lOO) apan was awar e t e contract or u1 1ng an c1v1 eng1neer1ng wor . 
The site for the plant, at Umm Said, had been chosen by the IDTC 
team and was approved by the Amir. This site covers 650,000 sq. m. 
while an additional 370,000 sq.m. has been reserved on an adjacent site 
for possible future expansion. 
In March 1975, IDTC marked the beginning of the work on site by 
reclamation of the land which was allocated to QASCO. In February 1976 
the work started on the construction and installation of machinery and 
equipment. By 15 February 1978 all the work on site was completed, 
excluding the direct reduction plant. The official inauguration 
and the start of commercial production was on 26 April 1978, and on 
15 August 1978, the direct reduction plant started operation. 
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The plant has five main units. They are: 
a. Materials reception through a three berth jetty, and three 
storage yards; 
b. Direct reduction with an annual capacity of 400,000 tons of 
sponge iron; 
c. Two electric arc furnaces with a total capacity of 415,800 
tons/annum; 
d. Two continuous casting machines with total capacity of 
1,053,600 tons per annum; 
e. Rolling mill with a rated capacity of 380,000 tons per 
annum of plain and deformed bars. 
There is a strong supposition that there was another feasibility 
study carried out between June 1973 and July 1974 although no documents 
are available to support or disprove it. This belief is based on: 
the fact that the actual constructed size of the plant was not the same as 
studied by IDTC; and the total capital invested in the project was 
QR 1,100 million and not QR 210 million, as suggested by ITOC. 
QASCO operations are based on imported iron ore pellets and steel 
scrap. Because of the need of lime for the processing, a committee 
consisting of members from QASCO and IDTC was established in 1976 to 
produce quick lime locally. The lime since 1979 has been supplied 
by QNCC at Umm Bab (see pp. 15~-159). By using low priced inputs, 
from this and other governmentally owned or controlled enterprises, 
such as natural gas, electricity, water etc. the company can compete 
with other producers in the international markets. 
At the end of 1980, the Board of Directors decided to carry out a 
pre-feasibility study concerning the expansion of the existing plant. 
The pre-feasibility study's general conclusions were either to expand 
the company's output by establishing a new plant with the same capacity 
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(as was done with QAFCO I and QAFCO II), or to add some 50 per cent 
to existing capacity, but without a direct reduction plant. No 
decision has yet been taken. 
6. 6 . 1 Manpower 
QASCO's manpower data is, unfortunately, very limited because 
of the extreme reluctance of the Japanese participants to divulge 
information. We know that in 1978 the total labour force of QASCO 
numbered 733, of which only 22 were Qataris.(lOl) Table 6.19 shows 
that the number of Qataris employed by QASCO had risen to 41 by March 
1980, an increase of 86.4% over 1978. In March 1980 the Qatari proportion 
I 
of the total labour force was 3.6% (compared with 3% of a smaller labour 
force in 1978), but the Qatari proportion of the skilled category was 
slightly lower at 3.2% out of a total of 819. We also know that the 
total labour force at the end of 1979 was 1,148 (l02) of which 112 
were Japanese, these constituting the management team. 
Table 6.19 : QASCO's Manpower as at March 19~0 
: I 
Qatari Non-Qatari Total 
: 
Administrative 3 I 211 214 
i 
: 
Skilled 26 793 
! 
819 
' 
Semi-skilled 9 i 1 ! 10 
; 
Unskilled 3 86 89 
I 
' 
I 
I Total 41 J 1,091 I 1,132 
I 
Of which: I I 
Literate 3 - 3 
Technical 35 793 828 
Secondary - 148 148 
University 3 150 153 
Source Fieldwork questionnaire. 
' 
I 
i 
! 
I 
I 
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The Japanese management team, by the end of 1980, had declined 
to a total of 77 (l03) and by the end of June 1981 had declined even 
further to 74 employees. (l04) This contrasts markedly with the growth 
trendin QAFCO's management team (see Section 6.5). The decline in 
the QASCO team figures may be explained by the Management Agreement 
with Kobe Steel, whereby the total number in the foreign management 
team was expected to be 130 at the start-up of the plant and planned 
to decrease until totally replaced by locally trained employees. (l05) 
The total number of Qatari employees did increase from 41 in March 
(106) 1980 to 64 employees at the end of the year. (see Table 6.19). 
6.6.2 Production 
Although the work on site was not completed until 15 February 1978, 
the production of steel bars started at the end of March 1978, with 
rated annual capacity of 380,000 tonnes of steel bars. Figure 6.2 
shows QASCO's monthly production of steel bars. Between March and 
August 1978 production did not exceed 10,000 metric tons. This was 
mainly due to the reliance on steel scrap as the main input, and the 
fact that the installation of the direct reduction plant was continuing 
during that period, In mid August 1978 the direct reduction plant, 
using the U.S. developed Midrex process, started operation and managed 
to work to full daily capacity from the first day. (l07) 
In 1978 production totalled 113,994 tonncs, a monthly rate of 
11,399 tonnes. This figure was less than the planned total of 129,000 
tonnes. However, in 1979, QASCO's first full year of production, the 
output of steel bars was 378,544 tonnes, about 230 per cent of the 1978 
level and 18,3 per cent over the planned production figure of 320,000 
tonnes. The 1979 production level represented 99.6 per cent of the 
total capacity of the rolling mill. In 1980 the production of reinforcing 
bars was 450,340 tonnes, with a monthly average of 37,528 tonnes. The 
f'ig. 6.2 QASCO Pu-oduc~ion off Siee! Reinforcing Bars {By moflH~ and yean-) 
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highest monthly output figure was achieved in March where the production 
was 46,107 tonnes and by this figure QASCO had set a world record, (l08) 
in relation to the nominal monthly capacity of 31,667 tonnes. 
The labour force, including administration, at the end of 1980 
was 1,184 giving an annual productivity in 1980 of 380.4 tonnes per 
person, a high rate resulting from the automated systems used by the 
company. 
The 1980 production not only exceeded the planned figure by 
45.6 per cent, but exceeded the annual capacity of the plant. This, 
in itself is open to two possible interpretations. The first is 
that the Japanese management team ran the plant over normal capacity, 
disregarding the life expectancy of the complex, in order to maximise 
early returns from the low fixed prices of the Qatar government's 
supplies of gas, water and electricity (see p.l88 ). Gas prices were 
(109' less than l3 per cent of average world prices, J (1982 -<~1\ 0.022~/ 
cu.m.) whilst electricity at QR 0.04 kw and water at QR 2.2 per cu.ut. 
(llO) 
were also low. This interpretation of exceeding annual capacity is 
taken seriously by Qataris and expressed thus : 
"A local businessman said : By continually seeking to push 
production beyond the plant's capacity, they are wearing out 
the equipment prematurely. At this rate we shall have to 
spend more money to replace burnt-out equipment just for the 
sake of the record books."(lll) 
The second realistic possibility is that the actual annual 
capacity figure of the plant, especially of the rolling mill shop from 
inception was higher than the published figure.* 
* There are several published figures i.e. 
a. al-Mis'hal (The Managing Director of IDTC) stated in 1978 that 
the designed capacity of QASCO is between 400,000-450,000 
M,T, per year. 
b. QASCO pamphlet - 330,000 M.T. per year 
c. QASCO Steel Mill Project - 380,000 M.T. per year. 
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Unfortunately, there is no answer to this question, the Japanese 
management believing that the secret of the operations should not "pass 
through the plant's gates.'' From a close examination of the description 
of the steel mill (see page 189 ) one can deduce from the great capacity 
of the two continuous casting processes that the rolling mill capacity 
should be much higher than the stated 380,000 tonnes. 
6.6.3 Local Sales & Export Operation 
The sales of QASCO's output of reinforcing bars is carried out 
by two bodies. One of these is QASCO's Sales Department, which 
undertook to arrange the marketing of the output only inside Qatar, 
whilst Tokyo Boeki, acting as sales agent of QASCO, undertook external 
marketing operations. 
In 1973, IDTC predicted that by 1977 the local demand for 
(112) 
reinforcing bars would reach 45,000 tonnes. In addition, it 
had been assumed that about 30 per cent of the level of production 
predicted in the feasibility study- 147,100 tons, would be used 
locally and the balance would be exported by Tokyo Boeki. (ll 3) 
According to import statistics for reinforcing bars and from information 
collected in the field, the annual domestic consumption of bars cannot 
be expected to exceed 30,000 tonnes without some sudden increased demand, 
which usually is associated with the construction of major new industrial 
projects (see Table 6.20) and is not with demand for house construction. 
Table 6.21 shows the distribution of QASCO sales during 1978-80. 
In 1978 QASCO supplied the domestic market with only 457 tonnes, only 
some 0.5 per cent out of 1978 total sales. In 1978 Saudi Arabia 
was the dominant market for QASCO's steel, taking 77.8 per cent out of 
85,581 tonnes. Second came Kuwait with 12.9 per cent, followed by 
U.A.E. In 1979, the total sales of QASCO rose to 379,779 tonnes, of 
which 13.0 per cent was sold locally, 51.8 per cent to Saudi Arabia and 
Table 6.20 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Construction 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
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Reinforcing Bars Imported to Qa~ar by Value 
(Unit = M.T. Value in 1000 QR) 
Quantities % of increase CIF Values 
(Decrease) 
10,588.8 
- 8,117 
15,459.1 46.0 I 10.481 
15,665.7 1.3 10.430 
26,573.4 69.6 22.122 
53,545.9 101.5 80,879 
26,130.0 (51. 2) 30,138 
31,396.2 20.2 39,095 
75,089.2 139.2 84,803 
32,373.2 (56. 9) 44,871 
13,701.1 (57. 7) 24,536 
7,002.6 ( 48. 9) 11 '881 
of QAFCO during 71-73 
" Flour Mill " 71-72 
" 
New Refinery " 72-74 
" QASCO " 75-78 
" QAFCO II " 76-79 
" 
NGL 2 
" 77-80 
" QAPCO " 77-81 
" NGLl " 78-81 
I Av.Prices/ Tonne in QR 
I 767 
I 
' 678 I 
I 
I 
I 666 I 
I 
I 833 
' 
I 
1 '511 ' 
1,153 
1,245 
1,129 
1,386 
1,791 
1,697 
Source Ministry of Finance & Petroleum : Yearly Bulletin of Imports 
and Exports 1970-1980, Customs Dept, 
19.7 per cent to Kuwait. The increase in flow to the domestic market in 
1979 by steel bars reduced the import figure from 32,373 tonnes in 1978 
to only 13,701 to~nes. In 1980 there were several changes which occurred 
in the domestic and export market levels; for instance, there were 
decreases in both the quantity and proportion sold at the domestic level 
and also in other countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman, whilst 
the reverse applied to the U.A.E., Bahrain and Iraq. The total sales of 
1980, however, increased by 15,9 per cent over 1979 figures. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
Between March 1978 and ·~:he end of 1980 QASCO succeeded in selling 
96.1 per cent of its overall production, with Qatar taking only 9.9 
per cent, Saudi Arabia 48.5 per cent, the U.A.E. 18.2 per cent and Kuwait 
15.9 per cent of cumulative sales. 
Table 6.21 Destination and Quantities of QASCO sales (in M.T.) 
I /Grand I Country 1978 1979 1980 % of % of I 
1980 G. Tot. 
I 
Qatar 457 49,207 I 39,653 9.0 89,317 9.9 
Saudi Arabia 66,599 196,624 I 175,841 40.0 I 439,064 48.S ' I 
Kuwait I i 11 '038 '14,656 58,16'7 13.2 143,861 15. ~) 
I 
U.A.E. 7,009 51,852 I 106,450 24.2 ! 165 '511 18. :~ I 
I I I Bahrain 478 2,264 
I 
6,339 1.4 i 9,081 1.0 
! 
Oman ~ ) '109 1,281 0.3 4,690 o.s 
I 
Jordan - - I 527 0.1 527 0.1 I 
I 
I 
52,062 11.8 53,829 ; ' Iraq - 1,767 5.9 I 
~- ·---I 
Total 85,581 3/'9' 779 440,320 100.0 905,680 I 100.0 
Source QASCO Destinationwise Sales, Qatar 1981. 
6.6.4 Sales Value 
Table 6.22 below shows the sales value of QASCO's bar products 
between 1978 and 1980, In 1978 QASCO obtained QR 1,076 per tonne for 
its exported steel, while the domestic prices were much higher. This 
fact was due to several factors: 
a) The domestic market was an effective monopoly of QASCO, given 
by the a.uthori ty of Law No (2) of 1979 which fixed the customs duty 
. (114) . 
on 1mported steel bars·. Th1s resulted in controlling the local steel 
prices in favour of QASCO. 
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b) Open international competition in steel trade outside Qatar had 
forced the company to lower export steel prices below the international 
c.i.f. prices and this was made possible by low transfer prices of 
domestic inputs. 
Table 6.22 
Country 
Saudi Arabia 
Kuwait 
U.A.E. 
Oman 
Bahrain 
Jordan 
Iraq 
Total 
Local Sales 
G. Total 
Sales Value of QASCO's Bar Products (1978-80) 
(in 000 QR) 
1978 1979 1980 
Total Price Total Price Total 
sales QR/.M.T. sales QR/M.T. sales 
72,800 1,093.1 256,221.4 1,303.1 221,994.7 
I 11 '600 1,050.9 97,791.1 1,309.9 74,372.7 
I 
I 7,500 1,070.1 66,434.3 1,281.2 130,935.5 
I -
-
4,660.4 1,349.6 1,597.3 
I 
500 1,046.0 3,043.4 1,344.5 8,110.0 
708.6 
- - 2,017.1 1,141.4 65,670.3 
91,600 1,076.1 430,107.8 1,301.1 503,339.1 
600 1,200 64,562.8 1,312.1 54.497.0 
92,200 1, 077.3 494,670.5 1,302.5 557,836.1 
Price 
QR/M. T. 
1,262.2 
1,278.6 
1,230.0 
1,247.2 
1,279.4 
1 '345. 1 
1,2(11.4 
1,256.3 
1,374.3 
1,266.9 
Source Ministry of Finance & Petroleum Yearly Bulletin of Imports & 
Exports (1978-80) Customs Department, Qatar. 
While in 1978 QASCO received QR 92.2 million for total steel bar 
sales, in 1979 average prices increasedby 20.9 per cent over 1978 and 
this, together with higher sales quantities helped QASCO to achieve 
total sales value of QR 494.7 million. In 1980, although the average 
price per tonne was down to QR 1,256.3 the company's sales income 
reached QR 557.8 million. The only fact which assisted the company was 
its high productivity. 
i 
' 
I 
j 
I 
I 
! 
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The profit and loss accounts of QASCO are unknown, but from the 
government publication, especially of the Ministry of Economy & Commerce, 
we gather that the company did not make any net profit during 1978-80. 
Governmental sources have always indicated that QASCO is still in the 
first stages of its establishment. There have been some recent 
unofficial statements which cannot be attributed, that since its 
establishment the company has in fact made a considerable cumulative 
net loss. The place of QASCO in Qatar's and the region's future 
industrial scenario is discussed along with that of other industries 
in the concluding section of this chapter. 
6. 7 Small-Scale Industries (SSI) 
There is no doubt that two fundamental influences on the way 1n 
which small-scale industries have developed in Qatar have been, first, 
the rising revenue from oil exports and, secondly, the structural 
characteristics of the import trade. The oil revenues, on one hand, 
provided the cash flow which provided capital for all kinds of industrial 
development, whilst at the same time these revenues once disbursed into 
society become the principal factor expanding and changing consumer demand. 
The importing of finished goods, on the other hand, has had a noticeable 
effect on limiting the development of some specific types of industry 
i.e. carpentry. 
The general trend of development in SSI in Qatar, in the author's 
opinion, has included. three different and interlocking phases, three 
phases which can be summarized as follows: 
Phase One : Prior to oil discovery 
Qatar, at this stage, as with many other analogous countries had 
traditional crafts rather than what could strictly be called manufacturing 
industry. These craft activities fell into two main groups. The first 
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and dominant group was linked with maritime activities i.e. dhow building, 
the making of fishing nets, sails etc. The second group comprised land-
based activities i.e. quarrying, construction of traditional buildings, 
the making of simple house furniture etc. 
The general characteristics of these craft activities can be 
seen as: 
a) Reliance on manual and physical work. 
b) The use of simple traditional tools in most cases owned by 
individual workers. 
c) No requirement for financial backing. 
d) More national workers than expatriate. 
e) Production responding to individual domestic demands and 
requirements. 
Phase Two : Following oil exploitation 
The discovery and exploitation of oil totally changed the attitudes 
of the inhabitants toward the sea-related crafts, which had already been 
weakened by the decay of the pearling industry . The 
result has been the almost complete abandonment of the majority of 
traditional crafts. The movement of artisans, mostly self-employed, 
towards employment by government agencies, became rapid and general. This 
movement together with the other trends noted in Chapter 3 led to a 
greater demand for developed urban land while at the same time higher 
incomes made the effective volume of this demand financially even stronger. 
The creation of a rich city state led to greater private sector involve-
ment in land purchases, sales and development. The construction industry 
boomed and created new types of industries, i.e. bricks, tiles, carpentry 
and metal working. Due to the growing requirement for skilled and 
semi-skilled labour in the new individual enterprises which made up the 
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SSI sector and the inability, and/or the reluctance of citizens (given 
alternative opportunities) to undertake such labouring employment, a 
large wave of immigrants began pouring into Qatar from many countries, 
but mainly from Iran. This latter surge, together with the rapid growth 
of disposable incomes, in turn produced a further escalation in con-
sumption, both in quantity and quality. This in turn helped in the 
establishment of some consumer goods industries i.e. soft drinks, ice 
making, dairies etc. 
This second phase had some distinguishing characteristics which 
can be summarized as follows: 
a) The majority of the new activities were industries rather than 
crafts. 
b) The supplying of building materials to the construction sector 
became dominant within the new industries. 
c) The growth of imports of luxury commodities. 
d) The dependence on foreign labour both as manual workers 
and technicians. 
e) The small size of issued capital associated with the new enterprises. 
Phase Three : Following independence 
In the third phase, although there were many similarities to the 
second, particularly relating to the types of industrial productions, 
several significant changes took place. These changes define the 
characteristics of the third phase as being: 
a) The relatively larger size of individual establishments, both in 
terms of labour force units, land area required and issued capital. 
b) The appearance of new Qatari investors wishing to introduce new 
industrial technologies in order to capitalise on more sophisticated 
demand. 
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c) Even more dependence on foreign labour force, than in the second stage. 
d) The change of industrial distribution patterns within Doha City. 
e) The appearance of the Industrial Estate of Doha (IED)(see Chapter 7.2). 
In an examination of the small and medium scale industrial sector, 
which is entirely private enterprise, we have to adopt several different 
interlocking approaches. The evidence which is available is of four 
different types: 
l. Annual publication of the Ministry of Economy and Commerce. 
2. Unpublished stati~tics for the registration and closing 
down of establishments. 
3. Sample questionnaires, 
4. Personal fieldwork data. 
However, even before the analysis of these data, we have to 
clarify several elements: 
a) The term "establishment" has been used so far because even though 
the official data on registration purports to describe industrial enter-
prises, in fact the distinction between purely or mainly manufacturing 
businesses and those with large or solely commercial interests is not 
always clear. For example, during the 1976/80 period there were 202 
establishments registered under the carpentry (furniture) heading. 
Only 73 of these, less than 36.5 per cent, were actually concerned with 
manufacturing to any extent and Table 6.23 shows the figures corrected 
as the result of personal fieldwork survey. Even of this reduced number, 
the majority of industrial enterprises still handle imported furniture 
and joinery products. 
b) It is believed, but this cannot be proved given the nature of 
commercial and industrial regulations, that many entrepreneurs own major 
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establishments with several branches or subsidiaries. The issued 
capital of the major establishments may appear, although to an unknown 
extent, also as the issued capital of individual branches. Because of 
the uncertainty, all the registered establishments are treated here as 
separate units. 
c) The question of ownership itself raises some problems in the 
identification and classification of industries. There are, nominally, 
legal restrictions on the type and size of enterprise which can be owned 
by non-citizens. In practice, as the economy has grown and demand become 
more diverse, and as fieldwork has shown, it has not been possible or 
even desirable to apply these controls strictly, The maximum capital 
investment in any business by a non-Qatari is QR 5,000 (as specified 
by Law No (20) of 1963 and its amendments of Regulation of Non .. Qatari 
Working in Trade and Industry), but field survey shows that many such 
businesses have much larger fixed capit~l investment. As a result, the 
figures for issued capital have to be used with caution. 
Major trends in SSI Development 
Table 6.23 below shows the development of SSI during 1950-1980, 
The data are presented as a summary statement of all the evidence 
available including that from field survey. It can be deduced from 
the table that: 
a) The food industry, during the whole period (1950-1980) was 
dominant throughout, with a yearly growth of 5.4 per cent in the number 
of establishments. 
b) Although food industrial establishments continued to grow in 
absolute numbers, their proportional importance fell. For instance, the 
food industry held 69.6 per cent of total SSI establishments in 1950, 
but this declined to 64,9, 49.6 and 34,4 per cent in 1956/60, 1966/70 and 
1976/80 respectively, 
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c) There is a clear shift from the company form of enterprise to 
sole ownership. In 1950, for example, individual entrepreneur owners 
only made up 28.3 per cent out of the SSI total number. This increased 
to 52.6 in 1956/60 and after declining to 52.2 in 1966/70 increased 
again to 51.5 in the period 1976/80. 
d) In 1950, Qataris either as individuals or groups owned 32.6 per 
cent out of the SSI total. This percentage had declined to 16.6 in 
1961/65 period. This decline resulted from a reaction to the 1959/60 
economic crisis which made Qataris cautious in their involvement with 
industrial investment. Since then the Qatari percentage has grown 
rapidly, reaching 41.7 in 1976/80. The Qataris, on the other hand, 
were the dominant figures, during the whole period, in the field of 
stone crushing, industrial gases, bricks and ti.les and aluminium 
assembly, while they had lost ground in carpentry from 1961/65 till the 
end of 1971/75. 
e) Although the Qataris, during the whole period, made up less 
than 50 per cent of the legal owners of establishments, the issued 
capital of their enterprises made up more than 80 per cent out of SSI 
total issued capital, again over the whole period. However, this 
percentage declined i.e. from 99,2 in 1950 to 84,6 per cent in 
1976/80 total. This decline came as a result of the increasing prop-
ortion of establishments owned by several partners ("Partner" in 
Table 6.23). These increased by a 6.7 per cent average annual rate. 
The rate of investment of Qatari capital increased by 5.1 per cent per 
annum, this in single ownership or partner organized establishments. 
f) The general average of issued capital per establishment in all 
categories was at its highest during the early years, the 1950's, 
(QR 615,478 per establishment), This has declined ever since, reaching 
its lowest average of QR 192, 699 in the period 1971/75 and increasing 
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again in 1976/80 to QR 308,170 per establishment. The Qatari issued 
capital, in 1950, was QR 1,871,800 per establishment which decreased to 
QR 625,711 in 1976/80. Partnership investment increased from QR 13,333 
in 1950 to QR 223,626 in 1976/80 per establishment. At the same time 
the average capitalisation per foreign establishment grew from 
QR 6,964 in 1950 to QR 16,424 in 1951/55. Associated with the economic 
crisis of 1959/60 and the imposition of Law No.(20) of 1963, during 
the second half of the 1960's, foreign establishment issued capital 
average declined to QR 7,017 in 1976/80. The number of such establ-
ishments however continued to grow. 
g) While the Qatari issued capital during all the periods was much 
concentrated in the carpentry field with the exception of 1976/80, the 
partnerships were more concentrated in the field of iron fabrication. 
The foreign issued capital, on the other hand, was concentrated in the 
food industries, especially in bakeries. 
h) While the total number of establishments were growing by 6 per 
cent per annum, the issued capital was growing at a much slower rate 
of 5.3 per cent per annum, 
The manufacturing of plastic products, which is not identified 
in Table 6,23, is the most recent type of private sector industry 
introduced to the country in 1978, Although the Ministry of Economy 
& Commerce's annual reports show that in 1980 there were nine estab-
lishments in this field, our search in the Ministry files shows that 
in 1980 there was, in fact, only one Qatari establishment with a total 
issued capital of QR 2 million, However, whilst this is the only 
information available relating to the capitalisation of plastic 
industries, as pointed out in Section 7.2,4 there do exist unregistered 
factories, some of which are in this field, This new field for 
industrial ventures is one in which the factual detailed position is by 
no means clear. 
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Table 6.2;i The Development of Small-Scale Manufacturing Industries during 1950-1980 
Total Legal Status Ownership of Est. Issued Capital (in Thousand QR) 
of 
Estab- Co. Indiv- Qatari Partners Foreign Qatari Partners ·oreiW' Total 
lish- idua1 only only only only 
ments owner 
Stone Crushers 1 - 1 1 - - 100 - - 100 
Food Industries 32 28 4 2 2 28 17 25 
I 
195 237 
Carpentry 7 2 5 6 1 - 8,760 15 - I 8,775 
Industrial Gases 1 1 - 1 - - 8,500 - - i 8,500 Bricks, tiles 3 1 2 3 - - 1,200 - - I ,2UO 
Iron Fabrication 2 1 1 2 - - 9,500 - - i Y,SOO 
Aluminium Fab. - - - - - - - - - I -
Total 46 33 13 15 3 28 28,077 
' 
40 195 I 28,312 
1951-55 
S.C. 1 - 1 I 1 - - r 100 - ! - I 100 ! 
F. I. 52 46 6 2 4 46 17 34 315.5 I 336.5 
c. 17 5 12 12 2 3 10,600 35 233 10,ll6!i 
Ind.G. 1 1 - 1 - - 8,500 - - : !>,500 i 
B.T. 6 3 3 6 - - 2,350 - -
' 
2,350 
! 
I. F. 6 1 5 2 - 4 9,500 - 322 I 9,!122 Al. F. 
- - - - -
- - - - -
Total 83 56 27 24 6 53 31,267 69 I 870.Q 32,206.5 ' 
1956-60 
S.C. 2 1 I i 2 - - 2,100 - I 
- j 2,100 ! F. I. 113 95 18 5 10 98 1,150 253. s I 717 2,120.5 I c. 37 10 27 21 2 14 18,637 35 524. 19,196.3 
Ind.G. 1 1 - 1 - - 8,500 - I 8,500.0 I 
B.T. 14 5 9 10 3 1 9,415 150 I I 5 
1 
9,57o.o I 
I. F. 7 2 5 2 1 4 9,500 900 322 I_ 10,722.0 i 
Al.F. 
- - - l - - - - - - - j 
! ' 1,s68.:J s2,2os.b I Total 174 114 60 
' 
41 16 117 4 9. 302 i 1 '338. 5 
1.961-65 
-
S.C. 3 2 
I 
2 I 3 - _ I 2,140 - - J 2,140.0 
F. I. 175 137 38 ' 8 25 142 5,160 634.5 I ,894 7,688.5 
c. 69 20 49 
I 
22 8 Lll'·"' 594 '" l'·'" ' Ind. G. 1 I - I - - 8. 500 - - !1,500 .0 i B.T. 19 9 10 I 10 7 2 9,41!> 320 " 9,7G<L<~ I. F. 17 7 1.0 l 3 4 I 0 9 _5!;9 I , 253 ~~)(, 11 ,~OK. 0 A1.F. - - - - -
19 ~-- ~-~ict2.! ;_Qt_~~ I ----- ----- ---Total 284 175 109 47 44 _:~ • ..!!!:'.~~ _!~!~30. -~-
1966-70 
- I I S.C. 4 2 2 2 2 - 140 Sb .5 - I !.16. ~> F. I. 230 136 94 18 17 195 5, 777.5 1,164 2 ,099. t Y,041.3 c. 116 43 73 32 14 70 24,142 823 561..1 25,526.1 
I Ind.G. 2 1 1 2 - - 2,400 - - 2,400 B.T. 63 33 30 23 18 22 13,670 389.5 177 14,236.5 
I. F. 47 12 35 10 5 32 11,371 1,907 294.1 13.572.1 
A1.F. 2 2 
-
1 1 
-
60 900 
-
960 
Total 464 229 235 88 57 319 57,560.5 5,240 3,132 65,932.5 
1971-75 
S.C. 13 10 3 8 5 - 1,745 2. 636.5 - 4,381.51 
F. I. 257 146 111 25 24 208 8,165.5 2,454 1,174.5 11,794 ' 
c. 152 67 85 57 25 70 -15.7 39.4 1,882 572.9 1M ,194. 3 I 
l:1d.G, 2 1 1 2 - - 2,400 - - 2,400 ' 
B.T. 133 68 65 73 34 26 34,623.5 2,222 280.5 37 ,126 I 
I. F. 89 31 58 28 21 40 14 .0!17 .5 4,217 312. 1 1i:S,6:!6.6 i Al. F. 7 5 2 4 3 - 2,1(,() 1,150 - 3,310 
_I_~ tal 653 328 ' 325 197 I 108,930.9jl4,561.~ 2,,340 I 112 344 125,1S32.4 I 
-----
1976-80 
S.C. 18 12 6 12 6 I - 10,295 7. 236.5 - 17,531.5 I 
F. I. 304 llb6 138 61 44 199 32,488.7 5,409 I I ' 14 4 . 5 39 '04 2 . 2 c. 168 68 100 80 34 54 42,854.4 3,806 491.7147,1!.2.1 
Ind.G. 3 J ,: 2 3 - - 22,400 - - 122,400 B.T. 177 86 103 48 26 58,786.5 5,692 I zss.5 b4,764 I. F. 144 53 91 74 30 40 22,037 2,902 316 6 35 255 .b 
AI. F. 19 13 6 14 5 - 28 260 2,300 I - 'l3o:s6o 
' 
Total i 833 ! 404 "429 347 167 319 217 ,121.6~7 ,345.5/2,238.31256,705.4 i 
Source: Compiled by the Author from 
Ministry of Economy & Commerce : Commercial Registry Files of Existing and 
Closing Down Establishments. Survey Oct. 1982. 
Note Ownership tabled as"Partnership'' invo1 ves both Qatar is and non-Qataris. 
! 
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The Labour Force of SSI 
Table 6.24 shows the 1980 estimation of labour force employed 
in SSI by sector. The total employment is estimated by the author to 
be some 8,640 persons which gives an average of 10.4 persons per 
establishment. The largest employment group lies within the food 
industry, whilst the largest average number of employees per establish-
ment is found in the industrial gases plants. The number of Qataris, 
on the other hand, are very small compared to other nationaJities. The 
Qatari labour force in the SSI ~s believed to compose around 4.5 per 
cent of the 1980 total, i.e, a total of 389 persons. This figure in 
fact represents owner/employers rather than employees. 
Table 6,24 : EstimaUon of SSI Employment in 1980 
Number of Estab- Estimated total I Estimated aver-
lishmcnts labour force 1 age per cstt:Lb-
Ushmcnt 
I 
Stone Crusher 18 360 20.0 I 
i 
Food Industry 304 2,949 9.7 
Carpentry 168 2,050 12.2 
Industrial Gases 3 87 29.0 
Bricks & Tiles 177 2,053 11.6 
Iron fabrication 
163 1,141 7.0 
Alumin~um Assembly 
Total 833 8,640 10.4 
I 
Source : Fieldwork 
Prospects for SSI 
There are, at the moment, several factors affecting the contrib-
ution of SSI to the national economy of Qatar. The most important of 
these are : 
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a) The size of the domestic market : It is well-knO\m that the size 
of the domestic market plays a vital role in determining the size of 
manufacturing operations and their range of activities. Qatar's 
market, however, is characterised primarily by its small size, and, 
although there is no restriction whatsoever on exporting and re-
exporting, the entrepreneurs prefer to confine themselves to supplying 
local demand. They have not, until recently, found any attraction in the 
idea of exporting their establishments' outputs (see also Chapter 10). 
b) Inadequate governmental direction : The government, apart from 
licencing and registering new and wound-up establishments, has no 
control on the setting up of new industrial establishments, neither 
in terms of the operation size nor of type. This essentially laissez 
faire, free economy situation, and the market gap opportunity approach 
of individual entrepreneurs has led to imbalances between the various 
industrial fields (see also the conclusion to this chapter). 
c) Working under capacity : As a direct result of a) and b) above 
mentioned, the author found during fieldwork that most, if not all, of 
SSI establishments were working at a rate of two thirds, and sometimes 
even one third of their daily or annual capacity. This appeared 
particularly clear in plants in the newest field, plastic products. 
The prospects for each existing field of SSI are evaluated as 
follows: 
a) Stone crushers : The activity of these plants depends mainly on 
the construction industry which, in turn, mainly depends on government 
expenditure. In 1980 the import statistics showed that there were some 
quantities of crushed stone still being imported from abroad, especially 
from Jordan and Lebanon. These imports include not only materials 
unavailable in Qatar (see Chapters 2 & 5) 
-207-
b) Food industry : There is no doubt that the demand for the food 
industry's products has grown in recent years and will continue to 
grow in certain categories. Therefore, the number of establishments, 
especially of bakeries, is expected at first to grow, but at a very 
slow rate and are later most likely to decline. This is mainly due to 
the trend, already established, of setting up large establishments 
(both in terms of size and issued capital), which will put some of the 
smaller ones out of business. The number and type of dairy and soft 
drink establishments are expected to remain the same, but they probably 
will continue to work at less than full capacity. Import statistics 
do not allow the detailed separate identification of processed foods, 
but personal observation suggests the following facts and trends. Almost 
all Qatari households continue to rely on fresh or only partly processed 
basic food ingredients which are then made up in the house e.g. fresh 
or frozen meat, vegetables etc. The domestic market for "convenience 
foods", i.e, frozen made-up meals remains very limited. However, the 
non-Qatari population, which, as noted in Chapter 3, has a varied ethnic 
mix, is significant. "Western'' expatriates, on the other hand, tend 
to have a much larger demand for processed foods, whilst Indians, 
Pakistanis and Iranians(the largest group) tend to have demands similar 
to the Qataris. Therefore, at the moment, the market attraction for 
new types of processed food industries is limited and the range and 
volume of domestically produced agricultural and fish products for local 
processing is equally limited. There may be a sufficient change in 
Qatari consumption habits in the future to make innovation possible. 
Under some circumstances, particularly big cities, i.e. million plus 
population, as neighbouring Riyadh and Jeddah, such changes are already 
attracting, not only a fast growing flood of processed food imports, (llS) 
but also local investment. The total market demand volume in Qatar, is 
bound, however, to remain small because of the small population size. 
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c) Carpentry : The main obstacle to the survival and growth of 
carpentry and joinery manufactur6 in the domestic market is the com-
petition of imported ready-made furniture which amounted in 1980 to 
be QR 161.2 million. Carpentry establishments, in 1980, were working 
only at less than half of their capacity and they only manufacture 
to order. But if local carpentry and wood working establishments 
change their output to suit contemporary general taste and reduce unit 
costs, only then can they win the local market. 
d) Industrial gases : This sector has a great chance to develop and 
expand in the near future. This expectation is based on the small 
number (3) and the small size of establishments now involved in this 
field as well as the reported unsatisfied local demand by the increasing 
number of various users of gases, i.e. soft drinks plant, hospitals, 
welding shops, etc. 
e) Bricks and tiles The development prospect for bricks and tiles 
is in a dilen®a. This is mainly due to, firstly, the great early rush 
to establish brick and tile making plants in response to rapidly rising 
demand and the high selling prices, which could be obtained. However, 
there may now be over-capacity of production and the less efficient 
plants may have to be shut down. Secondly, the growing demand for 
imported tiles, which in 1972 amounted to 1,761 tons worth QR 1.7 
million, increasing in 1978 to 27,225 tons worth QR 37.0 million. This 
potential market for domestic industries is large even if total demand 
falls, but here too, home industries have to meet present and future 
high quality specifications, The decline of building and construction 
especially during 1978/79 and lately during the 1982/83 oil crisis has 
totally confused the situation at present and the short-term future 
is equally unclear. 
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f) Iron and steel fabrication and turning : In the author's opinion 
there is little future prospect for growth in iron fabrication and most 
likely the total number of establishments may decline in the near 
future. This is mainly because the demand range of fabricated products 
is restricted. The growing demand for aluminium frames (windows, doors, 
etc.) is destroying the once important iron fabrications market and the 
changing from iron water tanks to fibre-glass has had a similar result. 
Iron and steel turning, on the other hand, has relatively good expec-
tations, mainly due to the demand for machinery repairs by the increased 
number of SSI with installed machinery and equipment, as well as that 
in the heavy public sector industries. So far there has not been any 
development of the standardised production of light structural steel 
units ready for assembly since the building contractors will only supply 
a complete building·against a specific firm order. 
g) Aluminium assembly : It is expected that the assembly of aluminium 
forms will continue to develop even further, and probably will replace 
iron fabrication. So far, aluminium forms produced in the Gulf region, 
e.g. by ALBA in Bahrain, have not been significantly imported. 
h) Plastic products. The future of such private sector industries 
is unforeseeable. This is a field which is rapidly changing. The total 
number of plants, in 1982, is believed to be more than 15 of which 
seven were then operational. All but one are designed only to produce 
plastic bags for the local market and one is known also to produce 
extruded plastic pipes. There is severe competition from very cheap 
imported plastic products. At the moment, the relative advantage which 
hypotheticru-ly results from the local production of basic chemical 
feedstocks does not exist (see Chapter 6 for a consideration of inter-
industry linkages). It is not surprising that relatively large 
production lines are working now at half of their nominal capacity 
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or less. The future here is partly governed by whether entrepreneurs 
are prepared to look outside the limited national market for specific 
products, but mainly on whether the inter-industry linkages, considered 
in the conclusion to this Chapter, can be fully developed. There is 
also the problem of competition from other industrialising Gulf 
countries, a problem considered in the Conclusion to this whole study. 
6.8 Current Large Scale Development 
There are, additional to the major enterprises already considered, 
other large scale industrial developments which have either very 
recently come onstream or are at the planning stage. 
6.8.1 Petrochemical Industry 
The first pre-feasibility study concerning the establishment of 
a petrochemical complex in Qatar was carried out in 1962, (ll6 ) but 
the project was completely set aside until the early 1970's. In 1973-74 
studies were initiated to investigate the various ways in which to 
utilize the NGL plant output. (ll 7) On 27.6.1974 the government of 
Qatar signed an agreement with C,d,F Chimie of France to establish 
two joint venture petrochemical plants, one of them in France, the 
other in Qatar. (ll8) On 2nd September 1974, the Minister of Finance 
& Petroleum passed Resolution No (3) of 1974, permitting the 
collaboration of two French companies; C,d.F Chimie and Gazocean, with 
Qatar Petrochemical Company (QAPCO). On the same day, the Amir signed 
Decree No (109) of 1974 establishing QAPCO with an initial capital 
of QR 240 million, divided as follows: 
% of the shares Value in million QR 
State of Qatar 
C.d.F Chimie 
Gazocean 
Total 
80 
15 
5 
100% 
192 
36 
12 
240 
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The company was formed for an initial period of 25 years, to be extended 
by mutual agreement. In November 1974, QAPCO signed four agreements, 
three with C.d.F Chimie whereby C.d.F Chimie undertook to 1) supervise 
on site and co-ordinate different contractors, 2) provide a management 
team for the company and the plant and 3) market overseas Low Density 
Polyethylene (LOPE) for a period of 10 years. QAPCO's fourth agreement 
was with Gazocean which undertook to market the ethylene output for 
a period of 10 years. (llg) In June 1975 the governmental shares in 
QAPCO were taken over by QGPC. (120 ) In October 1976 Gazocean 
relinquished its original shareholding and, as a result, the shareholding 
in QAPCO became 84 per cent by QGPC and 16 per cent by C.d.F Chimie. 
At the same time the share capital of QAPCO was increased to 
QR 360 million. (121 ) 
In May and June 1977, QAPCO had signed four agreements for the 
construction of the complex: 
1) The polyethylene plant contract was awarded to Coppee-Rust of 
Belgium, valued at QR 450 million. This plant has a capacity 
of 140,000 tonnes of LOPE per annum. 
2) Technip of France was awarded the contract to build the 
ethylene plant of 280,000 tonnes a year capacity. The contract 
was worth QR 900 million. 
3) Offsite facilities contract was given to Japan Gasolene 
Corporation. 
4) Turbotechnica of Italy was appointed to build the steam and power 
plant. 
Several other contract agreements were signed with different 
European f:irms for minor works, such as digging a canal for waste 
seawater, a small desalination unit, installation of sulphur bulk-
loading and a jetty crane. (122) 
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The location of QAPCO complex is in Umm Said in an area of 
1,050,000 sq.m. between QAFCO and QFMC to the south and QASCO to the 
north. 
The complex, which involved a total investment of QR 2,600 
million, started production in December 1980, (123 ) with a total annual 
capacity of 
280,000 tonnes of pure ethylene 
140,000 tonnes of low-density polyethylene (LOPE) 
40,000 tonnes of sulphur 
5,000 tonnes of propylene 
The plant was officially inaugurated in February 1981 and it was 
estimated that the capital invested should be repaid within seven years. 
At the end of 1979 (124) 336 persons were employed by QAPCO; 
at the beginning of 1981 the total labour force was 650 persons of 
(125) 
which 14.6 per cent were Qatar is. The division-wise distribution 
of QAPCO labour force in 1981 was as follows: 65 senior staff (60 
French), 125 intermediate employees and 460 workers. (126 ) 
The total production of QAPCO during the first half of 1981 
was 63,277 tonnes of ethylene or 45 per cent of the total capacity, 
55,044 tonnes of LDPC, that is to say 78.6 per cent of the plant 
total capacity and 2,778 tonnes of sulphur, about 11 per cent of the 
1 . (127) tota capaClty. The company's production rate has not as yet 
met expectation, mainly due to the shortage of feedstock. This 
shortage was mainly due to the corrosion of offshore NGL and gas 
pipelines which considerably reduced the volume and regularity of flow. 
6,8.2 Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) 
It is useful first to divide the NGL plants into three groups: 
NGL, NGL 1 and NGL 'l. 
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1) NGL 
In March 1971, QPC announced its independent intention to build 
a factory for the purpose of expbrting NGL. In the same year of the 
announcement, the company carried out the engineering work as well as 
the site survey, and by the beginning of 1972 the work on site started 
by site preparation. Shell International was appointed to act on behalf 
of QPC as the technical consultant. (1 28 ) During 1972 QPC signed 
several contracts,in respect of erecting the plant, with several 
international and local companies (none of the companies' names are 
available), The total cost of QPC's NGL plant was estimated around 
&25 million. (129) (approximately QR 250 million). In early 1975 the 
plant, which is located in Umm Said, to the north of the oil terminal, 
d · ( 13 O) · h d ' d i f' 34 C I * f' starte operat1on w1t a es1gne capac ty o 0 MS :u o · 
( 131) 
natural gas as feedstock. The output design capacity was: 
Propane 
Butane 
Natural gasoline 
20,000 b/d 
8,000 b/d 
4,000 b/d 
The actual production of the plant varied between the summer 
(132) 
and winter months, for instance -
Summer Winter 
Propane 16,000 14,000 b/d 
Butane 9,000 6,000 b/d 
Natural gasoline 6,000 3,000 b/d 
In 1975 the company, however, exported about 949,843.4 barrels 
of propane, 675,799.7 barrels of butane and 241,798.1 barrels of 
natural gasoline. (133 ) 
The 3rd April, 1977 marked the end of QPC's NGL plant which 
was destroyed completely by a mysterious fire. ~ 34 ) 
* Million Standard cu.ft./day. 
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2) NGL 1 
Qatar, mainly due to its obligation to other domestic and 
international markets did not take long to recover from the destruction 
of NGL. In the second half of 1978, Qatar started to reconstruct NGL 1 on 
the same site as NGL. Qatar was advised that utilizing the same engineering 
and basic documents of the old plant would ensure a reduction in overall 
costs. (135) In addition, all the gas collection facilities in Dukhan, 
as well as the pipelines, were still operational. 
The construction of this plant took almost three years, and in 
23.2.1981 the Amir officially inaugurated the plant. (l 36 ) The plant, 
which involved capital investment of about QR 300 million, had an 
output design capacity of 
Propane 740 tonnes/day 
Butane 470 
" " 
Natural gasoline 310 
" " 
~r da-.y 
In addition the plant will produce 24 MSCfAof ethane-rich gas which forms 
the feedstock for QAPCO, and 140 MSCF of methane-rich gas (137) which 1s 
consumed as fuel or feedstock in other local industries, particularly 
QAFCO. (see Fig, 6.3). 
3) NGL 2 
The major source of gas for industrial and other usage was 
obtained, until recently, from the onshore oilfield, while all natural 
gas from offshore fields was 'flared'. 
On 4th September, 1974, the government and Shell International 
(Gas) Ltd, signed the original document of establishing the Qatar Gas 
Company Ltd. The aim of the company, according to the basic statute 
was to carry out feasibility studies for developing project(s) in 
respect of the production of NGL and LNG in Qatar. Article (5) of 
the Statute limited the share capital to QR 400 million, divided over 
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40,000 shares. The government contributed 70 per cent of the capital 
and Shell International made up the balance. (138 ) On 22nd October 
1974 the Amir signed Decree No (133) of 1974, establishing the Qatar 
Gas Company. 
The project, on 1st December, 1976, became the possession of QGPC 
and Shell remained only to give technical assistance and to act on the 
f QG C 1 f h . (139) account o P as a consu tant or t e proJect. 
The main object of the NGL 2 plant is to utilize fully offshore 
associated gas. The work on site was started in January 1977 on a 
location near to NGL 1, so use can be made of the existing support 
facilities. The Amir had inaugurated the plant at the same time as 
. . . (140) NGL 1. NGL 2, which had a total Investment of QR 1,400 m1111on, 
has a design capacity of 
Propane 220 tonnes/day 
Butane 730 " " 
Natural gasoline 73 " II 
In addition to the previous output the plant will produce 28 MSCF per 
(141) day of ethane-rich gas and 110 MSCF per day of methane. 
Following the merger of the management of the two plants 
NGL 1 and NGL 2, the total number of staff reached about 300 persons. (l42) 
was as 
Propane 
Butane 
The total production of the two plants in the first half of 19Hl 
follows: ( 143) 
In Tonnes 
118,445 
78,462 
% of Prod./Capacity 
38 
35 
Natural gasoline 59,628 31 
The main reason for the low production quantities, as with QAPCO, is 
interruption in the gas-gathering offshore NGL and gas pipeline flows. 
On sale operation, NGL 1 - 2 had sold 177,275 tonnes of light 
Fog. 6·3 Sketch P~OJn of NGl 
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gases* (LPG) (of which 2,070 tonnes were sold locally), and a total 
of 35,328 tonnes of condensate ** (of which only 135 tonnes were sold 
locally). (144 ) 
Conclusion 
One of the most important aspects of industrialization, whether 
it be looked at from the point of view of the growth pole concept or 
that of industrial aggregation, is inter and intra-industry linkages 
between and within the industrial sector. These linkages can be 
identified as associated with the basic industries considered in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
Despite the fact that each one of the public sector industries 
has been considered here, and indeed were conceived,separately in a 
unique context, Figure 6.4 illustrates the position of inter-industry 
linkages as they appear to have been in 1970, as they are now and the 
way in which they seem to be developing, because here, perhaps, lies 
one of the keys to the future, 
The diagram of linkages has been constructed around the basic 
heavy industries of the public sector, particularly those associated 
with hydrocarbons. These industries are the central dynamo of the 
growth pole model. A review of trends indicates that between the basic 
industries, there are already established some inter-industry linkages, 
the basis for them all being associated and, increasingly, unassociated 
natural gas. The linkages between QASCO and QNCC also include the 
transfer of lime and iron dioxide. The operation of QAPCO, on the other 
hand, depends heavily on the performance of NGL 1 and 2, 
There are also the linkages between the public sector basic 
industries and the down-stream private sector, the small - scale 
industries (see F~gure 6.4 ) 
* 
** 
Consist of propane and butane liquids. 
Natural gasoline. 
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In some cases there can be identified potential internal linkages, 
which might develop as the result, for example of the extension of QAPC 
operations into HOPE and PVC polyester resins which are not yet estab-
lished but which hypothetically could be established. QASCO, on the 
other hand, in its present form is strongly tied to the construction 
industry. This is due to the fact that almost the whole of its present 
product is reinforcing bars. Future production would still mainly be 
associated with construction materials but there could be some possible 
development of different kinds of products (see Figure 6.4 ). 
The future of the two most recent major establishments, QASCO and 
QAPCO, apart from the internal growth of production linkages and also 
externally with other industries, is at the moment rather difficult to 
forecast, since both are heavily export oriented. The way in which other 
similar industrial ventures, particularly in the QAPCO type field arc being 
developed on a much larger scale in Saudi Arabia raises very considerable 
problems and this perhaps can only be resolved by regional co-operation. In 
terms of steel, the growth of steel making capacity in the Gulf is, on the 
face of it, less threatening, except for the fact that most of the steel 
making capacity is aimed at the local construction industry, and it is the 
ups-and-downs of the construction industry which will affect the future of QASCO. 
In each of the public sector industries studied, a short statement 
was made of the financial status, as described by income and expenditure 
can 
for the most recent years available. In no case~ direct government inputs of 
capital, either for establishing or expansion of plant, be shown 
either on the debit side or due for repayment. In all these cases, 
therefore, one has a situation in which much of the capitalization of the 
basic industrial organization has been in the nature of expenditure (in 
addition to infrastructural provisions), expenditure which the government 
has been prepa'l;'ed ~n effect to write-off. The profit and loss account is 
strictly a nominal statement of an excess of income over current expenditure. 
It is imvossible to present any other estimation of the status of the 
companies. 
Fig. 6.4 Inter and Intra- Industrial Linkages 
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CHAPTER 7 
LOCATION OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
In this Chapter the emphasis is entirely on two particular areas 
which have been deliberately developed by the government as industrial 
zones. Manufacturing industries in both the private and public sectors, 
together with some basic utilities, are also found in a few other parts 
of the peninsula, as well as in the city itself, but these are where 
the great concentrations lie. Urnrn Said has now become the great heavy 
industrial zone, whilst the Industrial Estate of Doha has become the 
main centre for private sector small-scale industries. 
7.1 Umm Said Industrial Area 
7.1.1 Introduction and historical background 
" ... and the Company (APOC later QPC) has 
the right to choose the port which may be 
suitable for exporting its substances ... " 
This phrase is a part of Article (6) of the original oil concession 
agreement which was signed on 17th May 1935. (see Appendix 5.1). But 
the power of this article was limited by Article (7) of the same 
agreement in which: 
" the Company has no right to acquire land 
occupied by the enterprise of the owners 
thereof and also houses, places and land 
which their owners decline to sell or to rent ... " 
Therefore, having in mind two facts that a) the population at the time 
was concentrated along the north, north east and east coastlines, as 
well as in the centre of the peninsula; and b) the coastal waters to 
the west are very shallow and the seabed is of hard rock, the company 
was forced to limit its choice of port only to the area south of Wakra 
village. When the company resumed its operation in 1947, following a 
war-time shut-down, it settled on the Umm Said area and toward 1949 
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the work on the oil storage tanks and terminal was complete. Interest-
ingly, the name of Umm Said was neither recorded nor marked on maps 
before the year 1947. 
Umm Said was almost ignored by the government until the end of the 
1960's. This was due to several factors: 
a) QPC had, as agreed by the government, full control over the Umm 
Said area. This control was requested by the company to cover the con-
centration of the oil terminal, storage tanks, topping plant and the 
company office and employees' residential campus. In addition, the 
company did not wish any disturbance to the traffic of oil tankers to and 
from Umm Said. 
b) Although the government had it in mind to establish industries 
based on natural gas, these plans were delayed by the slow growth of 
oil revenue (see also Chapters 4 and. 5 ), 
c) The government's entire attention was directed to the improvement 
of the capital, Doha, and its facilities. 
All these reasons and others contributed to the fact that the 
area was ignored, and increased the strain on relations between the 
government and QPC. In 1967, for instance, the government directed 
Gibb-Ewbank to make a feasibility study for establishing a chemical 
fertilizer plant in Qatar (see Chapter 6 pp. 172-175 ). Gibb-Ewbank's 
team strongly recommended a location at Umm Said, following which the 
government and the consultant team had discussions with QPC in order 
to locate the plant in Umm Said. The then QPC indicated in writing the 
area of the Umm Said marine terminal which they would wish to preserve 
exclusively for the oil-tankers (see Figure 7.1). Moreover, the 
company also wished to retain overall traffic control in the channel 
leading to both the oil terminal and the fertilizer jetty. (l) Umm 
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Said might be said to be an enclave of company territory over which the 
government appeared not to have full control. 
Between 1967 and early 1972 there were several changes which 
occurred in Qatar as a whole and which affected the control of QPC over 
the Umm Said area: 
a) The rapid development of the offshore oil fields and their greatly 
growing contribution to the state revenue. 
b) The purchasing of the topping plant by the government. 
c) The establishment of full independence of the State of Qatar 
from British control. 
d) The transfer of power from Sheikh Ahmad to Sheikh Khalifa. 
All these and other factors brought Umm Said to a more prominent 
place in government attention. This attention was not accidental 
but was greatly strengthened by the positive factors of safety and 
security which the area provided naturally (see below). 
7.1.2 Location and Topography 
Umm Said, as shown in Figure 7.2, is located on the south east 
coast of the peninsula, approximately 45 km to the south of Doha City 
and about 85 km to the south east of Dukhan Town. The area extends 
over a low promontory of solid ground which is surrounded by sabkha 
on sides away from the sea. The sabkha zone, 40 km long and 7-10 km 
wide, is frequently flooded by sea water during the spring, and storm 
tides produced by easterly winds. (2) The area as a whole lies only 
0-1.5 m. above sea level. (3) (sec also Fig. 7.2.B). 
There are two areas where the terrain has different character-
istics. First there are the sand dunes bordering Umm Said to the south, 
sizeable features which are not easy to cross by wheeled vehicles. 
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These dunes,due to the prevailing winds, are not stable, having an annual 
average movement towards the south of about 8.0 m. (4) Secondly, there 
is a sandy knoll, about 10 km to the north east of the oil terminal, 
covered by sandy lithosols only 10-20 em. deep overlying limestone 
bed rock. The knoll has a maximum height of about 9 m above sea level 
and its choice for residential development is the reason why Umrn Said 
Town is away from the coastline. Other smaller sandy knolls are found 
close to the coast. They are of white oolitic sand of marine origin, with 
a common height of 1-3 m. (S) These minor features were critical in 
determining the detailed layout of inst<~llations in the area. (See Fig. 7. 2. h) 
Umm Said, on the offshore side, is relatively well served with 
deep water close to the shore. The five fathom line (9.14 m) lies less 
than 2 km to the east of the shore, whilst the 10 fathom line (18.3 m) 
is only 4 km offshore (see Figure 7.1). The sea-bed near Umm Said 
consists of materials which have been amenable to navigation channel 
improvement by dredging : a) quartz and muddy quartz sand extends 
offshore to the east for some 4 km, followed by b) a mud formation of 
about 10 km wide, this in turn followed by c) muddy sand formation. 
To the north of the first two zones lie the Fasht Al-Arif coral reefs, (6) 
which actually protect Umm Said Bay from sea swell driven by the north 
easterly winds. A natural channel leading to the high seas runs northward 
through the coral formation. 
7.1.3 The effect of climate 
Although climatic conditions in Urnm Said differ slightly from 
those of Doha, one can see a great deal of similarity between them. (see 
Chapter 2 pp.l3-15) The weather seriously affects the storage and 
functional characteristics of production inputs, machinery and its 
performance. Corrosion of machinery, made worse by high atmospheric 
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salt content,* produces a significant reduction in its life expectancy. 
The government, through IDTC, has been forced to set up a cathodic 
protection programme for the port and other steel erections in Umrn 
Said in order to limit corrosion. (7) The labour force's dislike of 
weather conditions at Umm Said is one important reason discouraging 
citizens from taking employment there. (S) 
7.1.4 Government policy 
Umrn Said, then, was created and set up by QPC, and remained in 
QPC possession until the early 1970s. The first official positive 
statement in respect of L~ Said was made by the Amir in 1973 as part 
of a public presentation of the kind of activities his regime was 
bringing for the benefit of Qatar. (g) In 1974 the Amir, in a newspaper 
interview, said that in the Umrn Said area one could see Qatar's 
future. (lO) 
Unfortunately, no official written statement of general govern-
ment policy for Umrn Said has been made. But from government and other 
sources we can identify the two main foundations of government policy 
towards Umrn Said. First, there appears the intention to concentrate 
public or national basic industrial development in one area, which 
in this case is Umm Said, for reasons of safety and security; secondly, 
to create a new community in Umm Said to accommodate the labour force 
required to operate such industrial activities and to relieve the 
pressure on housing demand from Doha City. 
The government, in order to fulfil these two main objectives, 
employed several governmental bodies to play their separate parts in 
the Umrn Said development, particularly the Ministries of Finance 
& Petroleum, and. Public Works. The area became controlled by one 
government agency only when IDTC was created. (see Chapter 4,pp.86-87 ). 
0 
The IDTC 1 s main function in Umm Said is as coordinator between the 
* This mainly due to the sabkha effect as well as high temperatures which 
produce a high rate of evaporation of sea and sabkha water. 
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various ministries for the development requirements of Umm Said~ whilst 
at the same time to keep close contact with, and to monitor~ government 
investment in the area, both in the industrial complex area and in the 
Umm Said township. 
The latest government policy in Umm Said is to approve the est-
ablishment by the private sector, in certain areas outside the heavy 
industrial boundaries, of medium and light industries e.g. a cement 
clinker grinding mill, and several other types. (ll) 
7.1.5 Site preparation and development 
The first site prepared for industrial purposes in Umm Said was 
that of oil storage tanks and the oil terminal pump. The oil storage 
tanks area (as seen in Figure 7,2) was reclaimed and raised from sabkha, 
while the oil terminal pump was simply established on a small semi-stable 
sand dune. Both of these were achieved before 1950 by QPC. During the 
1950's and 60's the coastline stayed almost unchanged. The develop-
ment of Umm Said employees' camps and of offices proceeded especially 
after 1956 when the head office of QPC was transferred from Dukhan 
to Umm Said. (l 2) From 1970 onward several major changes occurred on 
the coastline both inshore and offshore. 
Whilst the cost of land in Doha City reached extremely high levels 
during the 1970's, the Umm Said land cost the government nothing, except 
for site preparation. This was mainly due to the fact that all the land 
in the Umm Said area is government property whilst that in Doha was, 
and is, in private ownership. The government therefore was able, 
relatively sheaply, to carry out extensive preparation of sites for the 
public sector industries, and to provide low or nil rent incentives, 
whilst retaining the ownership of the land, 
The first site prepared by the Government was for QAFCO i.n 
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1970. In 1974 QPC started preparing a new site, to the north of the 
oil terminal, for the NGL plant (this plant caught fire and was 
destroyed completely in 1977). The then government decided further to 
develop the area between the NGL and QPC's Umm Said jetty, and work 
actually started in March 1975 and lasted till January 1978, development 
which completely changed Umm Said's coastal line. 
The cost of preparation of the specifically industrial area can 
be seen in Table 7.1, although total expenditure on the whole area is 
not known. 
Table 7.1 Statement of Government Expenditure in Umm Said 
(in million QRs) 
Estimated total Actual cost 
cost till end of end of 1397 
1398 H 
Dredged port and site 
preparation for factories* 275 250 
Other construction and 
port road 55 25 
Mechanical equipment 90 30 
Umm.Said berths 300 285 
720 590 
Source : IDTC, Indus~rial Development in Qatar, 1978. p.l05. 
till 
H 
The government also proposed to allocate and develop the area 
to the north of the oil refineries for small scale industries but 
unfortunately there is no indication of the site preparation costs of 
this proposal which is still only at a preliminary stage of implemen-
tat;ion. 
: 
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7.1.6 Present development 
Existing installations in Umm Said up to the end of 1981 are 
listed below: (see also Figures 7.2, 7.3). 
1. An oil tank farm was established by QPC and expanded later by 
the government. This farm, at present, has 16 individual 
tanks with a total capacity of about 275,000 tons. 
2. An oil tanker terminal with two submerged berths 
3. Oil and gas pipeline networks 
4. Two oil refineries (including old QPC's topping plant) 
5. Two fertilizer plants 
6. Flour mill plant 
7. Steel Plant 
8, Two natural gas liquefied plants 
9. Petrochemical plant 
10. An automatic bread-making factory. 
11, A sewage treatment plant 
12. 2,550 housing units, of which 750 are for families and 
1,800 for bachelors 
13, Warehouses 
14. Water tank 
15, A branch of Qatar National Bank 
16. Port and port facilities 
17. QAFCO's senior staff club 
18. QAFCO's kindergarten 
19. A few "corner" shops, three supermarkets, an unused tennis court, 
an open-air cinema and a golf course 
20. Government facilities: a) all governmental bodies and agencies 
have offices in Umm Said 
b) Two electricity substations 
c) A 66 Kv generator station 
(For more details of industrial plants and activities see Chapters 5 and 6) 
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7.1.7 Infrastructural provision 
There are three types of infrastructure provided in the Umrn Said 
area. The first of these relates only to the industrial area complex, 
the second one is related to the township, whilst the third is related 
to both of these. In this part of the study we examine the development 
of infrastructure in the Umrn Said area as a whole with only passing 
reference to the three divisions, because industrial development, 
ultimately, is the justification for all the facilities developed. 
1. Transport facilities 
Transport facilities in Umm Said now only comprise the seaport 
and roads. QPC established a small airfield but following the 
construction of good national road facilities, this airfield went 
out of conuni'ssion in the mid 1960 1 s. (l 3) 
a. The seaport. Although the oil terminal was completed in 1949, 
QPC continued to receive its own imported machinery and equipment from 
Bahrain through the small west coast port of Zekrit, about 13 km to 
the north east of Dukhan Town. From 1952 until 1966, Umm Said, 
besides serving its original purpose as an oil terminal and the 
company port, became the main port for the Qatar peninsula as a 
whole. (l 4) Although there is evidence that coastal modifications 
were considered from 1971 onward, no real action was carried out until 
after the Ministers' Council Resolution No (1) of 1975 which announced 
the 100 per cent take-over by Qatar of the oil Companies' assets. (l5) 
IDTC, through Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, carried out a massive 
dredging operation to link the internal sea channel with the outer 
channel. The dredging operation was to provide sufficient deepwater 
for large ship manoeuvres and at the same time to reclaim a 650 hectare 
site for industrial development. The total cost of these operations 
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was about QR 250 millions. (l 6) Between 1975 and January 1978 IDTC 
and several international bodies changed completely the coastal 
frontage of Urnrn Said by building and constructing an additional ten 
berths (see Fig. 7.2 for details), 
b. Roads. The first development of roads leading to Umm Said 
was carried out by QPC purely for company purposes in the late 1940's, 
and construction consisted entirely of heavy oil surfacing of 
vehicle tracks. In 1955 the development of hard~top roads became vital 
due to the planned shifting of the head office of QPC from Dukhan to 
Urnrn Said, Between 1955 and 1968 the company carried out no maintenance 
work on the Doha~Umm Said road or in Urnrn Said itself, In 1968, due to 
the poor condition of this road, the government and the company 
agreed that the government should undertake the responsibility of 
maintenance of the section between Doha to the southern boundary of 
Wakrah, while the company should undertake the section from that point 
to Urnrn Said, as well as in Umrn Said itself. (l 7) 
From 1977 onward the government, through IDTC and the Ministry 
of Public Works, was involved in massive changes in the development of 
road networks, both in the town itself and the Doha-Urnrn Said roads 
via Wakrah. Figure 7.4 illustrates an action programme of the Ministry 
of Public Works in 1400 H. (1979/80), together with an estimate of 
the cost, It is worth noting here that the master plan for a road 
network was prepared and designed by William L. Pereira Associates 
in 1977. (l 8) 
2. Electricity and Water Supplies 
The Urnrn Said area, due to its physical setting, has very poor 
underground fresh water resources. The area, during the early years, 
was dependent on the company's fresh water farms at t\1-Suna and 
55 
57 
Sf 
62 
65 
@ffi!ili~O~iow 
'\fQ~Ii' 
~ o IIi ffiCl ~o~ 
Ceoil @JtM. 
o·m 
1·1 
0·1'5 
TOTAL COST 91'9/80 35·26 
Action Programme 
Either developed or 
under dctvelopment 
Source: Sllanltland CoJt PartnQrship, Oufl/ne Planning OattJ, Policy and Procedure Reviet:t, 
(Jatar Planning Studies, (Jatar 1979, p. 157 and Appendi'Jr E Table I 
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Al-Jumailiah.* The fresh water was transferred from these farms through 
a pipeline to water tanks in the heart of the town, and then distrib-
uted to the city and the jetty. Water consumption until 1953 was very 
small, not surprisingly, since the resident population was less than 
500. (l9) Electricity was first provided by a diesel powered plant, 
but in 1954 the company constructed a distilled water station in Umm 
Said, located at the jetty with a production capacity of 90,000 gallons 
of fresh water (409 cu.m.) and 4,510 KWH per day. (20) The purpose of 
this station was to provide fresh water and electricity to the topping 
plant,** as well as for QPC's other uses. In 1968 the company started 
to charge the government's topping plant for utilizing the company's 
water and electricity, (2l) This was probably the main reason for the 
government's insistence that QAFCO should be selfrsufficicnt, especially 
in water and electricity supplies. 
In 1970 the government connected the Ras Abu Aboud water/power 
plant with QAFCO via Wakrah, Umm Said Town and the topping plant by 
66 KV double circuit overhead line, The fresh water supply was left 
dependent on QPC's and QAFCO's installations. In 1976 the government, 
through the Water Department, started to construct a pipeline from the 
Ras Abu Funtas power/water plant, to both the town and the industrial 
area of Umm Said. (22) At the same time the government connected Ras 
Abu Fontas with the Ras Abu Aboud-Umm Said electricity line to ensure the 
sufficient supply of electricity to the industrial complex and espec-
ially to QASCO. Data on the cost of supplying these services are not 
available for electricity, but are available for water. The estimated 
* 
** 
Al-Suna or Us Suna water well farm is about 75 km to the NNW of Umrn 
Said and 4 7 km to the NW of Doha, while Al-Jumailiah is about 10 km 
to the NW of Al-Suna. 
The estimated average Topping Plant consumption was: 
Electricity 1,000 K.W.H. per day 
Water 1,000 gallons per day 
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capital costs for all Water Department activities in Umm Said are listed 
in Table 7.2 below. 
Table 7.2 Water Department Bud~t Estimate 1980 
Com- Com- Est- Exp.to 1980 
Scheme menced pleted imate 1979 Alloc-
_QR m at ion 
Umm Said town water supply 1977 1982 40.0 6.31 1.32 
Umm Said industrial area 1979 1982 100.0 13.0 32.0 
water supply 
Ras Abu Fontas to Umm Said 1976 1982 107.7 77.37 17.5 
distillate Forwarding 
system 
Total 247.0 101.68 50.82 
Source Shankland Co. Partnership, Qatar Planning Studies, Dec. 1979. 
Estimates of water and electricity demand for 1977-1981 by the 
various bodies in Umm Said are illustrated in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 below, 
the figures based on the assumption that the total population of Umm 
(23) Said in 1981 would read 6,000 people. 
3. Telecommunication 
The particular aspect of telecommunication which is of concern 
in this study is the telephone network. At present the telephone 
service is fully automated with world dialling capability and equipped 
with the most modern apparatus, but unfortunately the installation 
capacity of Qatar National Telephone Services* (QNTS) is not sufficient 
to meet the growing demand in Umm Said, especially in the town. 
In 1978, the Umm Said central switchboard was opened with a 
capacity of 3,000 lines, (24 ) but the total telephones installcc.l in l~80 
* QNTS is a joint venture operation with Cable & Wireless Ltd. providing 
management and technical expertise whilst the government supplies the 
financial backing. 
I 
I 
I 
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Table 7.3 Estimation of Fresh Water Demand in Umm Said (1977-81) 
lcresh Water Util iz- Years (Cubic Metre/Day) 
(a) I I 
ers 1977 1978 I 1979 1980 I 1981 
I 
' QASCO 909 5,450 5. 450 5,450 i 5,450 I 
I QAPCO 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 I 5,000 I 
I 
Umm Said Ports 
I QNNTC Yard 45 91 100 llO llO 
NGL 1 l- NGL 2 227 909 909 909 1,310 
I 
NODCO 300 300 300 300 ' 300 I 
I 
Umm Said Town 2, 272 3,200 11,360 14,550 /13,200 
Others 27 350 50 so I 100 
Total 4,780 16,300 19,169 22,369 30,470 
(a) QAFCO is not included due to being self-sufficient. 
Sources: Shankland Cox Partnership, Outline Planning Data, Policy and 
Procedure Review, 1979, p. 90. 
IDTC, Industrial Development in Qatar, 1978, p.lOl. 
Table 7.4 Umm Said Estimated Demand of Electricity (1978-81) 
(a) Years (Mega\vatt) Electricity Utilizers 
I 1978 1979 1980 1981 
' I 
QASCO 80 90 110 130 
I 
QAPCO -
-
40 55 
Umm Said ports QNNTC' s yard 3 3 4 4 
NGL 1 & NGL 2 - 10.5 10.5 10.5 
NODCO 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Umm Said Town 15 19 ! 22 25 
Light Industries - 5 I 7 9 I 
Others 0.5 1 2 2 
I 
: 
Total 100 130 I I 197 I 237 
I 
(a) QAFCO is not included 
Source : IDTC, Industrial Development in Qatar, 1978. p.97. 
I 
: 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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numbered only 405 (25 ) (180 offices and 225 residents). In 1981 QNTS 
tried to catch up with the growing demand in Umm Said~ which resulted 
in the installation of 403 additional lines~ thus achieving a total of 
808 telephones (Z6) (259 offices and 549 residents). The companies in 
Umm Said are also served by an automatic telex service which connects 
Umm Said via Doha with the international telex net. The total capital 
cost of QNTS activities in Umm Said, it has been estimated, could reach 
approximately QR 6,712 million, the reported 1980 expenditure being 
QR 1,200 million. (27) The author finds the cumulative total unreal-
istically high. 
7.1.8 Population and other facilities 
There is strong evidence that the area of Umm Said was not inhabited 
before oil exploitation began to affect it in 1949. In 1953 the total 
population of Umm Said was still less than 500, (28) but by 1960 the 
population had increased, because of the transfer of QPC's head office 
to Umm Said, to over 2,500. (29 ) From the mid 1960's the company followed 
a policy of labour force reduction* which resulted in reducing the 
population of Umm Said, and by 1970-71 it is clear from personal invest-
igation that the majority of the labour camps and employees' houses were 
uninhabited. In 1976 and following the development of some of the major 
industries in Umm Said, the population had grown to somewhere around 
2,000. (30) 
William L. Pereira Associates assumed that the total town popul-
ation of Umm Said would reach the figure of 21,200 in 1980,C3l) that is 
to say a 960 per cent increase from that of 1976 with about 39 per cent 
out of 21,200 consisting of local employees (see Table 7.5 below). From 
1980 to 1995, the WLPA's assumption was based on a 2.27 per cent increase 
per annum. The slow-down of population growth assumed that there would be 
*In 1960 the total manpower of QPC was 3,684 of which 1,790 of which were 
Qataris. In 1972 the total labour force of the company was 875 of which 
588 of them were Qataris. 
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no further major industrial programme from 1980 onward, but that there 
would be enough economic activities to ensure the town's continued 
growth.C 32 ) But in accordance with an IDTC memorandum on employment 
and the population of Umm Said, the population in 1982 had not reached 
more than 5,800 of which 4,900 persons were employed by industrial 
d . . (33) an serv1ces enterpr1ses. 
Table 7.5 Umm Said long term industrial, service employment and 
population estimates 
1976 1980 1985 
Industrial Employment I 400 4,900 5,450 
Services Employment - 3,350* 3,780 
Total Town Population 2,000 21,200* 23,600 
* Based on operating companies' response to WLPA's Survey 
Other figures are estimates 
Source: William L. Periera Associate, 
I 
I 1990 
I 
I 
I 
6,080 
j 
4,200 
126,300 
Umm Said Long term Structure Plan Qatar, 1977, 
Tables 1 & 2, pp.l5-16. 
The government has been confronted with a major challenge to 
1995 
' 
' 6,770 
I 
4,690 
29,300 
satisfy a large demand for housing, public utilities etc. but, unfortunately, 
even the government with all its power simply cannot convert yearly plans 
into actuality. This is mainly due to the absence of government capability 
to supervise and follow up the plans, and the result has been a delaying 
of the majority of the development programmes. This is particularly a 
reflection of the shortage of indigenous trained manpower. 
The housing shortage is particularly serious if we consider that 
the majority of the immigrant expatriate population in Umm Said is 
composed of single workers. Due to the lack of housing units at Umm 
Said, the operating companies have moved their personnel accommodation 
to Wakrah and Doha C~ty, IDTC, in 1976, had forwarded a 
i 
I 
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memorandum to the High Authority with estimated requirements of housing 
units in Umm Said. The estimation was 4,440 units, of which 2,020 
units were for families and 2,420 units for bachelors. (34 ) In 1982 the 
total number of housing units available was 2,550, of which 750 units 
were for families and 1,800 for bachelors. (3S) Furthermore, in spite 
of the increase of population and housing, there has been a decrease 
in health services. For instance, in 1960 QPC's hospital had 40 beds. 
In 1979 this hospital, which was handed over by QPC to the government, 
was turned into a health centre with only 29 beds. This is mainly due 
to the preference of the Ministry of Public Health for centralising 
health services in Doha City. But because of the Umm Said industrial 
activities, the area is actually in need of special health care to meet 
industrial accidents. 
Umm Said has now become the zone in which all the basic heavy 
manufacturing industries have been developed and it seems likely that 
at least a major part of a~y North Dome gas development and processing 
will be also be located in Umm Said. The idea of developing another 
specialized site in the north of Qatar now seems less likely. 
7.2 Industrial Estate of Doha 
7.2.1 Introduction and Historical Background 
The industrial estate system only became publicly known in the 
second half of the 1970's, as being under the control and supervision of 
Doha Municipality, although as noted below, planning started earlier. 
In the 1950's the location ofaany private industrial enterprise was 
decided in most cases by the personal interest and convenience of the 
entrepreneur concerned, who usually constructed a new establishment on a 
site very close to his/their residence(s), which also generally coincided 
with local market demand. This resulted in a scattering of small scale 
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industrial activities all over the city. In the 1960's commercial and 
economic, rather than personal reasons, became more effective in 
influencing the location of manufacturing enterprises. This may be 
attributed to : a) the accelerated growth of population and income 
which produced a larger effective market, particularly during the 
second half of the 1960's, b) the increasing local perception of 
opportunities and growing commercial and financial sophistication, and 
c) the growing economic attraction of central city sites for manufacturing, 
spatially associated with growth of activity in the old markets 
produced by a) above. 
The attitudes in the sixties, therefore, led to more concen-
tration of industries in and surrounding the old market centre. By the 
early 1970's this process had created an annular zone of commercial 
and manufacturing activity along concentric streets and roads, together 
with a "spoke" development along radial roads. This was a more or 
less spontaneous spatial development of the classical urban model 
developed by Berry. Because of governmental action to re-develop the 
city centre, beginning in the early 1970's, many small scale industries 
began to move from the centre to Fariq al-Najma along one of the 
radial spokes, especially those concerned with iron working, aluminium 
fabrication, and carpentry. These activities and other services had 
spontaneously created in Fariq al-Najma an unplanned market called 
Souq al-Haraj, or what can be called loosely a spontaneous estate. 
This was followed by the planned creation of an extra-urban estate, the 
Industrial Estate of Doha (I.E.D), which here is examined in terms of 
its planned function as an industrial estate. 
The plan 
lED is the official name of an area of governmental owned land, 
developed and subdivided into plots of different size, with provision 
-242-
for roads and public utilities. for the use of small-scale industry as 
well as for specific type of manufacturing and services, such as garages 
and car washing, which cause disturbance and pollution to other life in 
the city. 
UNESOB's publication in 1972 of the report of its Qatar Reconn-
aissance Mission, was the first report to draw governmental attention to 
the value of locating small scale industries in one concentrated area. But 
this report was in some ways already out-dated and in other ways out of 
phase with government thinking, in that it suggested that such a con-
centration should be near the population centre and possibly near Doha 
port, so that its facilities could be utilized for export purposes. (36) 
However, the actual location of the present industrial estate on 
Salwa Road was selected by the High Authority between 1973 and 1974. 
Documentary evidence for this appears in one of Llewelyn-Davies Weeks 
reports: (37 ) 
"The changes to the plan (Doha development plan) 
between 1973 and 1974 have included: 
New industrial site location. 
There is no evidence on which date the decision to establish lED was 
taken, but it is believed that it was made before August 1973.* 
The Ministry of Public Works engaged its own Department of 
Engineering Services in the project, and it is believed that the 
planning stage and Phase I of land preparation was completed by the end 
of 1977. Again, there are no detailed records extant. 
The industrial estate is located on Salwa Road to the south-west 
of Doha City and near the junction of Rayan-Salwa Roads. The general 
height of the area li.es between 17. 5 to 31. 5 m above sea level. (3SJ 
.Th~ site.has a.shallow soil.covered with rock fragments, typical 
( 
* According to the Municipality's files plot distribution started 
in August 1973. 
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lithosols, overlying limestone bed-rock of the Middle Eocene. The 
engineering geology offers good conditions for construction. Climate 
and weather conditions on the estate are similar to those of Doha 
City (see Chapter2, pp.l3-15). 
7.2.2 Government Policy 
The government's policy. devolved to the policy of the Ministry 
of Municipal Affairs, was to re-develop Doha City and to create an 
industrial zone away from the capital to accommodate small and large 
enterprises which required larger plots for their operations and 
expansion than could be accommodated in the city, as well as those which 
.produced effluent (solid, liquid or dust) from processing operations 
which would cause pollution to the city environment. 
The first main objective of the policy was therefore to relocate 
small and large companies and establishments which already existed in 
Doha on new sites. 
The government, in order to achieve this objective, carried out 
the basic land preparation of the site through the Ministry of Public 
Works (MPW). At the same time the government promised that water, 
electricity, sewage and telephone systems would be installed in the 
area and available at a basic charge approximating to the operational 
and production costs. The Municipality with MPW also planned the roads 
within, and leading to, the estate, as well as the serving of the estate 
by Doha Municipality's public transport. 
7.2.3. Land and Site Preparation and Allocation 
According to L.-D.W. 's reports and maps, the original area 
allocated to the estate was 4 sq.km, but more recently published 
governmental maps show that the area given over for the estate actually 
occupied 24.5 sq. km. (39 ) (245 hectares). The estate, during the 
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planning stage and its physical development, was the responsibility of 
the Engineering Services Department (ESD) of MPW. 
The main duty of the ESD was not only to relocate in this area 
various scattered industry and service activities, but also to group 
various types of plant within specific parts of the estate. 
Figure 7.5, showing the layout of lED, illustrates how the 
estate was divided into nine blocks: 
Block A: an area of 1,206,000 sq.m. divided into 257 varying 
size plots, all for the use of garages and iron 
fabrication workshops. 
Block B: 1,77,200 sq.m. divided into 223 plots for 
carpentry workshops. 
Block C: 1,141,200 sq.m. divided into 187 plots for concrete 
product workshop. 
Block D: 3,437,000 sq.m. divided into 83 plots for the 
use of stone crushers. 
Block E: 744,950 sq.m. reserve and divided into 103 plots 
for the use of various types of factories. 
Block F: 35 large plots over an area of 816,000 sq.m. for the. 
use of car and heavy machinery agencies, incorporating 
service and workshop facilities. 
Block L: with a total area of 1,986,000 sq.m. was allocated 
& K 
into 32 plots for the use of big firms, apparently 
for chemical manufacturing processes and warehouses. 
Block M: 2,662,000 sq.m. divided into 359 plots for the 
use of garages, carpentry workshops and big firms. 
Fig. 7.5 Layout of I.E.D. 
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The plan included a reserve of plots for governmental use. such as 
the MPW, Doha Municipality, police, fire service, mosque, Electricity 
and Water Departments, road and open space. A zone in the middle of 
the estate was set aside as a gas pipeline transmission corridor. 
Unfortunately, there is no data available as to the cost of land 
preparation so far. The cost of road construction, QR 25 million, alone 
gives some idea of the scale of government expenditure necessary to 
start the development of lED as an industrial estate. 
The Municipality, following land preparation, rents the plots to 
enterprises and then the lessee of a plot builds his own premises in 
accordance with the estate building regulations. 
The normal procedure for obtaining a plot in lED is that the 
firm applies for a site to the Director of Doha Municipality who checks 
the validity of the application. The City Engineer of Doha Municipality 
is then instructed to allocate a plot to the applicant. The plot is 
usually granted for five years, extendable for another five to thirty 
year period, the rent payable in advance. The rental is not designed to 
recover the cost of the estate development, but rather to establish the 
fact that occupiers are tenants and not owners of sites. The rates 
are deliberately low, QRl per 60 sq. m. or QR 50 per 3,000 sq.m. are 
examples quoted. (39) 
7.2.4 Implementation 
(a) Infrastructure 
Mention has been made of the several basic governmental commitments 
to infrastructural provision necessary for the effective operational 
development of lED. Here we examine actual implementation between the 
date when the companies started building their premises to October 1982 
(the period covered by the author's ficltlwork). 
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1. Roads: IED is very well connected by first class dual carriageways 
wer~ 
with both Doha City and Rayyan Town. These roads,however,Aconstructed 
before the establishment of IED, Roads development within the industrial 
estate can be divided into three phases (see Fig. 7o7) 
Schedules Estimated Cost (QR m) 
Phase I July 1980 - March 1981 8 
Phase II Jan. 1981 - Sept. 1981 8.5 
Phase III Jan. 1981 ;.. Sept. 1981 8.5 
These scheduled phases were concerned only with the main internal roads 
and not the secondary feeder and access roads which were left as unmade 
tracks. 
2. Electricity: Some of the early arrivals to IED set up their own 
diesel power generators, but from mid 1980 the government supplied 
electricity demand from a nearby 66/11 KV sub-station installed at 
a police camp. 
3. Water: In the original plan there were to be provided four fresh 
water tanks of 0.5 mn.g. each, but none of them has yet been installed. 
All fresh water demand at the moment is met by road tankers carrying 
water from Doha City, whilst brackish water for industrial uses is drawn 
from the underground water table by individual enterprise private wells. 
4. Sewerage: There is a comprehensive internal sewage system in the 
area. The only action by the government was the connection of IED with 
the Zoo system, but neither of the two pumping stations were oper-
ational. (40) Solid industrial wastes are transported by truck to the 
Doha Municipality tip, near the airport. 
5. Telephone System: In 1980 QNTS started the installation of new 
telephones in the estate, but the unsatisfied demand for telephones and 
telex is still very high. 
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The implication of this only partial implementation of infrastruc-
tural requirements is examined below. 
(b) Type of Industrial Activities 
There is a wide range of business enterprises located in lED 
but in the context of this study, we concentrate only on the manufacturing 
activities. 
The data, obtained from both the Ministry of Economy & Commerce 
and Ministry of Industry & Agriculture, show that there are five main 
groups of industrial activities in lED: 
1. Food industry 
By October 1982 there was only one operational factory, for ice 
cream, in the estate. Through the Ministry of Industry & Agriculture 
there had been licensed another six food processing establishments to 
construct factories in lED, but none had started operation. 
2. Chemical Industry 
Three companies which exist within the industrial estates can be 
put in this category. One of them is Hamble Marine and Apartment Paints, 
one producing detergent liquid and powder, the third processing fibreglass. 
The government had authorised eight other factories to be con-
structed in lED, six of them plastic products factories and two industrial 
gases producers. 
3. Metal Fabrication Industry 
There are, according to the official registration, 18 companies of 
this type which have moved from Doha City to the estate. Three of them 
are aluminium fabrication establishments, whilst the rest are fabrication 
plants handling other metals. The actual number of metal fabrication 
industrial establishments which exist in the estate is believed to be 
higher than 18. 
4. Non-metal Industries 
In lED, there are four companies for stone crushing, eight 
carpentries and 48 make and process bricks, tiles, marble and white stone. 
TI1is figure is much lower than the observed number because it does not 
include unregistered firms in lED carrying out the same type of 
activities. 
5. Printing Industry 
There is only one printing firm, at this time, in lED called 
Gulf Publication and Printing Organization. 
These total figures are at variance with the claim by Doha 
Municipality that there is no single plot vacant within IED. The actual 
number of industrial firms and their type of activities is by no means 
clear, partly because of the observable prese~of unregistered 
enterprises and partly because of some confusion in the classification of 
types of non-industrial activities, e.g. warehousing. 
7.2.5 The Impact of lED and Conclusion 
There is no doubt that lED was well conceived and planned in 
layout, but this should not blind us to some adverse impact of lED 
on industrial development. The establishing of lED can be shown to have 
resulted in the closing down of several industrial firms for a variety 
of reasons as stated in fieldwork interviews. 
1. The expense which the owners would have incurred in transferring 
their plant from previous sites to the new plots discouraged some 
entrepreneurs from carrying on with established activities. 
2. The expense of developing the new sites (boundary walls, housing 
units for the employees etc.) were a discouragement to some, noting that 
some small scale industries applied for, and received, plots larger 
than strictly required. 
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3. The distance between lED and the nearest port, Doha, almost 
14 km, was regarded as additional transport cost for their raw materials. 
4. If the small scale industries are to survive they have to 
compete with others in close proximity, usually in the same blocks. 
Some entrepreneurs regarded this as likely to reduce their profits. 
5. The close supervision by the owners which was possible at the 
stage when establishments were deliberately built alongside the owners' 
residences is not possible in the IE~. Given the considerable use of a 
semi-skilled expatriate labour force, this is often regarded as a 
disadvantage. 
6. Incomplete infrastructural facilities, especially of water, 
sewerage and road systems, are considered as the main disadvantage, whilst 
enterprises can obtain these facilities easily at their present locations 
in the capital. 
From field interview and observation it is clear that these 
perceived disincentives to relocate at lED had the effect of discour-
aging several individuals from continuing with their usually small scale 
and very individualist industrial activities. 
lED, on the other hand, helped entrepreneurs in adopting and 
installing up-to-date processing machinery in their plants in lED, which 
was not possible in the old sites. lED, furthermore, helped new 
entrepreneurs in finding suitable plots on which to start. 
Other conclusions which can be drawn from the study are: 
1. Although there are many plots in lED which have not actually been 
occupied (see Fig.7.6) the Municipality insists that all plots have 
been distributed. The elucidation of this is found in the way in which 
lessors behave in reality rather than nominally. Lessors who do not 
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-250-
develop their sites stiictly should lose their tenancies, but the very 
many who wish to seize opportunities for the future but do not wish 
immediately to set up their factories, tend to construct either only 
the boundary walls of some minimal structure or merely office units. 
They then either sub-let the plots to other Qataris or often to 
expatriate workers, who as non-citizens are unable directly to rent 
plots from Doha Municipality, often at higher rents than are charged by 
the Municipality, or merely defer other investment to the future. 
These practices can also occur, although illegal and impossible to 
quantify accurately, because the Municipality, in this respect, does 
not have sufficiently close supervision and control over !ED and the 
individual firm. The Municipality, in order to achieve this control, 
should have more direct contact with each lessor than that obtained 
merely through public notices in local newspapers and magazines. The 
Municipality risks losing control over the functioning of lED and 
therefore of the direction of industrial development which can follow 
paths other than those the government planned. Al-Shuwaikh Industrial 
Estate in Kuwait is a living example of such loose organisation. (4l) 
2. The Municipality has not got sufficient influence to force 
industrial firms to move from urban sites to the new estate. This 
became clear, for example, when the Municipality published in early 1982 
a general notice to all the industries and services in the city 
which were to move to IED, pointing out that if a firm did not move 
to the new site by the end of April the Municipality would act strongly 
towards the full implementation of this notice. From personal 
observation in the following October, six months after the time limit 
expired, it was clear that the majority of these firms kept running on 
the same sites in the city and some new firms had joined them on the 
same location. Because of the lack of firmness there arc several 
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industrial sites still existing within the city, such as at Najma and 
along the Airport road. 
3. There is no co-operation between the Municipality and other 
governmental bodies. Whilst, for instance, MPW was carrying out road 
construction in lED, the Municipality finished the distribution of plots 
to different enterprises. This action delayed the construction 
operations, and instead of finishing Phase III on schedule (see p. 246) 
MPW had still not completed its programme a year later. In addition 
the Ministry of Economy & Commerce between 1979 to 1982 was still granting 
licences to several new industrial firms, by comn1ercial registration, 
to enable them to practise their operation in Doha City (see Table 7.6). 
Table 7.6 Selected industrial registration 1979 - Oct. 1982 
! I l ·I i Doha ; 
Industrial Activity in Doha in lED suburbs Total 
& others 
Carpentry 24 5 12 41 I i 
I 
I 
Brick, tiles and marble 1 15 3 19 I 
Iron fabrication 18 17 14 49 I 
I 
Source : Compiled by the author from M.E.C. Registration files Oct. 1982. 
4. The infrastructure in lED is not yet finished and there is no 
indication of any strong intention to complete installations: 
a. Fresh water is still delivered by road tankers 
b. Secondary roads within lED are still tracks 
c. There is no effective sewerage system in the area 
d. The Doha Municipality's transport networks have not 
yet included lED. 
5. The living conditions for workers in the area are not really 
tolerable. 
~?.57.-
6. Even in the plan, there was no suggestion, in spite of the wide 
range of activities expected to grow in IED that an establishment or 
institution for vocational training should be set up in the estate. 
The value or such central training facilities is clear from British 
experience, for example, in Newton Aycliffe. 
There are additional drawbacks resulting from implementation 
deficiencies: (see Figure 7.7 compared to Figure 7.5). 
a. There is no single plot reserved for residential use, and in 
local conditions this raises difficulties with the labour force. 
b. Although the planners had included a site for medical care 
in the area, the Ministry of Public Health have only included 
a clinic in plans which are not finalised. The site originally 
suggested has been allocated to an industrial firm. 
c. TI1ere were to be, in the original plans, three bank branches but 
none of them have yet been constructed. 
d. There was no gasoline filling station operating in 1982. 
e. At the moment there is no car park in the area and traffic 
congestion is caused by widespread parking on roads. The planned 
location of a few car parks is clearly not suitable for IED 
conditions and the whole provision needs completely reviewing 
otherwise there will be both congestion and under-used 
car parks. 
f. The original plans appeared with a large area reserved for 
a green belt. Instead of expanding IED to meet the growing 
demand, new applicants tend to be allocated plots in the 
reserved area of the green belt. As with vehicle parking, 
this defeats the objective of creating an attractive industrial 
estate with good amenities. 
fig. 7.7 Latest Layout of LED. 
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Clearly the Industrial Estate of Doha, while similar in many 
respects, to planned industrial estates the world over, particularly 
in the provision of developed sites at low cost for private sector 
occupation, does also have some special characteristics. As in 
Saudi Arabia, the purpose seems to have been partly to improve living 
conditions in the urban centre and partly to provide incentive for 
private investment in small and light scale industries. There has 
been here no question of providing new employment opportunities unlike, 
for example, the Team Valley or in India. As we have seen the first 
objective of reducing the amount of industrial activity in central 
Doha City has been almost completely achieved but the incentives for 
industrial growth have been weakened by the non-completion of any 
of the necessary facilities on the site. 
_, 
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CHAPTER 8 
DECISION-MAKING, CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT 
Industrialisation, ultimately, requires that technical, 
investment and managerial decisions are taken by some identifiable 
group of people. In Chapters 2 and 3 we have examined the resource 
context, both human and physical, in which such decisions have to be 
taken in Qatar. In Chapter 4, Industrialisation Policies and 
Institutions, we found that the role of the State is much more 
than one of general control and regulation but involves State 
agencies in the decision-making process. Chapters 5 to 7, show this 
active involvement of government, not only in large public sector 
industries, but also in the supply, as well as control, of the pre-
onderant source of finance - oil revenue, of land, and as considered 
specifically in Chapter 9, of labour. The State also is the dominant 
market for most products of the private sector as well as for the 
publicly-owned basic industries. 
The nature and characteristics of decision-making within, and 
also externally influencing, industry have, therefore, to be analysed 
in terms of this situation. The three elements - decision-making, 
capital investment and management, form one complete combination in 
any industrial project. Decision-making would be a decision on 
paper only if there is no financial backing or capital availability. 
At the same time an establishment without management would act 
haphazardly. These may seem obvious truisms, but in the case of 
countries such as Qatar, where industrialisation is recent and rapid 
and in some ways is a transplant rather than the indigenous product 
of domestic multi-sectoral growth, they are vital first principles 
which must consdously be applied. 
Many of the existing es~ablishments examined in the previous 
chapters showed surprisingly similar characteristics in their 
decision-making~ capital investment and management; that is 
within each group of industries categorised as being publicp minist-
erial or private sector. 
This chapter, therefore, deals mainly with decision-making~ 
capital investment and management in each of these three industrial 
sectors. 
8.1 Decision-Making 
Unlike Kuwait or U.A.E., Qatar has no planning body. The 
highest authority for any decision-taking is the Amir himself and the 
degree to which the Arnir's intervention in this respect is a vital 
factor must continually be remembered (see also Section 4.2). 
One very appropriate model with which to start is that of 
D.W.Taylor, particularly as applied to decision processes in Qatar. 
Taylor's ideas were grouped in a non-meaningful word called 
"POSDCORB"p which refers to the necessity of "Planning", "Organisation", 
"Supervision," "Direction", "Coordination"p "Reporting", and 
"Budgeting ". These factors are structurally linked, as we shall see 
in public and ministerial projects, but with varying emphasis. In 
the private sector, in effect, the situation is different. Discussion 
in this section will be directed to the process of industrial decision 
in public, ministerial and private sector projects. The difference 
between the three industrial divisions will be developed during 
the argument. 
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8.1.1 Process of Industrial Decisiort~making 
1) Decision Process in Public Sector 
The process of decision-making in public projects is not too 
complicated due to the existence of a bureaucratic system associated 
with an autocratic headship. 
Figure 8.1 illustrates the decision process of any industrial 
project from its appearance as an idea up to the production stage. 
This figure is a synthesis of research observations by the author 
of what actually happens in the absence of any official code of 
practice. The information is derived from close examination of the 
existing industries (as shown in earlier Chapters), personal interviews 
of some of the leading figures concerned and the relevant legislation 
(see Chapter 4). 
If this schema is applied before 1972, two modifications would 
have to be made. Firstly, "TheArnir" should be changed to "Deputy 
Ruler" (although the name remains the same). Secondly, "IDTC" should 
be changed to Ministry of Finance & Petroleum (headed at that time 
by the Deputy Ruler). 
More recently, QGPC replaced the IDTC 's positi-on--in the decision-
process in the field of hydrocarbon industries onl~ Since 
the Director General of IDTC is also a member of QGPC's Board 
of Directors, it still participates in the decision-making process 
of QGPC. 
The figure identifies six different stages in the establishment 
of an industry: the idea; feasibility study; project management 
and evaluation; foreign partners and plant design; construction; and 
operation and production. 
Fig 8·1 PUBLIC SECTOR, AMIR OR IDTC PROJECTS 
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Stage One 
At this stage, the Amir and his advisory bodies (IDTC in this 
case) would consult each other on what kind of industries may be 
introduced to the country.* The Amir would approve the suitable and 
more urgently needed concepts. After this approval IDTC will carry 
out a pre-feasibility study in respect of the project required in 
its economic aspect (mainly the sales and marketing of the proposed 
output). This study will be evaluated further by the Amir and his 
advisers. The Amir will then give his final decision whether the 
project should be abandoned or be taken on to the second stage. 
Stage Two 
IDTC, after the position approval of the previous stage, will 
appoint a foreign consultant (mostly European) to carry out a com-
prehensive feasibility study. Because of the export-oriented nature 
of public sector industries (see Chapters 5 and 6) this study 
concentrates on the evaluation of the world market (production, con-
sumption and trade) in respect of the final output of the project. 
In addition, the study pays attention to the scale of operations, 
availability of e.g. feedstock, site location, proposed installation 
and cost and profitability of the project. If the findings appear 
favourable and the Amir is satisfied, the project will go to the next 
stage of the decision process. 
Stage Three 
In this stage the Amir will choose, based on his own judgement, 
members of a project management team or committee. The first act 
of this committee is to evaluate in more detail the feasibility study 
in general and, specifically, the scale of operation and proposed 
* Most of the ideas which often suddenly appear were concentrated on the 
way in which natural gas (associated or unassociated forms) should be 
used. The balance of existing industry proved this. 
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installation. The project management~ at this stage is exchanging views 
on the project with IDTC experts. IDTC in its turn will carry the 
points arising to the Amir~ who usually instructs either IDTC or the 
project management directly to represent their points of view to the 
Amir, concerning the viability of the project and its contribution to 
the state's economy. 
This consultation must lead to a clear and objective picture for 
the Amir who will give positive approval for the project, so that it can 
move on to the next stage 
Stage Four 
By this stage most of the project features will have been 
abundantly studied and its economic values become clearer. The 
crucial point of the project's life lies in this stage. This is 
mainly due to the fact that 1) the Amir is in favour of partnership 
ventures, whereby the foreign partners should provide risk capital 
through combined Qatari foreign equity; and 2) there is assurance that 
through foreign partners the management and marketing of the output 
of the company would be achieved successfully. If the foreign 
countries or companies are not willing to participate, the project 
may be delayed.* If the plans to involve foreign partners in the 
new company work, then the functional and technical design stage of 
the project will follow. The foreign partners, who will manage the 
company and market its output, will take the major part in the 
technical design of the plant. 
* Industrial joint ventures represent a large proportion of public 
sector industries as noted in Chapter 6. The LNG project of North 
Dome illustrates this pattern in an industrial field regarded as 
appropriate. The Amir was eager to construct the complex, but 
at the same time wanted to involve directly foreign participation which 
would commit foreign contributions of risk capital, provide expertise on 
the production side and guarantee product outlets. By June 1983 Shell 
and BP involvement together with assurances from the Japanese market 
fulfilled these requirements. 
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Stage Five 
An International tender will be announced, at this stage, for 
construction and equipment installation. The Amir, who usually 
negotiates the contract terms, has to give his approval before any 
work cornmenceso If the financial terms are satisfactory to the Amir, 
the project decision at last becomes irrevocable, the point of no 
return. The contractor(s), with the collaboration of IDTC, project 
management and the functional and technical design team will then 
carry out the construction and physical implementation. At the same 
time there are progress reports flowing from IDTC and project management 
to the Amir, as well as site inspections carried out by the Amir himself. 
Stage Six 
The project is now at the final stages of construction and 
start-up operation. The Amir will appoint, also based on his own 
selection, the Qatari members of the Board of Directors of the new 
company,* who will interpret his ideas and policies in the plant and 
its performances. 
The time required for all of the six stages varies from one 
project to another, ana may take from five years i.e. QASCO, to 19 years, 
i.e. QAPCO. The reasons which govern the time schedule lie in 
a) the profitability of the project; and b) the response of the Amir. 
2) Ministerial Projects 
The ministerial projects (see also Chapter 4), although sharing 
some similarities with the public process, take a different procedural 
path. Figure 8.2 below represents the author's findings of the 
characteristics of the decision process carried out in respect of 
* The number of the members of the Board of Directors and their 
subordination depends mainly on the nominal share value. 
Fig. 8.2 Ministerial Project Development 
a= A either direct to C or through 8 to C 
or C and 8 to A, if approved by C 
b = C to 8 for study and back for 
joint consultation with A,if agreed 
c =A & 8 to C,if approved 
d = C to 8 for tender and return to C for 
negotiation,if approved 
e = C to 8 for management control before completion 
Payment made by C against A's budget,at completion 
f = 8 handover to A 
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ministerial projects. 
At the first stage a ministry would inform the Amir (either 
directly or through the Council of Ministers, or in most cases 
through IDTC which acts at this point only as postman) of its 
intentions to establish an industrial plant. The request, after 
acceptance by the Amir, would be sent back to IDTC for study of the 
project details and requirement. This study in most cases is 
carried out jointly with the Ministry concerned. The findings will be 
forwarded to the Amir. If the Amir accepts, then the project proposals 
will be sent back to IDTC for international tendering. The Amir, after 
negotiation of capital investment with the appointed contractors, 
will then give his final decision concerning this project. If the 
decision is positive then IDTC, either jointly with the ministryD or 
separately, will take management control of the project until its 
completion. At the same time the Amir will make the payment for the 
project set against the relevant ministry's budget. 
At the completion of all the construction and equipment 
installation the entire project will be handed over to the ministry. 
IDTC, on the other hand, will keep a linkage with the plant open 
to receive a monthly report of its performance and to solve any 
technical problems. 
As seen from the previous discussion, the main difference between 
public and ministerial project decision-taking is that the decision-
maker, in the case of the public sector, depends heavily on the studies 
and evaluations of the project, while the ministerial decision-making 
is governed not so much by financial income generation as by criteria 
of social benefit to the population of Qatar. We can, therefore, note 
that whilst a commercial approach to product marketing is a crucial 
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element in public projects in the case of ministerial projects 
such as the slaughter house and compost plant, the question of 
financial net return on investment is subordinated to perceived need. 
3) Private Sector Decision-Making 
The decision-making process in the private sector is both very 
simple and risky at the same time, particularly bearing in mind that the 
individual entrepreneur often cannot afford to spend capital on 
studying the project from all sides. Under Law No.ll of 1980, however, 
(as noted in Section 4.9) applicants for government loans to establish 
or expand enterprises must submit feasibility studies. The government 
may make a contribution to the associated costs but this refers 
only to very large proposals which are rare (see also Chapter 4). The 
most common procedure followed in the private sector is illustrated 
in Figure 8.3. The position indicated in this Figure is really 
based on a fairly simple demand and supply balance, but where the 
government is seen as the main demand sector along with private demands. 
The owner(s) of private establishments depend more on quick judgements 
of market opportunities than careful planning. The whole process 
of decision-making (and of providing capital) will usually be carried 
out by a single individual. 
Figure 8, 3 Private Sector Decision-making 
Supply 
-264~ 
The previous discussion of the decision-making. has pointed out 
that although many experts (local and foreign consultants) were 
involved in studying all the project details, the final decision at 
each stage of public and ministerial industrial activities is highly 
centralized and confined to the Amir personally. This type of 
autocratic system with the institutional support available, gives the 
project, in all respects, a thorough evaluation and in particular an 
economic one. The Amir, on the other hand. is entitled to reject 
any project, for any reason at any stage (in practice up to the middle 
of Stage Five). 
The economic aspect controls the nature of industrial decisions 
as defined in the public sector. At the same time, the Amir has to 
make sure that no other state in the Gulf would damagingly duplicate 
or compete with Qatar's industrial output. To emphasise this point 
deeply, the Aluminium project and QASCO are briefly examined. The first 
thought of establishing an aluminium smelter was believed to 
be in the 1960's . (1) Decisions concerning this project developed 
only to Stage Two, when it was abandoned. The reasons behind the 
abandonment were: 
a) the feasibility study cast doubt on the advisability of 
such a project. 
b) Bahrain was already producing aluminium. 
The final decision was to co-ordinate, through the Gulf Organization for 
Industrial Consulting (GOIC), the expansion of Aluminium Bahrain 
(ALBA) with the cooperation of other Gulf States. QASCO, on the 
other hand, was seen as an economic project during the whole decision-
build-up, since no country in the Gulf had then the desire to establish 
similar steel production.* Saudi Arabia, in its third five-year plan, 
* The output of QASCO was designed to be absorbed in the Gulf market, 
mainly in Saudi Arabia. 
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exploded the prospect of Qatar monopolising the Gulf steel round bars 
market. The Saudi plan is to establish two steel plants with 
processing methods, capacity and output similar to that of Qatar. 
Although there is no impact, in the short and medium~run on the 
performance of QASCO, the risk of competition will be greater in the 
long run. This is why Qatar invited Saudi Arabia to sign an agreement 
covering joint steel projects. This agreement was signed on 7th 
April 1981; ( 2 ) 
The ministerial projects, on the other hand, (although one can 
for some purposes include them as public projects) take different 
processing development paths, despite the fact that they are sharing 
the dominant role of the Amir. The main reasons for the differences 
between the relevant decision-making processes lie in the char-
acteristics of the ministerial projects: 
a) The capital value is relatively small compared to the 
public projects 
b) Their main purpose is to serve the domestic market 
c) They are not based entirely on financial return on investment. 
Considering these facts and given the autocratic control of 
decisions and budgets, the ministerial projects, either industrial 
or services, in most cases face long delays in their decision-
making process. 
The private sector decision-making process, in contrast to 
public an~ ministerial sectors is very risky. This is mainly because 
of the unsettled domestic market, as well as the absence of decisions 
based on close economic evaluations. There is also the fundamental 
point that the risk here is borne by personal entrepreneurial 
8.2 
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finances whilst public and ministerial projects are backed by the 
treasury of the state, 
Capital Investment 
After the taking of any positive decision, either by the Amir 
in the case of public and ministerial projects, or by an individual 
entrepreneur, to invest in certain projects, an answer to the question 
of project financing has to be provided before any procedure is 
undertaken. 
In this review of capital investment in industry, a distinction 
will be drawn between the three forms of sectoral projects. 
1. Capital Investment in Public Sector 
The heavy manufacturing industry in the Gulf in general, and 
Qatar specifically, relies on two factors: a) utilization of natural 
gas; and b) the availability of financial resources. ( 3 ) 
The public sector financing plan consists of a combination of 
equity, finance, government loan, supplier credits, bank loans 
and others. Table 8.1 below illustrates an estimated financial 
source for major projects in 1978~. The table points out clearly 
that the total equity capital raised covered 20.9 per cent of the 
total, QR 7,890 million. The major financial sources for capital 
investment were in the form of loans of which large amounts were 
drawn from European consortiums. 
* The actual amounts of capital investment of these projects are 
higher than those shown in the table. This is mainly due to the 
strong impact of inflation on investment costs, especially 
in the case of projects with implementation periods extending 
over several years. Knowing this we can estimate that the 
1978 figures were higher by 39.6 per cent than those of 1977. 
Moreover, QAFCO I and QAFCO II will illustrate this type of . 
capital investment inflation (see QAFCO p.l76). 
Table 8.1 Estimated Financial Sources of Major Projects 1978 
(in QR million) 
Govern- Supplier I Banking· i Total -~ 9.; of the Equity ment Credits Loans Others Total 
loans i 
I 
I 
I 
QASCO 200 I 275 290 695 I 1,460 18.5 - I 
' 
I 
I 
QAFCO I 92 130 158 I 380 4.8 
- -
I 
I I QAFCO II - 140 305 480 25 950 12.0 
QAPCO 360 - 950 1,190 - 2,500 31.7 
NGL 1 260 
-
190 - 450 900 11.4 
NGL 2 740 - 760 200 - 1,700 21.6 
Total 1,652 545 2,653 2,565 475 7,890 100.0 
go of the 20.94 6.91 33.62 32.51 6.02 100.00 Sources 
Source IDTC, Industrial Development in Qatar, Qatar, 1978, p.l04. 
Governmental loans to the public sector were very small, consisting 
of 6.9 per cent only out of the total, However, the government provides 
guarantees for other loan capital, In order to examine the sources of 
finance more deeply, QASCO is selcted as a model. · QASCO's 1978 own est-
. - ~ 
imates of its sources of finance differ from those of the IDTC and are 
as follows: ( 4) 
Supplier Credits 
Qatar Government Loan 
Euro-Loan (1977) 
Euro-Loan (1978) 
Equity 
Total 
of which: 
Machinery & Equipment 
Erection 
Civil & Building 
Total 
(In equivalent QR million) 
347 
275 
393 
388 
200 
1,603 
741.5 
112.7 
286,5 
1,140.7 
! 
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In addition to the capital investment in capital goods, the 
government from its own capital, has to provide infrastructural 
facilities (for infrastructure see Chapter 7. pp.233-240). 
2. Ca~ital Investment in Ministerial Projects 
The general features of capital investment in ministerial 
projects were : 1) relatively small compared to the public sector 
requirements; 2) all the capital finance is met by the government 
as well as current expenditure. e.g. the salaries of employees. 
Once the Amir has agreed on a ministry's proposal, he has to 
reserve sufficient funds for the project; these funds are usually 
distributed over several years and included within the annual budget 
of the ministry concerned. If the general annual budget of the 
state, for any reason, had to be changed, the allocation for the 
project in any particular year could be transferred to a later 
period. In addition, the Amir himself, as mentioned earlier, carries 
out the payment for the project and equivalent funds are withheld 
from the ministry's budget. 
3. Capital Investment in Private Sector ~-
There is no industrial bank in Qatar to support the private 
sector in their struggle for raising sufficient capital for projects, 
nor has there been any actual flow of government grants or credit 
to private industry. 
The main financial source of private industries, therefore, 
is the entrepreneur(s)' own capital or the profit of existing 
establishments. The ordinary banks in Qatar sometimes participate in 
financing private projects but because of the high (9-10 per cent per 
annum) interest rate (high, that is, compared to the public sector, 
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and very high compared with loans available through special credit 
institutions in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries), the 
complexity of the bank routine and long delays, private approaches 
are severely discouraged, 
As seen from the previous discussion the financial source of 
capital investment in industry is drawn from two sources : internal 
and external, Although industrial development can be financed 
entirely from Qatar's own monetary reserve (domestic and foreign), 
the main financial source, especially for the public sector, is 
it'lcrea~\"j 
loans. Loans which are always;in value and linked with varying 
interests, add more pressures on the companies. 
The private sector operation, on the other side, has serious 
difficulties in financing the project from its own capital because 
there is no industrial bank in Qatar to support the individual 
entrepreneur. The government, early in 1981, set up a Committee 
to supply the private sector with industrial grants, (Chapter 4 
pp. 91-93 ) but unfortunately only a few well known people have 
succeeded in gaining approval, 
The government, in order to maintain good industrial development, 
should be more positive in encouraging industrial investment of the 
revenues from oil. This is because : 
"what they (Emirates including Qatar) need is not a reserve 
fund to supplement public revenue in the future, but an 
investment fund which can invest the major part of oil 
revenues in long-term national and international 
investment." ( 5 ) 
Here one is reminded once more that the industrial development 
strategy as identified in Chapter 4 is not in fact part of an integrated 
development plan, 
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8.3 MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS 
The evaluation of the validity of decision-taking in the 
industrialising process and the efficiency of use of capital invest-
ment is very strongly linked with the performance of management. 
The management organisation structure in Qatar in general, and 
in the industrial field specificallyp takes the classic pyramidal 
form, where the shop floor workers form the base of the pyramid. 
There are three forms of organisation structure of the 
industrial establishments in Qatar. They can be divided as follows: 
1) Management of Public Joint Ventures 
All the feasibility studies carried out by foreign consultants 
in respect of public projects, recommended strongly that Qatarp 
in order to achieve maximum benefit from its industrial enterprises, 
should set up joint venture companies with foreign partnership, who 
would provide management and marketing know-how. These recommendations 
were valid knowing that a) there is an absence of modern management 
practices among Qataris, and b) modern imported technology is involved. 
The foreign partners usually tied themselves with the government 
through long-term agreements. The agreements in all cases covered 
partnership, engineering designp management, marketing and other 
elements with varying balances of benefit, 
The management agreements with foreign bodies are usually set 
up for an initial period of 8 years or more with the prospect of 
being extended by another agreement for similar periods. 
The main characteristic of management structure in joint venture 
public sector and other industrial fields in Qatar is the "Line 
Organisation", or what is sometimes referred to as "military 
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organisation". This line organisation tends to proceed to "line 
and staff organisation" where the general manager appoints officers 
or managers for all of the development of the company. The officers, 
usually experts in their field, are followed by section heads, 
general foremen, foremen and workers. 
Chart 8.1 below represents QASCO's organisation structure. 
This chart, with some modification, can be applied to most of the 
joint venture public sector companies. 
There is, on the top, as Chart 8.1 shows, the Board of 
Directors. The function of the Board is to decide on major policies 
of the company. These decisions are referred to the Amir (who is 
the final authority) for his final approval, The general manager of 
the company carries out the daily routine works and coordinates all 
activities of the company with manager/officers. His main function 
is to implement the policies of the company, as already approved by 
the Amir and the Board of Directors, and to report to the Board any 
difficulties facing the smooth working of the company.* He also 
prepares the draft annual budget containing any suggestions for 
improvement or future development for the Board to decide. 
The main difference between QASCO' s organisation chart 
and other joint venture companies is that QASCO had adapted a 
network of committees on the line of organisation structure,** 
* 
** 
The general manager of the company is also a member of the Board 
of Directors. 
The effect of the committees in QASCO is noticeable. The main 
result of them is to involve their people in working together 
towards a sound unique solution to the company's problems. The 
committees have also improved the plant's efficiency. This is 
very much a Japanese contribution to management structure. 
Chart 8.1 OASCO Organization Chart 
Source ~OASCO. OASCO Organisation Chart. Qatar 
Board of Directors 
General Manager 
lj I Secre:~ 
Corporate Planning 
Groc;.p 
Committees 
Production meeting 
Safety & Security 
Committee 
Reduction 
Dept 
Production Control 
Group 
Safoty 1!. Security 
Group 
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2) Management of Other Public and Ministerial Organizations 
The other public and ministerial establishments which are 
100% owned by the government, nearly follow the same path of 
line and staff organisation. The difference between the joint 
ventures, on the one hand, and the public and ministerial sector, 
on the other, lies in the top level of management structure. 
Whereas the governing body in the first case is the Board of 
Directors, the latter can be governed by several types of bodies. 
Chart 8.2 Management of Other Public and ~!inisterial Organisations 
a. Public 
QGPC 
Board of Directors 
QGPC 
Managing Director 
Deputy M.D. 
Head of Refining Gas 
processing and Petro-
chemical Dept. 
General Manager 
of the Company 
b. Ministerial 
Cabinet 
Minister 
Deputy Minister 
of 
Ministry Director 
Head of General 
Administrat;lon 
General Manager 
of the Plant 
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Here, above the plant general manager, comes first the head 
of Section/Department of a government body or agency, who in turn 
is responsible to the Deputy/Director of the government body which 
also operates under the auspices of higher administrative authority. 
These authorities are supervised by the Council of Ministers 
or the Board of Directors in the case of QGPC; the QGPC itself is 
responsible to the Council. All of these combinations lead 
to the Amir. (see Chart 8. 2a. and b.) 
3) Management of Private Sector 
The line organisation is the most common organisational 
structure followed in the private sector. The structure in most 
cases consists of two bodies: 1) the manager, who is commonly 
the entrepreneur(s); and 2) the workers. 
The organisation of private establishments, as illustrated 
in Chart 8.3, falls on the owner/manager who settles all the 
establishment's requirements, FurtheT.more, the owner/manager 
intervenes in all of the establishment's operations i.e. decision-
making, sales, production, purchasing--p personnel, as well as the 
finance, 
Chart 8.3 Management of Private Sector 
Section 
Owner (s) 
Manager (s) 
Section 
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The centralization forms, as seen in decision-making, also 
appear when management organisation is discussed. The Amir's hand, 
in some cases, appears strong and direct in public and ministerial 
activities while in others the control appears as indirect but 
is nevertheless present. The entrepreneurs in the private sector, 
as seen, are involved directly in all aspects of their establish-
ment's activities. 
This kind of autocratic system has left the employees entirely 
dependent on the higher authority of the establishment, This type of 
dependence is believed to diminish the capability of the employees, 
whatever their employment status, in developing their administrative 
skill and freedom of action in respect of the establishment's 
interests (but see also Chapter 3 conclusion). 
Although the straight line organisation structure is very 
simple and can be applied to all of the industrial organisations, the 
feed-in, feed-back of information and orders are carried out 
efficiently only in the case of small -scale industries, whilst in 
medium and large-scale establishments the flow of information and 
orders takes a long time, and tfie ultimate decision maker is so 
remote from actual operations, rendering him helpless if the information 
feedback fails or is faulty, This kind of line system isolates rather 
than improves the co-ordination between the different departments. 
QASCO, in order to overcome the classic line formational problems, 
have established different committees on the line. These committees, 
although taking an advisory form, have created understanding between 
all of the departments in the company, which has resulted in more 
co-ordination between them in order to fulfil the company's targets. 
Although it is agreed between the government and its foreign 
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partners that the foreign partners not only undertake the management 
and marketing but also train local citizens to replace foreign 
personnel, unfortunately, the existing management has not carried 
out the planned educational and training programmes for managerial 
and skilled technicians. The foreign partners, for whatever 
reason, by ignoring the development of local citizens' abilities 
and skills, have made the state more dependent on them. It is clear that 
at least part of the reason - inadequate training - is a desire of at 
least some foreign partners to maintain this dependence, as a result 
of the incapability of locals to run large projects. At the same time, 
the agreements between the foreign partners and the government 
are made less effective in one way or another as well as the respons-
ibility for, and the supervision of, the Board of Directors 
of the performance of the companies. 
The implications of the way in which decision-making and 
management structures affecting industry have developed in Qatar 
are of considerable importance and some of the key points are 
considered in the whole context in Chapter 10. 
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CHAPTER 9 
DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN LABOUR FORCE IN 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
Arabian Gulf States, despite their oil wealth, have found 
themselves in an unenviable situation since all of them suffer from 
a notable shortage of national labour forces and especially of 
trained labour. This had forced the Gulf States to import most of 
their labour requirements from outside the region. The ease of 
this importation operation has made the Gulf States in general, and 
Qatar specifically, dependent on foreign manpower in all economic 
sectors i.e. primary, secondary and tertiary. 
In this Chapter we come almost full circle back now to 
consider the question of the place of foreign labour force in 
industrial development. The population and demographic background 
were examined in Chapter 3, but it is only after an analysis of the 
industries and the decision manage-making structure we can now 
analyse this key factor. 
A great deal has been published with regard to immigration of 
labour in the Gulf area, but most of this has been in the field of the 
volume of immigration, effects of immigrants on the employment 
structure, or on the impact on social changes. 
This Chapter, therefore, discusses the dependence of the 
country on a foreign labour force for running the economic dynamo. 
But, why does the country depend on foreign labour? Which occupational 
group(s) is/are desirable? Where do the Qataris stand in relation 
to this massive importation of foreign labour? Is it vital to import 
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all this large number of foreigners? Moreover, what is the impact 
of foreign labour on the country and its people? The purpose of 
this Chapter is to answer these questions. 
To begin with, we have to identify the different elements 
which have helped the appearance of dependence on a foreign labour 
force in industrial and economic developments. 
9.1 Factors Which Caused The Dependence 
There are several factors or elements which can be selected 
and used as evidence for the cause of the dependence on foreign 
labour force, but the most important of them all are: 
1. Oil wealth and the distribution of oil revenues 
The slump of the pearl industry in the 1930's severely affected 
the life of most of the inhabitants of Qatar. Income, on a far 
greater scale, from oil, during the late 1940's and 1950's suddenly improved 
immeasurably the life standards of the inhabitants, either directly or 
indirectly. The government, with the oil wealth which all accrued to 
it, started to pay more attention to development with particular 
emphasis on tlie infrastructure facilities. The government at first 
started to purchase lands from the original owners. This operation, in 
itself, rapidly increased the value of land from almost nothing to more 
or less QR 100 per square foot.* Development carried out by the gov-
ernment,in a country already suffering from the shortage of local 
manpower, made it difficult not to rely on other countries' human 
resources. In addition to the development of infrastructure, the gov-
ernment was expanding its own organisational bodies by employing more 
* There is no compulsory purchase legislation at present in Qatar, and 
the acquisition of land for the infrastructure facilities, therefore, 
can only be carried out by negotiation between the government and 
the land owners on the price of the land. 
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manpower. But, unfortunately, this type of distribution of the oil 
revenues translated the Qatari community into a consumer society 
rather than a productive one. This, in itself, produced the dangerous 
idea that "money can buy almost everything" which appeared strongly 
among the Qataris in general and in the state specifically, This 
resulted in the large importation of capital goods and, simultan-
eously, the importation of a foreign labour force to operate them. 
2. Qatari 's attitude towards manual work 
The Qataris' attitude towards manual work can be identified 
as a cultural and social problem. The main reasons behind this 
problem ar.e a) the wide range of alternative opportunities that 
Qataris can take up, especially in the government sector; b) most 
manual work is in any case characterised by low income; and c) manual 
work is associated with the menial lowest social classes which most 
Qataris disdain. These reasons and others have been a compulsive 
force pushing most of the native population away from manual work. 
Although not on the same scale as in Kuwait, the flow of money from 
government through land purchase and compensation during the oil 
period helped in driving the Qataris even further away from "dirtying 
their hand" in manual work. Because of all these factors, the demand 
for foreign manpower, in particular for manual labourers, rose even 
more sharply (see 9.2 below), not only in fields where no skills 
were required, but also in areas where literacy and some education is 
necessary e.g. the industrial shop floor. 
3. Lack of educational background and insufficient training 
Due to the sudden inflow of wealth and the changing of the 
population's activities in the country, the Qataris found themselves 
in urgent need of education. This need in 1952 was recognised by the 
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establishment of a formal educational system (see Chapter 3 p. 49 ). 
But after nearly two decades the majority of the Qataris are still 
illiterate since training and education has not had time to transform 
the whole population. This together with the Qataris 9 attitude 
towards manual work, even of a semi-skilled or skilled nature, has 
combined in virtually eliminating the governmental objective of 
developing the Qatari vocational skills. The government, on its side, 
soon lost its enthusiams for adopting extensive educational and 
training programmes and has,therefore, tended to replace it with 
( 1) 
theoretical and "fact-stuffing" programmes, far from the country's 
requirements (see Fig. 3.7). Furthermore, the extensive development 
projects carried out in the last decade (1970 9 s), would not have been 
possible in any case if the government had relied on the educated and 
highly skilled native population; this tended to reduce the urgency 
of official action. 
4. Marginal participation of women 
Women's participation in the economic life of the Gulf in 
general, and in Qatar specifically, was much more positive in the 
pre-oil era. Bearing in mind that most, if not all, the active male 
population were away for most of the year pearling, leaving behind 
the women, children and inactive males, the women, in order to sustain 
the life of their own dependants, had to practise one, or several, 
productive activities, e.g. tailoring, retailing, grazing animals 
etc. In olher words, most of the on-shore activities heavily 
involved women in a near-subsistence society. 
With the appearance of oil wealth, the old values of the 
"struggle for survival" were completely abolished. In addition, 
established conservative tendency to segregate women within the 
-281-
family circle was more easy to achieve, given greater wealth. In 
addition, development activity led to more foreigners with different 
cultural backgrounds entering the country and the raising even more 
of "cultural walls" around Qatari women. Only teaching and nursing 
activities were permissible and even then only within female circles. 
If such "walls" were absent, the contribution of women could reduce 
the huge shortage in the Qatari labour force, hypothetically by almost 
one-half. In 1981, for instance, the working Qatari women represented 
only 4.2 per cent out of the 48,000 Qatari native population; 10.7 
per cent of the total active Qatari work force of 18,910; and only 
1.7 per cent of the total active population of 121,572. 
Moreover, new social trends among women have at least temporarily 
reduced the possibility of their contribution to the national economy. 
The new trend, which is wrongly known as a "freedom" has made women 
more dependent on foreign servants in running domestic affairs. 
Further, women have extended their understanding of freedom to include 
much of the care for their own babies and the upbringing of their 
children in which foreign servants and nursemaids now play an important 
role. This has, however, only partly released women from domestic 
chores but has not induced them into the active labour force. 
5. Government attraction 
The dynamic aspect of oil wealth had created formal government 
bodies which replaced the traditional form of tribal systems of 
government. The government, in order to fulfil some of its obligations, 
has acted as a "welfare state" in providing full employment to its 
native population, identifying and implementing development programmes 
and setting up public utilities. The government, with huge oil 
income and expenditure, has expanded its ministerial and departmental 
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operation which, in turn, has created a large demand for a labour 
force. At the same time the local population, not unnaturally, assumes 
it has the right to benefit from the oil revenue flowing into gov-
ernment and in particular has a right to government employment as one 
means of obtaining such benefit. 
The attraction toward government employment, however, came 
mainly from a) the easiness of government work compared to that of 
other sectors;b) shorter working hours and only light supervision, 
whilst the employees of private and public sectors have to work at 
least eight hours a day; c) the assurance of stability in govern-
mental work; d) most of the governmental posts did not require high 
qualifications; e) promotion came easily to the governmental employees, 
and f) other social factors e.g. influence of the bureaucracy, the 
status associated with government employment, especially for those of 
to.p cadres etc. These reasons, and others, had been causing several 
problems to the private and public sectors in a society already 
suffering a shortage in its labour force. ( 2 ) What we also find 
is that the employees in the industrial sector eagerly await the 
chance to transfer themselves from the productive sector to the 
government services. Moreover, most of the university graduates and 
the highly skilled members are the most attracted to government offices. 
This, in itself, has been creating over-employment as well as disguised 
unemployment in government occupations. The government, instead of 
dismissing inactive employees from their offices,* import foreign 
labour to do no more than what other local employees are already 
* The government, due to several social factors, could not easily end 
the employees' contract and once the employees recruited they would 
continue to work for the government. If the government, on its side, 
is no more in need of the workings of (a) certain body(ies) the 
government does not formally abolish the agency but allows that 
body(ies) to die away itself gradually. This matter is simply due to 
what is literally translated as the "water of the face" i.e. the 
loss of face which would be associated with dismissal. 
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allocated to. The oil crisis of 1982/83 has forced the government 
to follow a tight employment policy and for the first time it 
dismissed many expatriates or employees of the government. But if 
this crisis had not arisen the expectation was that government 
employment would continue to grow. 
We see. therefore, that until very recently these key factors 
have played a vital role in encouraging the importation of foreign 
labour to the country, and have resulted in the dependence on 
foreign labour which appears as one of the major features associated 
with development. 
9.2 Occupational Structure of Imported Labour Force 
It is clear that the above factors and the development require-
ment made it impossible for Qatar to progress without depending on 
foreign labour. At the same time, these factors have determined 
the size of foreign labour importation in each of the occupational 
categories. The occupational categories analysed in this section 
are selected from the Ministry of the Interior.' s classifications. 
Table 9.1 below shows the new resident visas issued by the 
Ministry of the Interior between 1396-99 H (1976-79). The new resident 
visas, in other words, represent the demand on foreign labour in 
each current year. In 1976 the total demand of new visas was 33,566 
of which 61 per cent of the total were labourers. This large 
proportion of demand for labourers was mainly directed to construction 
and other manual work. Because of the continuing demand by const-
ruction, the labour force in 1977 reached a total of 37,495,of which 
the labourers had the lion's share of 61.5 per cent. Technicians, 
although having a smaller proportion of the demand, increased by 
42.3 per cent over their 107(i total. i\t the end of l'J77 the domestic 
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economy was overheated by a trade/construction boom. Immediately 
the government, in order to reduce the inflation which was caused by 
this boom, controlled ( 3 ) public spending in 1978. This control 
led to the private sector reducing its activities, especially in the 
construction activity. Simultaneously, the demand for foreign labour 
was reduced in 1978 by 3.7 per cent below the 1977 total figure. 
The categories most hit by this policy were teachers* followed by 
labourers. But the labourers, on the other hand, still made up more 
than 55 per cent of the 1978 figure of 36,112. The demand for foreign 
drivers, engineers and technicians had increased and there was no 
immediate effect on them from the cut in public spending. The gov-
ernment,in 1979,took a further step in controlling public spending 
by freezing the government vacancy posts. ( 4 ) The government policy 
for its own recruitment indirectly affected the private sector 
employment. Thus the total demand for new visas was reduced from 
36,112 in 1978 to 28,771 in 1979, a reduction in demand of over 20 
per cent. The categories most severely affected by this decline 
were general labourers followed by farm workers, teachers and engin-
eers, while the demand for technicians and driver groups remained in 
the growth mode. Total demand during the whole period declined 
by an average of 5.1 per cent per annum. The labourers had the 
highest decline of all occupational categories with a fall of 18.0 
per cent per annum. The technician, farm worker and driver categories, 
on the other hand, had an average increase during the period of 
14.&, 10.8 and 10.4 per cent per annum respectively. It is obvious 
that the trend in demands for new resident visas had shifted from 
importing unskilled manual workers,to a relatively skilled and highly 
skilled labour force. But, it is believed that, during the next 
* The decline in foreign teacher demand was mainly due to graduation 
from Qatar University and its contribution to education in Qatar. 
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Table 9.1 New Residential Visas Issued Between 1396-99H (1976-79) 
by Occupations 
I Year 
I 
I Lab-
ourer 
% of Tcchn- % of 
Growth ician Gr. 
Ad-
min. 
4,344 1,211 
% of 
Gr. 
Engin- % of 
eer Gr. 
1,129 
Doc-
tor 
47 
% of 
Gr. 
1396 20,472 
1397 23,055 
1398 20,193 
1399 11,758 
12.6 6,181 42.3 1,057 12.7 
6.5 
2.4 
1,240 9.8 
1 '604 29.4 
1,425 -11.2 
41 -12.8 i 
-12.4 6,470 4.7 1,126 
-41.8 6,775 4.7 1,153 
4481,1 17.1 
14.6 
I Overall I ncr. 
(Decrease) (18. o) 1 14.6 (1. 6) 1 1.1 , ( 4. 6) I 
Year Tea-
cher 
% of Far-
Gr. jmer 
% of 
Gr. 
Dri-
ver 
% of 
Gr. 
Others % of 
Gr. 
Grand a of 
Total G 
1396 268 184 615 5,296 33,566 1 
1397 392 46.3 329 78.8 478 -22.3 4,722 -10.8 37,495 11.7 1 
I ' 
1398 239 -39.0 359 9.1 657 37.5 5,416 14.7 36,112k~3.7 i 
r1~3_9_9~~~~_1_94 __ r-_1_8_.8 __ r-_25_5 __ ~--29~._o-+ __ 8_4_1-+_2_8_._o-r_6~,_3_29~_1_6_.9-+ ___ 2_8~,7 __ 71 -20.3 i 
Overall Incr. I 1 I 11 I ,. I (Decrease) (10.7), 10.8 10.4 j . 5.9 I (5.1)! 
Source: Ministry of Interior New Residential Visa 139()-99 Doha 1 ~J80. 
Table 9.2 Renewed Residential Visas Issued Between 1396-99 * (1976-79) 
by Occupations 
I Lab- % of Techn- ~a of Ad- % of Eng in- % of Doc-j Year Gr. ician Gr. min. Gr. eer Gr. tor ourer 
1396 40,583 3,785 3,003 456 66 
1397 47,449 16.9 5,043 33.2 3,624 20.7 678 48.7 87 
' 1398 60,284 27.1 7,149 41.8 6,231 71.9 1,283 89.2 163 
! 1399 - - --- -67,910 12.7 7,253 1.5 6, 534 4.9 1,425 11.1 141 
; Overall I ncr. 16.8 21.0 24.7 ' 34.3 i (Decrease) I I 
! 
OthcrsJ% of I 1 Year Tea- % of Far- % of Dri- % of Grand 
cher Gr. Gr. vet Gr. I Gr. Total mer I I 
ro of 
I Gr. 
31.8 
87.4 
--
-13.5 
24.2 
---
~~ of 
i c;r. 
-------·---
1396 524 2.7 1,016 1,797 13,575 1 i 64, sos 1 
29, 230 Ins . 3 j 1397 538 1,555 53.1 2,490 38.6 90,694 40.0 
1398 1,143 112.5 2, 277 46.4 3,007 20.8 38' 054 1 30. 2 ll9,591 31.9 
1399 1,186 3.8 1,157 -49.2 3, 371 12.1 41,055 7.9 130,032 8.7 
Overall Incr. 25.8 I 4. 3 I 20.3 : 33.5 22.3 (Decrease) 
* Revised Figures 
Source: Ministry of Interior Renewed Residential Visa 1396-99 Doha 1980. 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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few years the manual labour group will continue to take the largest 
share of the demand. This is mainly due to the continued requirements 
in the construction field, as well as in small-scale industries and 
services. (The services are of both the government and private sectors). 
Table 9.2 above shows the renewed resident visas issued by the 
Ministry of the Interior between 1396-99 H (1976-79). The rene\ved 
visas can be seen as the accumulated figure of the non-Qataris as a 
whole (not including the permanent visa holders). The two Tables, 9.1 
and 9.2, unfortunately do not give any satisfactory indication of the 
turnover of the non-Qatari labour force. This is because until 1981 
the renewed visa holder could change his original occupation group 
(see Chapter 3 p~35-38 ). In 1976, however, the total renewed visas 
were 64,805, of which 40,583 were labourers. Technicians came third 
with only 5.8 per cent out of the 1976 total. In 1977 the labourers' 
percentage, although continuing to be the dominant group, had declined 
from 62.6 per cent, in 1976, to 52.3 per cent. In 1978 nearly all of 
the occupational groups had a large cumulative percentage,varying 
from 20.8 per cent in the case of the dr~vers,to 112.5 per cent in the 
case of teachers,based on 1977 figures. This large accumulation was 
followed in 1979 by a slow average growth and a sharp decline in 
some cases i.e. farmworkers and doctors. The general growth of the 
foreign labour force was sharp in 1977 and 78, and continued to grow 
in 1979, although on average more slowly than in the previous two 
years. The increase of the foreign labour force holding renewed 
visas during the mentioned period was 22.3 per cent per annum. Once 
again the more skilled labour element was increasing at a higher rate 
than unskilled workers. 
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9.3 Occupational Distribution of Qataris and Non-Qataris 
Table 9.3 below shows the distribution of the Qatari and non-
Qatari (Arab and non-Arab) labour force by the main economic sectors. 
But, in order to arrive at a full understanding of manpower distrib-
ution, one should keep in mind the previous elements of sections 9.1 
and 9.2. 
Table 9.3 
Sector 
Agriculture, 
huntipg arid 
husbandry 
Oil and 
quarrying 
Manufacturing 
industry 
Electricity 
and water 
Construction 
Trade 
Transport, 
store and 
communica-
tion 
Government 
services 
Other 
services 
Distribution of labour force by Nationality and 
Main Economic Section (1981) 
% of Non- % of 9" of 
Qataris each Qatar is each Total Total 
sector sector (abou.r-
to.-ce. 
500 2.6 2,439 2.4 2,939 2.4 
1,114 5.9 2,083 2.0 3,197 2.6 
475 2.5 9,210 9.0 9,685 I 8.0 
2,731 14.4 5, 777 5.6 8,508 7.0 
364 1.9 17,053 16.6 17,417 
I 
14.3 
1,035 5.5 13,080 12.7 14' 115 11.6 
1,205 6.4 2,751 2.7 3,956 3.3 
; 
I 
10,835 ' 57.3 25,730 25.1 36,565 30.1 
651 3.5 24,539 23.9 25,190 20.7 
I 118,910 100 102,662 100 121,572 100 
Source: Based on the author's revision of: 
! 
I 
' 
Al-Kuwari, A.K., Analysis study of the factors delimain3 t~. 
size, structure and type of labour force in Qatar. Qatar 
University 1982. Appendix 1-A. 
% of 
Non-
Qatar is 
in each 
sector I 
83.0 
65.2 
95.1 I 
67.CJ 
97.9 
- 92.7 
69.5 
70.4 
97.4 
: 
84.4 
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The total labour force had increased from 48,390 in 1970 (see 
Chapter 3 Table 3.9) to 121,572 in 1981, an increase of about 151 per 
cent. The Qataris increased from 8,168 in 1970 to 18,910 in 1981, 
whilst the non-Qataris increased from 40,222 to 102,662. That is to say, 
while the Qataris increased by 7.2 per cent per annum the non-Qataris 
were increasing by 8 per cent per annum. Therefore, the contribution 
of the Qatari labour force in the economy decreased from 16.9 per 
cent in 1970, to 15.6 per cent of the total in 1981. The dependence on 
the foreign labour force appears very strong indeed, knowing the 
fact that the non-Qataris outnumbered the Qataris in all of the 
economic sectors, and especially in those requiring manual workers, 
where their percentage was exceeded by 95 per cent. The Qataris, on 
the other hand, were concentrating in the purely Governmental sectors, 
such as government services, electricity and water. This concentration 
reduced the dependence in these two sectors to almost 70 per cent. 
The total Qatari labour force in the primary and secondary sectors 
in 1981 was 5,184, that is to say, 4.3 per cent of the 1981 total 
labour force. But from close examination the majority of these 
were actually representing "labour outside the industrial production 
fields". This is mainly due to the fact that most of the Qataris 
in industry were in the transport and administrative services. 
9.4 The Impact of the Foreign Labour Force 
There is, unfortunately, no escape route that the Gulf in general 
and Qatar in particular can adopt to stop the large importation of 
foreign labour, except by freezing all the development programmes. The 
development process, as seen earlier, requires, besides availability 
of capital, a continuous flow of human resources, something which 
Qatar cannot manage with its scarce domestic human resources. This, 
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as seen in Chapter 3, has created a rapidly growing demand on the 
foreign labour force. But the foreigners brought with them socio-
economic and political problems as well as satisfying immediate 
needs. Some of the identifiable problems are summarily considered 
here. 
1) Qataris and their activities 
The spreading of the foreign labour force in Qatar has helped 
the country to go ahead with its development. The technical and 
managerial experts and workers brought to the country, hypothetically 
reduced the gap of technical understanding between Qatar and the 
industrialized nations. This primarily satisfactory stage has led to 
laziness of the government bodies in adopting extensive and serious 
training programmes for the local people. In addition, the effect 
removed some incentive and motivation in the Qataris and they 
became content not to practise the work which their foreign analogues 
were carrying out. Furthermore, this attitude of full dependence 
on foreign employees has created among Qataris the "absenteeism 
phenomenon"; absenteeism both from work and their obligations. It 
is well know .that a side _effect of dependence on foreign_ labour is 
the taking away of the enthusiasm for the acquisition of different 
types of knowledge and needed skills among most of the Qataris. 
The dependence on a foreign labour force has not led to, or 
helped in, developing the local human resource in skills and 
qualifications but, on the contrary, it has been accompanied by a 
strong trend of driving the local manpower away from the fields of 
production, so it is not surprising that in 1981 about two thirds 
of the Qatari manpower was concentrated in the government offices. 
This concentration, together with the absenteeism phenomenon had 
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been causing over-employment as well as disguised unemployment. 
The government~ on the other hand~ instead of disciplining such 
Qatari employees, had been importing foreign labour to carry out 
work that Qataris would not fulfil. This, in itself~ helped in the 
spreading of ''welfare employment" where citizens and others receive 
a monthly salary without h<l.vi(\9 tc wo.-\4 fc.- i.L-. 
2) Public utilities 
There is no doubt that there is very heavy dependence on 
foreign labour in the setting up of the hardware of the public util-
ities but the foreign labour force is also the main utilizer of the 
public utilities. The government's tendency in this area towards 
short term planning methods and the annually increasing pressures 
of demand on public utilities, have made it necessary almost contin-
uously to increase the output of the public utility units. The 
electricity maximum demand in 1954, for instance, was 0.6 megawatts 
(MW). In 1964 demand reached 28.4 MW~ while iri 1974 it was 116 MW. 
From 1974 to 1979 the demand increased by 263.8 per cent of that 
in 1974, reaching a total demand of 442 MW. ( 5 ) The causes of such 
demand growth were the population -increase, p-er -capita demand 
increase and the wide range of economic activities. This kind of 
increase in the electricity field, can also be seen in 
the less sophisticated areas of public utilities e.g. water, health, 
education, telecommunication, road, etc. 
3} Housing 
Any very rapidly growing country, like Qatar, is likely to 
find itself with a housing crisis. The increase of oil prices from 
1973 onwards put a great pressure on housing supply. This pressure 
has been mainly created by the increase of the foreign population. 
Housing construction is carried out by the private sector, which 
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was not geared to respond to the great and sudden demand. The private 
sector also controlled the housing market. This control, with the 
shortage of supply, resulted in a considerable rise in residential 
unit rents. The private sector, in order to increase their income 
from the housing rents, started in 1973 to import more labourers, 
especially from Asian sources in order to construct more housing units. 
This unlimited importation of Asian workers, and others,in turn 
created yet more pressure on the available housing units. This great 
pressure caused a) overcrowding, especially among the Asian bachelor 
workers, b) even higher rents per housing unit and c) diminution of 
health standards. ( 6 ) 
4) Economic 
There are positive and negative sides to the foreign workers' 
impact on the economy and economic activities in Qatar. The residence 
impact of the foreigners can be seen from the point that the country 
has been taking a "work-ready" labour force, especially where this was 
technically well advanced over that of the native work force, and 
where the country did not require to train the labour. At the same 
time, and .due to--the- noticeable shortage of quality and quantity of 
' the local manpower, the imported labour force has been able to fill 
these kinds of shortages. In addition, the large number of foreigners 
have also helped, either directly or indirectly, in developing and 
reviving the domestic market. 
But, on the other side of the coin, the foreign labour force 
has also been draining overseas the local capital which is believed 
to be very high, especially among bachelor workers and those whose 
families did not accompany them, i.e. a high outward flow of 
remittances. In addition, the foreign workers have been instrumental 
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in spreading new consumption patterns which have resulted in obstructing 
further development of local production especially among small-scale 
industries. 
Concluding remark 
It is clear, from the previous discussion, that dependence on 
foreign labour has appeared very strongly in Qatar. But we should not 
take this matter as a fact which cannot change or be changed. This 
is due to the fact that some of the socio-economic values are 
changing, and once these values change the contribution of the native 
population to the domestic economy could be great. Some s'jM 
o~ positive changes within the Qatari population e.g. in the attitude 
to the involvement of women and the attitude to productive work, 
whilst, negatively, a growing ~once~n over the dependence on foreign 
labour which has alien cultural values. At the same time, the spread 
of education and vocational training could enable the citizens of 
Qatar to be more active in manufacturing industries and they could 
gradually replace the non-Qataris. Women, moreover, sooner or later, 
will probably enter the labour market and as a consequence the local 
labour could comprise at 1 east --a- high proportion of the-- total . 
The present recruitment methods, which have produced all this 
disequilibrium in the labour force structure, might have been 
necessary in the past, given development policy could also be changed. 
The present situation, arising from the 1982/83 oil price crises, 
has made governmental and other demands for the labour force more 
cautious in this approach. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION 
A. Summary review of findings 
Before essaying an analytical evaluation of industrialisation 
in Qatar, a summary review of the main factual findings of this study 
is necessary. First, it is clear the development of manufacturing 
industry in Qatar has been very strongly influenced by two fundamental 
factors, the national physical resource endowment (see Chapter 2 
and Section 5.3) and the small absolute size of population (see 
Chapter 3). The exploitation of the only major raw material resource, 
oil, started in 1949,since when capital has been available for industrial 
investment and both the economy and society of Qatar have become 
fundamentally changed. 1be real involvement of the government jn 
industry carne later only after the striking of the offshore oil field 
in 1960 . This involvement, in 1962, took the form of studying 
different projects for utilizing associated natural gas. Though the 
resource inventory has subsequently been enlarged by the discovery of 
very large offshore unassociated natural gas reserves, these as yet 
have ilot-b~een exploHed. 
From one point of view, it might be said that the first third 
of the thirty year period during which oil has transformed the scene 
was a period during which industrialization and divcrsifjcation were r1ot 
given much attention by government. From another point of view one could 
state that the whole process of industrialization and of oil revenue 
based socio-economic change has so far only extended over thirty years i.e. 
half the current male life expectation. This last point is a reminder 
of the importance of demographic factors which explicitly and implicitly 
appear in several contexts throughout the study. 
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Chapter 4 examines the sequence of government industrial investments 
in terms of the evaluation of industrialization policy and strategy. 
The appropriateness of classical development models and theories to the 
Qatari situation is discussed. 
In Chapters 5 and 6 both the extractive and manufacturing industries 
in the public sector have been analysed in terms of the evaluation of the 
government policy and the fixed variables of material resources endowment 
and local manpower availability. Direct government investment in heavy 
industries took place following studies made in 1962 but the first 
evidence of implementation of an emerging policy appears in 1965 in the 
joint venture with Ross in fishing and fish product processing. The 
next government backed manufacturing industry did not enter production 
until 1969 i.e. cement production. 
The study of the location of manufacturing industries in Chapter 7 
highlights the role of the government in its virtually total control of 
manufacturing industries through decisions on siting and the provision 
of infrastructure as well as direct investment, and also serves to 
emphasize the fundamentally different behavioural characteristic of the 
publ_~c and pr~va~e sect_or_s. This _l_ast theme_was more fully developed-in 
Chapter 8, which is fundamentally concerned with decision-making as 
it affects industrialization. In decision making in a State, which is 
essentially dedicated to the principle of private enterprise, nevertheless, 
the dominant role of the State comes out very clearly both in the decision-
making structure of the public sector and also in the extent to \vhich the 
government has taken some positive action at least to regulate the 
private sector. 
Even at this level, however, and as appears in all the previous 
Chapters,the dominant functional variable is that of a shortage of domestic 
manpower for industry. In Chapter 9 the way in which this factor, directly 
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and indirectly, profoundly influences everything in the industrial sector 
was developed. 
So, essentially, we have a picture of a state, territorially and 
demographically small, with a highly skewed material resource base but 
which in its specific way is very rich. The society of the state has 
experienced rapidly accelerated change, \vhich, of course, commenced 
before Qatar started extracting its own oil, and this has effectively 
influenced attitudes to investment and activity. As a result, qualitative 
as well as quantitative factors emerge as significantly influencing the 
process of industrialisation. Qatar, as with its neighbours, has recently 
committed itself to industrialization,first in national terms and 
more recently in terms of regional collaboration. The whole process 
so far has been highly compressed in time. From the study's factual 
findings some themes of particular significance emerge and, in conclusion, 
form the basis for an analytical evaluation of the past, present and 
possible futures of industry in Qatar. 
B. Analysis and Evaluation 
An important point which needs to be established at the outset of 
tl:ri.s_auiil)'sis is that Qatar assumed the powe~ and capability ful-ly 
to control its national destiny only during the 1970's. Politically, 
full sovereignty was achieved at the beginning of that decade. As noted 
in Chapter 5, not until 1977 did Qatar become the sole and complete 
owner of all the assets of the oil industry, as they existed at that 
time. It is now the State of Qatar and its government that determine 
the rate of extraction of both oil and gas and the ways in which they 
are utilised, the criteria now being those which Qatar determines as 
suitable for its own development purposes as well as for revenue raising. 
The balance between the raising of revenue from the export sale of crude 
oil and semi-processed gas and gas liquid is clearly one vital factor 
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in determining Qatar 1 s policy toward hydrocarbon exploitation. We 
must remember, however, that even in the preparation of crude for export 
and the part processing of gas and natural gas liquids, already an 
element of manufacturing is involved. The domestic use of hydrocarbons 
was first thought of as being almost entirely confined to the 
domestic consumption of a small range of refined products e.g. petrol, 
gas oil and kerosene. Since then, the situation has become more 
complex and Qatar now refines not only all the standard products 
such as those mentioned above, but has adopted refining processes which 
have become more multi-product and multi-purpose. However, until the 
unassociated gas resources of the North Dome are exploited, the rate 
of production of natural gas, now entirely associated, is determined 
by the rate of crude oil production, which in turn is governed by the 
export revenue consideration noted above. The significance of this 
lies in the fact that it is natural gas,rather than oil itself,which 
is critically important to industry. So far as this matter of national 
control affects industrialization, Qatar as a State now has total 
responsibility for balancing the various supplies to meet current demands 
i.e. for energy, feed stock, electricity and water, and against any 
--future planned development-of-industry. 
During Stages Two and Three of policy evolution, as outlined in 
Chapter 4, it was government policy towards public sector industrialization 
which completely dominated supply-side decisions. Qatar has now 
arrived at what was identified as Stage Four, and as with, for example, 
the production of industrial gases in the private sector, the role of 
government has now become one of encouragin~ or at least reviewing, 
likely or desired developments in relatively small scale private sector 
industries as well as those under its direct public sector control. 
Behind all such decisions lies the second basic fact, following from the 
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1977 oil asset control, that Qatar is now responsible as a State for 
financing all operations for exploitation although in processing it 
may arrange joint venture financing such as QAFCO and QAPCO. 
Forward planning, therefore, of any industrial policy can and 
now must become part of a coherent national economic, as Hell as 
developmen4 policy. This includes aspects of meeting desired social 
aims of consumption as well as determining production patterns. 
For sources of finance, Qatar, as already in some joint ventures, 
has turned and will be turning to the world-finance market in order 
to meet investment needs. Since now, however, it is a sovereign state 
which is negotiating for such finance and not a multinational company, 
Qatar has a different kind of leverage which can be utilized, not only 
in the procurement of financial backing for investment in the whole 
hydrocarbon field, but also in creating medium or long term marketing 
links. Most of the Gulf Emirates and Saudi Arabia have taken the 
opportunity, presented by their state ownership of major hydrocarbon 
resources, of entering into agreements which are commercially and 
financially integrated. This does, however, produce a historically 
abnormal si tua_t_ion in tJ:tat ~h_e Arab_9j,J_producing_ states r~rety _ 
negotiate with centrally planned economies such as the Eastern Bloc 
and mainly deal with non-governmental companies and organizations in 
countries such as Japan and Western Europe. The essential characteristics 
of such agreements is their conditionality, i.e. foreign investors arc 
welcome on condition that they also provide markets for Gulf products 
(see below for further examination of the implied interdependence). 
When the oil companies were essentially asset-owning agencies, 
their needs and wishes in terms of the manpower employed in the industry 
might very often be ncgot·iatcd with government, hut the companies' 
technical dcm;1nds tended lu he :·atpn:me. As :1 result the importation oF 
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foreign labour was very considerable. Now that Qatar is in complete 
control, it might be expected that a manpower and employment policy, 
which need not be totally dominated by economic and profit-making 
motives, might have incorporated measures controlling the origins of 
the work force in the oil sector. However, what the trends in employ-
ment seem to indicate is that the technical demands of the oil industry, 
as it has become a complex of exploration, extraction, processing and 
export, has not made it possible to reduce dependence on foreign 
manpower. This question examined in Chapter 9 appears as one which 1s 
not easily controlled even in a state-owned oil sector. 
The role of government in this context, as noted earlier, is not 
confined to the ownership but, as in neighbouring countries has been 
extended into the development of the hydrocarbon industrial sector 
(or as it is rather inaccurately called, the petrochemical sector). 
In many statements made, not so much in Qatar as in neighbouring 
Emirates and also in many theoretical studies, diversification of 
the economy away from crude-oil export is often seen in terms of 
movement into the processing of oil and gas. Diversification, if it 
rests solely or ma_!nly on ~!:t-~ __ process~!lg o:f ()ila_nd gas, ra_tb~r_ than on 
their export as crude or semi-processed commodities is dangerously 
deceptive as an economic planning objective. On the other hand, 
movement into hydrocarbon industries is structurally a natural 
progression for states with large oil and gas resources. The limited 
range of resource endowment, as noted in Chapter 2, has made it 
extremely difficult for Qatar and similar states to move into industrial 
investment in non-hydrocarbon fields. What is important, therefore, 
perhaps is that for more than intellectual purposes, a clear distinct ion 
is made between diversification based on multi-sectoral growth as 
opposed to diversification which is based on the translation of the 
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single hydrocarbon resources into other basic forms. Moreover, as 
considered later in terms of regional and Arab world co-operation and 
collaboration care must be taken not to exaggerate the capacity of 
either market complex to absorb the standard range of petrochemical 
products which Qatar and the other Gulf States are all no\v producing 
and whose production will be very rapidly increasing in the near future. 
Following what here has been termed Stage Three of industrial-
isation Qatar, as with neighbouring countries, now has to consider, 
above all, the market outlets for the products of any further basic 
hydrocarbon industries. Government policy has now established the 
basic platform of production, and merely to increase the level of prod-
uction of the same products e.g. fertilizer, lllJPE, etc. is to as!:»ume 
that unlimited markets for these exist. At the same time it has 
already become clear in statements made by both Saudi Arabia and the 
United States of America that even the further diversification of 
petrochemical products for export cannot be assumed to be acceptable 
automatically in specific world markets as opposed to a hypothetical 
global market (and see below). It should be noted here that in the case 
of Qatar the identification of market linkages has been an integral 
----
part of the approach both ih the discussion of forthcoming North Uomc 
gas exploitation as well as in the involvement in joint ventures with 
foreign companies who will serve as marketing agencies or market outlets 
in their own right. This is the reason why the integrated investment 
and commercial agreements referred to earlier are likely to remain 
standard practice wherever possible. 
The government's role in the public sector industries is thus 
increasingly becoming important in identifying and capturing external 
markets, given that, as noted below, the internal national market for 
a very great r;111gc of hoth pnbJ·ic and private sector industries js 
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limited in volume. The need for an external market drive is obviously 
very great, and certainly as far as the public sector industries are 
concerned, the government is now virtually totally responsible. The 
position as it affects the private sector is less clear and this 
together with relevant state policy is considered below. Whilst this 
role of market management is now looming large, the traditional and 
still basic governmental role is that of deciding on investment, according 
to various criteria which need not be purely commercial. This necessarily 
raises the whole question of economic and development planning as a 
coherent whole. 
As far as capital availability for investment is concerned, the 
government is in a strong position, as arc similar states which arc able 
to derive most governmental revenue directly from the major national 
income source i.e. oil and gas export. However, the balance between 
investment in manufacturing industries (and other viable production 
sectors) and expenditure on providing a whole range of goods and services 
ranging from social and cultural welfare facilities e.g. education, 
health etc. to basic infrastructure,places further responsibilities 
on government. We have recognised that much expenditure on infrastructure 
is, in part, investment for production, in this context in manufacturing. 
But this is a "grey" area i.n which the di sciplinc of control requires 
very considerable skills. For example, it is clear that a full cost-
benefit appraisal has not been undertaken for the construction of the 
road network in Qatar. 
Similarly, the supply of electricity and water is not only a matter 
of providing public utilities but also inputs to manufacturing. When all 
infrastructural capital costs and a large proportion of recurrent 
production costs,are met by a government revenue which is not raised by 
taxation or customer chargcs,it becomes difficult to distinguish 
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between wealth creating investment and expenditure for consumption. 
The place of private sector industries in this context has been indicated 
in Chapter 6 and is further considered below. 
Whilst the situation as so far analysed demonstrates that the 
government of Qatar has the economic dominance and capability necessary 
for full economic planning, Qatar has not proceeded to complete planning 
of the conventional five year plan type. Whilst an over-all strategy has 
emerged, this remains very much a matter of what is understood to be desirable 
and acceptable as opposed to a technocratic formulation in firm detail. 
Before leaving (at least in general terms) this vital theme of the 
role of government in industrialisation a further point of clarification 
is necessary. In this study it is not possible to explore the nature of 
government in Qatar or its neighbouring countries, but, in fact, the role 
of government in any economic activity can only be understood by reference 
to the way in which the form of government present has very strong roots 
'· in the cultural and social background of the people. This can mean that 
whilst, in this thesis, the evidence for government policy has had to 
be presented in a form which seems highly formaLized and institutionalized, 
it must be appreciated that, wh:i.lc much of the mach.inery of government 
is bureaucratic in appearance and often in function, the approach to uny 
planning strategy is more a matter of the evolution of an understanding 
between a relatively small group of senior Qataris. The place of the 
Amir, in this case, can become particularly important in deciding on 
various matters. Moreover, the question of social and cultural accept-
ability within the Qatari community for particular policies is something 
which is again a matter of personalized fceU ng transmitted by personal 
contact, rather than voting hy an electorntc. The quest·ion of social 
and cultural ncccptabi Lity leads the arwnncnt from the role of J~ov-
ernment as such tt'> another key .i ssuc, that of i ndustri al·i sat ion 
and manpower. 
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As noted in Chapters 4, 9 and further below, industrialization 
as it has proceeded so far has apparently required the very large 
importation of foreign labour of many different ethnic origins, 
mostly culturally alien to Qatar. Since this has had many social 
and cultural as well as economic consequences, this is now a factor 
which may, therefore, considerably influence government policy. An 
industrialization strategy now should include the search for industrial 
ventures which have smaller consequential demands for foreign manpower 
than those industries already established. Therefore, one has to 
recognise, before any identification»technical or market orientated~ 
of future industries, is the need for minimising the demand for labour. 
This is not simply a numerical matter but has to be seen to be qualitative 
in some specific ways. Since for the foreseeable future, young Qatari 
males will continue to have a wide range of choice of opportunities, 
one musttake into account the social acceptability of different kinds of 
employment, even at the managerial and supervisory levels. This is not 
a static situation but one socio-economic area of investigation could l>c 
to try to ensure, as far as possible, that the nominal demands for 
skilled manpower in any particular project does match what can be measured 
or predicted in terms of acceptability and attractiveness to future 
Qatari senior staff work force. 
A quite different question of balance often appears in many 
developing countries. 'l11at is the apparent conflict of social interest 
which can arise from attraction of automated advanced production and 
control systems where the supply of skilled manpower is limited, 
even though the potential numerical labour force is large and unemployment 
is common. This, then, develops into an argument over wealth creating, 
as opposed to job creating, industries. In Qatar this conflict does not 
arise since automated systems, even though they may mean technological 
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import dependence, could, in some cases at least, lead to lov;er dependence 
on imported manpower and possibly in time even on imported equipment, 
whilst at the same time being associated with technological management 
training of a modern kind. While there is no formal plan in Qatar for 
education and training, nevertheless, both from what was noted in 
Chapter 3 and proposed by the author, it has been made clear here the 
importance of investment by government in what may be called human 
infrastructure or human resources. The Third Plan of Saudi Arabia 
specifically makes such provision. 
Up to this point a great deal of emphasis has been placed on the 
role of government, particularly in public sector .industries anJ Jn 
manpower policy. The question has also been raised at several points 
concerning the possible desirability of coherent economic and social 
strategic planning. The place of private sector industrial activity in 
all of this, as has been noted, is not clear, because here one is not 
concerned with direct government investment or with areas such as 
education, health and communications in which government is now expected 
to be active. Private sector manufacturing in Qatar appears, in fact 
to exist in yet another "grey area". In economic terms the government 
has not provided much direct financial stimulus to private sector industry 
compared, for example, to Saudi Arabia. Only very recently has there 
been the provision of interest-free credit for industrial expansion 
or establishment (as noted in Chapter 4 ). On the other hand, through 
low transfer prices, the government has ensured that the private sector 
can obtain at least some inputs, at or below, their production cost 
e.g. electricity, water and, in the case of lED, the provision of 
developed land and at least basic utilities. Qatar would seem to be 
more or less in step with many other countries, including the indust-
rialized countries, in providing such support. 
Far more important, however, is the fact that the government has 
provided almost guaranteed markets, directly and indirectly, for the 
products of a large section of the small-scale industrial private 
sector. First a distinction must be made between consumer goods 
industrics,such as bakerics,where price controls are meant to protect 
the consumer,rather than the fixed support prices for the producers. 
Even so, the artificially low prices charged for Flour Mill products, 
are of assistance to some food industries. In the much larger field of 
construction materials, however, as long as the government supported 
large construction projects,there appeared to be an almost unlimited 
market open to private manufacturers of building materials. In fact, 
as experienced in 1977/78 and now in 1983/84, when the level of 
government expenditure on construction projects periodically declines 
this market appears by no means as safe as some producers had begun 
to assume. 
On the whole, therefore, it could be maintained that small-scale 
industries in Qatar are risk bearing to a much greater extent than would 
seem to have been the case if one relied only on the periods of rapid 
and apparently continuous growth i.e. 1973 to 77 and 79 to 82. As noted 
in Chapter 6, the response of entrepreneurs venturing into private 
manufacturing has been a combination of cautiousness and a development 
of techniques of risk-sharing through the more complex organisation of 
companies and the frequent involvement of foreign partners, legally and 
not so l,egally. Whilst the government can, to a very considerable extent, 
protect the public sector basic industries from the worst consequences of 
the small size of the domestic market by negotiating export outlets by 
exerting governmental leverage (see above) and through large-scale joint 
ventures, in the case of the private sector things are not so easy. 
Here the small size of the domestic market also makes reliance on 
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export necessary in many fields such as plastic goods, but the competition 
between private sector manufacturing, imports from industrialized 
countries, the import of re-exports from countries such as the U.A.E, 
and very likely in the near future from domestic manufacturers in 
Saudi Arabia, are discouraging much industrial innovation in the private 
sector. Here again, perhaps, there is a need for a total review of the 
nature and purpose of governmental assistance and encouragement both 
in the national sphere and in the regional Gulf sphere. In the private 
sector perhaps it is even more important, if Qatar is not to be totally 
government dominated in manufacturing industries, that bodies such as the 
IDTC should be employed in identifying particular types of manufacturing 
which could be attractive to private investors in these circumstances, as 
well as concerning themselves with the public sector. This again requires 
a more coherent and detailed planning of strategy and techniques. 
As far as public industries are concerned, the range of industries 
in which government investment has been made has been decided by a basic 
industrial approach modified by the realities of resource endowment. So, 
in Qatar as in virtually every other developing country, whether energy 
rich or not, one finds similar early trends, for example, in cement 
making, flour milling and some kinds of iron or steel making. In Qatar 
and its neighbours and also in other countries such as Indonesia, the 
special factor of resource endowment has led to investment in hydro-
carbon processing industries. This field, generally, in developing 
countries, however rich they may be, is beyond the financial and 
technological scope of private investors. Ministerial projects, as 
described in Chapter 8, are quasi-industrial, for example, electricity 
generation and water manufacturing, which import service provision, while 
part public utility, also have an element of manufacturing processing. 
The criteria which determine investment here are not economic generally, 
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but mainly social needs. When we look at SSI i.e. the private sector, 
this indicates how profit seeking private investors, with dominantly 
economic motivations, select sectors of viable manufacturing. Until 
1980 there was no industrial credit provision in Qatar, and even today 
very few capital grants or loans are made. So the situation is not 
obscured by the availability of cheap loan capital. In these 
circumstances, we find that the type of industries which have developed 
are much the same in Qatar, in some respects,as in other developing 
countries i.e. the early boom in building materials and the continued 
strength of industries supplying construction industries. 
What is striking, however, is that one sees in neighbouring Saudi 
Arabia that through the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF), 
established in 1974/75, there has been a massive and accelerating flow 
(1) 
of industrial lending. If one excludes the provision of capital to 
electricity generation and cold stores, which might be regarded as the 
equivalent of ministerial projects and notes that the basic heavy 
industries i.e. petrochemicals, are financed separately, the pattern of 
loan commitment indicates the type of requests for assistance made by 
potential industrialists in the private sector. If one, therefore, 
looks at the sectoral break-down of loans made by SIDF to the five 
identified sectors, one finds that, as in Qatar, the construction 
activity throughout has remained the dominant area of attraction to 
industrialists. The accumulative loans up to 1402 shows that 24.2 
per cent of loans were made to industries concerned with building 
products, 25.4 per cent made to cement making, and also much of the 
engineering products sector is concerned with steel structures for 
(2) 
industrial antl commcrc i.al hu i I Jj ngs. So, between S0-(,0 per cent of 
( 7.' loan value goes to the s:11nc sector. ·') 
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Therefore if we examine the small-scale industrial sector as 
representing the private sector, where the types of industries were 
dictated by the appreciation of economic opportunities by individuals 
and groups, then we have some idea of the way in which industrial 
activity of the conventional kind is developing. 
In the public sector one finds analogous conventional development 
around the basic heavy industries. What then is significant is that in 
totally different planning or ideological circumstances, as in for 
example, Algeria, in most developing countries, state investment 
has generally been made in the same type of basic industries. The 
private sector in Qatar has responded to market opportunities in \vays 
similar to those found elsewhere where a private sector is tolerated 
or encouraged. Such conventional developments seem to reflect 
the effect of forces which are of world-wide significance. The one 
important difference between the industrial structure of Qatar and the 
less rich developing countries is that the consumer industries which 
appear very strongly in the latter, such as footw~ar, clothing and 
ceramics, (apart from tiles and bricks) are not represented here. llcrc 
one is returned to points which dominate much of the analysis made 
here, i.e. the small size of the local consumer market and, of course, 
the free availability of cheap imports together with high disposable 
incomes. There is.of course.also an absence of a domestic resource 
base for such goods e.g. leather and textiles. 
Within the scope of this thesis it is not possible to develop fully 
a comparative analysis of general theory concerning why and in what 
ways forces influence the structural development of manufactures. 
Nevertheless it cnn be claimed that th·is first :integrated stuJy of 
manufacturing in Qatar makes it possible for further research to be made 
in relevant comparative studies. 
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A further theme of significance to contemporary and future 
industry in Qatar emerges from those already examined, that is the 
pattern which has developed in particular industries of joint ventures 
between Qatari and foreign interests. As noted in Chapter 6, Qatar, 
as with many other developing countries has found it necessary and/or 
worthwhile to enter into joint venture industrial agreements with 
foreign partners. Without joint ventures very few industrial projects 
would have been 9 or are 9 feasible, but the objectives of the two partners 
have to be reconciled and made as compatible as possible. The basic 
objective of the foreign partner, which invariably has been private 
sector business, is, of course, to maximise its returns over a short or 
a long period depending on its perception of the future. For Qatar there 
are other requirements which can not necessarily be stated in a financial 
balance sheet. Tho matter is not of course qu:i tc as simple as this :uHJ 
joint venture relationships have evolved over time. 1\t the beginning, 
negotiation between the two partners was strictly unequal, in which the 
only power held by Qatar was that of being the sovereign state concerned, 
while the foreign partner had most, if not all, the relevant technology, 
expertise, and experience in the specific field, management know-how and 
in most cases access to international markets. Slowly, but at an 
increasing rate, skills in negotiations, management and appreciation of 
the consequences of various elements in partnerships have been growing 
on the Qatari side. In each of the cases mentioned in Chnpter 6, it 
can be noted that terms of agreement increasingly became more favourable 
to Qatar and lessened the risk carried by the State. On the other hanJ 
there is also the question of identifying those foreign partners which are 
prepared to take a long view of their profitable involvement with 
enterprises in Qatar and those potential partners that are not solely 
insistent,directly or indirectly,on becoming the dominant partner i.e. 
by monopolizing the supply of equipment. 
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The characteristics of joint venture industrial projects are now 
and in the future will be of great importance to Qatar. The growing 
export dependence of public and private sector manufacturing in Qatar, 
reinforces the importance of the marketing contribution made by the.: 
foreign partner. This in turn has strengthened the Qatari drive 
for foreign partners with such commercial involvement and obligation 
to market Qatari industrial products as noted earlier. If, as considered 
later, new industries become more specialised, high value added, and of 
high technology, the choice of foreign partners becomes even more critical, 
particularly if there is to be a significant acquirement of skills by 
Qataris. 
As indicated earlier in this Chapter and in Chapter 4, industry 
in Qatar can be seen to be at a stage (Stage Four) where inter and intra-
industrial linkages,within and between the public and private sector, 
are now developing (see the conclusion to Chapter 6). Of critical 
importance to this development of linkages are the various studies 
commissioned during the 1970's from consultants such as Seret, and which 
were then studied by IOTC, which were specifically concerned with the.: 
1 . f . bl d f d . . d . ( 4 ) se ect1on o su1ta e pro uct areas or omest1c 1n ustr1es. In one 
final report there was published the identification of 98 potential 
manufacturing products from which a short list of 18 recommendations was 
drawn up. In fact, in commissioning these studies, Qatar has recognised 
the need for selectivity and is now apparently able to select particular 
industrial projects which would support or promote the national economy. 
However, an examination of these lists exposes some real problems. 
First, a comparison of the listed.suggestions with those contained 1n an 
(S) 
IBRD study of Kuwait economy as early as 1960 ·suggests that from the poi11t 
of view of conventional analysis, very little freedom of manoeuvre is 
available to Qatar. Table 10.1 shmvs that apart from items 11 to 13, 
which are concerned with petrochemical based plastic goods manufactures, 
Table 10.1 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Project Title 
Clay bricks and Products 
Sand-Lime bricks and Products 
Asbestos Cement sheets and Pipes 
Paper tissue conversion 
Paints (emulsion) 
Detergents(domestic washing powder) 
Biscuits 
Canning(pu1ses and fish) 
Packaging of oils and hydroge-
ration (GHEE) 
Toilet soaps,cosmetics and 
perfumery 
Thermo plastic goods 
PVC coverings 
Melamine from urea 
Dry cells 
Automative batteries 
Automative tyres and tubes 
I
. Window type air conditioners 
Electrical accessories 
- * does not exist. 
Source: Compiled by the Author from 
Summary Table of the 18 Projects 
Em loyees Required aw mater-
lof which "als lac-Total skilled lly av-
45 
66 
263 
47 
33 
:24 
56 
93 
74 
49 
156 
26 
76 
139 
96 
553 
206 
40 
and ilable 
!beyond 
37 
54 
111 
31 
19 
14 
20 
31 
41 
26 
78 
15 
52 
40 
37 
399 
90 
23 
]clay + 
sand 
Sand + 
lime 
Sulph. 
jresist 
ing cem-
ent (39%) 
Flour 
(23%) 
An.Fats 
5 to 10% 
LDPE(26%) 
i 
:urea 
Aver-
age 
Local 
Sales 
% 
100 
100 
20 
58 
80 
50 
75 
8 
43 
40 
15 
10 
0 
18 
20 
12 
66 
38 
Finance (1000 QR) 
Loan I Equity 
Total in-
vestment 
over a 10 
year per-
iod 
30,000 
20,000 
55,000 
10,000 
3,500 
8,000 
10,000 
10,000 
10,000 
10,000 
35,000 
8,000 
65,000 
15,000 
10,000 
130,000 
25,000 
5,000 
Capital 
Year 
c 1000 ____QlU 
25,088 1 59,230 
20,372 1 47,015 
42,012 1 105,302 
3, 334 
2,791 
5,988 
5,912 
13,440 
14,967 
8,965 
35,879 
6,949 
57,570 
5,493 
4,864 
124,637 
20,233 
4,893 
16,714 
9,306 
14,435 
18,566 
24,4 74 
27,261 
19,610 
72,593 
15,478 
124' 264 
25,275 
18,756 
271,279 
47,811 
10,122 
IDTC, Development of Light and ~1edium Industries in Qatar, Final Report, Serete, Qatar 1979, pp. IV 18-19 
Pay 
back 
period 
(years) 
10.0 
9.2 
5.5 
8.0 
4.9 
10.0 
7.2 
* 
- * 
4.3 
5.8 
8.4 
9.9 
9.6 
10.0 
* 
I 10~0* 
I 
(.N 
I-" 
1-' 
I 
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the two lists are almost identical. Second, the close similarity 
between the findings of two basically different studies, separated by 
over eighteen years of time,shows that not only Qatar but also its 
neighbouring Arab Gulf Emirates are, in fact, severely constrained in 
what can be done in manufacture, given, as noted earlier in this thesis, 
the dominant characteristic limitations of their physical and human 
resources background. Nevertheless however skewed may be the physical 
and human resource inventories of Qatar and its neighbours it is also 
true that they are immensely rich in hydrocarbon resources, and these 
are highly unlikely to lose their world market value even though demand 
prices may periodically fall. Therefore, a third problem appears, i.e. 
whether the various conventional studies commissioned for international 
consultants have been designed to give answers to the right questions.Onc rca-
son,perhaps why there is the need, in Qatar, for finding non-conventional 
answers to industrial development questions is that no major international 
agency or consultant has had sufficient experience in dealing with the 
unique situation of no more than four states in the world (Qatar, Kuwait, 
Bahrain and the U.A.E.). For the most part consultant advice is based on 
either the experience of already industrialized and diversified 
countries or of other developing countries whose characteristics are 
totally different to Qatar. An additional reason is that Qatar and its 
neighbours have themselves experienced very rapid changes in a short 
time, during most of which time oil revenue upward trends seemed to he 
permanently set. As a result there was no immediate need to identify 
anything other than conventional questions concerning directions for 
growth. 
Qatar and the neighbouring Emirates are, in many ways, unique. 
First, they are all virtually "city states" with a small population and, 
therefore, have highly urbanized, small potential work forces, and 
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limited volume domestic markets. Secondly, the only important natural 
resource which they have is that of hydrocarbon wealth which, as consid-
ered earlier in this Chapter,is both a source for revenue through export 
and a source of energy and raw material sources. Thirdly, Qatar and 
its neighbours are all in a position where the social consequences of 
the presence of large non-Arab non-Moslim populations have, in recent 
years, been recognised as becoming acute. Lastly, Qatar,as with all 
other Emirates,is necessarily tied into the international economic 
system and virtually nothing viable can be developed domestically without 
reference to international markets unless the states are prepared for a 
few decades to become autarchic. Therefore the question \·Jhich might 
very well be asked in Qatar is how to identify industries of a totally 
different type than those hitherto considered, i.e. non-conventional 
industries, based on rather different criteria than purely conventional 
accountancy economics. The aim would be to make a major jump into 
a new generation of industries with the following essential characteristics: 
a) Requirements for the smallest possible input of labour in absolute 
numerical terms. 
b) The employment creation must be of.jobswhich are in terms of 
social status and social and cultural acceptability attractive to 
Qatari males. 
c) Jobs for which a small number of Qataris could receive spedaJ 
high level technical and management training, as a deliberate 
creation of a Qatari elite. 
d) The products have to be identified in terms of reasonable forecasts 
of future world production demand and this requires long term market 
identification research of a specialized kind. 
e) Products must be of high value, and the processes in terms of 
material input requirement, should need little more than energy, 
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possibly some hydrocarbon products or the small range of other 
mineral resources available in Qatar, or a small range of 
specialised imported materials. 
So far, discussion has mainly centred on Qatar as a sovereign 
state, with its own specifically national concepts of industrial devel-
opment. The general issue of regional and/or Arab economic cooperation 
is considered later, but in the context of planned selection of future 
industrial growth in Qatar, the more restricted issue of regional 
competition is relevant here. 
Since 1983 a new measure of urgency has appeared over international 
industrial collaboration although it has not been reported in any of the 
published statements yet to come out of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
This emergency arises from the rapid coming on stream between 1983-1986 
of the enormous petrochemical production built up by SABIC in Saudi 
Arabia. The implications of this for the industrialized countries have 
already been reported, ranging from statements such as that of Donald 
Regan, in October 1983, pointing out that whilst there is no intention in 
the USA to raise tariff obstacles to the importation of Saudi Arabian 
petrochemicals, this position would only be maintained as long as imports 
were not subsidised or unfairly priced by Saudi Arabia. In another 
statement, in November 1983 the Managing Director of BP Chemicals estimated 
that by the late 1980's, 5 per cent of the world's ethylene output 
capacity would be located in Saudi Arabia. The Financial Times of U.K. 
in 1984 made it clear that the position and the industrial muscle behind 
the international competitiveness of Saudi Arabia petrochemicals will be 
a result of the use of very cheap feedstock - about 12 to 15 per cent 
of the average prices in Europe and America respectively. Additionally, 
SABIC's production units have as joint venture partners very powerful 
allies such as Mobil, Mitsubishi, Exxon and Shell_(G) 
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The financial, organisational and technical muscle behind SABIC 
is such that it will be very difficult for other newly emerging petro-
chemical producers to compete, and whatever is done, in terms of 
collaboration through the GCC, it is now a fact that this production is 
in being and more will shortly be coming on stream. This addition within 
some three years of an extra 5 per cent of world ethylene capacity, 
together with the growing sophistication of the Saudi production system, 
is something that will have both global consequences and consequences 
for Saudi Arabia's neighbours. 
What is here most relevant to the case of Qatar is that every one 
of the SABIC units will be exporting,for years at least, some 90 per 
cent of its production. The strategy for Qatar hitherto has been to make 
certain of market outlets for its public sector industries before 
deciding on investment. It would seem that Qatar will not be well 
advised to go further with mainstream hydrocarbon products. This is, 
first, because of the danger of market competition with its larger 
neighbour, and secondly, because in a fight for markets, Qatar could be 
forced into agreeing to arrangements which were certainly not profitable 
to Qatar. 
So far Qatar has been in a slightly weak position as also have been 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in that present petrochemical industries have 
been dependent on associated gas, and the availability of this depends 
on the rate of crude oil extraction. Saudi Arabia would seem likely 
to continue to be in this position for at least another decade. Qatar, 
on the other hand, could divorce its gas supplies from the rate of 
oil production by developing the North Dome offshore gasfield. This 
perhaps reinforces the point that Qatar, in addition to any regional 
collaboration, needs urgently to identify some specialised, non-mainstream 
hydrocarbon based inliustTl.al opportunitJes particularl.y suited to its present 
<lnd long-term wealth in unassoci.atcd gas. 
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Already demonstated is Qatar 0s particularly vulnerable position 
in regard to its small domestic population market and indigenous labour 
force. One has also noted the strength so far of a responsibly managed 
centralized decision-making system which has been associated with 
socio-political stability to a greater extent than that found in most 
neighbouring countries. In Kuwait, for instance, there are clearly 
major and powerful private economic interests which are not necessarily 
always in tune with national interest, the U.A.E is still a federal and 
not a unified state, Saudi Arabia has weaknesses as well as strengths 
in its great size and diversity. 
At the national level, perhaps, the most imn'lediate question for 
the future is h.ow private sector production is to be diversified 
viably, noting its export dependence; s~econdly the evolution of an 
effective manpower policy linked with the problem of immigration; 
thirdly, how the machinery of government, as applied to economic 
management, will continue to evolve. 
Over and above all this is the general issue of Qatar's economic 
relationships with its neighbours in the Gulf and the Arab world and the 
way in which, in the context of this thesis, there can be an identif-
ication of mutual interests in the industrial sector, which are best 
served by collaboration and co-ordination rather than competition. 
Regional and/or Arab cooperation in economic development in 
general and relating to industry in particular is a subject which on the 
one hand has been explored by many writers and analysts and on the other 
hand is of practical concern to ijatar and its neighbours. 
A somewhat confused situation has developed because most Arab 
writers concerned with the theme of industrialization in the Arab world 
as a whole tend to write from the point of view of non-Gulf nationals 
and are certainly not the people responsible for actual management 
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(7) 
decisions in the Gulf (see Chapter references). This is not the place to 
discuss questions on Arab unity or the function and effectivness of Arab 
League agencies, but most of the scenarios that come from recent writers 
on Arab industrialization appeared to adopt the formula of linking the 
financial and hydro-carbon wealth of the Gulf States with the development 
needs of other lands such as Egypt and Syria, very nearly a position in 
which the "have less' are indicating how the "have more" should invest -
for non-Gulf purposes. It does, of course, make general economic sense 
to argue that whilst the Gulf Emirates, acting individually, appear to be 
in a position of continuing dependence rather than one of increasing 
dependence, their freedom of manoeuvre would be enlargedif they reduced 
their individual freedom of action through collaboration and cooperation. 
However, more detailed examination suggests that regional and/or Arab 
collaboration are not enough. There are, perhaps, as Besseisu has 
pointed out, ( 8 ) several "circles" involved. One is that of the Gulf 
region, the second is the Gulf with its Arab neighbours, the third being 
the Gulf, its Arab neighbours and the international economic community. It 
can be suggested that much relevant Arab writing tends to exaggerate the 
way in which the first two circles can be isolated from the third, and 
equally important the willingness of the first circle to have its 
aspirations limited by the needs of the second. This self-isolating 
approach is by no means universal and other studies such as that 
of Besseisu suggest that: ( 9 ) 
" ... , even the Regional circle has severe limitations as 
illustrated by the limited factor imposed by Regional market on 
many industrial sub-sectors. All these factors tend to extend 
the motivation to co-operation outward to the wider international 
circle." 
It is suggested that this present study tends to confirm this 
view. Countries such as Qatar are exposed to a great range of advice 
and comments hoth from within the /\rab world and from outside. What is, 
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perhaps of more immediate significanceare the steps which Qatar and its 
neighbouring countries are taking in establishing formal relationships 
for the implementation of areas of collaboration, specifically in 
the industrial sector. 
It is significant that these poi.nts emerged at an OAPEC sponsored 
seminar held in Rome in 1981 and attended by most of the OAPEC and South 
European countries. (lO) If one examines the proceedings of this 
seminar one is reminded that in any discussion of Qatar's industrialization, 
one must never forget that Qatar is not a totally isolated unit. In the 
region discussed, as demonstrated in Table 10.2, it is clear that the 
component countries do not greatly complement each other in their 
industrial opportunities but rather are likely to compete.Whatever 
happens in the region as a whole or in other particular countries affects 
Qatar's decisions. 
The first actual agency created for promoting co-operation was the 
Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consulting (GOIC), established in 
February 1976 with its headquarters in Qatar. GOIC,which includes Iraq 
as well as the Gulf Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Oman,has been most active 
and carried out under its terms of reference (see Appendix60.l) the 
dissemination of published information and studies of industries such as 
glass fibre and carbon black production. The implementation· of 
recommendations so far has been confined to the expansion of ALBA in Bahrain. 
This relative slowness appears to arise because all recommendations for the 
specific siting of new industries raise problems of allocation between 
states of particular enterprises. For example, as far as Qatar is 
concerned,none of the listed projects such as the manufacture of carbon 
black, the glass fibre industry and glass making, were suggested to he 
located in Qatar. 
Table 10.2 
Country 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Libyan 
AJ 
Bahrain 
Iraq 
Kuwait 
Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia 
S~Tia 
UAE 
---- ---- ----
i 
Industrial 
Areas & Dev-
elopment 
Zones 
Arzew 
Skikda 
Algiers 
Alexandria 
Tanta-Talka 
Cairo-Helwan 
Abu Kammash 
Zuwarah 
Azzawiyah 
Misratah 
Ras Lanuf 
Jl.larsa El Brega 
Awali-Sitra 
Basra 
Shuaiba 
Umm Said 
Jubail 
Yanbu 
Horns 
Ruweis 
Jebel Ali 
Source: ENI Estimates 
I Refin-
ing 
X 
X 
X I 
X 
X 
I 
X 
X I 
X 
I 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X i I 
I j 
! X I 
X 
X 
i 
~lain Industrial Areas and Development Zones 
Petrochemicals Gas Iron 
I Proc- & 
Ethy- Ammon- I Urea Meth- essing Steel 
lene ia anol 
X X X X 
X X X 
(El Hadjar) 
- ----·-· --------
X X X 
X X 
X 
X 
X X 
X X X X 
X X 
X X X X X 
X X X X 
X X X X X 
X X X X 
X X 
! 
i X X 
I X X X 
! X X 
\ote Describes the situation variously between 1980 6 1982. 
Alum- Cement Note 
inium 
+ Aromatics 
:\eighbouring the Annaba 
area(cement,metal indus-
try,etc.) 
X + Light industry 
X + Light industry 
X 
Chemical complex 
X 
X 
Chemical complex 
+ Phosphate Fertilizers 
Further cement mills in 
Benghazi,Tri oli,Lebda 
X X 
X 
X .,. ~:inor industrial 
activities 
+ Cement at Umrn Bab 
X 
+ Phosphate Fertilizers 
X X 
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lfuatever the recommendations made on purely technical and 
commercial terms, decisions are ultimately only possible as a result of 
political agreement between the states concerned. This is why the 
establishment of the Gulf Co-operative Council (GCC) in 1979 and its 
~Vl 1982 
formulation of an economic agreement~became particularly important. 
Since its inception, the GCC has become a rapidly evolving organization 
which constitutionally has political authority. unlike GOIC. In the 
context of this thesis, the economic agreement (see Appendixro.2) 
becomes especially crucial to the future. 
In March 1984 the Advisory Council of Qatar gave preliminary 
approval on behalf of Qatar to the terms of the agreement and this now 
awaits ratification by the Amir. What now matters, therefore, is 
how not only policies directly concerned with industrialization but 
other policiespsuch as common tariffs and the movement of capital and 
people and even other, as yet unformulated policies which have been 
discussed e.g. concerning immigration, are formulated and accepted. 
There have been Ministerial meetings over a.griculture, marine and mineral 
resources in the GCC area as well as discussions over common currency and 
other matters which indirectly are of great significance to future 
industry in Qatar. 
On the whole, there should be some general benefit if the GCC 
confers some socio-economic political stability even more important 
today than it was 15 years aso, since this can encourage enterprise. 
But having said that, the situation could also be assessed as one in 
which Qatar stands to lose rather more than it has to gain in specific 
fields. This is partly because the small size of its manpower capability 
and the small size of its domestic market and partly because of the very 
considerable development in some commercial and industrial fields in other 
states, e.g. banking in Bahrain, finance in Kuwait and import/export trade 
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in Dubai. On any detailed evaluation it would seem that further mainstream 
industrialization in Qatar, even given maximum GCC collaboration, would 
not be expected to be, in practice, profitable to Qatar in the short and 
medium term future. It would seem that Qatar is still faced with the 
classic situation of having to find special market opportunities 
which have not yet been taken by its neighbours. 
So far, as has been shown, the policy of Qatar has been very cautious 
and selective w.ith regard to the exploration of areas of industry giving 
the most suitable returns at the most appropriate time. This policy 
could be even more important in the next decade or so. What one can 
perhaps assert is that to employ most effectively the most scarce resource, 
manpower, whether in industry or in other activities, and so to upgrade 
its indigenous human skills~provides the best long term guarantees for the 
future of Qatar. 
This last general point is also specifically relevant to the 
industrial sector. In the OAPEC seminar study referred to earlier, and as 
explicitly stated earlier in this concluding chapter, the need to explore 
new frontiers of science and technology for innovative fields of 
. d . 1 d 1 . " d(ll) h' h . h 1 . 1n ustr1a eve opment 1s express"e . In t 1s t es1s sue e.xp orat1on 
cannot be taken further but it is clear that Qatar's industrial future needs 
to he appraised in ways different from those pursued in the past. 
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I. Nama of the establishment and any 
subsidiaries. 
2. Date s'hrted operations and date 
naglstsred as company. 
A. B. 
3. V he &1"'811 lt1\ t d\ the estab I I shment 
oeCVjl!es 
I OCS't I c.n • 
Csq.m.> and 
4. Slnos ~!ng, has this establishment 
bssn:-
a. (nps~? b. Moved? 
c. ~lnded In sama place? 
5. If tha en~r Is Cal, why? 
6. If ths ans-r Is Cbl, 
~.t1hei"S ttere the previous locations? 
b. !thy did you move? 
7. If the ans~r Is Ccl, why? 
e_,.,._.i.J~ dS.r.JI~I -l 
~~ 6r.Jil:; aS'.;- .;.JicQ,;;.:;;I 6r,;\; -V 
-~ 
f::t;:>p 
_..,.. 
~~~~ r.sA-~' o.c.l\.dt ~r 
~ 
~,p&-Wi ~~~aS~.~ t~o&_~ 
~lb.,;;o~·- ..... -·~-~ 
-- v a:.JI_s,.6; ..:> ~ - "? 
q l,jbJ ..,..~ ~1.. ( 1) ..,..~ 0 \S'I..iD -o 
..,..~'lll.(..,..) ..... ~i:~iS'I..iD -"I 
~~ J>,WI~I vi! u,i-' 
- ~ll,jb.J_..,.. 
_l..iw;..,..t::-.,'))1., (-':") ..,..~0 i3'1..il_v 
8. 
9. 
Do you want tc move your establishment 
from Its present loeatlon. 
a. Yes b. ll!o. 
If CYes>, ~hy and tlhere do you want 
to movs? 
10. If <~l, tmy? 
II. Doss tlte =rlsl 11:anaga the 
establ!sh=an~ by himself? 
a. Ves 'b. IW. 
12. If (~)¢cas cne ot his tamlly 
manage the establishment? 
a. Yes b. ~. 
13. If (1\!ol, Is your Qanager 
a. Qatar! b. 1\:on-Qatarl 
14. Hotl many ~ioysss did the establishment 
have ~ started? 
a. Qatarl b.ll!on-Qatarl 
15. Have you provided any tacl lltles for 
your Bl<l!lloyaes? 
a. Yes ll. No, 
~ vo ~~~cl,i(_r JE; ..!\;!p.).n -A 
~~~Wl 
0~~..,.. ~-~ 
q l..iLd ~~) ..,..~G.,;..IE'0' -'l 
~ ~ v~..'\1-P ,.pu ~~ 
~ O..iW:i ~~ .... ~O.:,a'O.!>G=~ o 
~ '1£, p ~ oS' ~h,:-.c> il&J,o = u ~ 
c~~..,.. ~=~ 
11 J=-"" o ... ~.; o .Ao> GJ.v.O ,j.>J ~ ..,.. ~ o.,;.. \tl .!> o = t '? 
V l-..ap cl;j 'CS_rJO-.,...c-1:& 
0~-..... ~-~ 
u;~Z>.r.P- ..... 
~I.,..,..~Ou\C"I.,DO=O? 
Ul~- ~ pd1 J,D 
oS';.:,Ht b;D~I:..~i..ID .;.,IE~-~~ 
- V'<1_,.lr.D,r.P-.,.. - ~ -~ 
\' ~~"'-~C...D<>5rJDr~-~o 
~-..... ,-: -~ 
16. If <yesl, what are they? 
17. How many workers are I'\O'llt emp I oyed? 
0 N.Q. 
a. Admlnlstratlva s"taff __ 
b. Skilled 
c. Semi-skilled 
d. Unskilled 
\' ~w t~> ..... ~luiS'.i'-', 
~~llSrJiuP JW~ ~~-'~rS-\V 
.S~p cj~ ~ 
IS,; I .,o -~ 
~t.J,b~ 
.;Lb."'~-..,. 
.;-----& ~..~- .J) 
18. Which of the foll0::1lng do you pay employees ~~lu)l4-aJ.J.:;IJF.ll •~a ... :.'~lil.lfllb-1A 
In addition to their salaries: g~~Ju)I6H~~~ 
A. Social security 8. Insurance V11''6_..,.. ~,~?k:.:-ivl.-_ 
C. Retirement and saving fund w 4 .. ..1.!> _ J .r.h~ .b~-~ 
c. Medical services E. Ren1" or <Jlr---">'- 3 v5-,\u!-J~-.£:) 
houses. F. Other {pI e:~se I nd I cate. ( ..!ot J.c.:J 1 o a.,. .3 ) 
19. Can you give a rough estimate of 
employees travel ling to bark? 
a. less than ona km. 
b. I - 5 km 
c. 5 - 20 km 
d. more then 20 k!:l 
20. How many of yourQ atarl employees 
have been trained. 
21. 
a. In Qatar 
b. Outside Qatar 
How many of your Non-Qatar! employ~es 
have been trained: 
a. In Qatar 
b. Outside Qatar 
d~)\:' ..:..l_;.t ~ •l.b I cl:!s l!:.;,... ~ _ ~ ~ 
f3 ..&ii..UJ.Wi;uil.,.JI ~wJI6Db.lJ 
8 ..1-oJi~i 
..~.<>~~ U<>JiO -~ 
~u.J·<k>-~ V"- ..... 
~u.J'~vo-~ 
• ?. • A<t'i o u:u •IJ>p - ~ 
~J~.,rl-..m.ll ~.1.13~'( o 
L- I. . L::: • Q 
-r=" ~..,.._...,. -;+--..sf _i 
~.) .J.:; ..:n:t.rl-l ftAJ ~,S» ,J .t:J. rL 'l' l 
-.rl.D t::Jt.,;._..,.. -~uD-~ 
22. Which of the fol l~lng problems have 
been encountered to a significant 
degree In the labour force: 
a. leek of ski lied labour. 
b. leek of operational e~ertence • 
c. Hlch turno,~r of labour. 
d. Absenteeism. 
e. Holidays and leave 
f. Others (please Indicate) 
23. Is the bulldlt,g:. 
a. Personal property? 
b. Ren-ted? 
24. If (b), do you ren-t It from 
a. the Government. 
b. Privately. 
25. How much Is the rant? 
26. Was the bulld~ng built specially for 
the establlshmant? 
a. Yes b. Jllo. 
27. How many sq .m. tsara covered t:J?Ien 11" 
started? 
28. How far Is this establlshmant from 
Doha City Q:l'l're? Roughly. 
29. Has this establishment obtained any 
loan from tha foll~lng sources? 
a. Bank b. Governmen-t sources. 
c. Elsewhere? (please Indicate) 
30. If the loan was obtained from a bank 
please Indicate whlc~ bank, 
85';-:JH.~.;•~-~ c;;'lln~~~ J 1.:,, •• 11~1~'1 7 
g JU,, .. ,j!.:l~rJJ ~lt ~·rJI/ 
o.,K<' J ~· .J~j f o!J> - ~ 
~ilp.J~' f.\0 ..-. 
J b..oJ IV"~~~~ Q ~ .t:;> 
";-' Q,;JO- .I 
..,;.~~~~-~ 
l,(l~~.$~ = .lJ 
~ ~_,..:Ji &~~ ='iJ? 
IPQ,;. ~ ~ ~ 
.JI~~~~";o' 
'i' ..,..~'))~ (..,..) "':-'~ ,;,15'0JO =H 
19~yf>ov:.H ~= ~ .p~i.bi'~-'7' 
~~~ .)~-':'<! ~0 sA rS = "l 0 
~0srf"c5.rJJ ~~~ L.a.a~J,Ji -n 
"' • g ~-..,.. r~' 
'l !(: b:;; ~' ~ as .;-kl b L...o o.=.; 13' evo ..r r5 - <J v 
iJ~.;,:J5.1" ~8-.-o,rJI;bS;•~•Ji ~~ ="JA 
o ....,_j:Jlt ~ JJU 
vo j>_j c.ll ~uP ~·.rJOtbSrJI o..:.J.ru,...}..f. ='i q 
~=~ 
~~- ...... 
( -'.1~1 .,..,..), clJ.i,r-D~~ 
~.'>--'..:.~1 J.....,o 0 
'll_ ..... 
1..< ;ii<, • ..U.- r-1 u ~ = \' 0 
f O..:W~ 
,...,..... -
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31. If no loan ~as obtained did you Invest 
your 011n money? 
a. Yes b. No 
32. t:lhat Is the maIn product of the 
estab II shiilsnt? 
33. ~at other products do you sell? 
3.1!. t::hsre do you dIspose of your 1:1aste 
caterlals? 
35. Oo3s the establishment sell the final 
product through Wholesalers? 
a. Yes b. No 
36. If so. ~:~here arethe ~:~holesalers? 
~~~ .:a.s. r-' fT"!' u.!!:.., uo ..P)'l.llv i!I.H -r ~ 
s-,...•s-JIJ'i$.rJ.l~;JI~l\:;; "ll~ lo -'f 'i 
'65.,..:JIY J,~.p.JI ..sr> ":ileJ-Ii~b -'f'i' 
k=0.s=JIJ9!rJU...:.~tt~.C.: uo~V=l'-n 
'l o..i>_,$..1l 
u . ., ... n • ..:..t~' eS.rJ' ~ ...J,A ~v o 
)l_...,.. f"""'-~ 
q ~J,~.al~~~~..,..::f"'b uo ~n 
:n. if not. hot~ do you market your products? d:;~ ~~~~JJS';'lll~rJ IJI -'fV 
38. Doss your establishment have a deposit 
eooount ~:~lth a bank? 
~9. In ~lch area do you market the 
product? 
40. What fuel Is used? 
a. Electricity b. 011 
c. coal d. Gas 
e. tlOod f. Others (please 
Indicate) 
~1. ~~at Is the annual consumption of 
tuel and energy (In quantltyl 
J ff 1-'j ..:..l, 1\.....c. &..--•.s.Ji/ eS_,..:JJ ..J,A- .'1 A 
'r~J 
'l!_...,.. f'"""'-1 
6-,...0~1/7$~1~~ I ~ ~·I.;,JI..s \,o? -'f" 
o-·~~~~rJU..J J -· ..JI, ~~~ b -Ito 
t;;~ J,o.;J,_..,.. ·w -~ 
;!;;- ..J ~-.&;> 
..sr>~- ..ll ~-.R 
~ ~~ ·~.J) 
#1uos~~~~'li1Wyfbb -t' 
~ 6.iiW~ 
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42. Ho1:1 do ypu obtain your fuel and 
ert3rgy? 
43. ~at percentage of the rat~ materlat 
~lch rou use In your establishment 
Is f~ ~~ follo~:~lng sources? 
a. loeal darlvatlon. 
b. elss'.:JMire In Qatar. 
c. abi"'Sd • 
'? ~IIJJ~~~y;b~l Fto..i:JJ= \!.1 
~ t?Ji .,;,~W,!~U~I ~'6 =ll.l? 
• -~ ~'lii.J-' L.:,JI~V-:> 
_.Ji; t,;p ~ ":" ~ = ~ 
~w~~=..!?> 
44. t:llst 1$ tM source of tho Important I!Ji,.;~~~C,t.JI .,;,\bllbJI.b.JJ b~'6 =1!. \l. 
rot~ t:mwarlals? C-<=0~U/£,S'~~ 
45. Can ~ Indicate tile sort of rat~ 
ma"''a!rials tl'hlcll you use? 
~~w.JO<.d~WU~~~.::;~~ =ll.o 
"D-=0s:JD/ 'CS'~I 
46. Do you 11se materials manufactured by 
oi11011" icctoll"les In Qatar? 
}r:5e) """.l&o .J\]y ~ ~ =1!. '\\ 
~=""' ~=~ 
a. Ves b. No 
47. If (Ves>. iron, ~hlch factories? q ~~~":"~'lf\b: ~~~ ~~~~U,j~=\l.'V 
48. Do you use ~ater? ~o~i;'65rJ~~ cltrJD J-,n· ~!JA =~A 
'lf_.,. ~~~ a. V<as b. No. 
49. If (Yes>. for tJIIat purposs? ~j>~'ll..,..~'ll~ (~b ..,..~lulilDJD=<!.\1 
a. for cleaning. b. for pwecesslng c,\l;$ ="l"' ~-~ 
as ra~ r.lBter·lat. c. ~or cooling • ..:..)!~~~= J ~="? 
d. for drlnlldng or other purposes ( .P.!...d>) UJ.;bi 
please Indicate 
50. t:l'lat Is itlG annual consumption of 
~:~ater? 
'? ObJQY<' u>~~~~'lfO~gr!!lb ="' 0 
il. What ~:~as 'lt!e reason( sl for your estab I I shment' s .:5 _,..:.lJ ~I I.U,.J J..,:.t..l~ "-'~I,_ 0 \ 
location? \' a-·~ 1. 
a. Availability of the marl<.et? .Ub...o.J'&-~ ~D #- ~ 
b. Labour supply? 4:-~~.&Jio.::..l,.a,D.._ ,J t.DUJt_....,. 
c. Pmler .·~~~~'.J'li~-.A 
d. City amenities and services. Jli.;J I~~.)~-!) 
e. The cost of land and building <!!.Jj.r.J>-"""" ~ ~-J 
t. ConvenIent transport. 
g. Personal choice. 
h. Other (please Indicate) 
i2, tlhat kind o¥ ~hlnery do you use and 
the capacity? 
f i..q.:IDU,~urJI.,;;il.JDe_~D~\b- oV 
~u \..:l,,J,b a...J~~~-~ 
~ Cal!acf~ 
a. Steam Eng I os 
b, 011 
c. Electricity 
d. Wind 
e. So I ar Energy 
f. Gas 
g. Other 
i3. ~ do you repair your machlne(sl~ 
i4. Hot~ do you obtain The spare parts? 
a. From local marl<.et? 
b. From abroad? 
i5. Do you Th I nl<. you t:10u I d get the same benet Its 
It the fact-ory ~:~as est~bllshed In another 
area and t1hy? 
a. Yes b. No 
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i6, Do the limiTed facilities of electricity _;·~·wr, •t,~~.J,,_._,i j2~DJ,A_ o, 
and ttater supply affect your establishment \' ~-·,, •. llfiS_,...;.l~u;b 
site? 
57. By tthat means Is the ratt material 
transported to the establishment from '6-·~ 1/~,r:JJq-Wl.,~l 
abroad? 
a. Road b. Sea c. Air. 
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58. Does the establishment deal with: -: ,j'llivol.ll1: ~ C-=0s=''t'i3.r=JD .. H.:.; J,.n,- oA 
a. Agriculture b. Machinery u~i- "'? .;,;iLJI_ '":" eol.u-H-~ 
59. 
c. Hotels d. Construction 0.J~D- ;; J~;H~..!b o.:..~l!hJi_ J 
e. Transport f. Trade ~1.:! .. 6..Ji.J~L""" .P~~.,~~D-J 
g. Import and Export ·~~.,~- l.ll ..:..l.:'i~l:,.,:.':l~~j. 
h. Food I. Wood and furniture. o~~- J ~~~r~i=<!EJ 
j. Building n.aterlal { -\l~i •u,..J) l.ll~C 
1<.. Livestock I. Others (please 
Indicate) 
At ~hat educational level are the 
establishment's ~~~kers: 
Literate 
Kutab 
Elemsntary 
Tochnlcal 
Preparatory 
Secondary 
University 
~ non-Qatar I 
~·~i/;.S~IJ~~yJ~iu;~~~ ~ lil 'II 
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~1= ~ 
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60. Does the estab I E shmant !lave a spec I a I vS-J , .... .....,;,.., .) ~ 8 '6-= 0-?li fil5' _,...:J i IS cnJ ~ = 1 o 
place for workers and t1here? f J~i 
~- '":" r-~ 
61. Does the establlshment train the ~<Jorker~ Jlb....JI...,.,.,.;~ ~·~ltc5'r.Ji f~ -1 ~ 
on Its property'? ~ ~..,.. f=""'- ~ 
a. Yes b. No. 
I 
t..l 
N 
0\ 
I 
-----------------------------------------------------------62. Is the establishment an agency for other 
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64. Is the establishment H.Q. and does It 
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66. 
67. 
Do you do contract work for: 
a. Governmen-t b. Any other Industry. 
Why did you Invest your money In this 
particular field? 
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market before starting? 
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a. Yes b. No 
Ho~ did you choose your employees? 
Is there c tes"t or period of training 
employees must pass before starting? 
a. Yes b. No 
To ~hat extent does the location 
affect ~ price? 
72. Are there any problems In marketing 
your proo~ctlon? 
a. Yes. b. No 
73. What Is your suggestion to solve these 
pronlems? 
74. Who is res?Qnslble for transporting the 
fin1sned p~ctucts? 
a. The fcc~ry b. The wholesaler 
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a. Yes b. No 
76. If (No), ~hy? 
77. Does the estab ll.shment have a shIft 
system? 
a. Yes b. No. 
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companies practicing the same 
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Its operations. 
82. How many telephone lines does the 
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APPENDIX 4.1 
DECREE - LAW NO.lO OF YEAR 1974 CONCERNING THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE QATAR GENERAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION 
Article (1) 
A Public corporation of independent legal personality shall be 
established to be called "QATAR GENERAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION". 
Article (4) 
The objectives of this Corporation shall be to engage in all 
phases of oil industry in Qatar and abroad, including exploration and 
drilling for oil, natural gas and other hydrocarbon substances, production, 
refining, transport and storage of the aforementioned substances, and 
any of their derivatives and by-products, as well as trading in, distribu-
tion, sale and export of these substances. 
Article (5) 
To achieve its objectives, the Corporation may carry out the 
following:-
1. Establishment of companies either on its own or jointly with others. 
2. Acquisition of or participation in existing companies. 
3. Contracting with other companies or bodies which practice works 
similar to its own or which may help achieving its objectives. 
The Corporation may also participate in any manner with such 
companies or bodie~ ~_or_ may purchase_ ()r ann·ex them. 
4. To carry out all legal disposition that would be necessary for the 
Corporation to perform its operations properly. 
Article (6) 
1. The capital of the Corporation shall be one thousand million 
Qatar-Riyals which shall be paid fully by the State of Qatar. 
2. 
The decision of payment shall be issued by the Council of 
Ministers in accordance with the proposal of the Minister of 
Finance and Petroleum. 
As of the effective date of this Law the share of the State in 
the Companies mentioned hereunder shall revert to this Corporation 
A. Qatar Petroleum Company Limited. 
B. The Shell Company of Qatar Limited. 
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C. The Arab Maritime Petroleum Transport Co. Ltd. 
D. Arab Petroleum Pipelines Co. (SUMED). 
E. National Oil Distribution Co. 
F. Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard Co. 
4· Subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers, all 
future petroleum exploitation relating to the objectives of 
the Corporation whether owned wholly or partly by the State 
shall be affiliated to the Corporation. 
Article (9) 
1. The management of the Corporation shall be conducted by a Board 
of Directors which shall comprise between seven and eleven 
members including the chairman and his deputy. They shall be 
appointed by the Amir. 
The Board of Directors shall be responsible for conducting 
the affairs of the Corporation before the Council of Ministers. 
The Amir may appoint one or more full time managing directors 
from among the members of the board. 
3. The Board of Directors shall exercise all the powers required 
for the management of the Corporation. Its decisions shall be 
effective as from the date of their issue. As an exception, 
the decisions relati~g to the following matte~s shall not 
be considered effective until approved by the Council of 
Ministers:-
A Internal or external loans obtained by the Corporation. 
B The establishment of companies by the Corporation on 
its own or with others or participation in existing 
companies. 
C Exercising by the Corporation of the operations of search 
and exploration for oil and natural gas. 
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Article (10) 
The Council of Ministers shall have the right to issue general 
directives to the Board of Directors regarding the measures 
to be taken on matters related to public interest. 
Article (24) 
The auditor shall submit his annual report to the Amir, and a 
copy thereof to the Board of Directors. 
Article (29) 
Law No.l3 of year 1972 establishing Qatar National Oil Company is 
hereby repealed. 
Issued in Doha Palace 
On 14.6.1394 A.H. 
Corresponding to 4.7.1974. 
Khalifa Bin Hamad Al Thani 
Amir of The State of Qatar 
APPENDIX 4.2 
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LAW N0.(3) OF 1973 FOR ESTABLISHING THE 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT TECHNICAL CENTRE 
We, Khalifa bin Hamad, Al Thani, the Amir of the State of Qatar. 
After perusing the amended Provisional Basic Ordinance, particularly 
Articles 23, 34 and 51 thereof, and Law No. (5) of 1970, determining the 
power of Ministers and specifying the jurisdictions of Ministries and other 
Government establishments and Laws amend·ing it. 
And the Proposed-Law submitted by the Council of Ministers. 
And after consulting the Advisory Council. 
Have decreed the following Law: 
Article (1) 
A governmental establishment called 'Industrial Development Technical 
Centre' shall be established. This establishment shall be directly 
responsible to the Amir. 
Article (2) 
The object of establishing this Centre is to lay down industrial devel-
opment plans for the State and to supervise their execution after being 
ratified. 
Article (3) 
To realize the object of its establishment, the Centre shall be 
concerned in: 
1) preparing industrialization plans and projects to utilize the State's 
natural resources in conformity with its revenues and requirements, and 
to carry out studies of the economic and technical advantages of 
such projects. 
2) proposing the extent of the State's participation with the private 
sector in joint industrial projects. 
3) participation, with the governmental bodies concerned in planning 
availability of Qatari manpower, training projects, services and general 
utilities connected with the technical development of the State. 
4) preparing statements and technical specifications required for 
invitation for tenders for industrial projects due to be executed 
and studying tenders submitted and carrying out negotiations in 
participation with other governmental parties concerned in preparation 
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of the relevant contracts necessary for implementation of the 
said projects. 
5) following-up the execution of approved industrial plans and 
projects in co-operation and co-ordination with the government 
establishments concerned and supervising the handing over of the 
projects to the parties responsible for their operation. 
6) preparing detailed and analytical follow-up reports on national 
industries in which the State participates, stating the extent of 
success achieved and the obstacles which have been met and 
putting forward recommendations to overcome them. The Centre should 
extend technical advice to companies undertaking these industries 
as well as other national companies belonging to the private sector 
whenever possible. 
7) co-ordinating co-operation with foreign bodiesp regional and 
international organizations, and taking part in world conferences 
relating to industrial development and following-up decisions 
and agreements concluded in this respect. 
8) collecting technical, statistical and economic data needed for the 
preparation and study of industrial development plans and projects 
in the State. 
9) following-up economic, scientific and technological activities 
world-wide in the industrial field. 
10) studying statements, -reports and projects passed on to it by 
Ministries and other governmental establishments as well as-any-
studies, reports or projects made available in the field of 
industrial development. 
11) whatever the Arnir decides to refer to the Centre in the way of 
matters relating to the realization of the objectives for which 
the Centre is established. 
Article (4) 
The Centre shall submit all its reports to the Arnir, and the plans 
and projects submitted will not be considered operative unless they are 
approved by the Arnir. 
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Article (5) 
The Centre shall undertake its studies of industrial projects 
directly through its experts and/or through consultant experts contracted 
for this purpose as and when required. 
Article (6) 
The Centre is formed of technical experts, whose appointment 
shall be by an Amiri decision. The Centre will have a Director selected 
from among these experts who will administer the Centre in addition 
to his work as a technical expert. 
Article (7) 
The Centre shall lay down the rules for the exercise of its 
functions and an organization plan with the posts required for the 
discharge of its responsibilities. These rules shall be decreed by 
the Amir. 
Article (8) 
The Ministries and other governmental Establishments shall co-
operate with the Centre, and will provide it with what they have 
available and whatever statements, studies, report and statistics 
relating to industrialization projects and industrial development the 
Centre may ask for-
Article (9) 
Any provision contravening the provisions of this Law shall be 
considered void. 
Article (10) 
All parties concerned, each within its own competence, shall 
execute this Law and it will be published in the Official Gazette and 
become effective as from the date of its publication. 
Issued: 
19th Safar 1393 
24th March 1973 
KHALIFA BIN HAMAD AL THAN! 
AMIR OF THE STATE OF QATAR 
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APPENDIX 5.1 
QATAR OIL CONCESSION 
This Agreement was made on the seventeenth day of May 1935 
Article First : The Sheikh grants to the Company to explore, 
to prospect, to drill for and to extract and to ship and to export and 
the right to refine and sell petroleum and natural gases, ozekerite, 
asphalt and everything which is extracted therefrom, which shall hereinafter 
be called "the Substances". If the Company discovers, in the course of its 
investigation and general activities, any minerals other than the Substances 
mentioned in the first article, e.g. gold or iron oxide or any other 
minerals, it shall not be justified to appropriate the same, but must inform 
the Shaikh of their discovery; and the Shaikh shall have full right to, 
and absolute control, over those minerals which have been extracted and he 
shall be free in granting concessions for the extracting of those minerals 
to any Company or Companies or to dispose of those minerals in any manner 
he considers to be consistent to his interests 
Article Second : the Company can operate in any part of the State 
of Qatar ..• but it will not operate on places such as religious lands, 
cemeteries, lands occupied by religious buildings or by essential enterprise 
by their owners as may exist on the date of the signature of this 
Agreement. 
The period of this Agreement shall be seventy five years from the 
date of its signature 
Article Third: ... the Company shall employ all customary and 
proper means and shall carry out the examination by methods agreeable to 
the modern Scientific knowledge. 
Article Fourth: ... the Company shall pay to His Excellency the 
Shaikh the following payments during the period of this Agreement namely: 
(a) On Signature 
(b) At the end of each year of the first 
five years from the date of Signature 
(c) At the end of the sixth year from the 
date of signature and at the end of 
every year which follows it until the 
end of the Concession. 
Four Lakhs of Rupees, 
Rs.400,000 
One and a half Lakhs of 
Rupees. Rs. 150,000 
Three Lakhs of Rupees. 
Rs. 300,000. 
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(d) When the Company wins oil and saves it 
into Storage it shall pay royalty on the 
Substances, in accordance with the des-
cription of Article First, as follows:-
(1) On all the substances ... except 
asphalt, ozokerite and natural 
gas per ton, at the rate of. 
(2) On asphalt and ozokerite 
the rate of. 
at 
(3) On natural gas produced and sold 
per 1000 cubic feet at the rate of. 
Three Rupees. 
Rs .3/-
One Rupee Eight Annas. 
Rs. 1/8 
Two Annas. As. 2 
Article Sixth : The Company may construct, maintain and operate 
roads and telegraph and telephone installations and their lines and 
wireless stations, railways, refineries and the ordinary ports situated 
at Doha for importing its materials ... And the Company has the right 
to choose the port which may be suitable for exporting its substances. 
Article Seventh : The Company has no right to acquire lands 
occupied by the enterprise of the owners thereof and also houses, places 
and lands which their owners decline to sell or to rent; and excepting 
these, it does not matter to use (other lands) if occasion arose. 
Article Eighth : The Company may take any quantity of water which 
it may require for its operations, free of charge, on the condition that 
this will not cause any loss or damage to any of the inhabitants. 
Article Ninth : The Company- can take any earth, mud,- gravei 5~ 
lime, gypsum and stone and other similar substances which it requires 
for its operations, free of charge. 
Article Tenth: ... the Company shall have the right to import ... 
all equipments and goods required by the Company or by its employees for 
its operations and it shall have the right to export its Substances 
and their derivatives ... without Customs duty or import duty or export 
duty or tax or any other duty .... And the Company and its operations, 
incomes, profits and properties shall be exempt and free, during the period 
of this Agreement, from all the present and future Taxes of any kind 
whatsoever. 
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Article Fourteenth : The Shaikh has the right to cancel this 
Agreement in the two cases mentioned below 
(A) If the Company fails to pay the sums 
(B) If the Company is in default .... 
Article Seventeenth : The labourers employed by the Company must 
be from amongst the Shaikh's own subjects or from amongst those approved 
by the Shaikh, excepting technical employees and the managers and clerks 
whom the Company may require and whom it cannot find in the country 
(Sgd.)Sheikh Abdullah Bin Qasim Al Thani 
Ruler of Qatar 
On 14.2.1354 H 
CorTesponding to 17.5.1935. 
(Sgd.) C.C. Mylles 
On behalf of the Anglo-Persian Oil Co.Ltd. 
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APPENDIX 5.2 
THE GOVERNMENT AND SHELL COMPANY AGREEMENT 
Article 1 
"Concession Area" means ... (i) all the seabed and subsoil 
which fall within the jurisdiction of the Sheikh ... (ii) any and 
all islands, islets, shoals and bars. 
"The Substances" means crude oil, asphalt, ozokerite and 
natural gas and everything which is extracted therefrom. 
Article 2 
1. The Sheikh grants to the Company for a period of 75 years 
from the 6th day of August 1952 
(a) the sole and exclusive right within the Concession Area to 
explore for, drill for, develop and produce the Substances, and 
(b) the right within the Concession Area and elsewhere within 
the State of Qatar to transport, dispose of and export the 
Substances. 
2. In the exercise of the right specified in clause l(b) above the 
Company will have due regard to the prior rights of Petroleum 
Development (Qatar) Ltd. under the Agreement dated the 17th day 
of May 1935 corresponding to the 14th day of Safar 1354. 
Article 3 
On the date of signature of this Agreement the Company will pay to 
the Sheikh as consideration for the execution of this Agreement the sum 
of £231,976 sterling. 
Article 4 
As from the 6th day of August 1952 the Company will pay to the 
Sheikh an annual rental, at the rate of £75,415 sterling, per annum 
up to the date of commencement of regular exports of oil, and at the 
rate of £37,707 sterling per annum thereafter until the termination 
of this Agreement. 
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Article 6 
1. The Company will pay to the Sheikh royalty as follows:-
(a) each ton of exported oil •.. four shillings and 
six pence sterling. 
(b) each ton of asphalt or ozokerite ... two shillings 
and three pence sterling. 
(c) each 1,000 cubic feet of natural gas ... two and 
one quarter pence sterling. 
2. No royalty shall be payable by the Company in respect of the 
Substances used within the Concession Area or elsewhere within 
the State of Qatar. 
Article 7 
1. The Company will pay a taxation commutation of sixpence sterling 
per ton of the Substances exported ... hereof in consideration of 
which the Company will be entitled 
(a) to import free of all import customs and other duties ... 
whatsoever required by the Company or by its employees 
for its operations. 
(b) supply and export shall be free of all export 
customs and other duties. 
(c) to exemption ... from all taxation. 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of _clause 1 (~) of _thi_s Art_icle the 
Company shall not be exempted from liability to Qatar Income 
Tax in respect of any year or part of a year after the Date of 
commencement of regular exports of. oil. 
Article 8 
1. The Company undertakes that as from the date of commencement of 
regular exports of oil the Sheikh shall receive 50 per cent of 
the oil Profits. 
Article 9 
0 
1. The Border Value ... of crude oil of 40. A.P.I. is eighty-two 
shillings and three pence sterling per ton. 
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3. The cost of Exported Oil shall be ascertained by sound and 
consistent accounting methods as follows:-
(a) By determining the total of all costs and expenses of the 
Company ... Such costs and expenses shall consist of: 
(i) Operating expenses and overheads, 
(ii) amortisation of survey exploration and development costs 
at a rate not exceeding 15 per cent per annum until such 
expenditure is fully written off. 
Article 12 
The Company shall have, without hindrance, all reasonable rights and 
facilities within the Concession Area and elsewhere in Qatar for the 
purposes of its operations under this Agreement including (but not 
limited to) 
(a) The right to build, construct, maintain, operate and use all 
types of buildings, installations, staff facilities, 
communication and transport systems and engineering works of 
every description. 
(b) The right to use free of all payments to the Sheikh earth, 
stone, sand, gravel, lime, gypsum, clay and similar sub-
stances and water that may be available and may be required 
for its operations provided always that the inhabitants of 
Qatar shall_n~t thereby be deprived of their usual require-
ments of these materials, that irrigation is not prejudiced, 
that no land, habitation or watering place for animals is 
deprived of a reasonable supply of water and that the water 
supply of the inhabitants is not endangered. 
Article 20 
1. The Company will place requests with the Sheikh to provide such 
labourers as are required bwt the Company has the right to decide 
as to the qualifications and suitability of any such labourers 
for a particular job. 
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industrial activities all over the city. In the 1960°s commercial and 
economic, rather than personal reasons, became more effective in 
influencing the location of manufacturing enterprises. This may be 
attributed to : a) the accelerated growth of population and income 
which produced a larger effective market, particularly during the 
second half of the 1960's, b) the increasing local perception of 
opportunities and growing commercial and financial sophistication, and 
c) the growing economic attraction of central city sites for manufacturing, 
spatially associated with growth of activity in the old markets 
produced by a) above. 
The attitudes in the sixties, therefore, led to more concen-
tration of industries in and surrounding the old market centre. By the 
early 1970's this process had created an annular zone of commercial 
and manufacturing activity along concentric streets and roads, together 
with a "spoke" development along radial roads. This was a more or 
less spontaneous spatial development of the classical urban model 
developed by Berry. Because of governmental action to re-develop the 
city centre, beginning in the early 1970's, many small scale industries 
began to move from the centre to Fariq al-Najma along one of the 
radial spokes, especially those concerned with iron working, aluminium 
fabrication, and carpentry. These activities and other services had 
spontaneously created in Fariq al-Najma an unplanned market called 
Souq al-Haraj, or what can be called loosely a spontaneous estate. 
This was followed by the planned creation of an extra-urban estate, the 
Industrial Estate of Doha (I.E.D), which here is examined in terms of 
its planned function as an industrial estate. 
The plan 
IED is the official name of an area of governmental owned land, 
developed and subdivided into plots of different size, with provision 
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APPENDIX 10.1 
GOIC AGREEMENT 
The objectives 
The objective of the organization is to achieve 
industrial co-operation and co-ordination among the member 
states and, toward that end, the organization shall undertake 
the following. 
1. Collection and publication of information about industrial 
development projects and policies. 
2. Provision of proposals concerning the establishment of 
common industrial projects among the member states. 
3. Provision of recommendation for reconciliation between 
industrial development projects. 
4. Co-ordination and development of technical and economic 
co-operation among existing or planned industrial 
companies and establishments. 
5. Provision of technical assistance to prepare and ~yaJuate 
industrial projects. 
6. Preparation of statistics and studies concerning industry. 
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APPENDIX 10.2 
SUMMARY OF AUTHOR'S TRANSLATION OF GCC ECONOMIC AGREEMENT 
Chapter 1 Trading Exchange (Articles 1 - 7) 
Allowing the import and export of national products* free from 
custom duties, whilst the memper countries work towards a fixed 
uniform customs duties for imported goods from the outside world. 
The most important purpose of this Chapter is to create joint neg-
iation power for the member countries against foreign countries in the 
fields of exports and imports. 
Chapter 2. Transfer of Capital and People and Exercising Economic 
Activity (Articles 8 & 9) 
The member countries to agree on 
1. Freedom of movement between work and residence for citizens 
2. Right of possession, inheritance and trusteeship for citizens 
3. Freedom for exercising economic activity 
4. Freedom for the movement of capital 
Also to encourage the private sector to establish joint venture 
project(s) 
Chapter 3. Development Co-ordination (Articles 10 - 13) 
To co-ordinate the development plans, especially of hydrocarbon 
industries. At the same time to distribute industries among them 
iT!_ ~c~~r£l~nce to relative advantages __ ~n~-- ~e~;~.sibility studies. 
·chapter- 4. -Technical co;...operat:ton- ---
To encourage scientific and technological research as well as the 
setting up of policies for vocational and training programmes to 
suit the development requirements. 
Chapter 5. Transport & communication. 
Chapter 6. Capital and financial cooperation 
* 
To co-ordinate in unifying investment legislation. 
The national product, as defined in the agreement is of not-less than 
40% of the added value from local sources, and at least 51% of the 
establishment assets owned by the citizens of the member countries. 
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